The Politics of North Korea in Japan

1
The Politics of North Korea in Japan

• Rust M. Deming

2
Introduction

• The normalization of relations with North Korea
  represents one of the two major Japanese foreign
  policy issues remaining from WWII. (The other is
  a peace treaty with Russia.)
• Today I will examine the background of this
  issue, the efforts made by Japan to normalize
  relations with the North, and current impasse
  over the abduction, nuclear, and missile issues.
• I will also discuss the current strains between
  Washington and Tokyo over approaches to North
  Korea.
  
• I will conclude with some thoughts about the
  future evolution of Japan-North Korean
  relations.
  

3
The Political Setting In Japan

• Since 1945, the Korean issue has created a deep
  divide in Japanese politics
  
• Cold War polarization
• The Japanese Left attracted to Kim Il Sungs
  Socialist Paradise
  
• ROK US puppet
• Conservative establishment supported ROK
• Korean War deepened divide
• Left
• ROK started war
• GOJ
• Still under Occupation so neutrality not an
  option
  
• Sent Japanese minesweepers
• Japanese firms provided logistical support
• Korean War contributed to major economic boom

4
Divided Interpretations in Japanese Politics of
Japans Korean Legacy

• Japanese Left regarded Japans 40 - year
  occupation of Korea as an example of Japanese
  imperialism and exploitation
  
• Japanese Right defended colonial period as
  leaving a largely positive legacy of economic
  development and education
  
• Left/Right divide on treatment of Korean
  residents of Japan
  
• Left supported greater rights for resident Koreans

5
Japans Korean Community

• Korean community in Japan divided on North/South
  lines
  
• Chosen Soren
• Supported North
• Originally about 2/3s of 700,000 Korean
  community
  
• Schools, well developed social networks
• Channeled remittances to Pyongyang
• Supported 1959-1984 repatriation to DPRK of
  87,000 Koreans
  
• 6000 Japanese spouses also went to North Korea
• Mindan
• Supported ROK
• Originally About 1/3 of Korean Community
• Less structured than Chosen Soren
• Membership less political, more integrated
• GOJ allowed Korean residents to register only as
  ROK citizens

6
Japans Normalization with the ROK

• ROK-Japan relations not normalized until 1965,
  reflecting the complex history between Japan and
  Korea
  
• First ROK President Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) not
  interested in normalizing
  
• Left in Japan opposed to normalization with ROK,
  pushed for normalization with DPRK
  
• US pushed GOJ to establish diplomatic ties with
  ROK

7
Elements of Japan-ROK Normalization

• Treaty with apology deep remorse
• ROK government only lawful government, from UN
  resolution language
  
• Reflected ROK desire to block Japan-DPRK
  relations
  
• Claims/reparations
• GOJ position Japan-Korea not at war
• But renounced all claims to property
• 1.5 billion aid package
• Fisheries agreement
• Status of 700,000 Koreans in Japan
• Legal residency for those in Japan in 1945 and
  their children
  

8
GOJ-ROK Relations Developed Rapidly

• Trade expanded rapidly
• Sato agreement to Korea clause at Nixon Sato
  summit - 1969
  
• Connected to US agreement to return Okinawa to
  Japan
  
• Seen by US as GOJ intent to allow US use of bases
  to defend ROK
  
• Kim Dae Jung kidnapping by KCIA (1973) set back
  ties
  
• Nakasone breakthrough - 1982
• Visited ROK right after his assumption of office
• Took with him 4 billion aid package
• But still rocky periods
• History
• Fujio statement
• Textbooks

9
Japan-North Korea

• Normalization with North on Japans diplomatic
  agenda after 1965
  
• Balance ties with ROK
• Remove source of domestic political tension
• Trade incentives (DPRK and ROK economies
  essentially equivalent in 1965)
  
• But steady erosion of interest in Japan
• ROK economy took off
• US, ROK discouraged GOJ overtures to DPRK
• Japan had other priorities
• Okinawa return 1972
• China normalization

10
Japan-North Korea (2)

• Norths increasingly aberrant behavior added to
  problem
  
• North gave sanctuary to Japan Red Army hijackers
  of Yodo airliner - 1970
  
• Suspected abduction of Japanese citizens -
  1979-83
  
• Rangoon bombing
• KAL bombing 1987
• GOJ essentially left relations with DPRK to JSP
• Part of quiet division of labor under the 1955
  system
  
• Private trade and fisheries agreements but no
  formal ties

11
Japan -North Korea (3)

• Post Cold War revival of interest
• Roh Tae Woo initiatives toward North (1988)
  opened door for GOJ
  
• Led to NK-ROK agreements on reconciliation/denucl
  earization 1991
  
• ROK normalization with Moscow (1990) and PRC
  (1992)
  
• Opened door for ROK/DPRK UN membership (1991)
• Kanemaru-JSP mission (1990)
• Designed to set terms for negotiations on
  normalization
  
• Kanemaru (Mr. Abouto) poor negotiator
• Japanese delegation agreed to compensate DPRK not
  only for colonial period but for post war
  division - repudiated by GOJ
  
• But did agree on basic issues to be negotiated
• 1) Settlement of basic issues of past with
  treaty
  
• 2) Economics, including reparations
• 3) International issues, N-S, nukes
• 4) Humanitarian (abductions) - Megumi Yokota
• Eight rounds of negotiations with little
  results
  
• Disagreement over amount/terms of compensation

12
Japan-North Korea (4)

• 1990s fluctuations
• 1992-94 cool nuclear issue erupts
• 1995-97 - Revitalized
• Jimmy Carter visit - GOJ joins KEDO, contributes
  1billion for LWR
  
• GOJ provides food, humanitarian aid to North
• Resumption of normalization negotiations, return
  of Japanese spouses
  
• 1997-99 downturn
• Abduction issue families organized
• Taepodong missile launch over Japan - key event
• Japan developed laws to control funds to DPRK
• GOJ unhappy with muted US response led to
  satellite program
  
• Spy boat intrusion
• Fundamentally hardened Japanese attitudes toward
  North Korea
  
• Even long-time supporters on Left backed away
  from DPRK
  
• Support in Korean community greatly weakened
• New generation less political
• Increased integration of Korean community into
  Japanese society

13
The Koizumi Era

• Koizumi visit to Pyongyang in Sept. 2002
• Wanted to make historic breakthrough
• Settle one of last pending WW II issues
• Give Japan greater diplomatic leverage,
  flexibility
  
• Speculation that Bushs tough approach to NK may
  have led Pyongyang to soften toward Japan
  
• Secret negotiations kept from US
• Visit produced mixed results
• NK revealed 13 abductions, eight dead
• Included one person GOJ was unaware of
• North apologized
• Allowed five survivors to visit Japan
• Koizumi demanded full explanation
• But revelations produced backlash in Japan
• Suspicions became confirmed reality
• Almost complete erosion of public support in
  Japan for North Korea

14
The Koizumi Era (2)

• Visit did produce some positive results
• North agreed to
• Nuclear would stand by agreements
• Long-range missiles continue moratorium on
  tests
  
• Normalization
• Accepted Murayama statement as basis for apology
• Accepted ROK formula for reparations
• Breakdown of negotiations
• Oct. 2002
• GOJ did not return five survivors visiting Japan
• North accused Japan of breaking agreement

15
Koizumi Era (3)

• Second summit May 2004
• North allowed family members to leave
• Promised further investigations of abductions
• But remains of Megumi Yokota did not match DNA
• Comprehensive talks 2006
• DPRK stiffed Japan on further investigations

16
Japans Response to Nuclear North Korea - Oct.
2006

• July 4-5 2006 missile tests by DPRK led to
  sanctions
  
• Ban on port calls by weekly ferry linking
  Niigata-Wonson, charter flights, remittances for
  groups linked to WMD
  
• Oct. nuclear test -Japans reaction strong but
  measured
  
• GOJ played lead role at UNSC on resolution
  condemning DPRK
  
• Japan banned all North Korean ships from
  Japanese ports -impact on fund transfers - and
  all DPRK imports
  
• Reinforced public support for missile defense
• Net result
• Further hardening of Japanese public attitudes
  toward the North
  
• Reinforced when Abe became PM in late Sept. 2006
• Abes popularity largely a result of hard stance
  on DPRK

17
The Gap Between the US and Japan on North Korea
after Norths tests

• Tokyo and Washington had been the hardliners
  among the Six Parties
  
• Some ambivalence in Tokyo about refusal of Bush
  administration to engage directly with North
  
• But happy with Washingtons strong support on
  abduction issue
  
• Bush meeting with families

18
US-Japan Gap (2)

• US shift on North Korea not clearly signaled to
  Tokyo
  
• Complex policy and bureaucratic background
• Nuclear test changed stakes for US
• Rumsfeld, Bolton departures
• Hardliners weakened
• Sec. Rice, Chris Hill got Presidents support for
  engagement
  
• Hills Berlin meeting alarmed GOJ
• Agreement on terms of Banco Delta Asia settlement
  cleared way for resumption of Six Party talks

19
Feb. 13, 2007 Beijing Six Party Denuclearization
Action Plan

• Implementation of Sept. 2005 Six Party Agreement
• Five parallel actions agreed on
• DPRK shuts down Yongbyon, invites IAEA back
• DPRK to list all its nuclear programs, including
  separated Pu
  
• US-DPRK normalization talks - removal of DPRK
  from terrorism list, etc.
  
• Japan-DPRK normalization talks
• Resolve unfortunate past and outstanding
  issues of concern
  
• Economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance for
  DPRK
  
• 50,000 tons of fuel oil in 60 days
• GOJ reluctantly went along but did not join
  supply of oil

20
Oct. 3, 2007 Second Phase Actions to Implement
Joint Statement

• Spelled out details and timetable for
  declaration, disablement by end of 2007
  
• DPRK commitment not to transfer nuclear material
  and technology
  
• US reaffirmed its intent to remove DPRK from
  terrorism list, tied to declaration, disabling of
  reactor, reprocessing, fabrication facilities
  
• Japan, DPRK to make sincere effortsto
  normalize
  
• Reaffirmed aid, oil, to DPRK

21
GOJ - US Tensions

• GOJ unhappy with USG de-linkage of abduction
  issue from the removal of DPRK from US list of
  state sponsors of terrorism
  
• Seen as a betrayal and undercutting GOJ
  leverage with North
  
• US unhappy with GOJs parochial perspective
• De-nuclear DPRK highest priority for US, Japan,
  region, world
  
• Delisting one of few carrots US has to offer
• US terrorism list relates only to recent actions
• PM Fukuda appears to be looking for greater
  flexibility but has little room to maneuver
  
• Separate abductions from nuclear issue
• Tie abduction resolution to final normalization

22
Recent Developments

• US-DPRK Singapore meeting - March 2008
• US seeking promised full declaration of all DPRK
  nuclear programs, including clarification of the
  uranium enrichment issue, that was due at end of
  2007
• Indication that earlier DPRK declaration
  inadequate
  
• US also seeking clarification of Syrian
  connection
  
• US also made clear that it will remove NK from US
  terrorism list if it produces declaration/clarific
  ations
  
• Form of clarifications unclear - Shanghai
  formula?
  
• On-going discussions within USG and with DPRK to
  flesh out the deal
  
• On-going USG-GOJ discussions on coordination
• Deputy Secretary Negropontes May 9 visit to
  Tokyo
  
• Continuing major source of tension in relations

23
Other Lurking US-Japan Differences on the DPRK

• Differing end-game priorities
• For US
• Non-proliferation is real red line
• Syrian connection very troubling
• Accounting and removal of plutonium essential
• Explanation of uranium enrichment program
• For GOJ
• Abductions - resolution is highest political
  priority
  
• Plutonium - insists on accounting/removal of all
  material
  
• Missiles - continued moratorium
• HEU - important but less central to GOJ concerns
• Non-proliferation - important but Syrian
  connection less central
  
• Potential for differing US and GOJ bottom lines

24
Conclusion - Whither Japan and North Korea?

• Japan-North Korean normalization essential
  element of long-term solution of the Korean
  Issue
  
• Strategic
• Remove a lingering source of tension in East
  Asia
  
• Resolve one of last WW II issues
• Economic
• Japanese aid, investment one of the keys to NK
  development
  
• Humanitarian
• Family reunifications

25
Barriers to Normalization

• Abduction Issue
• Extremely difficult to resolve
• GOJ demand
• Return all living victims to Japan
• Provide a full accounting of all victims
• Hand over those responsible for the abductions
• DPRK may be unable or unwilling to comply
• Most sensitive, and embarrassing, aspects of
  North Korean behavior are involved
  
• Tied to both Kims
• How do you prove a negative?

26
Barriers to Normalization (2)

• Nuclear Issue
• Represents direct threat to Japan
• Normalization conditioned on resolution of
  nuclear issue
  
• Freeze, disablement, dismantlement of Yongbyon
• Accounting for and export of all separated
  plutonium
  
• Missile Issue
• Taepodong poses unique threat to Japan
• Not a threat to ROK
• Not a credible threat to US given US nukes
• Tied to credibility of US nuclear umbrella
• Continued moratorium on tests essential condition
  of normalization

27
Barriers to Normalization (3)

• Dynamics of Japanese politics and public opinion
• Hardened attitudes toward DPRK in LDP
• Abe, Aso representative of uncompromising
  attitude
  
• Appeal to right wing in LDP
• Disinclined to follow Koizumis example
• Pro-DPRK lobby has essentially dried up
• Japan becoming more nationalist, less apologetic
  about the past
  
• Reduced tolerance of North Korean polemics
• Politics of guilt no longer works in Japan
• Lack of informal pipes between Japan and North
  Korea
  
• Economic disincentives
• GOJ budget deficits, reduced support for ODA
• Little interest in Japanese business community
• DPRK represents unattractive trade and investment
  target

28
Barriers to Normalization (4)

• North Korean attitudes toward Japan
• Pyongyang giving little apparent priority to ties
  with Tokyo after Koizumi visits
  
• Some Japanese believe that Pyongyang is convinced
  that isolating Tokyo is the best strategy
  
• Belief that if US moves toward DPRK, Japan will
  inevitably follow

29
Requirements for a Breakthrough

• A nuclear deal of some kind
• Continued missile test moratorium
• Some DPRK give on info about abductees
• Political will on both sides to make it happen
• Now apparently lacking in both Tokyo and
  Pyongyang