Crisis Decisionmaking, Disaster Response, and Emergent Networks

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Crisis Decisionmaking, Disaster Response, and
Emergent Networks

• PADM 523 524 Summer 2010

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Characteristics Defining a Crisis

• Crises are defined as situations involving
• Threats to major valueshigh organizational and
  personal stakes.
• Time urgency time pressures.
• Ambiguity or uncertainty.
• Surprise or uniqueness.
• Insufficient information.

• 1. Jerrold M Post. 1993. The Impact of
  Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers, in
  Avoiding Inadvertent War, ed. A. George. Boulder
  Westview Press.
• 2. Alan Dowty. 1979. U.S. Decision-Making Under
  Stress 1973, International Political Science
  Association.
• 3. Irving Janis and Leo Mann. 1977. Decision
  Making A Psychological Analysis of Conflict,
  Choice, and Commitment. New York The Free Press.

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Crises and Crisis Management

• Crisis situations are by definition novel,
  unstructured, and well outside of an
  organizations or individuals customary
  operating framework.
• Crises require nonprogrammed decisional
  responses.
• Crises are highly uncertain and complex
  situations.
• Crises are characterized by an overload of
  incomplete, conflicting information.
• The process of perceiving, selecting, and
  processing this information is critical to
  effective crisis management

Reilly, A.H. 1993. Preparing for the Worst The
Process of Effective Crisis Management.
Industrial and Environmental Quarterly. Vol. 7,
No. 2. Page 118.
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THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN CRISIS
MANAGEMENT (Source Reilly, A.H. 1993. Preparing
for the Worst The Process of Effective Crisis
Management. Industrial and Environmental
Quarterly. Vol. 7, No. 2.)
CRISIS ATTRIBUTES

PROBLEM SENSING
CRISIS OUTCOMES
EVENT PERCEPTION
PROBLEM/THREAT DIAGNOSIS
CRISIS MANAGEMENT
DECISION RESPONSE EXTERNAL INFORMATION FLOW
DECISIONS AND ACTIONS
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION RESPONSE ACTIONS
INTERNAL INFORMATION FLOW
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Tasks of the Crisis Decisionmaker

• Define the principal elements of the situation
• Maintain receptivity to new information
• Identify and adequately consider the major
  values, interests, and objectives to be fulfilled
• Search for and evaluate alternative courses of
  action
• Estimate probable costs and risks of alternatives
• Seek new information pertinent to assessment of
  options
• Discern relevant/important from
  irrelevant/trivial information
• Consider problems that arise in implementing
  options
• Assess the situation from the perspective of
  other parties
• Resist both defensive avoidance and premature
  closure
• Monitor the developing situation and make
  adjustments.

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Characteristics of Defective Decisionmakingin a
CrisisDecisional Dysfunctions

• A truncated and compressed time span, with much
  more attention paid to the immediate consequences
  of action than to long-range consequences
• A perceived requirement for decisional
  closurei.e., rushed decisionswhich may in turn
  lead to premature action or, conversely,
• A tendency toward defensive avoidance, e.g.,
  procrastination
• Cognitive rigidity, a tendency to maintain a
  fixed mind-set and not be open to new
  information diminished creativity.
• A tendency to reduce cognitive complexity and
  uncertainty
• A reduction of the range of options considered

Jerrold M. Post. 1993. The Impact of
Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers, in
Avoiding Inadvertent War, edited by A. George.
Boulder, CO Westview Press. Page 475.
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Defective Decisionmaking

• In considering options, a tendency to bolster,
  that is to overvalue and overcommit to factors
  favor the desired action prescription and devalue
  and set aside factors militating against that
  desired course of action.
• A tendency toward faulty historical analogies
• A tendency toward the fundamental attribution
  bias To see the others actions as being
  precipitated by internal (psychological) causes
  rather than external circumstances (example my
  adversarys actions show that s/he is
  malevolently out to destroy us, rather than that
  s/he responding to external threats
  demonization, caricature.
• With sustained cognitive conflict and increasing
  value conflict, there is a tendency toward the
  emotional loading of chosen options Choices are
  often rationalized by such statements as We've
  run out of options, when in fact good options
  remain to be considered.

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PERFORMANCE/STRESS CURVE
Source Post, Jerrold M. 1993. The Impact of
Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers.
STRESS
PERFORMANCE
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Decisionmaking Patterns

• Vigilance follows a methodical, high-quality
  process to objectively collect available
  information, thoroughly consider it, search for
  other possible options, and make a well reasoned
  decision.
• Unconflicted adherence continuing with the
  current situation.
• Unconflicted change following the last advice
  received.
• Defensive avoidance avoiding decision making.
• Hypervigilance The Inability to distinguish (or
  discern) the critical or crucial from the
  unimportant equal attentiveness to all stimuli
  undifferentiated scanning leads to a vacillating
  approach.

Source Fink, Steven. 1986. Crisis Management
Planning for the Inevitable. New York Amacom.
Pages 133150.
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A Definition of Groupthink

• a mode of thinking that people engage in
  when they are deeply involved in a cohesive
  in-groupmembers striving for unanimity override
  their motivation to realistically appraise
  alternate courses of action a deterioration of
  mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral
  judgement that results from in-group pressures.

Source Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. From
Group Think to Teamthink Toward the Creation of
Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing
Work Teams. Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8.
Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis
(Boston Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 9 in
Groupthink.
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Antecedent Conditions for Groupthink

• Primary A moderately or highly cohesive group.
• Structural or administrative faults in the
  organization in which the group exists,
  including
• Insulation of the group.
• The group leaders preference for a certain
  decision.
• A lack of norms requiring methodical
  decisionmaking procedures for the group.
• Homogeneity of the group members social
  background and ideology.
• High stress from external threats with low hope
  of a better solution than the leaders
  solutionbased in turn on over-reliance on the
  leader and his or her framing of situations.
• Relatively low levels of group self-esteem, often
  induced by the groups perception of recent
  failures, excessive difficulty of current
  decisionmaking tasks, and moral dilemmas (for
  instance., apparent lack of feasible alternatives
  except ones that violate ethical standards).

Source Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. From
Group Think to Teamthink Toward the Creation of
Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing
Work Teams. Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8.
Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis
(Boston Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Pages2 and 3.
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Symptoms of Groupthink

• Direct social pressure placed on a member who
  argues against the groups shared beliefs.
• Members self-censorship of their own thoughts or
  concerns that deviate from the group consensus.
• An illusion of the groups invulnerability to
  failure.
• A shared illusion of unanimity.
• The emergence of self-appointed mind guards that
  screen out information from outside the group.
• Collective efforts to rationalize.
• Stereotyped views of potential adversaries
  outside the group.
• Unquestioned belief in the groups inherent
  morality.

Source Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. From
Group Think to Teamthink Toward the Creation of
Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing
Work Teams. Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8.
Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis
(Boston Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 3.
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Correlative Symptoms of Defective Decisionmaking

• Incomplete survey of alternatives.
• Incomplete survey of objectives.
• Failure to examine risks of preferred choices.
• Failure to reappraise initially rejected
  alternatives.
• Poor information search.
• Selective bias in processing information at hand.
• Failure to work out contingency plans.

Source Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. From
Group Think to Teamthink Toward the Creation of
Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing
Work Teams. Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8.
Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis
(Boston Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 3.
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Decisional Limits in Disaster Response

• Research shows that while authority, leadership,
  and accountability are necessary in any event,
  collaboration functions better than
  over-centralized command and control approaches
  in major crises (Drabek McEntire, 2002).
• Complex disasters necessitate decentralized
  decision making structures and collaborative
  networks of exchange and support. A decentralized
  network will often emerge in the post-event
  environment of a large-scale disaster. The
  challenge is to maximize collaboration and
  communication across that network.
• Disasters disrupt the patterns of what can be
  absorbed by routine procedures. As Tierney (2002)
  states, these types of events are largely defined
  by the need for improvised responsesbut not
  entirely improvised. Rather, emergent
  organization shapes responses based on a
  combination of experience improvisation.

• Drabek T. E. and D.A. McEntire. 2002. Emergent
  Phenomena and Multi-organizational Coordination
  in Disasters Lessons from the Research
  Literature. International Journal of Mass
  Emergencies and Disasters. August, 22(2),
  197-224.
• Tierney, K.J. 2002. Lessons Learned from
  Research on Group and Organizational Responses to
  Disasters. Paper presented at Countering
  Terrorism Lessons Learned from Natural and
  Technological Disasters. Academy of Sciences,
  February 28 March 1

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Incident Management Systems

• A generic term for the design of ad hoc
  emergency management teams that coordinate the
  efforts of more than one agency under a unified
  command (p.1)
• A functional management system that integrates
  personnel from different home organizations
• Involve identification of an incident manager or
  unified management team when jurisdictional areas
  or responsibilities overlap
• Standard terminology facilitates cooperation
  (although some minor regional variance remains)
• Rules for chain of command, unity of command, and
  span of control
• Protocols for communications and flow of
  information
• Emphasis on logistics planning and centralized
  resources allocation
• Planning functions on an equal level with
  operations and logistics functions

Christen, H., P. Maniscalco, A. Vickery, and F.
Winslow. 2001. An Overview of Incident
Management Systems. Perspectives on
Preparedness. Executive Session on Domestic
Preparedness. No. 4 (September).
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Emergent Organization in Disaster Response

• Even with IMS in place, disasters evoke emergent
  responses.
• Emergence is likely when members perceive a
  present threat, when the social climate is
  supportive of emergence, when social ties are in
  place at least to some degree before the
  mobilization, when the social setting legitimizes
  the groups, and when resources are available
  (Quarantelli et al., 1983).
• This is so given that major disasterscatastrophe
  sinvolve situations where
• Most or all of the community built structure is
  heavily impacted...and the facilities and
  operational bases of most emergency organizations
  are themselves usually hit
• Local officials are unable to undertake their
  usual work role, and this often extends into the
  recovery period
• Help from nearby communities cannot be provided
• Most, if not all, of the everyday community
  functions are sharply and concurrently
  interrupted
• The mass media system, especially in recent
  times, socially constructs catastrophes even more
  than they do disasters
• Because of the previous five processes, the
  political arena becomes even more important
• Therefore the level of emergence
  necessary to contend with these severe and
  unanticipated conditions is likely to be greater
  than would occur in more typical disaster
  situations.
• Quarantelli, E.L., with K.E. Green, E. Ireland,
  S. McCabe, and D.M. Neal. 1983. Emergent Citizen
  Groups in Disaster Preparedness and Recovery
  Activities An Interim Report. Newark DE.
  University of Delaware, Disaster Research Center.

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Emergent Networks

• Emergent Multi-Organizational Networks (EMONs)
• The structure of relationships that form among
  organizations, or segments of organizations, that
  are focused on a specific activities or response
  functions (Drabek, 1996 21-11)
• Form during the emergency period for a limited
  time in order to address emerging needs
• In catastrophic events, EMONS are often
  simultaneously comprised of a range of
  established, expanding, extending, and emergent
  organizations.
• Emergent organizational networks are defined as
  such not necessarily because they are comprised
  of emergent groups, but because of the newly
  formed relations between organizations
• Drabek, T.E. 1996. The Social Dimensions of
  Disaster. Washington, DC Federal Emergency
  Management Agency.

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Emergent Groups Benefits and Challenges

• May be able to act more quickly as they are
  outside of a formal bureaucracy
• May have a better pulse of what emerging needs
  are as they connected to emergent systems and
  networks
• May meet needs unidentified or not being met by
  formal systems

• May not be governed by the same standards or
  systems of oversight as formal organizations
• May have less of a feel for emerging needs as
  they not necessarily part of the formal network
  where certain information is directed to
• May generate overlap and compete with existing
  systems
• May be characterized by unclear leadership
• May have unstable definitions of tasks and roles

Drabek, T.E. and D.A. McEntire. 2003. Emergent
Phenomena and the Sociology of Disaster Lessons,
Trends and Opportunities from the Research
Literature. Disaster Prevention and Management,
12(2) 97-112.
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Role of Personal Convergence in Emergent Groups
and Networks

• Personal or people convergence involves the
  influx of people to areas associated with the
  disaster milieu (Kendra Wachtendorf, 2003
  Fritz Mathewson, 1957).
• - Fritz, C. and J. H. Mathewson. 1957.
  Convergent Behavior A Disaster Control Problem.
  Special Report for the Committee on Disaster
  Studies. National Academy of Sciences,
  Washington, D. C.
• - Kendra, James M., and Tricia Wachtendorf,
  2003. Reconsidering Convergence and Converger
  Legitimacy in Response to the World Trade Center
  Disaster. Terrorism and Disaster New Threats,
  New Ideas (ed. Lee Clarke). Research in Social
  Problems and Public Policy (11), 97-122.

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Network Visibility

• As existing groups take on new roles or other
  groups emerge, information about key
  organizations is often not known across the
  social network.
• In catastrophic events where convergence and
  emergence may play an even larger role than in
  typical disasters, network visibility, which
  allows for both open and coordinated systems,
  becomes paramount. Networks need to take visible
  form so that communications and role and task
  structuring can begin to take shape as well.

- Wachtendorf, T., B. Brown, J. Holguin-Veras,
and S. Ukkusuri, and Perez. (In preparation).
Network Visibility in Emergency Supply Chain
Management.
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• In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, emergent
  groupspreviously existing groups undertaking new
  tasks or with new organizational arrangementsand
  established organizations all formed new
  organizational networks as they contended with
  the many response needs. Some groups played more
  dominant roles than others in different stages of
  the response and early recovery, with respect to
  different tasks, and in working with different
  communities. Some activities, such as Coast Guard
  search-and-rescue were so pre-programmed and at
  the same time apt for the situation at hand, that
  they were immediately deployable, and they also
  formed nuclei for the self-organization of
  emergent responses.

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Katrina ExperienceDecisional failures

• Lack of adequate plans for things like evacuation
• Flawed local planning process
• Loss of local command and control facilities
• Lack of coordination among organizations of all
  types volunteers in boats and buses, Coast
  Guard, Red Cross, medication
• Lack of initiative, as in the waste of city buses
  which could have been mobilized for evacuation
  and instead ended up under water.
• Lack of creativity or resilience, as in the
  instance of refusal of Amtraks offer to fill its
  last train out of the city with evacuees
• Lack of expertise
• Governors refusal to nationalize National Guard
  political pettiness.

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Strategic View of Disaster Response
Defining, articulating What is the nature and
scope of the emergency? What are the values
involved (those threatened and those in prospect)?
Strategic managerial leadership individual and
systemic
What operational capabilitiesand resourcesare
required? Capability organizational capacity
individual skill experience
What authorizers resources need be involved,
and aligned? White House, FEMA, Governor, Mayor,
Red Cross, etc.