Missile Defenses for Stability in Europe

1
Missile Defenses for Stability in Europe

• Baker Spring
• F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security
  Policy
• The Heritage Foundation
• Vienna, Austria
• February 19, 2008

2
President Bushs National Security Strategy
March 2006

• Yet the first duty of the United States
  Government remains what it always has been to
  protect the American people and American
  interests. It is an enduring American principle
  that this duty obligates the government to
  anticipate and counter threats, using all
  elements of national power, before the threats
  can do grave damage.
• Damage Limitation Strategy

3
President Bushs National Policyon Ballistic
Missile DefenseMay 20, 2003

• The contemporary and emerging missile threat
  from hostile states is fundamentally different
  from that of the Cold War and requires a
  different approach to deterrence and new tools
  for defense.
• Building on previous missile defense work, over
  the past year and a half, the Defense Department
  has pursued a robust research, development,
  testing, and evaluation program designed to
  develop layered defenses capable of intercepting
  missiles of varying ranges in all phases of
  flight.
• Because the threats of the 21st Century also
  endanger our friends and allies around the world,
  it is essential that we work together to defend
  against these threats.

4
Global, Layered Missile Defense System

• Global Scope
• Layered Defense
• Different Missile Ranges
• Different Basing Modes

5
Global Defenses

• U.S.-based Defenses for the Protection of U.S.
  Territory (e.g. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense in
  Alaska and California
• Defense of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad (e.g.
  Patriot PAC-3)
• Defense of U.S. Allies and Friends (e.g.
  Aegis-based defenses on ships)

6
Allied Cooperation (Examples)

• Great Britain (Fylingdales radar)
• Denmark (Thule radar)
• Germany (MEADS)
• Italy (MEADS)
• NATO (Defenses against shorter-range missiles)
• Israel (Arrow)
• Japan (Aegis systems)

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NATO and Missile DefenseU.S. Department of State
Fact SheetApril 16, 2007

• NATO has focused its missile defense development
  efforts on countering shorter-range threats.
• The United States and NATO efforts are
  complementary and could work together to form a
  more a more effective defense for Europe.

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Components of the Global Missile Defense System

• Patriot PAC-3
• Standard Missile-3
• Standard Missile-2 Block IV
• Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
• Defense Support Program Satellites
• Upgraded Early Warning Radar
• Sea-Based X-Band Radar
• Aegis AN/SPY-1 Radar
• Cobra Dane
• Japan-based FBX-T Radar
• Patriot AN/MPQ-65 (PAC-3) Radar
• Global Command and Control Structure
• Future systems

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European Sites

• Midcourse X-Band Radar in the Czech Republic
• Transportable Forward-Deployed X-Band Radar in
  Caspian Basin (For Analytical Purposes)
• 10 Ground-Based Midcourse Interceptors in Poland
• Protecting Europe and the U.S. Against
  Longer-Range Missiles

10
The Damage Limitation Strategy

• Protection Over Retaliation
• Reassuring U.S. Allies
• Reduce to an Absolute Minimum the Likelihood of
  an Attack on the U.S and Its Friends and Allies
  with Weapons of Mass Destruction
• Lessen the Incentives for Other States and
  Non-State Actors to Acquire Nuclear, Biological,
  and Chemical Weapons and the Means to Deliver
  Them
• Limit the Impact of Attempted Attacks

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The Damage Limitation Strategy and StabilityThe
Link to Missile Defense

• Target Driven Force Posture
• Offense-Defense Mix
• Timely Engagement
• Adaptive Force

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Stability and the Nuclear Games Exercises

• Proliferated Environment (7-Player Game Design)
• Regional Settings (Global Option)
• Differing Levels of Vulnerability
• Diplomatic Options (Formal and Background)
• Force Posture Options (Offensive and Defensive)
• Disarmament Option (Not An Arms Control Exercise)
• Detailed Study on Nuclear Games Exercises is
  Available at www.heritage.org/upload/NuclearGames.
  pdf

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Nuclear Games ExerciseTokyo, JapanAugust 9, 2006

• Player Descriptions Are Derived from an
  AbstractSetting Based on East Asia
• Player A North Korea
• Player B South Korea
• Player C China
• Player D Japan
• Player E Taiwan
• Player F Russia
• Player G The United States

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Opening Moves

• North and South Korea both hedge their bets by
  shrouding readied weapons.
• Japan moves to disarm, but only after seeking
  defenses and protection under the U.S. nuclear
  umbrella.
• The U.S., seeking to reassure its friends and
  protect its own position, readies its offensive
  force and fields defenses for itself.
• To realize its nonproliferation goals, the U.S.
  offers defenses and nuclear guarantees to other
  players that disarm.

15
North Korea SeeksLarger Power Sponsorship

• North Korea proposes an alliance with China and
  Russia.
• While North Korea is rebuffed on the alliance
  offers, its relationship with China remains
  friendly.

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Initial Adjustments

• China and Russia move to ready their offensive
  weapons.
• U.S. and Japan enter into an alliance.
• South Korea lifts its shroud and holsters, as it
  sees China and North Korea holster and obtains
  defenses from Player G.
• North Korea lifts its shroud and holsters on the
  basis of its confidence in its relationship with
  China.

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Divergent Tracks

• Japan, Russia and the U.S. see North Korea as too
  unpredictable and move to isolate it by
  downgrading relations.
• South Korea and Taiwan, seeing Japan not
  adversely affected by its decision to disarm,
  disarm under the U.S. nonproliferation offer,
  while Taiwan even seeks non-hostile relations
  with China.

18
Russia Moves Toward the West

• Russia sees its security enhanced by joining the
  U.S. in seeking the disarmament of all the lesser
  powers and joins a great power condominium with
  the U.S. for that purpose.
• Simultaneously, Russia moves to improve relations
  with South Korea, Japan and Taiwan.

19
China Isolated

• China offers closer relations to Russia to break
  the great power condominium, but the effort
  fails.
• The U.S. and Russia enter a full-blown alliance
  and Russia obtains defenses.
• The U.S. and Russia later move together to
  threaten China over its refusal to disarm.

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North Korea Refuses to Disarm China Looks to
Back Down

• North Korea refuses combined U.S./Russian demands
  that it disarm and faces an imminent threat of
  destruction at the hands of both.
• China moves to holster, but not disarm, and seeks
  non-hostile relations with Taiwan and improved
  relations with Japan in an effort to avoid being
  attacked.
• A combined U.S./Russian attack remains possible.

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Lessons Learned

• The presence of the U.S. nuclear deterrent
  remains essential to stability (deterring North
  Korea and China) and a force against
  proliferation (through reassurance to allies).
• The ability and the willingness of the U.S. to
  provide defenses contribute to stability and
  nonproliferation goals (Japan, South Korea and
  Taiwan disarm).

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Lessons Learned-Continued

• The U.S. finds nuclear-armed allies a risky
  proposition and will work to seek their
  disarmament through close security relationships
  that include nuclear guarantees.
• Both U.S. and Russia are tempted by a great power
  condominium to lessen the nuclear risks to
  themselves from the lesser powers.

23
Lessons Learned-Continued

• New nuclear powers are likely overestimating the
  value of nuclear weapons, (made evident by the
  North Korean equivalent players refusal to
  disarm despite an imminent threat of
  destruction).
• New nuclear powers do not have well developed
  doctrines regarding the use of nuclear weapons,
  which may simultaneously carry great risks for
  miscalculation and conflict and unexpected
  opportunities for disarmament (inherent
  volatility).

24
Lessons Learned-Continued

• It is possible for Japanto forgo nuclear
  weapons.
• The Japan equivalent player demonstrated that
  Japan can maintain its security without nuclear
  weapons in a proliferated setting (example to
  others).
• It required a strong security relationship with
  the U.S (maintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance).
• It required an effective nuclear deterrent by the
  U.S.
• It required defenses.

25
A New Design of the Nuclear Games Exercise

• European/Middle East Regional Setting (Iran,
  Israel, Czech Republic, Poland, United Kingdom,
  United States)
• Partially Proliferated Environment (Two Players
  Lack Nuclear Arsenals)
• Initial Offensive Forces Differ (Nuclear Players)
• Initial Diplomatic Relations Differ

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Conclusion

• Nuclear Games Validates the Damage Limitation
  Strategy
• The Need to Protect and Defend Over Retaliation
• Multilateralizing Mutually Assured Destruction
  Will Lead to Instability
• Policymakers Can Use the Nuclear Games Tool to
  Familiarize Themselves with the Requirements for
  Stability in a Multi-polar Environment