Independent Task Force Report on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Presentation to Oak Ridge National Laboratory Dr. Charles D. Ferguson Philip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science and Technology July 21, 2009 - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Independent Task Force Report on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Presentation to Oak Ridge National Laboratory Dr. Charles D. Ferguson Philip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science and Technology July 21, 2009

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Title: Independent Task Force Report on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Presentation to Oak Ridge National Laboratory Dr. Charles D. Ferguson Philip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science and Technology July 21, 2009


1
Independent Task Force Report on U.S. Nuclear
Weapons Policy Presentation to Oak Ridge
National Laboratory Dr. Charles D.
FergusonPhilip D. Reed Senior Fellow for
Science and TechnologyJuly 21, 2009
2
Outline of Presentation
  • Why did CFR sponsor this report?
  • What did the report initially intend to do and
    why did this change?
  • What are the major findings and recommendations
    of the reportmany are directly relevant to the
    national labs?
  • What are the likely future next steps for U.S.
    nuclear weapons policy?
  • What are the remaining challenges?

3
What originally motivated the report?
  • Wall Street Journal op-ed in January 2007 signed
    by George Shultz, William Perry, Sam Nunn, and
    Henry Kissinger
  • They called for the vision of a nuclear weapon
    free world
  • They believed that nuclear weapons have
    become--for the United States--more of a
    liability than an asset because of
  • Proliferation to other states
  • Potential terrorist acquisition of nuclear
    weapons
  • But they still accepted a role for nuclear
    deterrence.

4
Reports Original Intentions
  • Mini-Nuclear Posture Review to help guide
    incoming administration
  • Congress requires new administration to conduct
    an NPR within first year of office
  • Last NPR in 2001 with only parts revealed in
    early 2002
  • Many misconceptions of Bush administration NPR

5
Primary Objective Urged in the Report
  • Prevent nuclear use by any state or non-state
    actor
  • Does not imply elimination of nuclear weapons
  • Does not imply no-first-use policy
  • But does imply reevaluation of the purposes of
    U.S. nuclear weapons

6
Five Pillars of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy
  1. Reenergizing political relationships with major
    nuclear-armed states with emphasis on
    reinvigorating arms control with Russia and
    revitalizing strategic dialogue with China
  2. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons
    and know-how to more states and non-state actors
  3. Reaffirming and maintaining U.S. extended
    deterrence commitments to allies
  4. Ensuring that the U.S. nuclear stockpile is safe,
    secure, and reliable to maintain the credibility
    of the U.S. arsenal
  5. Implementing best security practices on nuclear
    weapons and weapons-usable materials worldwide

7
U.S.-Russia Major Recommendations
  • Premise any new arms control agreement on shared
    understanding of mutual interests
  • Urge legally binding, verifiable follow-on treaty
    to START
  • Include in strategic dialogue non-deployed
    warheads, missile defense, nonstrategic nuclear
    weapons, and advanced conventional weapons
  • Build on success of CTR and related programs
    (WSSX, Megatons-to-Megawatts, etc.) to form a
    true partnership with Russia on nuclear security
    projects
  • Reinvigorate technical cooperative projects with
    U.S. and Russian technical experts

8
U.S.-China Major Recommendations
  • Relationship not ripe for formal nuclear arms
    control
  • But important to renew strategic dialogue
  • Conduct frequent dialogue on nuclear security
  • Be transparent about U.S. intentions and
    capabilities on missile defense. Offer an
    agreement on formal transparency and confidence
    building measures
  • Propose a trilateral ban (U.S.-China-Russia) on
    tests of kinetic anti-satellite weapons. Discuss
    how to expand to global ban

9
Strengthening Nonproliferation
  • Prepare high level diplomatic team for NPT RevCon
  • Provide for multiple levels of assurances on
    nuclear fuel
  • Freeze construction of new national enrichment
    and reprocessing facilities
  • Set up a fuel leasing program
  • Make the Additional Protocol a prerequisite for
    obtaining nuclear supplies

10
Strengthening Nonproliferation (continued)
  • Develop and implement improved safeguards
    techniques
  • Provide adequate funding and resources for the
    IAEA
  • Correct weaknesses in the NPT that allow easy
    withdrawal
  • Ratify the CTBT and renew international efforts
    for entry into force
  • Phase out use of civilian highly enriched uranium
    (HEU)
  • Renew U.S. pledge to pursue nuclear disarmament
  • Call for global moratorium on fissile material
    production for weapons

11
Extended Deterrence
  • Reaffirm U.S. commitment to security assurances,
    including extended deterrence
  • Consult with allies to determine their views
    about the credibility of the nuclear component of
    extended deterrence
  • Keep the small U.S. nuclear stockpile in Europe
    as long as it supports NATO political objectives
    and acts as a disincentive for NATO allies to
    build their own arsenals

12
Safe, Secure, and Reliable Nuclear Arsenal
  • Ensure stockpile stewardship program has adequate
    resources
  • Maintain a readiness to modernize or replace the
    arsenal, as necessary
  • Be transparent about any proposed changes to the
    weapons complex
  • Couple these changes to arms control and
    strategic dialogue with Russia and China
  • Conduct comprehensive cost vs. benefit assessment
    of proposed complex transformation
  • Implement an integrated approach to the complex
  • Exercise the intellectual capacity of the
    technically talented people at the labs

13
Best Security Practices
  • Meet the presidents goal of securing all
    vulnerable nuclear material by 2012
  • Increase transparency about the status of the
    U.S. nuclear weapons inventory, e.g., publish an
    annual report on dismantlement activities
  • Dispose, as much as possible, excess fissile
    material into non-weapons usable forms
  • Share information with other nuclear-armed states
    about best security practices, consistent with
    U.S. laws
  • Move the IAEAs nuclear security budget into the
    regular budget
  • Redouble efforts to bring the amended Convention
    on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material into
    force

14
Next Steps for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy
  • Complete Nuclear Posture Review (December 2009)
  • Complete negotiations on START follow-on treaty
    (December 2009)
  • Submit follow-on treaty to Senate for advice and
    consent (end of 2009?)
  • Ask Senate to reconsider CTBT (2010?)
  • Convene global nuclear security conference (March
    2010)
  • Convene NPT RevCon (May 2010)
  • Push for more action on FMCT (ongoing, no
    definite deadline)
  • Complete major goals of the Global Threat
    Reduction Initiative (2012)

15
Remaining Challenges
  • Desirability and feasibility of nuclear
    disarmament
  • Linkage between nuclear and conventional
    disarmament (Article VI of the NPT)
  • Technical verification issues
  • Political confidence building measures
  • Geopolitical conditions that would be necessary
    to move seriously toward nuclear disarmament
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