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A mechanism for quality control applied to the EU-India digital platform

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Title: A mechanism for quality control applied to the EU-India digital platform


1
A mechanism for quality control applied to the
EU-India digital platform
  • S. R. C. Prasad Challapalli, Paolo
    Coppola,Stefano Mizzaro, Michele ZennaroDept.
    of Mathematics and Computer Science
  • University of Udine
  • QCDL06, Udine

2
Outline
  • Introduction
  • Electronic Publishing Peer review
  • A new proposal
  • Informal description example
  • Experimental evaluation
  • Application to the EU-India digital platform
  • Discussion, future work, open problems

3
How scientists work
  • We all know
  • Idea, discovery, hard work, blablabla
  • Submission
  • Peer review
  • If accepted, publication
  • Not only scientists ? Scholars
  • It has not always been like that
  • This is not the only way

4
Scholarly communication/publishing
  • 1665 1st scholarly journal
  • Since then quality
  • Reviews by the editor (few papers and topics)
  • (1930) Peer review by external referees
  • 90es Internet
  • Electronic scholarly publishing
  • Speed-up (JAIR,), Multimedia,
  • E-prints, archives CoRR, ArXiv, ResearchIndex,
  • Do-it-yourself scholarly publication

5
Electronic scholarly communication 2 positions
  • Supporters
  • Scholarly publishing as it is today is dead
  • Electronic scholarly publishing allows a cheaper,
    faster, more effective communication
  • Authors, editors, referees work for free,
    publishers and libraries make money
  • Detractors
  • Be careful
  • Different kinds of electronic journals
  • Differences among fields
  • Preprint practice
  • Peer review takes time
  • Standard Model vs. Socio-Technical Network Model

6
Peer review 2 positions
  • Supporters
  • Reasonably effective quality control
  • Harnad The invisible hand of peer review
  • No better solution, at least so far
  • Detractors
  • Time
  • Bias (e.g., medicine)
  • Wrong
  • Inadequate (HEP experiments, computer
    simulations, )
  • Schön affair
  • Juan Miguel Campanario

7
Alternatives, complements, supplements to peer
review
  • Democracy
  • Authors publish whatever they want
  • Readers read what they judge interesting
  • Perhaps with commentary
  • Plenty of proposals
  • Different publishing models
  • Authors pay
  • IEEE, Jon Vig Good or bad open access is
    happening Its not a matter o if but
    when

8
A threat to peer review
  • Not abstract
  • Do-it-yourself publishing
  • Physicists do not use journals (?)
  • Repositories
  • ? without peer review
  • Readers of a paper can judge it?
  • Referees are experts, readers are not!
  • Not only a threat! Opportunity, challenge,

9
Our position
  • Not supporters, not detractors
  • We dont know if peer review is really threatened
  • We dont know if Internet is an opportunity to
    improve peer review and if alternatives to peer
    review are viable
  • We dont
  • Well, we have an idea, were just curious and
    want to understand if it is a good idea or not

10
Outline
  • Introduction
  • Electronic Publishing Peer review
  • A new proposal
  • Informal description example
  • Experimental evaluation
  • Application to the EU-India digital platform
  • Discussion, future work, open problems

11
A new proposal
  • An example of the opportunities
  • A new model for the submission-review-publication
    process
  • Similar to democratic approaches
  • Improvement (quality of readers)
  • 7 years (not full time!) work
  • For the sake of simplicity
  • Electronic journal
  • Substitute for peer review (more later)

12
The proposal (1/3)
  • Papers, authors, readers, scores, judgments
  • A journal has subscribers (authors readers)
  • Each paper is immediately published after its
    submission
  • Each paper has a score, measuring its quality
  • The score is initially zero. It changes after
    readers read and judge the paper
  • Paper with high score ? good paper

13
The proposal (2/3)
  • Each author has a score too
  • It changes accordingly to the scores of the
    papers published by the author
  • Publishing good papers leads to higher author
    score

14
The proposal (3/3)
  • Each reader has a score too
  • Judgments by high scored readers are more heavy
  • (Nothing really new so far)
  • Reader score changes
  • Accordingly to the goodness of the judgments
    expressed
  • Good (right) judgments lead to a higher score
  • Bad (wrong) judgments lead to a lower score

15
Good judgment?
  • Theoretically,
  • equal to the final paper score (the score that
    the paper will have at time ?)
  • In practice,
  • the score at time ? is not available
  • But we can
  • approximate it (with the current score)
  • revise the approximation as time goes on and we
    get closer to ?

16
Last ingredient Steadiness
  • Authors/readers/papers have a steadiness value
    (how stable a score is)
  • Papers published a long ago (and very much read)
    have a high steadiness value
  • New authors whose papers are not yet so much
    read have a low steadiness
  • Readers that expressed many judgments have a more
    stable reader score
  • Steadiness values change (increase)

17
Summary
  • Papers, authors, and readers have a score that
    measures their quality
  • Steadiness how stable the score is
  • Virtuous circle (hopefully)
  • Authors try to publish good papers
  • Readers try to express good judgments
  • Score of
  • Papers which papers to read
  • Authors scientific productivity
  • Readers scientific reputation

18
An example
r
j
p
j
r
19
An example (1/2)
r
j
p
20
An example (2/2)
r
j
p
j
r
21
Paper score
  • Average of readers judgments...
  • ... higher weights to better readers
  • Paper score
  • weighted mean of readers judgments
  • weighted by readers scores

22
Paper score formula
Rp(t) set of readers that judged p before t
23
Paper steadiness
  • Number of judgments expressed?
  • Judgments by good readers are more important!
  • Sum of the scores of its readers

24
Author score
  • Average of her papers scores...
  • ... higher weight to more stable papers
  • Author score weighted mean (by paper
    steadiness) of her papers scores
  • Average of the judgments on her papers
  • higher weight to judgments by better readers
  • Author score weighted mean (by reader score) of
    judgments on her papers

25
Author score formula
26
Reader score (1/2)
  • Average of judgment goodness...
  • ... higher weights to judgments on more stable
    papers
  • Goodness distance of the judgment from the
    current paper score
  • Reader score
  • weighted mean of the goodnesses of her judgments
  • weighted with the steadiness of the judged papers

27
Reader score (2/2)
28
Steadiness
29
Updating formulae
  • Long summations ? inefficient?
  • Definition of updating formulae
  • How to compute sx(t1) by updating sx(t)
  • Ill spare you those!
  • (see my paper)

30
Outline
  • Introduction
  • Electronic Publishing Peer review
  • A new proposal
  • Informal description example
  • Experimental evaluation
  • Application to the EU-India digital platform
  • Discussion, future work, open problems

31
Evaluation
  • Software simulations of the system
  • Analysis of typical and critical cases
  • Higher ?, slower s changes
  • Bad author, good paper
  • Bad author, bad paper, late recognized
  • Lobbies
  • Lazy readers
  • More complex simulations
  • Twofold aim understand better and more

32
Higher ?, slower s changes
  • 3 papers p1, p2 and p3
  • Initial sp 0.1
  • Initial steadiness
  • ?p1 1
  • ?p2 10
  • ?p3 100
  • 100 readers with sr 0.5 express a 0.9 judgment

33
Higher ?, slower s changes
readers
34
Higher ?, slower s changes
35
Bad author, good paper
  • Author a with score sa 0.1
  • Publishes a good paper p
  • Readers r1, , rn (sri 0.5)
  • Judgments jri,p 0.9
  • sa 2, 10, 100

36
Bad author, good paper
r1
0.9
0.5
j1
p
r2
j2
0.9
0.5

0.1

rn
jn
0.9
0.5
37
Bad author, good paper
38
Bad author, bad paper, late recognized
  • Author a with score sa 0.1
  • a publishes p
  • Readers r1, , r10 very good paper (jri,p
    0.9)
  • Readers r11, , r100 very bad paper (jri,p
    0.1)
  • ?a 2, 10, 100

39
Bad author, bad paper, late recon
40
Lobbies
  • People that mutually give high judgments
  • Paper with high judgments more read
  • If they are bad papers, bad judgments
  • Counter lobby
  • Maybe dangerous how big has to be an effective
    lobby?
  • Automatic software spotting (clique)
  • To pay for judgment expression?

41
Lazy readers
  • Readers that simply confirm the current sp
  • 3 points
  • Is it really effective?
  • Improve the mechanism
  • Measure reader laziness

42
1. Is laziness really effective?
  • Of course, it depends!
  • Again bad author, bad paper, late recon
  • Author a with score sa 0.1
  • a publishes p
  • Readers r1, , r10 very good paper (jri,p 0.9)
  • Readers r11, , r100 very bad paper (jri,p
    0.1)
  • The laziest r10
  • The least lazy r11

43
The laziest and the least lazy
44
2. Improve the mechanism
  • Give higher scores to quick readers
  • Dont show sp for some time after its publication

45
3. Measure reader laziness
  • Mean of goodness values
  • Weighted by paper steadiness

46
More complex simulations
  • Software agents that simulate readers
  • Autonomous agents
  • Partly random behavior
  • Not easy! (many parameters)

47
Simulation 1 kinds of readers (1/2)
  • 5 categories of readers
  • Random
  • Constant (0.5)
  • Lazy
  • Worst
  • Lazy-best (good)
  • 60 papers, 100 readers
  • 3000 judgments

48
Simulation 1 kinds of readers (2/2)
  • Results
  • Worst 0.2
  • Good (Lazy-best) 1
  • Random 0.5
  • Constant 0.8 (!)
  • Lazy 0.7

49
Simulation 2 parameters
  • 7 continuous parameters of readers
  • Goodness
  • Laziness
  • Activeness
  • Selectiveness
  • Randomness
  • Quickness
  • Constantness
  • Uniformly distributed, independent
  • sp and sr distributions
  • 300 papers, 500 readers, 9500 judgments

50
Simulation 2 results
  • Correlation between sr and parameters
  • Goodness 0.16
  • Lazyness 0.20
  • Activeness 0.27
  • Randomness -0.5
  • Constantness 0.27
  • Quickness -0.1
  • Selectiveness 0

51
Does it work?
  • Difficult to draw a final conclusion
  • Social and biological systems tend to exhibit
    unexpected behavior
  • Rather complex game, rules of the game,
  • Forecasting is very difficult, particularly in
    the future ?

52
Outline
  • Introduction
  • Electronic Publishing Peer review
  • A new proposal
  • Informal description example
  • Experimental evaluation
  • Application to the EU-India digital platform
  • Discussion, future work, open problems

53
The EU-India digital platform
  • E-Dvara
  • CMS (XML, XSLT)
  • Cultural heritage dissemination
  • Ancient Indian Science
  • http//archiviazione.infofactory.it/india
  • A first implementation of the mechanism

54
Software Architecture
55
User interaction reading
56
User interaction judging
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63
Outline
  • Introduction
  • Electronic Publishing Peer review
  • A new proposal
  • Informal description example
  • Experimental evaluation
  • Application to the EU-India digital platform
  • Discussion, future work, open problems

64
Summary
  • Scores of papers and authors
  • Readers acting as referees
  • Scores of readers
  • Feedback on the readers for achieving good
    quality judgments
  • Good reader good reputation
  • EU-India

65
Discussion
  • Historical trend increase referees
  • (interdisciplinary fields)
  • (its peer review!?)
  • Improvement of
  • Pure democratic journal
  • Impact factor, citation counts (lt ?p!)
  • Collaborative/social filtering (complementary)
  • Replace/complement peer review
  • Referees do not work for free!

66
Open questions and problems
  • Malicious strategies
  • Lobbies?
  • Lazy readers?
  • Others
  • Human supervisor (? referee!)
  • Simple variants to pay each judgment
    expression
  • Technical problems (security, efficiency, )
  • Socially accepted?

67
Future work improvements (1/2)
  • (in random order)
  • More scores
  • technical soundness, comprehensibility,
    originality,
  • Different formulae
  • More journals, different acceptance thresholds
  • Better approximation of the final sp (trend?)
  • Theoretical analysis (game theory?)

68
Future work improvements (2/2)
  • More simulations
  • Real life experiments
  • Final implementation
  • Use referee data from journals, etc.
  • Find a name
  • Fake authors/papers/readers?
  • Generalization, application to reputation systems
    (e.g., in e-commerce, e-learning)

69
Reference
  • S. Mizzaro. Quality Control in Scholarly
    Publishing A New Proposal, Journal of the
    American Society for Information Science and
    Technology, 54(11)989-1005, 2003.
  • (just ask for a copy)

70
Thanks to
  • Vincenzo Della Mea
  • Massimo Di Fant
  • Luca Di Gaspero
  • Marco Fabbrichesi
  • Andrea Fusiello
  • Stefania Gentili
  • Stevan Harnad
  • Paolo Massa
  • Marco Mizzaro
  • Carla Piazza
  • Ivan Scagnetto
  • Walter Vanzella
  • Paolo Zandegiacomo Riziò
  • Referees
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