Towards Nuclear Weapons Capability for All? A Presentation by Henry Sokolski The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center www.npec-web.org - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Towards Nuclear Weapons Capability for All? A Presentation by Henry Sokolski The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center www.npec-web.org

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Nuclear Power 2008: Limited to Europe and 14 Non-European States ... Countries that have initialed or are discussing nuclear cooperation to build power reactors ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Towards Nuclear Weapons Capability for All? A Presentation by Henry Sokolski The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center www.npec-web.org


1
Towards Nuclear Weapons Capability for All?A
Presentation byHenry Sokolski The
Nonproliferation Policy Education
Centerwww.npec-web.org
  • Given before a forum by
  • the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
  • Senate Dirksen Office Building, Room 562
  • Washington, DC
  • June 23, 2008

2
Clinch River GNEPs Embarrassing Demonstration
Precursor
3
Nuclear Power 2008 Limited to Europe and 14
Non-European States
4
Current Proliferation Seems Manageable(With DPRK
Disarming and Iran Nonnuclear)
5
But at Least 18 States Since 2006 Have Announced
Plans to Build Large, Peaceful Nuclear Reactors
by 2020
  • Turkey (US, France)
  • Egypt (US, Fr. China)
  • S. Arabia, (Fr., US, Rus.)
  • UAE (France, US)
  • Yemen
  • Morocco (France)
  • Jordan (US, France)
  • Libya (US, France)
  • Algeria (Rus., Fr. US)
  • Applauded by Israeli officials as an
    announcement directed against Iran
  • Possibly interested in developing a nuclear
    weapons option
  • ( ) Countries that have initialed or are
    discussing nuclear cooperation to build power
    reactors
  • 31 states currently operate power reactors
  • Qatar (France)
  • Tunisia (France)
  • Syria (DPRK?)
  • Indonesia (RoK)
  • Bangladesh (Russia)
  • Nigeria
  • Vietnam (Russia)
  • Australia
  • Israel

6
Countries With Declared Civilian Programs that
Have Toyed with Nuclear Weapons Programs in the
Past
  • Reactors Only Reactors and Fuel
    Making
  • Taiwan o Iran
  • South Korea o Brazil
  • Algeria o Argentina
  • Iraq o India
  • Egypt o France
  • Israel o South Africa
  • Sweden
  • Italy
  • Known to have dedicated known civilian
    reactors to weapons program
  • actually acquired nuclear weapons

7
2030 2050 Power Reactor Projections
8
Nearly All of These Future Reactors Will Be
Proliferation Resistant LWRs
9
Estimated Yields for Different Bomb Technologies
Using One-cycle LWR Pu(Hubbard)
10
Small, Covert Reprocessing Plant Can Make 20 or
More Bombs/Month (e.g., Ferguson-Culler) from
Spent Fuel10-day startup, 1 bombs-worth-a-day
production rate
11
IAEA Has Yet to Detect Military
Efforts/Diversions in NPT States in a Timely
Manner (Mirroring US Intelligence)
  • Natanz
  • Iraqi EMIS
  • Libyan centrifuges
  • Syrian production reactor
  • Early North Korean reprocessing campaigns
  • North Korean uranium enrichment efforts
  • Taiwanese hot cell activities
  • RoK weapons efforts
  • Algerian fuel diversions

12
Fresh Fuels A Worry Too
  • 4,000 swus required to convert natural uranium
    into one bombs worth (20 kgs) of HEU
  • 700 swus 1/5th the effort or time is
    required to convert 3.5 fresh LEU fuel to one
    bombs worth (with 3,000 P-1 centrifuges this
    could reduce the time Iran needs to make its
    first bomb down to as little as 4 to 13 weeks)
  • 20 tons of fresh LWR fuel is brought every
    12-18 months and loaded in the reactor over a
    period of weeks.
  • Crushing, heating, and fluorinating the ceramic
    fresh fuel pellets is all that needed to get 3-4
    enriched UF6 feed

13
Finally, LWRs Projects Have Been Used to Cover
Nuclear Weapons Activities
  • Bushehr now has 1,300 Russian technicians and
    this number is about to double. What else might
    they be doing?
  • India feared to have transferred tritium
    extraction technology useful for nuclear weapons
    boosting on a safety assistance visit to
    Bushehr
  • Hundreds of Iranians trained in Russia and
    elsewhere on the entire fuel cycle
  • Bushehr used as a procurement cover for other
    weapons-related nuclear projects (enrichment,
    HWR, etc.)

14
Limiting Damage in the Middle East Bombing
Civilian Reactors for Peace
  • 1980 Iran bombs Iraqs peaceful IAEA-
    safeguarded large research Osirak reactor
  • 1981 Israel bombs Osirak
  • 1985-88 Iraq bombs Irans civilian
    IAEA-safe-guarded Bushehr power reactor 7
    separate times
  • 1991 US bombs Osirak
  • 1991 Iraq fires Scud against Dimona, what Israel
    claims is a electricity generating reactor
  • 2007 Israel bombs Syrian undeclared reactor

15
But Wont IAEA Safeguard Systems Prevent Fresh
and Spent Nuclear Fuel Diversions?
16
Not Unless They Are Upgraded
  • Of IAEAs 1,200 remote nuclear inspection
    cameras, nearly 800 still have no near-real-time
    feedback. Virtually all of the countries of
    concern have no near-real-time feedback
  • IAEA internal review of May 2005 found in that
    Over the past 6 years, there have been 12
    occasions when facility lights were turned off
    for a period greater than 30 hours See
    http//www.npec-web.org/Frameset.asp?PageTypeSing
    lePDFFile20070731-NPEC-ReportOnIaeaSafeguardsSys
    temPDFFolderReports
  • Of those 400 IAEA cameras that have near-time
    feedback today, many depend on internet
    connections that can be interrupted
  • US State Dept. officials requested NPEC
    self-censor 2 scenarios for spent fuel rod
    diversions scenarios that could evade IAEA
    detection entirely. Similar scenarios, it turns
    out, were described elsewhere on the web by
    IAEAs own Safeguards advisory group chairman.
    See http//www.npec-web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType
    SinglePDFFile20041022-GilinskyEtAl-LWRPDFFolder
    Essays

17
Also Too Hard Keeping Track of Declared Nuclear
Fuel Making
  • Sellafield (Euratom safeguards meeting IAEA
    criteria)
  • 29.6 kgs pu MUF (Feb. 2005)
  • 190 kgs pu in leak undetected for 8 months
  • Tokia Mura
  • MoX, 69 kgs pu MUF (l994)
  • scrap 100-150 kgs pu MUF (1996)
  • Pilot reprocessing 206kgs 59 kgs pu MUF (2003)
  • Commercial reprocessing 246 kgs/yr pu MUF (2008?)
  • Cogema-Cadarache reprocessing plant
  • Euratom report 2002, unacceptable amount of
    MUF, 2 yrs to resolve
  • Similar MUF challenges at centrifuge enrichment
    plants seehttp//www.asno.dfat.gov.au/publications
    /addressing_proliferation_challenges_from_spread_e
    nrichment_capability.pdf
  • No Country-specific listing of MAF (material
    accounted for)

18
Where Were Headed Assuming Current Safeguards
and a Presumed per se Right to Any Nuclear
Technology
  • The regime will not be sustainable if scores
    more States Develop the most sensitive phases of
    the fuel cycle and are equipped with the
    technology to produce nuclear weapons on short
    notice and, of course, each individual State
    which does this only will leave others to feel
    that they must do the same. This would increase
    all of the risks of nuclear accident, of
    trafficking, of terrorist use, and of use by
    states themselves. The Secretary General of
    the United Nations, NPT Review Conference, May 2,
    2005

19
With More Nuclear-Ready States Ramp Up to a
Nuclear 1914?
20
Recommendation 1 Reform the IAEA
  • Make near-real time surveillance mandatory
  • Increase safeguards funding by creating an
    inspections user fee
  • Encourage the IAEA to distinguish between what it
    can safeguard and what it can only monitor
  • Stop insisting that states have a right to
    unsafeguardable, unprofitable dangerous nuclear
    technology and materials -- e.g., nuclear fuel
    making
  • Adopt automatic, country-neutral sanctions in the
    IAEA for IAEA/NPT violators

21
Recommendation Two Stop Fighting Gods
Invisible Hand
  • No private bank has yet chosen to fully finance a
    new nuclear reactor build
  • No private insurer has yet chosen to insure a
    nuclear plant against third party off site
    damages
  • Every government where nuclear plants operate
    have already heavily subsidized these plants
    construction and operation
  • Now states want to increase current subsidies
    through proposed clean energy slush funds,
    international financial institutional loans, loan
    guarantees, insurance caps, tax credits,
    construction delay insurance, etc.

22
Whatever Else We Do, We Should Not Spend More To
Compound Our Nuclear Proliferation Headaches
  • Nothing says we must. Title V of the NNPA, sound
    market economics, the rules of the EU, the
    principles of the Global Charter on Sustainable
    Energy Development, and the Energy Charter
    Treaty, all suggest we shouldnt.
  • NPT was designed to encourage the sharing of the
    benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, not to
    promote money losing endeavors that bring states
    to edge of making bombs
  • Follow-on to Kyoto Protocol should take an active
    interest in reducing carbon in the quickest,
    cheapest ways. This will require identifying
    full financial and environmental costs of each
    energy option and openly competing them in
    international bidding to find the cleanest,
    quickest, lowest cost energy solutions
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