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Food Supply Protection in an Age of Biocrimes, Terrorism, and Emerging Infections

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Title: Food Supply Protection in an Age of Biocrimes, Terrorism, and Emerging Infections


1
Food Supply Protection in an Age of Biocrimes,
Terrorism, and Emerging Infections
  • Bruce Clements, MPH
  • Associate Director, Saint Louis University,
    Institute for Biosecurity

2
Objectives
  • Discuss current food supply vulnerabilities
  • Provide case examples exemplifying food risks
  • List the potential pathogenic agents of concern
    and methods of delivery
  • Describe international and national initiatives
    to protect the food supply
  • Explain local measures to reduce food supply
    vulnerability

3
Sources of Terrorism
  • State-Sponsored Programs
  • Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, North Korea
  • Ideological Extremists
  • Domestic (e.g. Anti-Government, Militia, Single
    Issue Radicals)
  • New World Terrorists
  • Religious extremists (e.g. Aum Shinrikyo)
  • International (e.g. Osama bin Laden)
  • Lone Wolves
  • Unabombers with specialized chemical/biological/
    nuclear training

4
Trends in Terrorism
Source Terrorism in the United States, 1999,
Report from the Counterterrorism Threat
Assessment and Warning Unit, Federal Bureau of
Investigation
5
Changing Goals of Terrorism
  • Historically
  • LOW CASUALTY, HIGH VISIBILITY
  • (Political concessions and media attention)
  • Today
  • MASS CASUALTIES
  • (Weapons of mass destruction are appealing)

From small car bombs to...
6
Weapons of Mass DestructionCBRNE (Formerly
NBC, CBR, WMD, etc.)
  • C Chemical Nerve, Blister, Blood, Choking,
    Incapacitant
  • B Biological Bacteria, Virus, Toxins,
    Rickettsia
  • R Radiological Dirty bomb
  • N Nuclear Detonation or Nuclear facility
    attack
  • E Explosive Any device that rapidly releases
    gas heat

7
FBI Definition of Terrorism
  • Terrorism is
  • Unlawful use of force and violence against
    persons or property
  • Intended to intimidate or coerce
  • Committed in support of political or social
    objectives.

Source Code of Federal Regulations Title
28--JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, CHAPTER
I--DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PART 0, Subpart
P--Federal Bureau of Investigation, Section 0.85
General functions.
8
One Definition of Bioterrorism
"Bioterrorism - The unlawful use, or
threatened use, of microorganisms or toxins
derived from living organisms to produce death or
disease in humans, animals, or plants. The act
is intended to create fear and/or intimidate
governments or societies in the pursuit of
political, religious, or ideological goals.
Note There is no single, universally accepted
definition of bioterrorism.
9
The Threats Are Changing
  • We have worried about
  • Airports / Aircraft
  • Public Transportation Systems
  • Public Buildings / Commerce Centers
  • We now need to consider the threat of
    bioterrorism, ecoterrorism, and agroterrorism as
    they relate to
  • Food Supply
  • Targeting Humans Indirectly
  • Targeting Crops and Animals Directly
  • Drinking Water
  • Natural Resources

10
History of Biological Warfare
  • 400 BC Scythian archers used arrows dipped in
    blood and manure
  • 300 BC Persian, Greek, and Roman literature
    provide examples of using animal cadavers to
    contaminate water supplies
  • 190 BC Hannibal hurled venomous snakes onto
    enemy ships of King Eumenes

11
History of Biological Warfare
  • 1155 Battle of Tortona Barbarossa put dead
    bodies in enemy water supplies
  • 1346 Siege of Caffa - Mongols catapulted bodies
    of plague victims over the city walls
  • 1718 Reval, Estonia - Russians tried the same
    tactic against Sweden

12
History of Biological Warfare
  • 1763 French Indian War During the Pontiac
    Rebellion in New England British forces gave
    smallpox inoculated blankets to Native Americans
  • 1863 Civil War Retreating Confederate troops
    left dead animals in water sources to deny safe
    water to advancing Union soldiers

13
History of Biological Warfare
  • 1915-18 World War I German BW Program
  • Developed anthrax, glanders, cholera, and wheat
    fungus as weapons Primarily targeting cavalry
    animals

14
History of Biological Warfare
  • 1932-1945 Japanese BW Program
  • 1942-1957 U.K. BW Program
  • 1942-1969 U.S. BW Program
  • 1920-1990 U.S.S.R. BW Program Biopreparat
    Corporation- a cover for the Soviet BW Program
  • Today At least 17 nations are suspected of
    having an offensive BW Program

15
History of Biological Warfare
  • During World War II, Canada, Great Britain,
    Japan, the United States, and the USSR studied
    many diseases including
  • Anthrax, brucellosis, and glanders, which are
    both antipersonnel and antianimal agents
  • Other primarily defensive work was done on
    rinderpest, Newcastle disease, and fowl plague
  • Crop diseases evaluated and/or produced for
    potential agroterrorism included late blight of
    potato, rice blast, brown spot of rice, rubber
    leaf blight, southern blight, and wheat rusts

16
Recent History of Ecoterrorism
  • 1989 The Animal Liberation Front set timed
    incendiary devices beneath a meat company in
    Monterey, California
  • 1993 A pipe bomb exploded in a window of an
    unoccupied USDA predator-control office in
    Southeast Portland
  • 1997 A 1.3 million slaughterhouse was burned
    down in Redmond, WA on behalf of the Animal
    Liberation Front
  • 1998 Seven fires broke out on Vail Mountain,
    Colorado, causing 12 million in damage the
    Earth Liberation Front (ELF) claimed
    responsibility

17
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
  • PETA has been described as by far the most
    successful radical organization in America
  • President and co-founder, Ingrid Newkirk is
    seeking total animal liberation
  • No meat or dairy, no aquariums, no circuses, no
    hunting or fishing, no fur or leather, no
    research using animals, no use of seeing eye dogs
  • PETA handles press for the Animal Liberation
    Front (ALF), a group of underground extremists
    who
  • Plant firebombs in restaurants, destroy butcher
    shops, and burn down research labs
  • PETAs vegan campaign director stated, It would
    be great if all the fast food outlets,
    slaughterhouses, test laboratories, and banks
    that fund them exploded tomorrow.

18
Food Security Defined by the U.N.
  • Food security exists when all people, at all
    times, have access to sufficient, safe and
    nutritious food to meet their dietary needs for
    an active and healthy life.
  • 1996 World Food Summit, Rome, Italy

19
Food borne Disease Threats
  • Viral  
  • Hepatitis A Virus
  • Norovirus (formerly know as Norwalk-like virus)
  • Rotavirus 
  • Viral gastroenteritis 
  • Parasitic  
  • Amebiasis
  • Ascaris, Roundworms 
  • Cryptosporidiosis 
  • Cyclospora infection
  • Cysticercosis
  • Giardiasis
  • Toxoplasmosis 
  • Trichinosis
  • Bacterial  
  • Botulism 
  • Brainerd Diarrhea 
  • Campylobacter 
  • Cholera 
  • Clostridium botulinum 
  • E.coli O157H7  
  • Listeriosis 
  • Salmonella Enteritidis 
  • Salmonellosis 
  • Shigellosis 
  • Typhoid Fever 
  • Vibrio vulnificus

Source CDC Division of Bacterial and Mycotic
Diseases, Food Safety Office
20
Early Intentional Foodborne Outbreaks
  • 1960s Several Japanese outbreaks of typhoid and
    dysentery traced to research biologist
    intentionally contaminating food items
  • 1970 4 Canadian students were ill after
    consuming food contaminated with embryonated
    Ascaris suum ova, a large roundworm infecting
    pigs

21
Case I - Raising Suspicion
  • September 1984, The Dalles, Oregon
  • 10 salad bars contaminated with Salmonella
    bacteria
  • More than 750 people became sick
  • Officials slow to identify the outbreak as
    deliberate
  • We really lost our innocence over this. We
    weren't suspicious enough." Michael Skeels of the
    Oregon State Public Health Laboratory in
    Portland.

22
Case II - Failing to Report
  • Saturday, in March 1997
  • Sun Harbor Airport, Phoenix, Arizona
  • 737 arrives from Acapulco, 50 on board
    w/diarrhea
  • Plane offloads 25 passengers to ambulances
  • 6 patients admitted to local hospital
  • County Health Officer learned of the event
    listening to the radio (NPR) the following Monday
  • Public Health had no names and no stool samples
  • The aircraft was cleaned, reloaded and continued
    to Detroit the same day

23
Case III Food Supply Vulnerability
  • January 2003, Michigan
  • Four families (18 people) experienced acute
    illness
  • Burning of the mouth, nausea, vomiting, dizziness
  • Recall of 1,700 pounds of beef
  • 148 more illnesses reported following recall
  • Four hospitalized, no fatalities
  • February 12, 2003, supermarket employee indicted
  • Poisoned 200 pounds of meat with Black Leaf 40
    insecticide, primary ingredient is nicotine

24
Case IV Biocrime in Dallas
Lessons from a Shigella dysenteriae Type 2
Outbreak due to Intentional Food Contamination at
a Dallas, Texas Hospital
Key Reference Kolavic, SA, et al, An Outbreak
of Shigella dysenteriae Type 2 Among Laboratory
Workers Due to Intentional Food Contamination.
JAMA 1997 278(5) 396-398
25
Shigella dysenteriae Type 2
  • Rare organism
  • Also known as Schmitz bacillus
  • Does not produce Shiga toxin
  • Much less severe infection than Type 1
  • Initial symptoms Nausea, abdominal discomfort,
    and bloating. Followed approximately 24hrs later
    by diarrhea
  • Infection confirmed with positive stool culture
    for S dysenteriae

26
Outbreak of Shigella dysenteriae Type 2
  • Dallas, Texas A large Medical Center
  • 29 Oct 1 Nov 96 12 Laboratory workers
    experienced severe gastrointestinal illness
  • All had eaten pastries left in their breakroom
    between the night and morning shifts on October
    29th 1996

27
Outbreak of Shigella dysenteriae Type 2
  • Case definition Lab worker with GI symptoms
    after 29 October
  • W/Positive stool sample for S dysenteriae
  • W/Oral temp gt37.8C (gt100F)
  • Demographics Mean age 41 years (range, 33-52
    yrs) and 9 (75) were female
  • All 12 consulted a physician
  • 5 treated in Emergency Departments released
  • 4 hospitalized, 8 received IV fluids

28
Lessons from Dallas Outbreak of S dysenteriae
Type 2
  • Covert contamination of food items is one of the
    most uncomplicated forms of bioterrorism
  • Do not consume food or drink items of an unknown
    origin
  • Better lab security is needed
  • Control access to laboratory stock cultures
  • Lock storage freezers
  • Maintain documentation of every individual
    gaining access

29
Former Secretary of DHHS Outgoing Comments
  • "I cannot understand for the life of me why the
    terrorists have not attacked our food supply,
    because it's so easy to do, and we're importing a
    lot of food from the Middle East and it'd be easy
    to tamper with that"
  • He said the government has made some progress in
    food biosecurity food-import inspections have
    increased from 12,000 to 98,000 per year, and
    laws now require businesses to give advance
    notice of the arrival of food shipments from
    abroad.
  • "But it still is a very minute amount that we're
    doing," Thompson said. "We've got more tools, but
    two areas pandemic flu and food security need a
    lot more work."

30
Technological Progress
  • Modern technology has transformed the
    production, storage, and preparation of food. 
    What once was a relatively simple system of local
    farming and home preparation is today complex
    involving producers, processors, distributors,
    and retailers.  As a result, at many points in
    the food chain, food safety becomes
    compromised.  Moeller, D.W. Environmental
    Health,
  • Harvard University Press 1997.

31
Increasing Vulnerability
  • Requires a low level of technical expertise
  • Food production and distribution is multi-layered
    and complex with many opportunities for tampering
  • Numerous opportunities for food supply access by
  • Random Individuals
  • Employees
  • Activists
  • Criminal Organizations
  • Terrorists
  • Numerous chemical and biological agents are
    effective
  • The globalization of our food supply increases
    risk

32
Why Would A Terrorist Target A Farm?
  • Opportunity 2 million plus farms average size,
    500 acres
  • Specific targeting most farms grow one crop/one
    livestock
  • High concentration of livestock in feed lots,
    sale barns
  • Disease agents require little specialized
    expertise
  • Agroterrorism agents easy to conceal, easy to
    distribute
  • Cost-effective A small amount can produce an
    epidemic
  • Low physical risk to carrier, high potential for
    disruption

33
How Bad Could It Be?
  • A single vial of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD)
    could spread through an entire state within a
    week
  • In 2001, an FMD outbreak in the UK cost more than
    10 billion over 11 months.
  • Related industries, such as transportation, feed
    suppliers, retailers adversely affected.
  • Agriculture directly or indirectly accounts for
    more than 800,000 jobs in the U.S.
  • Agricultural exports are 140 billion annually

34
Agricultural Vulnerabilities
  • Concentrated and intensive contemporary farming
    practices
  • Highly crowded breeding and rearing conditions
  • Outbreak of a contagious disease would be very
    difficult to contain
  • Could require the destruction of all exposed
    livestock
  • Increased susceptibility of livestock to disease
  • This has occurred because of changes in husbandry
    practices
  • Sterilization programs
  • Dehorning, branding, and hormone injections
  • Overuse and misuse of antibiotics
  • Insufficient farm/food-related security and
    surveillance
  • Farms seldom incorporate vigorous means to
    prevent unauthorized access
  • Most animal auctions and barn sales are devoid of
    organized on-site surveillance
  • Food processing and packing plants tend to lack
    uniform security and safety

Source Rand Research Brief, 2004
35
Agricultural Vulnerabilities
  • An inefficient passive disease-reporting system
  • Responsibility for reporting unusual occurrences
    of animal disease lies with livestock producers
  • They may have disincentives for reporting due to
    the lack of a consistent program for agricultural
    indemnity
  • Inappropriate veterinarian and diagnostic
    training
  • The number of veterinarians able to recognize and
    treat foreign livestock diseases is declining
  • Reflects a relatively underpaid profession that
    suffers from a lack of appropriate training in
    exotic animal disease epidemiology
  • A focus on aggregate rather than individual
    livestock statistics
  • The movement toward larger herds and breeding
    operations largely precludes the option of
    attending to animals individually
  • Makes it more likely that emerging diseases will
    be overlooked.

Source Rand Research Brief, 2004
36
Soybean Production
  • Today, farmers across the U.S. grow soybeans that
    have been harvested into yields of about 2
    billion bushes a year. About half of U.S.
    soybeans are exported to major markets including
    the European Community, Japan, Taiwan, Mexico and
    South Korea. More soybeans are grown in the U.S.
    than anywhere else in the world.

37
Soybean Rust
  • An extremely serious fungal disease of soybean
  • First reported in the continental United States
    in November of 2004. Carried in by Hurricanes
  • Currently, soybean rust has been found in
    Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
    Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina
    and Tennessee.
  • Soybean rust had previously been reported in
    Asia, Australia, Africa and South America, where
    yield losses due to the disease have ranged from
    10 to 80.

38
Jaffa Oranges Mercury
  • A 1970s plot by Palestinian terrorists to inject
    mercury into Jaffa oranges reduced Israels
    exports of citrus fruit to Europe by 40 percent

39
Chilean Grapes and Cyanide
  • 1989 incident in which a shipment of Chilean
    grapes to the United States tested positive for
    cyanide led to international trade suspensions
    that cost Chile 200 million.

40
Beef Safety
41
Foot and Mouth Disease
  • The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates that
    an attack on livestocka successful attempt to
    infect American cattle with a contagious disease
    such as foot-and-mouth, for examplecould cause
    between 10 billion and 30 billion in damage to
    the U.S. economy.

Vesicles on the foot of a pig (Image kindly
provided by Dr. Juan Lubroth)
Vesicle on the teat of a cow (Image kindly
provided by Dr. Juan Lubroth)
Excessive salivation in a bovine (Image kindly
provided by Dr. Juan Lubroth)
42
Prevention and Response
  • Distinguishing between a deliberate act and an
    inadvertent or natural food outbreak can be
    difficult
  • Therefore the threat must be addressed at every
    level
  • The national level, through policies designed to
    minimize the social and economic costs of an
    outbreak
  • The agricultural sector level, through disease
    surveillance, detection, and response procedures
  • The farm level, through facility management
    techniques designed to prevent disease
    introduction or transmission
  • The organism level, through animal and plant
    disease resistance

Source Anne Kohnen Responding to the Threat of
Agroterrorism Specific Recommendations for the
USDA
43
FDA Regulations
  • October 9, 2003
  • Two FDA regulations enable better targeted
    efforts to monitor and inspect imported foods
  • May 27, 2004
  • FDA Rule on Administrative Detention of Suspect
    Food
  • December 6, 2004
  • FDA Rule on the Establishment and Maintenance of
    Records to Enhance the Security of the U.S. Food
    Supply Under the Bioterrorism Act

Source FDA Food Safety an Terrorism,
http//www.cfsan.fda.gov/dms/fsterr.html
44
FDA Food Code
  • FDA publishes the Food Code
  • Serves as a model to assist food control
    jurisdictions at all levels of government by
    providing them with a scientifically sound
    technical and legal basis for regulating the
    retail and food service segment of the industry
  • Local, state, tribal, and federal regulators use
    the FDA Food Code as a model to develop or update
    their own food safety rules and to be consistent
    with national food regulatory policy

Source FDA FOOD CODE, http//www.cfsan.fda.gov/d
ms/foodcode.htmlget01
45
USDA Regulations
  • USDA finalized regulations on agricultural select
    agents and toxins in March 2005
  • The USDAs Animal and Plant Health Inspection
    Service provides lists of regulated select agents
    and toxins
  • The regulations govern possession, use and
    transfer of these agents and toxins, which have
    the potential to pose a severe threat to public
    health and safety, to animal or plant health, or
    to animal or plant products
  • Final rule revises format and content of USDA
    regulations, which prescribe registration,
    biocontainment / biosafety, incident response and
    security measures for facilities handling these
    agents and toxins to protect against the use of
    such agents in domestic or international terrorism

Source USDA Agricultural Select Agent Program,
http//www.aphis.usda.gov/programs/ag_selectagent/
ag_bioterr_forms.html
46
FDA / USDA HACCP Training Program
  • Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
    (HACCP)
  • Food safety program developed nearly 30 years ago
    for astronauts
  • Prevention based approach
  • FDA also established HACCP for
  • The seafood industry in a final rule December 18,
    1995
  • The juice industry in a final rule released
    January 19, 2001
  • Final rule for juice industry took effect on
    January 22, 2002 for large and medium businesses,
    January 21, 2003 for small businesses, and
    January 20, 2004 for very small businesses
  • In 1998, the USDA established HACCP for meat and
    poultry processing plants
  • FDA considering new regulations to establish
    HACCP as the food safety standard throughout
    other areas of the food industry, including both
    domestic and imported food products

HACCP Education Site http//www.nal.usda.gov/fnic
/foodborne/haccp/index.shtml
47
7 Principles of HACCP
  • Analyze hazards. Potential hazards associated
    with a food and measures to control those hazards
    are identified. The hazard could be biological,
    such as a microbe chemical, such as a toxin or
    physical, such as ground glass or metal
    fragments.
  • Identify critical control points. These are
    points in a food's production--from its raw state
    through processing and shipping to consumption by
    the consumer--at which the potential hazard can
    be controlled or eliminated. Examples are
    cooking, cooling, packaging, and metal detection.
  • Establish preventive measures with critical
    limits for each control point. For a cooked food,
    for example, this might include setting the
    minimum cooking temperature and time required to
    ensure the elimination of any harmful microbes.

Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
48
7 Principles of HACCP
  • Establish procedures to monitor the critical
    control points. Such procedures might include
    determining how and by whom cooking time and
    temperature should be monitored
  • Establish corrective actions to be taken when
    monitoring shows that a critical limit has not
    been met--for example, reprocessing or disposing
    of food if the minimum cooking temperature is not
    met
  • Establish procedures to verify that the system is
    working properly--for example, testing
    time-and-temperature recording devices to verify
    that a cooking unit is working properly
  • Establish effective record keeping to document
    the HACCP system. This would include records of
    hazards and their control methods, the monitoring
    of safety requirements and action taken to
    correct potential problems

Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
49
USDA Tool
  • Industry Self Assessment Checklist for Food
    Security
  • http//www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/Self_Assessment_Check
    list_Food_Security.pdf
  • 9 Sections
  • Food Security Management Plan
  • Outside Security
  • Inside Security
  • Slaughter and Processing Security
  • Storage Security
  • Shipping and Receiving Security
  • Water and Ice Supply Security
  • Mail Handling Security
  • Personal Security

50
Reportable Avian (Bird) Diseases
  • Avian infectious encephalomyelitis
  • Avian influenza
  • Fowl typhoid (salmonella gallinarum)
  • Infectious laryngotracheitis
  • Mycoplasma gallisepticum (MG)
  • Mycoplasma meleagridis (MM)
  • Mycoplasma synoviae (MS)
  • Paramyxovirus infection (other than Newcastle
    Disease)
  • Psittacosis (chlamydiosis and ornithosis)
  • Pullorum disease (salmonella pullorum)
  • Salmonellosis caused by Salmonella enteritidis
  • Velogenic viscerotropic Newcastle disease

Source Missouri Department of Agriculture
51
Reportable Bovine (Cattle) Diseases
  • Akabane
  • Anthrax
  • Bluetongue
  • Bovine babesiosis (Texas fever, piroplasmosis)
  • Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)
  • Brucellosis
  • Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia
  • East coast fever (coastal fever, theileriosis)
  • Ephemeral fever (3-day sickness)
  • Foot-and-mouth disease
  • Gonderiosis (theileriosis)
  • Heartwater
  • Hemorrhagic septicemia (Asiatic type 1 A shipping
    fever)
  • Ibaraki
  • Infectious petechial fever
  • Louping III
  • Lumpy skin disease (pseudourticaria)
  • Malignant catarrhal fever
  • Paratuberculosis
  • Pseudorabies
  • Q-fever
  • Rift valley fever
  • Rinderpest (cattle plague)
  • Scabies
  • Screwworm
  • Sweating sickness (tick-borne toxicosis)
  • Tuberculosis
  • Trypanosomiasis (nagana)
  • Vesicular stomatitis
  • Wesselborne disease

Source Missouri Department of Agriculture
52
Reportable Caprine-Ovine (Goat Sheep) Diseases
  • Bluetongue
  • Borna disease
  • Brucellosis caused by Brucella meletensis and B.
    ovis
  • Caseous lymphadenitis
  • Contagious agalactia of sheep and goats
  • Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia
  • Foot-and-mouth disease
  • Goat and sheep pox
  • Gonderiosis (theileriosis)
  • Heartwater
  • Nairobi sheep disease
  • Peste des petits ruminants (kata)
  • Screwworm
  • Tuberculosis
  • Rift Valley fever
  • Scabies
  • Scrapie
  • Vesicular stomatitis
  • Visna-Maedi (chronic progressive pneumonia)

Source Missouri Department of Agriculture
53
Reportable Equine (Horse) Diseases
  • African Horse sickness
  • Babesiosis (piroplasmosis)
  • Contagious equine metritis
  • Dourine (equine trypanosomiasis)
  • Eastern equine encephalomyelitis
  • Epizootic lymphangitis
  • Equine infectious anemia (EIA)
  • Equine piroplasmosis
  • Equine rhinopneumonitis
  • Equine viral arteritis
  • Glanders
  • Potomac horse fever
  • Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis
  • Vesicular Stomatitis
  • Western equine encephalomyelitis

Source Missouri Department of Agriculture
54
Reportable Porcine (Pig) Diseases
  • African swine fever
  • Brucellosis
  • Foot-and-mouth disease
  • Hog cholera
  • Porcine babesiosis
  • Pseudorabies
  • Swine vesicular disease
  • Teschen disease (porcine encephalomyelitis)
  • Vesicular exanthema
  • Vesicular stomatitis

Source Missouri Department of Agriculture
55
Reportable Diseases for All Species
  • Anthrax
  • Brucellosis
  • Exotic myiasis
  • Foot-and-mouth disease
  • Paratuberculosis (Johnes disease)
  • Rabies
  • Tuberculosis
  • Vesicular exanthema
  • Vesicular stomatitis

Source Missouri Department of Agriculture
56
Reportable Animal Diseases With Human
Transmission Risk
  • Anthrax
  • Arthropod-borne encephalitides
  • Eastern equine encephalitis
  • LaCrosse encephalitis
  • St. Louis encephalitis
  • Venezuelan equine encephalitis
  • West Nile encephalitis
  • Western equine encephalitis
  • Brucellosis
  • Chlamydia trachomatis infections
  • E. Coli 0157H7
  • Ehrlichiosis
  • Glanders
  • Hantavirus
  • Histoplasmosis outbreak
  • Leptospirosis
  • Lyme disease
  • Psittacosis
  • Q-fever
  • Rabies
  • Rocky Mountain spotted fever
  • Salmonella infections
  • Trichinosis
  • Tuberculosis
  • Tularemia

These diseases must be reported to the Missouri
Department of Health at (573) 751-6113 within 24
hours of suspicion or diagnosis
Source Missouri Department of Agriculture
57
Local Level Preparedness Measures
  • Food Industry Managers
  • Practice and enforce standard food safety
    protocols
  • Understand incoming and outgoing supply chain
  • Expand thinking to consider ways to reduce
    tampering risks
  • All Food Industry Workers (farm to fork)
  • Upgrade integrity of supply chain
  • Protect facilities and product
  • Prevent tampering and contamination
  • Do not wait for legislation
  • Proactively look at your operational security
  • Know your employees, contractors, suppliers
  • Restrict facility access and report suspicious
    activity

58
Food Tampering
  • Signs to look for in tampered food include
  • In packaged food look for broken seals, unusual
    stains, unusual smells, damaged packaging or
    other breaks in packaging
  • For unpackaged food, be vigilant of suspicious
    activity, especially in unsupervised food areas
    and around condiments or utensils used with food
    such as straws or plastic cutlery
  • If you see any suspicious activity contact the
    police immediately
  • If you suspect food has been tampered with
  • DO NOT SNIFF, TOUCH, EAT OR TASTE THE FOOD. If
    someone becomes sick after handling a suspect
    product call an ambulance immediately
  • Do not to handle the product unnecessarily

59
Prevention Issues
  • Intelligence measures (identify potential
    threats understand motivations predict
    behavior)
  • Monitoring programs (detect/track specific
    pathogens/diseases)
  • Establishment of laboratories to research the
    most-virulent diseases
  • International counterproliferation treaties,
    protocols, and agreements
  • Creation of agent-specific resistance in
    livestock
  • Specific vaccination against the most-threatening
    animal disease agents
  • Modification (where possible) of vulnerable
    food/agriculture practices
  • Biosecurity and surveillance
  • Education and training (federal, state, and
    local)

SOURCE Henry Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism
A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat, McNair
Paper,65,Washington,D.C.,National Defense
University,March 00
60
Response Issues
  • Early detection of exotic/foreign pathogenic
    agents
  • Early prediction of disease dispersion patterns
  • Early containment procedures
  • Epidemiology and treatment
  • Depopulation and carcass disposal
  • Diplomatic/legal/economic/ political responses
  • Compensation and indemnity
  • Education and training
  • Public awareness and outreach programs
  • Vaccine and pharmaceutical stockpiling

SOURCE Henry Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism
A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat, McNair
Paper,65,Washington,D.C.,National Defense
University,March 00
61
Additional Resources
  • U.S. Food Drug Administration, Center for Food
    Safety Applied Nutrition, Foodborne Pathogenic
    Microorganismsand Natural Toxins Handbook (The
    Bad Bug Book)
  • http//www.cfsan.fda.gov/mow/intro.html
  • FDA Food Safety and Terrorism Information
  • http//www.cfsan.fda.gov/dms/fsterr.html
  • Foreign Animal Diseases The Gray Book
  • http//www.vet.uga.edu/vpp/gray_book/index.htm
  • Gateway to US Government Food Safety Information
  • http//www.foodsafety.gov/
  • Community Food Safety Education Program
  • http//www.fightbac.org/factsht.cfm
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