Title: Radiological Terrorism: Introduction
1Radiological TerrorismIntroduction
2Nuclear WMD
- Modern time weapons
- First used in WWII
3Nuclear weapons testing, Bikini Atoll,
7/24/46 U.S. Department of Energy photograph.
4Nuclear WMD
- Modern time weapons
- First used in WWII
5Replicas of atomic bombs dropped over Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, Japan in 1945. National Atomic
Museum photograph
6Military-Style Backpack, similar to one carrying
the 1996 Centennial Olympic Park Bomb, could
deliver a dirty bomb Federal Bureau of
Investigation photograph
7Pros / Cons
- Advantages
- Highly disruptive
8Pros / Cons
- Advantages
- Highly disruptive
- High fear / terror factor
9Pros / Cons
- Advantages
- Highly disruptive
- High fear / terror factor
- Significant media profile
10Pros / Cons
- Advantages
- Highly disruptive
- High fear / terror factor
- Significant media profile
- Nuclear bombs also have
11Pros / Cons
- Advantages
- Highly disruptive
- High fear / terror factor
- Significant media profile
- Nuclear bombs also have
- Vast destructive power (destroys infrastructure)
12Pros / Cons
- Advantages
- Highly disruptive
- High fear / terror factor
- Significant media profile
- Nuclear bombs also have
- Vast destructive power (destroys infrastructure)
- Effect (death and destruction) is immediate
13Nuclear weapons testing, Operation Greenhouse,
May 8, 1951 at Enewetak. U.S. Department of
Energy photograph.
14Pros / Cons
- Disadvantages
- Expensive to obtain/maintain
15Pros / Cons
- Disadvantages
- Expensive to obtain/maintain
- Relatively short shelf life (7 years)
16Pros / Cons
- Disadvantages
- Expensive to obtain/maintain
- Relatively short shelf life (7 years)
- Low level of control and containment
17Pros / Cons
- Disadvantages
- Expensive to obtain/maintain
- Relatively short shelf life (7 years)
- Low level of control and containment
- Destroys infrastructure
18Pros / Cons
- Disadvantages
- Expensive to obtain/maintain
- Relatively short shelf life (7 years)
- Low level of control and containment
- Destroys infrastructure
- High risk of detection
19A U.S. Customs Inspector checks seaport
containers coming into the United States. U.S.
Department of Homeland Security photo by James
Tourtellotte
20Pros / Cons
- Disadvantages
- Relatively short shelf life (7 years)
- Low level of control and containment
- Destroys infrastructure
- High risk of detection
- Radiation signature helps pinpoint source
21Destructivity
- WMD far exceeds that of conventional, chemical,
or biologic weapons
22Destructivity
- WMD far exceeds that of conventional, chemical,
or biologic weapons - Dirty bombs lack real destructive power
23Destructivity
- WMD far exceeds that of conventional, chemical,
or biologic weapons - Dirty bombs lack real destructive power
- Goal of the terrorist
- Harassment vs. death
24Lethality
25Lethality
- Nuclear blast potential
- Kill tens of thousands of people
26Lethality
- Nuclear blast potential
- Kill tens of thousands of people
- Small target area
27Lethality
- Nuclear blast potential
- Kill tens of thousands of people
- Small target area
- Dirty bomb potential
28Lethality
- Nuclear blast potential
- Kill tens of thousands of people
- Small target area
- Dirty bomb potential
- Few deaths
29Lethality
- Weapon Grams
- Fuel-air explosives 320 million
- Mustard gas 3.2 million
- Sarin nerve gas 800,000
- A "crude" nuclear weapon 5,000
- Type A botulinal toxin 80
- Anthrax spores 8
30CIA Reports on Former Soviet Union Source U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency
31Availability
- Nuclear proliferation is a problem
32Availability
- Nuclear proliferation is a problem
- Rogue nations may provide terrorist groups with
both weapons and technical knowledge
33Availability
- Nuclear proliferation is a problem
- Rogue nations may provide terrorist groups with
both weapons and technical knowledge - Fall of the Soviet Union left many unaccounted
nuclear devices
34Availability
- Nuclear proliferation is a problem
- Rogue nations may provide terrorist groups with
both weapons and technical knowledge - Fall of the Soviet Union left many unaccounted
nuclear devices - For sale on the black market
35Availability
- Terrorist groups performing own research and
development of nuclear weapons
36Availability
- Terrorist groups performing own research and
development of nuclear weapons - Industry use of radiological materials provides
the isotopes for dirty bombs
37Availability
- Terrorist groups performing own research and
development of nuclear weapons - Industry use of radiological materials provides
the isotopes for dirty bombs - Power plant sabotage could produce massive dirty
bombs
38Delivery
- Suitcase bomb easily transported by person
-
39Delivery
- Suitcase bomb easily transported by person
- 10 kiloton bomb readily moved by truck or boat
40Delivery
- Suitcase bomb easily transported by person
- 10 kiloton bomb readily moved by truck or boat
- Radiation detection equipment might miss a small
device -
41Underwater radiation detector U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency photo
42The Terrorist Risk
43The Terrorist Risk
- Five levels of risk
- Threatened use, with no real capability to use
them
44The Terrorist Risk
- Five levels of risk
- Threatened use, with no real capability to use
them - Unsuccessful attempts to acquire NW
45The Terrorist Risk
- Five levels of risk
- Threatened use, with no real capability to use
them - Unsuccessful attempts to acquire NW
- Actual possession of NW
46The Terrorist Risk
- Five levels of risk
- Threatened use, with no real capability to use
them - Unsuccessful attempts to acquire NW
- Actual possession of NW
- Unsuccessful attempts to use NW
47The Terrorist Risk
- Five levels of risk
- Threatened use, with no real capability to use
them - Unsuccessful attempts to acquire NW
- Actual possession of NW
- Unsuccessful attempts to use NW
- Successful use of NW
48The Terrorist Risk
- Why havent we seen the use of NW by terrorists?
49The Terrorist Risk
- Why havent we seen the use of NW by terrorists?
- Fear of severe backlash
50The Terrorist Risk
- Why havent we seen the use of NW by terrorists?
- Fear of severe backlash
- More likely reasons
51The Terrorist Risk
- Why havent we seen the use of NW by terrorists?
- Fear of severe backlash
- More likely reasons
- Difficult to acquire
52The Terrorist Risk
- Why havent we seen the use of NW by terrorists?
- Fear of severe backlash
- More likely reasons
- Difficult to acquire
- Expensive
53The Terrorist Risk
- Why havent we seen the use of NW by terrorists?
- Fear of severe backlash
- More likely reasons
- Difficult to acquire
- Expensive
- Difficult to maintain
54The Terrorist Risk
- Why havent we seen the use of NW by terrorists?
- Fear of severe backlash
- More likely reasons
- Difficult to acquire
- Expensive
- Difficult to maintain
- High risk of detection
55Defense
- Defensive capabilities are limited
56Defense
- Defensive capabilities are limited
- Best defense
57Defense
- Defensive capabilities are limited
- Best defense
- Reduce nuclear proliferation
58Defense
- Defensive capabilities are limited
- Best defense
- Reduce nuclear proliferation
- Limit access to uranium and plutonium
59Defense
- Defensive capabilities are limited
- Best defense
- Reduce nuclear proliferation
- Limit access to uranium and plutonium
- Improve surveillance and detection capabilities