A Matrix Approach to Comparing and Contrasting Some Differing Perspectives on Emergency Management and Homeland Security in a Post-9/11 World

1
A Matrix Approach to Comparing and Contrasting
Some Differing Perspectives on Emergency
Management and Homeland Security in a Post-9/11
World and Some Suggested Reference Materials

• Paula D. Gordon, Ph.D.
• Presentation
• FEMA Higher Education Conference,
• Emmitsburg, Maryland, June 6 - 9, 2011

2
Using a Matrix Approach to Analysis to Enhance
Understanding

• of different perspectives concerning some of the
  major challenges facing those in roles of public
  responsibility for homeland security and
  emergency management
• of a range of different ways of looking at the
  role of the Federal, State, and local governments
  in recent major disasters, with an emphasis on
  Hurricane Katrina and
• of some possible explanations concerning the
  basis of widely varying perspectives and some of
  the possible consequences of major differences in
  perspectives.  

3
Some Differences Among Those in Positions of
Responsibility in Hurricane Katrina

• Differing levels of knowledge, experience, and
  skills with regard to addressing a moderate
  hurricane, let alone a catastrophic hurricane.
• Differing levels of knowledge, experience, and
  skills in emergency management.
• Differing views concerning what constitutes a
  catastrophe and what makes a catastrophic event
  exponentially more difficult to deal with than a
  disaster of lesser magnitude.
• Differing expectations concerning how effective
  emergency management efforts can be when all of
  the major elements of the critical infrastructure
  are in a state of failure in a 92,000 square mile
  area.

4
Comparing and Contrasting Some Differing
Perspectives of a Few Actors and Analysts with
Regard to a Variety of Parameters

• Don Kettl's views (as found in his book System
  under Stress Homeland Security and American
  Politics)
• The common view points found in the major
  government after action reports
• Michael Brown's views, including his February 11,
  2006 Deposition
• General Honore's views
• Ones own views
• (The list is short in order to accommodate the
  time frame for the presentation.)
• 
  
  

5
Some Typologies, Concepts, and ToolsUsed in
this Matrix Analysis

• Todd Stewarts Counter-Terrorism Strategic
  Model
• Similarities between this
  depiction
• of the homeland security
  cycle
• and the emergency management cycle
• Paula Gordons All-Hazards Adaptation of
  Stewarts Model
• A Typology of Emergencies of Differing Levels of
  Severity
• The Homeland Security Impact Scale and its
• Applicability to an All-Hazards
  Approach to
• Emergency Management

6
The Nature of the Approach Being Taken

• Are the actors or analysts taking a
  comprehensive or a less than holistic approach to
  emergency management and homeland security?
• Are they taking a realistic approach?
• Do they understand the differences between a
  medium scale disaster and a catastrophe?
• Are they expecting that the response to a
  catastrophe can be micromanaged?

7
Todd Stewarts Counter-Terrorism Strategic
Model

• Todd Stewart's model is helpful in depicting a
  comprehensive approach to preventing as well as
  preparing for and responding to potential
  terrorist-related events.
• A model that helps clarify key similarities and
  differences between the homeland security cycle
  and the emergency management cycle
• A model that importantly includes mitigation.

8
Todd Stewarts Counter-Terrorism Strategic
Model
Identify Characterize Threats
Recovery Reconstitution
Deterrence
Post-Event Response
Prediction
TERRORISM EVENT OR CAMPAIGN
Forensics Attribution
Prevention (Pre-emption)
Crisis Management
Mitigation (Preparation and Protection)
Detect Characterize
9
Paula Gordons All-Hazards Adaptation of Todd
Stewarts Strategic Model

• The following adaptation of Todd Stewart's model
  is helpful in depicting a comprehensive approach
  to preventing as well as preparing for and
  responding to potential events involving all
  hazards, whatever their origin may be.
• A model that helps clarify key similarities and
  differences between the homeland security cycle
  and the emergency management cycle.
• A model that importantly includes preparedness
  mitigation, and situational awareness.

10

Recovery Reconstitution Plus Mitigation
Preparedness Measures for the Future
Identify, Assess, Characterize Hazards
Preparedness
Remediation, Protective Measures, Mitigation
AN ALL- HAZARDS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CYCLE
Post-Event Response
Crisis Management
Contingency Planning
Event Response
Continuity of Operations Planning
Situational Awareness Assessment
When If the Event is Foreseeable or Imminent
When the Event Occurs Paula D.
Gordon, Ph.D, http//gordonhomeland.com
5/20//2011 Modeled Loosely on an Adaptation of
Todd Stewarts Counter Terrorism Strategic Model

11
A Typology of Emergencies of Differing Levels
of Severity

• A typology that is pertinent to an all-hazards
  approach to emergency management as well as to a
  natural hazards approach to emergency management.
• A typology that helps clarify the differences in
  impacts of emergencies of differing levels of
  severity and the implications of those
  differences for the emergency management cycle.

12
A Typology of Emergencies
Size of Emergency Number of Dead Injured Roles of Government Approach Characteristics of Care Skill Training Needs
Small Scale Scores Local, State, and Regional Surge of capa- bilities Manageable Surge capa- bility
Medium Scale Hundreds All levels of government Modified Normal to minimal Networked surge capability
Large Scale Thousands All levels of government Modified to makeshift Normal to minimal Networked surge capability
Catastrophic Scale Millions All levels of government Mostly makeshift Minimal or worse Make do capability
Mega- Catastrophe Multi-millions to billions Remaining vestiges of government Totally makeshift Minimal if existent Improvisa-tional skills
Adapted from P. Gordon " Comparative Scenario and Options Analysis Important Tools for Agents of Change Post 9/11 and Post Hurricane Katrina," Homeland Security Review, Vol. 1 No. 2 , 2006 (http//users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/options/Analysis.html ) Adapted from P. Gordon " Comparative Scenario and Options Analysis Important Tools for Agents of Change Post 9/11 and Post Hurricane Katrina," Homeland Security Review, Vol. 1 No. 2 , 2006 (http//users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/options/Analysis.html ) Adapted from P. Gordon " Comparative Scenario and Options Analysis Important Tools for Agents of Change Post 9/11 and Post Hurricane Katrina," Homeland Security Review, Vol. 1 No. 2 , 2006 (http//users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/options/Analysis.html ) Adapted from P. Gordon " Comparative Scenario and Options Analysis Important Tools for Agents of Change Post 9/11 and Post Hurricane Katrina," Homeland Security Review, Vol. 1 No. 2 , 2006 (http//users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/options/Analysis.html ) Adapted from P. Gordon " Comparative Scenario and Options Analysis Important Tools for Agents of Change Post 9/11 and Post Hurricane Katrina," Homeland Security Review, Vol. 1 No. 2 , 2006 (http//users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/options/Analysis.html ) Adapted from P. Gordon " Comparative Scenario and Options Analysis Important Tools for Agents of Change Post 9/11 and Post Hurricane Katrina," Homeland Security Review, Vol. 1 No. 2 , 2006 (http//users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/options/Analysis.html )
13
The Homeland Security Impact Scale Its
Applicability to an All-Hazards Approach to
Emergency Management

• The Homeland Security Impact Scale provides a
  common frame of reference that can be useful in
  considering and arriving at a consensus
  concerning the impacts of disasters.
• The Homeland Security Impact Scale provides a
  common frame of reference that can be useful in
  considering actions that can be taken to mitigate
  the impacts of disasters or emergencies of
  differing levels of severity or to address and
  help reverse them once they have occurred.

14
Homeland Security Impact Scale

• 0 -- No real impact on national security,
  economic security, or personal security
• 1 -- Local impact in areas directly affected
• 2 -- Significant impact in some areas that were
  not directly affected
• 3 -- Significant market adjustment (20 plus
  drop) some business and industries destabilized
  some bankruptcies, including increasing number of
  personal bankruptcies and bankruptcies of small
  businesses, and waning of consumer confidence
• 4 -- Economic slowdown spreads rise in
  unemployment and underemployment accompanied by
  possible isolated disruptive incidents and acts,
  increase in hunger and homelessness
• 5 -- Cascading impacts including mild recession
  isolated supply problems isolated infrastructure
  problems accompanied by possible increase in
  disruptive incidents and acts, continuing
  societal impacts

15
Homeland Security Impact Scale(Continued)

• 6 -- Moderate to strong recession or increased
  market volatility regional supply problems
  regional infrastructure problems accompanied by
  possible increase in disruptive incidents and
  acts worsening societal impacts
• 7 -- Spreading supply problems and infrastructure
  problems accompanied by possible increase in
  disruptive incidents and acts, worsening societal
  impacts, and major challenges posed to elected
  and non-elected public officials
• 8 -- Depression increased supply problems
  elements of infrastructure crippled accompanied
  by likely increase in disruptive incidents and
  acts worsening societal impacts and national
  and global markets severely impacted
• 9 -- Widespread supply problems infrastructure
  verging on collapse with both national and global
  consequences worsening economic and societal
  impacts accompanied by likely widespread
  disruptions
• 10 -- Possible unraveling of the social fabric,
  nationally and globally, jeopardizing the ability
  of governments to govern and keep the peace

16
Homeland Security Impact Scale(Continued)

• "Disruptions" and "incidents" can include
  demonstrations, work stoppages, strikes,
  organized or spontaneous vandalism, looting, and
  riots. Also included are sabotage and terrorist
  acts and attacks. (The scale and these notations
  have been adapted by Paula D.Gordon from the Y2K
  Impact Scale developed by Bruce F. Webster of
  WDCY2K and sent by him to the membership of
  WDCY2K on March 4, 1998.)
• "Supply problems" and "infrastructure problems"
  may include food shortages availability of
  potable water degradation of water purity, water
  distribution and/or waste management
  fuel/heating oil shortages, disruptions in
  utilities (power, gas, telecommunications),
  disruption in the financial sector, disruptions
  in transportation (airlines, trains, trucking,
  ports, ships) pharmaceutical shortages
  disruption of health care services or emergency
  medical services disruption of fire and public
  safety services disruptions or inadequacies, or
  overwhelming of public works operations and
  services.

17
Some Parameters Used to Compare and Contrast the
Views of the Actors and Analysts

• Characterization of the individual's general
  perspective
• Stance with regard to Typology of Emergencies in
  and assumptions concerning the level of severity
  of Katrina and what constitutes a catastrophe
• Stance with regard to the Homeland Security
  Impact Scale and perceptions concerning the
  impacts of Katrina on all key elements of the
  critical infrastructure near term and long term
• Capabilities and skills needed by those in
  various levels of public responsibility and
  assumptions concerning the capabilities and
  skills of those involved in Katrina.

18
Some Parameters Used to Compare and Contrast the
Views of the Actors and Analysts (Continued)

• Views concerning what went wrong and who or what
  was responsible for what went wrong
• Degree of realism in assessing the capacity of
  any or all levels of government to deal with
  Katrina
• Recognition of the existence of a cultural divide
  between homeland security and emergency
  management and DHS and FEMA
• Understanding of the problems between DHS and
  FEMA before, during, and after Katrina.

19
Some Parameters Used to Compare and Contrast the
Views of the Actors and Analysts (Continued)

• Perceptions concerning the nature of the
  intergovernmental challenges in Katrina
• Perspectives concerning the suitability of the
  National Response Plan at the time of Katrina and
  the suitability of presently planned approaches
  to a revised NRP to potential catastrophic events
  in the future
• Perspectives concerning whether or not the NRP
  was applicable at the time of Katrina,
  understanding of the extent to which the NRP was
  ignored or worked around.

20
Some Parameters Used to Compare and Contrast the
Views of the Actors and Analysts (Continued)

• Assumptions concerning who's in charge or who
  should be in charge and
• Views concerning lessons learned and where we go
  from here.

21
The Matrix

Actors Analysts 1) General Perspective 2) Stance re Typology of Emergencies
A) Don Kettl's views Wide-ranging assessment of DHS/FEMA and Katrina featuring historical and organizational analysis with some emphasis on lessons learned and recommendations concerning some current challenges Katrina viewed in part as a Large Scale Emergency and in part as an Emergency of Catastrophic Scale
B) Common viewpoints in reports Less wide-ranging assessment than Kettl's based on a more limited problem definition with less attention to historical and organizational analysis and with different prescriptions for change Similar to Kettl
C) Michael Brown's views Realistic assessment of emergency management challenges rooted in comprehensive all hazards approach to emergency management and the emergency management cycle and an understanding of the evolution of emergency management challenges since 9/11 Katrina was Katrina was an unprecedented Emergency of Catastrophic Scale impacting millions in a 92,000 square mile area
D) General Honore's views Extremely realistic assessment of emergency management challenges presented by natural catastrophes Similar to Brown's stance with even greater emphasis on the impact of the failure of all major elements of the critical infrastructure
22
The Matrix (Continued)
Actors Analysts 3) Stance re Homeland Security Impact Scale 4) Capabilities and Skills
A) Don Kettl's views Likely rating of near term impacts 5-6 Likely rating of long term impacts 3 Focus on improving processes, developing capabilities useful for large scale emergencies and "building nimble organizations capable of flexible response" that are needed for larger scale emergencies
B) Common viewpoints in reports Likely rating of near term impacts 5 Likely rating of long term impacts 1-3 Focus on improving logistics coupled along with the need to improve capabilities (primarily those best suited to Large Scale Emergencies)
C) Michael Brown's views Possible rating of near term impacts 5-10 Possible rating of long term impacts 3-5 Focus on the need to improve skills and capabilities across the board, including those involving planning and preparedness
D) General Honore's views Possible rating of near term impacts 5-9 Possible rating of long term impacts 3-4 Honore's Eleven Quick Fixes focus on problem solving skills and proactive approaches that would mitigate impacts
23
The Matrix (Continued)

Actors Analysts 5) What went wrong and who or what was responsible 6) Realistic assessment of govt's capacity
A) Don Kettl's views Focus on correctable failures of government at all levels and the need for government to improve processes and develop a capability for "flexible response" More realistic than most
B) Common viewpoints in reports Focus on the failure of government at all levels, particularly the Federal government, and the need to make organizational changes and significantly improve technology and emergency management processes Somewhat realistic, but rooted in a definition of the nature and scope of the challenges and of what is needed that is somewhat limited
C) Michael Brown's views Recognition well before Katrina of the government's failure to be adequately prepared and belief that far more adequate preparation for potential catastrophic events along with a far more viable FEMA pre-Katrina could have made a difference Far more realistic than most
D) General Honore's views Recognition of the catastrophic nature of Katrina and focus on dealing as effectively as possible with future challenges Extremely realistic

24
The Matrix (Continued)

Actors Analysts 9) Intergovernmental challenges of Katrina 10) Suitability of the National Response Plan (NRP) for Katrina
A) Don Kettl's views Viewed largely in terms of the need to make significant changes in process Not addressed in his book, only mentioned in passing on page 69
B) Common viewpoints in reports Reflective of varying views concerning what the nature of relations should be between Federal, State, and local entities, particularly in a worst case catastrophe The NRP was not sufficient (The relevance to catastrophes of the yet to be completed revised version remains to be seen.)
C) Michael Brown's views Unable using best efforts to develop effective working relationships with State and local governments in The NRP was not suitable for Katrina.
D) General Honore's views Was freer than Michael Brown to develop effective working relationships in that he was not constrained in the same ways that Brown was Not a matter addressed directly but some recommendations for changes can be found in his list of Eleven Quick Fixes

25
The Matrix (Continued)
Actors Analysts 11) The NRP at the time of Katrina the extent to which it was used 12) Who's in charge who should be
A) Don Kettl's views Kettl does not appear to recognize that the version of the NRP in place at the time of Katrina was "worked around" and not fully implemented and that it would have been impossible to implement that version of the NRP since it is not possible to "manage" an emergency the magnitude of Katrina using prescriptions that are inapplicable to catastrophic events Dealt with in very general terms
B) Common viewpoints in reports The authors of the earliest published reports do not appear to recognize that the version of the NRP in place at the time of Katrina was "worked around" and not fully implemented and that it would have been impossible to implement that version of the NRP since it is not possible to "manage" an emergency the magnitude of Katrina using prescriptions that are inapplicable to catastrophic events Question of when the military should be involved in catastrophic events raised and discussed. Plans concerning how potentially catastrophic events are to be handled in the future are as yet unclear
C) Michael Brown's views Brown decided to work around the NRP based on his perception that the August 2005 version of the NRP was inapplicable in a catastrophic event (For specifics see Michael Brown's Deposition) The military should be called out to deal with a catastrophic event



26
The Matrix (Continued)


Actors Analysts 7) Cultural divide between HS EM, DHS FEMA 8) Current DHS/FEMA Efforts
A) Don Kettl's views Some recognition of some aspects of the cultural divide Appears to be only somewhat aware of the nature and extent of the cleavages within DHS and between DHS and FEMA
B) Common viewpoints in reports Little recognition of the nature and scope of the cultural divide and how it might be bridged Far less aware than Kettl of the nature of the cleavages within DHS and between DHS and FEMA
C) Michael Brown's views Considerable insight into the basis for and the manifestations of the cultural divide (See especially the testimony of Michael Brown and his Deposition) Not apparent the extent to which he may be following current efforts
D) General Honore's views Far more focused on doing what needs to be done than on analyzing organizational and professional cultural challenges Not apparent what his interests might be in such matters
27
Some of the Value in Using a Matrix Approach to
Analysis

• The use of this kind of matrix approach to
  analysis can help deepen understanding of
  different perspectives, backgrounds, and
  experience that key actors have.
• The use of a matrix approach to analysis
• can also deepen our understanding of the
  implications of those perspectives and to
  understand in a new light the difficulties that
  were faced in Katrina.

28
Some Selected Reference Materials

• The following are materials, websites,
  videos, and DVDs that can be used in the
  development and implementation of courses and
  curricula focusing on an all-hazards approach to
  homeland security and emergency management.
  Complete references for these materials can be
  found in the List of Homeland Security and
  Emergency Management References and Resources
  compiled by Paula D. Gordon and posted at
  GordonPublicAdministration.com
• (http//GordonPublicAdministration.com ).
  The 102 page List of References and Resources
  includes twenty-two categories and is posted in
  two parts in the File Section of the
  GordonPublicAdministration.com website.  
• GordonHomeland.com (http//GordonHomeland.com)
  and GordonPublicAdministration.com
  (http//GordonPublicAdministration.com) include
  articles, reports, publications, and
  presentations on homeland security and emergency
  management and organizational, managerial,
  ethical, and educational issues. The websites
  have been developed by Paula D. Gordon and are
  provided as a free public service.

29
Some Selected Materials (Continued)

• Principles of Emergency Management from FEMA
  http//training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/emprinciples.a
  sp .
• Principles of Emergency Management October 10,
  2008, 1 page.
• Principles of Emergency Management Brochure.
  September 11, 2007. 9 pages.
• Principles of Emergency Management Slide
  Presentation.  Developed by Jim Fraser, February
  14, 2008.  18 Slides. 

30
Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• Claire B. Rubin, editor, Emergency Management
  The American Experience 1900 2005, Public
  Entity Risk Institute, (http//riskinstitute.org
  ), 2007.
• Claire B. Rubin, 4/9/08 Transcript of Forum
  Presentation Emergency Management The American
  Experience, 1900 2005. View at 
  http//www.emforum.org/vlibrary/all.htm .
• David A. McEntire, Introduction to Homeland
  Security Understanding Terrorism with an
  Emergency Management Perspective, Wiley, 2009.

31
Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• Stephen Flynn speaking on his book The Edge of
  Disaster Rebuilding a Resilient Nation at the
  Houston World Affairs Council, March 27, 2007. 
  See video at http//www.c-spanvideo.org/program/19
  7358-1 .
• Stephen Flynn, The Edge of Disaster, Random
  House, 2007.
• Secretary Mike Leavitt, U.S. Department of Health
  and Human Services, Emergency Preparedness Health
  Summit, National Press Club, April 18, 2006.
  View online at http//www.C-SPAN.org/videolibrary
  . ID192090-1. 45 minutes.

32
Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• April 2003 Frontline Program Cyberwar (PBS)
  (Also see archived program, transcript, and
  interviews online at http//www.pbs.org .)
• Paula D. Gordon, "Infrastructure Threats and
  Challenges Before and After September 11, 2001".
  PA TIMES, Vol. 24, Issue 12, December
  2001. Reprinted as a commentary in the Journal of
  Homeland Security, April 16, 2002. Also posted
  at http//users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/homeland_
  infra.html or see link at http//gordonhomeland.c
  om .
• Paula D. Gordon, "A Matrix Approach to Comparing
  and Contrasting Some Differing Perspectives on
  the Federal Governments Role in Hurricane
  Katrina and in Potential Catastrophic Events in
  the Future." Access at http//GordonPublicAdminist
  ration.com .

33
Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• Critical Infrastructure Task Force. Washington,
  DC Homeland Security Advisory Council, January
  2006 (50 pages). Access at www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/a
  ssets/HSAC_CITF_Report_v2.pdf
• Ted G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection
  in Homeland Security Defending a Networked
  Nation, Wiley-Interscience, 2006.
• Naval Postgraduate School Course Materials and
  videos on radical extremism and the resources of
  the Homeland Security Digital Library. Access at
  https//www.hsdl.org .

34
Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• General Russel Honore, Presentation on Hurricane
  Katrina, a presentation before the Houston Forum
  on February 13, 2006. Access at
  http//www.c-spanvideo.org/program/id/155435 .
• General Russel Honore, September 9, 2005 CNN
  transcript in which General Honore compares the
  crisis to a football game in which you cannot
  expect to win any ground in the first quarter.
• Michael Brown, Presentation on Hurricane Katrina
  and Weather Emergency Preparedness, January 18,
  2006
• Video can be viewed at http//www.c-spanvideo
  .org/program/id/153798 .
• For particularly significant insights into
  the massive challenges relating to catastrophic
  event planning, preparedness, mitigation, and
  response and the Federal approach to Hurricane
  Katrina

35
Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)
 
 

• Michael Brown, February 11, 2006, Congressional
  Deposition . Access at http//katrina.hours.gov/b
  rown/depo.doc .
• Paula D. Gordon, "Thoughts about Katrina
  Responses to Two Questions about Hurricane
  Katrina and America's Resilience, December 1,
  2005 (Prepared for the December 19-21, 2005
  Forum on Building America's Resilience to
  Hazards, sponsored by The American Meteorological
  Society in collaboration with The Space
  Enterprise Council of the U.S. Chamber of
  Commerce.) Access at http//gordonhomeland.com .

36
Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• Susan B. Glasser and Michael Grunwald,
  "Department's Mission Was Undermined From Start",
  Washington Post, December 22, 2005. Access at
  http//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/artic
  le/2005/12/21/AR2005122102327.html .
• Michael Grunwald and Susan B. Glasser, "Brown's
  Turf Wars Sapped FEMA's Strength" Washington
  Post, December 23, 2005. Access at
  http//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/artic
  le/2005/12/22/AR2005122202213.html?navhcmodule .
• For extraordinary insights into the background
  Federal homeland security efforts from after 9/11
  through Hurricane Katrina.

37
Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• Paula D. Gordon, Improving Homeland Security
  Critical Infrastructure Protection and Continuity
  Efforts. Access athttp//users.rcn.com/pgordon/
  homeland/hscipreport.pdf  or use link at
  http//gordonhomeland.com .
•  

38
Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• Paula D. Gordon, Presenter, "Improving Homeland
  Security - Continuing Challenges and
  Opportunities," transcript of Emergency
  Information Infrastructure Partnership (EIIP)
  Virtual Forum, March 24, 2004. Posted at
  http//gordonhomeland.com.
• Paula D. Gordon, "Transforming and Leading
  Organizations," (Examples from disaster
  management.) (Posted at http//gordonhomeland.com
  . Also published in Government Transformation, Win
  ter 2004-05 issue.

39
Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• Paula D. Gordon, "Capabilities and Skills Needed
  by Those in New Roles of Responsibility for
  Homeland Security at the Federal, State, and
  Local Levels of Government." Posted at
  http//gordonhomeland.com and published in the PA
  TIMES, Vol. 28, Issue 3, March 2005 (a
  publication of the American Society for Public
  Administration).
• Paula D. Gordon, "Comparative Scenario and
  Options Analysis Important Tools for Agents of
  Change Post 9/11 and Post Hurricane Katrina,"
  Homeland Security Review, Vol. 1 No. 2, 2006.
  Posted at http//gordonhomeland.com or
  http//users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/optionsAnaly
  sis.html.

40
Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• Paula D. Gordon, The Homeland Security Impact
  Scale  An Alternative Approach toAssessing
  Homeland Security and Critical Infrastructure
  Protection Efforts and a Frame of Reference for
  Understanding and Addressing Current Challenges.
  Access athttp//users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/t
  hehomelandsecurityimpactscale.htm or use link at
  http//gordonhomeland.com .
• Paula D. Gordon, Strategic Planning and Y2K
  Technology ChallengesLessons and Legacies for
  Homeland Security. Access athttp//users.rcn.co
  m/pgordon/homeland/homeland_strat.html or use
  link at http//gordonhomeland.com .
• .

41
Some Selected Materials (Continued)

• Paula D. Gordon, Using E-Technology to Advance
  Homeland Security Efforts. Access
  athttp//users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/etechnolo
  gy.html or use link at http//gordonhomeland.com
  .
• Paula D. Gordon, A Common Goal for Contingency
  Planning and Management, Emergency Management,
  and Homeland Security Building a Disaster
  Resilient Nation. Access at http//users.rcn.com
  /pgordon/homeland/CommonGoal.html or use link at
  http//gordonhomeland.com .

42
Some Selected Reference Materials (Continued)

• Paula D. Gordon, "The State of Emergency
  Management and Homeland Security," PA TIMES, Vol.
  30, Issue 8, August 2007. Also posted at
  http//gordonhomeland.com or see or
  http//users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/stateofEM.ht
  ml .
• Paula D. Gordon, Challenges for the Future of
  Homeland Security and Emergency Management
  Education, PA TIMES, Vol. 31, Issue 8, August
  2008. Also see http//gordonhomeland.com .

43
University Affiliations,Contact Information
Websites

• Paula D. Gordon, Ph.D.
• Auburn University Emergency Management for
  Government Private Sector Certificate Program
• University of Richmond
• Eastern Kentucky University
• E-Mail pgordon_at_starpower.net
• Phone [phone]
• Websites http//GordonPublicAdministration.com
  http//GordonHomeland.com and
• http//www.jhu.edu/pgordon