Independent Task Force Report on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Presentation to Oak Ridge National Laboratory Dr. Charles D. Ferguson Philip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science and Technology July 21, 2009

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Independent Task Force Report on U.S. Nuclear
Weapons Policy Presentation to Oak Ridge
National Laboratory Dr. Charles D.
FergusonPhilip D. Reed Senior Fellow for
Science and TechnologyJuly 21, 2009
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Outline of Presentation

• Why did CFR sponsor this report?
• What did the report initially intend to do and
  why did this change?
• What are the major findings and recommendations
  of the reportmany are directly relevant to the
  national labs?
• What are the likely future next steps for U.S.
  nuclear weapons policy?
• What are the remaining challenges?

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What originally motivated the report?

• Wall Street Journal op-ed in January 2007 signed
  by George Shultz, William Perry, Sam Nunn, and
  Henry Kissinger
• They called for the vision of a nuclear weapon
  free world
• They believed that nuclear weapons have
  become--for the United States--more of a
  liability than an asset because of
• Proliferation to other states
• Potential terrorist acquisition of nuclear
  weapons
• But they still accepted a role for nuclear
  deterrence.

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Reports Original Intentions

• Mini-Nuclear Posture Review to help guide
  incoming administration
• Congress requires new administration to conduct
  an NPR within first year of office
• Last NPR in 2001 with only parts revealed in
  early 2002
• Many misconceptions of Bush administration NPR

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Primary Objective Urged in the Report

• Prevent nuclear use by any state or non-state
  actor
• Does not imply elimination of nuclear weapons
• Does not imply no-first-use policy
• But does imply reevaluation of the purposes of
  U.S. nuclear weapons

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Five Pillars of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy

1. Reenergizing political relationships with major
   nuclear-armed states with emphasis on
   reinvigorating arms control with Russia and
   revitalizing strategic dialogue with China
2. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons
   and know-how to more states and non-state actors
3. Reaffirming and maintaining U.S. extended
   deterrence commitments to allies
4. Ensuring that the U.S. nuclear stockpile is safe,
   secure, and reliable to maintain the credibility
   of the U.S. arsenal
5. Implementing best security practices on nuclear
   weapons and weapons-usable materials worldwide

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U.S.-Russia Major Recommendations

• Premise any new arms control agreement on shared
  understanding of mutual interests
• Urge legally binding, verifiable follow-on treaty
  to START
• Include in strategic dialogue non-deployed
  warheads, missile defense, nonstrategic nuclear
  weapons, and advanced conventional weapons
• Build on success of CTR and related programs
  (WSSX, Megatons-to-Megawatts, etc.) to form a
  true partnership with Russia on nuclear security
  projects
• Reinvigorate technical cooperative projects with
  U.S. and Russian technical experts

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U.S.-China Major Recommendations

• Relationship not ripe for formal nuclear arms
  control
• But important to renew strategic dialogue
• Conduct frequent dialogue on nuclear security
• Be transparent about U.S. intentions and
  capabilities on missile defense. Offer an
  agreement on formal transparency and confidence
  building measures
• Propose a trilateral ban (U.S.-China-Russia) on
  tests of kinetic anti-satellite weapons. Discuss
  how to expand to global ban

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Strengthening Nonproliferation

• Prepare high level diplomatic team for NPT RevCon
  
• Provide for multiple levels of assurances on
  nuclear fuel
• Freeze construction of new national enrichment
  and reprocessing facilities
• Set up a fuel leasing program
• Make the Additional Protocol a prerequisite for
  obtaining nuclear supplies

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Strengthening Nonproliferation (continued)

• Develop and implement improved safeguards
  techniques
• Provide adequate funding and resources for the
  IAEA
• Correct weaknesses in the NPT that allow easy
  withdrawal
• Ratify the CTBT and renew international efforts
  for entry into force
• Phase out use of civilian highly enriched uranium
  (HEU)
• Renew U.S. pledge to pursue nuclear disarmament
• Call for global moratorium on fissile material
  production for weapons

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Extended Deterrence

• Reaffirm U.S. commitment to security assurances,
  including extended deterrence
• Consult with allies to determine their views
  about the credibility of the nuclear component of
  extended deterrence
• Keep the small U.S. nuclear stockpile in Europe
  as long as it supports NATO political objectives
  and acts as a disincentive for NATO allies to
  build their own arsenals

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Safe, Secure, and Reliable Nuclear Arsenal

• Ensure stockpile stewardship program has adequate
  resources
• Maintain a readiness to modernize or replace the
  arsenal, as necessary
• Be transparent about any proposed changes to the
  weapons complex
• Couple these changes to arms control and
  strategic dialogue with Russia and China
• Conduct comprehensive cost vs. benefit assessment
  of proposed complex transformation
• Implement an integrated approach to the complex
• Exercise the intellectual capacity of the
  technically talented people at the labs

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Best Security Practices

• Meet the presidents goal of securing all
  vulnerable nuclear material by 2012
• Increase transparency about the status of the
  U.S. nuclear weapons inventory, e.g., publish an
  annual report on dismantlement activities
• Dispose, as much as possible, excess fissile
  material into non-weapons usable forms
• Share information with other nuclear-armed states
  about best security practices, consistent with
  U.S. laws
• Move the IAEAs nuclear security budget into the
  regular budget
• Redouble efforts to bring the amended Convention
  on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material into
  force

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Next Steps for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy

• Complete Nuclear Posture Review (December 2009)
• Complete negotiations on START follow-on treaty
  (December 2009)
• Submit follow-on treaty to Senate for advice and
  consent (end of 2009?)
• Ask Senate to reconsider CTBT (2010?)
• Convene global nuclear security conference (March
  2010)
• Convene NPT RevCon (May 2010)
• Push for more action on FMCT (ongoing, no
  definite deadline)
• Complete major goals of the Global Threat
  Reduction Initiative (2012)

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Remaining Challenges

• Desirability and feasibility of nuclear
  disarmament
• Linkage between nuclear and conventional
  disarmament (Article VI of the NPT)
• Technical verification issues
• Political confidence building measures
• Geopolitical conditions that would be necessary
  to move seriously toward nuclear disarmament