Terrorism

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Terrorism
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Overview

• Inter vs. Intragovernmental War
• Rationality of Terrorism
• Religious Radicalism and Violence

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Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• Intergovernmental
• Traditional state vs. state conflict
• Symmetrical in that have to formally equal
  entities (states)
• Advantage goes to defense

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Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• Intragovernmental War
• Encompasses everything from coups detat to
  revolutionary movements
• Asymmetrical
• Advantage goes to offense

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Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• They differ also on the objective
• In intragovernmental war, the aim is for the
  anti-government forces to forge an alliance with
  a significant third party group within the country

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Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• In domestic violence...the essence of the
  conflict is the appeal to third parties. The
  direct action of the opponents upon each other,
  particularly in coups detat, remains important,
  but the decisive characteristic of the struggle
  is the effort to gain the support of those who
  initially are neither friend nor foe
  (Huntington, p. 490)

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Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• Anti-government forces, being in the minority,
  need to
• persuade a majority of the population to
  acquiesce, if not actually support the group, or
• persuade a significant (important) elite group to
  join the cause

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Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• The counterelite attempts to win the target
  group through terrorism and persuasion. In the
  normal intergovernmental war violence is
  directed primarily against the enemy it is a
  means of reducing his numbers and of undermining
  his will to resist...

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Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• In the initial phases of a revolutionary war,
  however, the counterelite directs its terrorism
  and violence primarily against the members of the
  target group. The aim of the violence is not to
  eliminate the forms of the government but to win
  the members of the target group (Huntington, p.
  494)

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Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• Terrorism is a weapon, however, which is
  effective not against the strong but against the
  vulnerable. Though sporadic murders and bombings
  would never suffice to destroy the forces of the
  government, they may suffice to win the active or
  passive support of the target group (Huntington,
  pp. 495-96)

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Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• To succeed, the revolutionary group needs a
  secure base of operations
• Given the aims of the revolutionary group,
  negotiation makes little sense
• Negotiation will be perceived as weakness and
  simply further embolden the recruiting and
  propaganda efforts of the anti-government forces

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Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• The decisive aspect of revolutionary war thus
  is the struggle for the loyalty of the vulnerable
  sector. In a sense, the war is conducted like an
  agonizing and bloody electoral campaign. If the
  counterelite can establish and maintain itself as
  the leader of the alienated sector, it has won
  its battle (Huntington, p. 500)

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Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• On the other hand, if the revolutionary group is
  unable to maintain itself, then violence is going
  to continue as it struggles to gain that upper
  hand or until it is eliminated

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Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• The more detached a government is from the
  society disrupted by revolutionary war, the more
  able it will be to surmount these obstacles
  i.e., of running counter to traditional ideas
  and established interests...

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Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• Obstacles for success include
• division in opinion in the home country for
  support of the war
• over reliance on the challenged groups in order
  to fend off the revolution

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Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• Revolutionary war is most likely in a society
  occupying an extensive territory and divided
  between different communities and races in which
  one group predominates in the government
  (Huntington, p. 501).

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Logic of Terrorism

• Not all political insurgent groups resort to
  terrorism
• Not all revolutionary groups resort to terrorism
• So, when does terrorism become the chosen mode of
  political warfare?

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Logic of Terrorism

• Note, the logic of collective action would
  suggest that terrorist groups should not form
• Why should a rational person become a
  terrorist, given the high costs associated with
  violent resistance and the expectation that
  everyone who supports the cause will benefit,
  whether he or she participates or not?
  (Crenshaw, p. 511)

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Logic of Terrorism

• Conditions for terrorism to become rational
  choice
• Weapon of the weak
• Raises question of what is the basis for the
  weakness?
• majority of population does not share ideological
  commitments of the group
• failure to mobilize support successfully or
  effectively
• repression nullifies recruitment and mobilization
  efforts

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Logic of Terrorism

• No matter how acute or widespread popular
  dissatisfaction may be, the masses do not rise
  spontaneously mobilization is required
  (Crenshaw, p. 514).

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Logic of Terrorism

• Rationality of terrorism (continued)
• time constraints (impatience)
• optimism for prospects of success
• Sources
• changed circumstances in the target regime
• practices in target regime increase its moral and
  political vulnerability
• new resources coming into the group

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Logic of Terrorism

• Given the preceding, what is the cost/benefit
  calculus for terrorists

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Logic of Terrorism
Costs
Benefits
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Religious Violence

• That cost/benefit calculation is further
  disrupted by the introduction of a religious
  element into the calculation
• Religion adds
• moral certitude and/or rectitude
• absolutism
• transhistorical dimension

A satanic enemy cannot be transformed it can
only be destroyed
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Religious Violence

• In some cases religious activists have been
  prepared to wait for eons -- and some struggle
  have not been expected to be completed within
  human history they must await their fulfillment
  in some transtemporal realm. There is no need,
  therefore, to compromise ones goals in a
  struggle that has been waged in divine time and
  with the promise of heavens rewards...

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Religious Violence

• There is no need, also, to contend with
  societys laws and limitations when one is
  obeying a higher authority. In spiritualizing
  violence, therefore, religion has given terrorism
  a remarkable power (Juergensmeyer, p. 525).

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Religious Violence

• If violence becomes an attractive option for some
  groups, then how should governments respond?
• Is violence (a war on terror) an option?

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Religious Violence

• The war-against-terrorism strategy can be
  dangerous, in that it can play into the scenario
  that religious terrorists themselves have
  fostered the image of a world at war between
  secular and religious forces. A belligerent
  secular enemy has often been just what religious
  activists have hoped for. In some cases it makes
  recruitment to their causes easier, for it
  demonstrates that the secular side can be as
  brutal as it has been portrayed by their own
  religious ideologues (Juergensmeyer, p. 533).

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Religious Violence

• Unless certain of ability to eliminate the
  threat, then probably not a viable strategy for
  success
• conditions for certainty
• threat is easily recognizable minority
• threat is contained in specific geographic area
• willing to engage in total war effort over
  potentially many years

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Religious Violence

• If cant eliminate threat, then second option may
  to try to alter the cost/benefit calculation by
  increasing the costs of participation in
  terrorist groups
• May help dislodge some of the fringe members of
  the group, but unlikely to work against the
  hardcore believers at the heart of the group

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Religious Violence

• Violence wins
• Peace possible if the terrorist demands are met
  and the target regime concedes
• Remove religion from politics
• Likelihood of that seems limited though
• Try to take the high ground and demonstrate own
  commitment to moral (if not religious) principles
  (e.g., the rule of law, democracy, etc.)