Title: Why do things happen the way they do in your imagination?
1Why do things happen the way they do in your
imagination?
- Is it because of the format of your image or your
cognitive architecture? Or because of what you
know? - Did it reveal a capacity of mind?
- Or was it because you made it do what it did?
- Can you make your image have any properties you
choose? Or behave in any way you want? Why not? - How about imagining an object from all directions
at once, or from no particular direction? - How about imagining a 4-dimensional object?
- Can you imagine a printed letter which is neither
upper nor lower case? A triangle that is not a
particular type?
2More on Representation of space and arguments
from neuroscience
- The intuition that images are spatial (or, as
some put it, that they have space) is an
interesting one and deeper than most other
questions being studied in laboratories. I have
discussed this in excruciating detail in the
last chapter of my Things and Places. - According to Kosslyn, the argument has now
entered the third and final stage, where
neuroscience evidence has put an end to the
debate. I will look at some of this alleged
debate-ending evidence and will show that it is
characterized by desperation and lack of critical
analysis.
3A brief look at whether we may be storing
information in the form of an icon
- For present purposes I want to look at the issue
of explanation and I will do this by considering
the sense in which spatial information may
(must?) itself be spatial - This matters to the question of what forms of
representation we have in our minds and how these
refer to things in the world.
4Our studies of mental scanning
(Pylyshyn Bannon. See Pylyshyn, 1981)
There is even reason to doubt that one can
imagine scanning continuously (Pylyshyn Cohen,
1998)
5Does visual imagery use the visual system?
Major Question 2
- It depends on what you mean by use and visual
system - To use vision can mean actually to perceive the
image - Only early vision is relevant to this use of
perceive, since general vision can involve all
of cognition - This question is of interest to picture theorists
because if vision is involved it may suggest that
images are uninterpreted picture-like (or
depictive) spatial displays. The visual module
cannot be applied to already-interpreted data
structures - Lets assume that the visual system is active
during mental imagery as some have suggested - What follows from that?
- Why should we believe that vision may be
involved? - In the last 15 years the main support for the
assumption that vision is involved has come from
neuroscience.
6Reasons for thinking that images are interpreted
by the visual system
- Similar phenomenology of imagining seeing
- This reason overshadows all others
- Superposition interference studies
- Visual illusions with projected images
- The ubiquitous role of attention
- Re-perceiving and novel construals
- A large but very problematic literature
7More demonstrations of the relation between
vision and imagery
- Images constructed from descriptions
- The D-J example(s)
- The two-parallelogram example
- Amodal completion
- Reconstruals Slezak
8Can images be visually reinterpreted?
- There have been many claims that people can
visually reinterpret images - These have all been cases where one could easily
figure out what the combined image would look
like without actually seeing it (e.g., the J D
superposition). - Pedersons careful examination of visual
reconstruals showed (contrary to her own
conclusion) that images are never ambiguous (no
Necker cube or figure-ground reversals) and when
new construals were achieved from images they
were quite different from the ones achieved in
vision (more variable, more guessing from cues,
etc). - The best evidence comes from a philosopher
(Slezak, 1992, 1995)
9Slezak figures
Pick one (or two) of these animals and memorize
what they look like. Now rotate it in your mind
by 90 degrees clockwise and see what it looks
like.
10Slezak figures rotated 90o
11Do this imagery exerciseImagine a parallelogram
like this one
Connect each corner of the top parallelogram with
the corresponding corner of the bottom
parallelogram
Now imagine an identical parallelogram directly
below this one
What do you see when you imagine the connections?
Did the imagined shape look (and change) like the
one you see now?
12Amodal completion by images?
13Is this what you saw?
14Off-retinal info different from foveal info
15Off-retinal info different from foveal info
16Labels propagate over picture
17 Anorthoscope Scan view How many contours are
there?
18 Anorthoscope Scan view What is the shape?
19Vision is involved when images are superimposed
onto vision
- Many experiments show that when you project an
image onto a display the image acts very much
like a superimposed display - Shepard Podgorny, Hayes,
- Interference effects (Brooks)
- Mental scanning
- Interaction with the motor system (Finke)
20Shepard Podgorny experiment
Both when the displays are seen and when the F is
imagined, RT to detect whether the dot was on the
F is fastest when the dot is at the vertex of the
F, then when on an arm of the F, then when far
away from the F and slowest when one square off
the F.
21Brooks spatial interference study
Respond by pointing to symbols in a table or by
saying the words left or right
22Visual-Motor adaptation and motor adaptation to
images
- The basic prism adaptation setup arm movement
towards a target while wearing prism glasses - Now repeat with arm unseen but subject told where
it is (actually where it would have been in the
prism case) - Get adaptation Finke, R. A. (1979). The
Functional Equivalence of Mental Images and
Errors of Movement. Cognitive Psychology, 11,
235-264. - But in the original experiment you dont need to
see a hand, any indicator of where the hand is
will do as long as the subject believes it is
where indicated
23Standard view of saccadic integration by
superposition
Is it plausible? Is it true?
24Superposition does not work (Oregan 1983)
25This is what our conscious experience suggests
goes on in vision
Kliban
26This is what the demands of explanation suggests
must be going on in vision
27Are there pictures in the brain?
- There is no evidence for cortical displays of the
right kind to explain visual or imaginal phenomena
28Is there very short iconic storage?
- Although the idea of pictorial long-term memory
is not supported, there is some provisional
evidence that sensory information outlasts the
duration of the stimulus. Many people have
studied these sensory buffers including George
Sperling and Michael Posner.
29Sperlings partial report method for showing an
iconic memory
30Posners demonstration of short lasting shape
information
Fast
Slower
Fast
Slower
31So what does the visual system produce?
- The best hypothesis so far (i.e., the only one
that has not been shown to be clearly on the
wrong track) is that the brain is a species of
computer in which representations of the world
are encoded in the form of symbol structures, and
actions are determined by calculations (i.e.,
inferences) based on these symbolic encodings. - Therefore vision (and other sensory systems)
compute symbolic expression for the rest of the
(Turing) computing machinery to use.
32So why does it not feel like we are doing
computations?
- The content of our conscious experience is a very
poor guide to what is actually going on that
causes both our experiences and our behavior.
Science is concerned with causes, not just
correlations. - We have learned (since Galileo) that we cant
assume that the way things seem has much to do
with how it works (consider the example of
language understanding) - As in most sciences, the essential causes are far
from obvious (e.g., How can the moon exert a pull
on the earth without contacting it? What is this
table made of? etc.). - In the case of cognition, what is going on is a
delicate mixture of the obvious (what Granny or
Shakespeare knew about people and why they do
what they do) and the incredible.
33We cant even be sure that we have the right
methods or instruments
34Mental Scanning
- Some hundreds of experiments have now been done
demonstrating that it takes longer to scan
attention between places that are further apart
in the imagined scene. In fact the relation is
linear between time and distance. - These have been reviewed and described in
- Denis, M., Kosslyn, S. M. (1999). Scanning
visual mental images A window on the mind.
Cahiers de Psychologie Cognitive / Current
Psychology of Cognition, 18(4), 409-465. - Rarely cited are experiments by Pylyshyn Bannon
which I will summarize for you.
35Studies of mental scanningDoes it show that
images have metrical space?
(Pylyshyn Bannon. See Pylyshyn, 1981)
- Conclusion The image scanning effect is
Cognitively Penetrable - i.e., it depends on goals and beliefs, or on
Tacit Knowledge.
36What is assumed in imagist explanations of mental
scanning?
- In actual vision, it takes longer to scan a
longer distance because real distance, real
motion, and real time is involved, therefore this
equation holds due to natural law - Time distance speed
- But what ensures that a corresponding relation
holds in an image? The obvious answer is
Because the image is laid out in space! - But what if that option is closed for empirical
reasons? - Imagists appeal to a Functional Space which
they liken to a matrix data structure in which
some cells are adjacent to other cells, some are
closer and others further away, and to move from
one to another it is natural that you pass
through intermediate cells - Question What makes these sorts of properties
natural in a matrix data structure?
37Thou shalt not cheat
- There is no natural law that requires the
representations of time, distance and speed to be
related according to the motion equation. You
could equally easily imagine an object moving
instantly or according to any motion relation you
like, since it is your image! - There are two possible answers why the relation
- Time Representation of distance
Representation of speed - typically holds in an image-scanning task
- Because subjects have tacit knowledge that this
is what would happen if they viewed a real
display, or - Because the matrix is taken to be a simulation of
a real-world display, as it often is in computer
science
38Mental Rotation has been one of the most cited
demonstrations of all
- Look at the following 3D figures and judge which
pairs are the same except for orientation. The
other pair are enantiomorphs 3D mirror images
so they cant be put into correspondence by 3D
rotation only.
39Mental rotation
Time to judge whether (a)-(b) or (b)-(c) are the
same except for orientation increases linearly
with the angle between them (Shepard Metzler,
1971)
40What do you do to judge whether these two figures
are the same shape?
Is this how the process looked to you?
When you make it rotate in your mind, does it
seem to retain its rigid 3D shape without
re-computing it?
41Thou shalt not cheat
- What happens in ALL imagist accounts of phenomena
from mental scanning to mental rotation is that
they assume the properties of real space in order
to provide a principled explanation, then retreat
to something not-quite-real space when it is
pointed out that they are assuming that images
are laid out in real space-in-the-head. - This happens with mental rotation as well, even
though the tacit knowledge account is not
plausible there (it is an involuntary and
universal way of solving the rotated-figure task
so long as the task involves tokens of
enantiomorphs).
42The missing bit of logic
- According to Prinz (2002) p 118,If visual-image
rotation uses a spatial medium of the kind
Kosslyn envisions, then images must traverse
intermediate positions when they rotate from one
position to another. The propositional system
can be designed represent intermediate positions
during rotation, but that is not obligatory. - Given that this happens in 3D so that it cant be
a literal brain space, the question arises What
makes this obligatory in functional Space?
43Sources of obligatory constraint
- It could be that there is a medium or a set of
analog properties that together happen to
simulate a virtual space, and the physical
properties of this medium enforce the continuity
of motion through it. This is very unlikely. - It could be that the constraint comes from the
fact that it holds in the world. Then its
transfer from the real to the mental world occurs
either - Voluntarily, because we know how it would happen
and we can use that fact to solve the problem - Naturally, because the constraint got built in
over time through evolutionary pressures - Naturally, but not because the constraint is
built in, but because of other properties of the
architecture that make it more efficient to
compute the rotated shape incrementally until
there is a match
44Do images have low-level psychophysical
properties?
- Bring the bars closer and closer together. In
which can you see the bars when the spacing is
closest? - In experiments, it was shown that the oblique
effect occurs in mental images just as it does in
vision - Kosslyn, Thompson Ganis (2006) argued that this
is because there are more vertical and
horizontally tuned cells than obliquely tuned
cells in visual cortex. Does this explain the
finding?
45Do images have low-level visual properties?
- Imagine a grating in which the bars are
- Horizontal
- Vertical
- Oblique (45)
46A final point
- In Kosslyn, Thompson Ganis (2007) the authors
cite Ned Block to the effect that one does not
need an actual 2D surface, so long as the
connections upstream from the cortical surface
can decode certain pairs of neurons in terms of
their imagined distance. Imagine long stretchy
axons going from a 2D surface to subsequent
processes. Now imagine that the neurons are
randomly moved around so they are no long on a 2D
layout. As long as the connections remain fixed
it will still behave as though there was a 2D
surface. - Call this the encrypted 2D layout version of
literal space.
47The encrypted-spatial layout alternative
- By itself the encrypted-layout alternative will
not do because without referring to the original
2D locations, the relation between pairs of
neurons and scan time is not principled. In the
end the only principle we have is
Timedistance/speed so unless the upstream system
decrypts the neuron locations into their original
2D surface locations the explanation for the
increase in time with increased imagined distance
remains a mere stipulation. It stipulates, but
does not explain why, when two points are further
away in the imagined layout it takes longer to
scan between them or why scanning between them
requires that one visit intermediate locations
along the way. - But this is what we needed to explain! One can
apply such a mere stipulation to any form of
representation. What was a principled
explanation with the literal 2D display has now
been given up for a mere statement of how it
shall be.
48The Imagery Debate Redux
- According to Kosslyn there have been 3 stages in
the debate over the nature of mental images - The role of images in learning and memory
(Paivios Dual Code theory). Influential at the
time but now abandoned except for a few
recidivists like Barsalou. - Spatial properties of images and their role in
dynamic processes, as assessed by reaction time
measures (Kosslyns research on metric
properties of images) - Discovery of brain mechanisms underlying visual
imagining, which led to the resolution of the
imagery debate.
49Mental imagery and neuroscience
- Neuroanatomical evidence for a retinotopic
display in the earliest visual area of the brain
(V1) - Neural imaging data showing V1 is more active
during mental imagery than during other forms of
thought - The form of activity differs for small vs large
images in the way that it differs when viewing
small and large displays - Transcranial magnetic stimulation of visual areas
interferes more with imagery than other forms of
thought - Clinical cases show that visual and image
impairment tend to be similar (Bisiach, Farah) - More recently psychophysical measures of images
shows parallels with comparable measures of
vision, and these can be related to the receptive
cells in V1
50Neuroscience has shown that the retinal pattern
of activation is displayed on the surface of the
cortex
There is a topographical projection of retinal
activity on the visual cortex of the cat and
monkey.
Tootell, R. B., Silverman, M. S., Switkes, E.,
de Valois, R. L. (1982). Deoxyglucose analysis of
retinotopic organization in primate striate
cortex. Science, 218, 902-904.
51Problems with drawing conclusions about the
nature of mental images from neuroscience data
- The capacity for imagery and for vision are known
to be independent. Also all imagery results are
observed in the blind. - Cortical topography is 2-D, but mental images are
3-D all phenomena (e.g. rotation) occur in
depth as well as in the plane. - Patterns in the visual cortex are in retinal
coordinates whereas images are in
world-coordinates - Your image stays fixed in the room when you move
your eyes or turn your head or even walk around
the room - Accessing information from an image is very
different from accessing it from the perceived
world. Order of access from images is highly
constrained. - Conceptual rather than graphical properties are
relevant to image complexity (e.g., mental
rotation).
52Problems with drawing conclusions about mental
images from the neuroscience evidence
- Retinal and cortical images are subject to
Emmerts Law, whereas mental images are not - The signature properties of vision (e.g.
spontaneous 3D interpretation, automatic
reversals, apparent motion, motion aftereffects,
and many other phenomena) are absent in images - A cortical display account of most imagery
findings is incompatible with the cognitive
penetrability of mental imagery phenomena, such
as scanning and image size effects - The fact that the Minds Eye is so much like a
real eye (e.g., oblique effect, resolution
fall-off) should serve to warn us that we may be
studying what observers know about how the world
looks to them, rather than what form their images
take.
53Problems with drawing conclusions about mental
images from the neuroscience evidence
- Many clinical cases can be explained by appeal to
tacit knowledge and attention - The tunnel effect found in vision and imagery
(Farah) is likely due to the patient knowing what
things now looked like to her post-surgery - Hemispatial neglect seems to be a deficit in
attention, which also explains the
representational neglect in imagery reported by
Bisiach - A recent study shows that imaginal neglect does
not appear if patients have their eyes closed.
This fits well in the account I will offer in
which the spatial character of a mental images
derives from concurrently perceived space. - What if colored three-dimensional images were
found in visual cortex? What would that tell you
about the role of mental images in reasoning?
Would this require a homunculus?
54Should we welcome back the homunculus?
- In the limit if the visual cortex contained the
contents of ones conscious experience in imagery
we would need an interpreter to see this
display in visual cortex - But we will never have to face this prospect
because many experiments (including ones by
Kosslyn) show that the contents of mental images
are conceptual (or, as Kosslyn puts it, contain
predigested information). - And finally, it is clear to anyone who thinks
about it for a few seconds that you can make your
image do whatever you want and to have whatever
properties you wish. - There are no known constraints on mental images
that cannot be attributed to lack of knowledge of
the imagined situation (e.g., imagining a 4D
cube). - All currently claimed properties of mental images
are cognitively penetrable.
55Explaining mental scanning, mental rotation and
image size effects in terms of functional space
- When people are faced with the natural conclusion
that the iconic position entails space (as in
scanning and size effects) they appeal to
functional space - A Matrix in a computer are often cited as an
example - Consider a functional space account of scanning
or of mental rotation - Why does it take longer to scan a greater
distance in a functional space? - Why does it take longer to rotate a mental image
a greater angle?
56But there are examples of solving geometry
problems easily with imagery
- There are many problems that you can solve much
more easily when you imagine a layout than when
you do not. - In fact many instances of solving problems by
imagining a layout that seem very similar to how
would solve them if one had pencil-and-paper. - The question of how pictures, graphs, diagrams,
etc help in reasoning is very closely related to
the question of how imagined layouts function in
reasoning. That is not in question. What is in
question is what happens in either the visual or
imagined cases and how images can benefit from
this processes even though there is no real
diagram.
57How do real visual displays help thinking?
- Why do diagrams, graphs, charts, maps, icons and
other visual objects help us to reason and to
solve problems? - The question why visual aids help is nontrivial
and Seeing Visualizing, chapter 8 contains some
speculative discussion, e.g., they allow the
visual system to - make certain kinds of visual inferences
- make use of visual demonstratives to offload some
of the memory load - Capitalize on the fact that the displays embody
the axioms of measure theory and of geometry
(which are then inherited by thought) - The big question is whether any of these
advantages carry over to imaginal thinking! Do
mental images have some (or any) of the critical
properties that make diagrams helpful in
reasoning?
58Visual inferences?
- If we recall a visual display it is because we
have encoded enough information about its
visual-geometrical properties that we can meet
some criteria, e.g., we can draw it. But there
are innumerably many ways to encode this
information that are sufficient for the task
(e.g. by encoding pairwise spatial relations,
global spatial relations, and so on). For many
properties the task of translating from one form
to another is much more difficult than the task
of visually encoding it the translation
constitutes visual inference. - The visual system generalizes from particular
instances as part of its object-recognition skill
(all recognition is recognition-as and therefore
assumes generalization from tokens to types). It
is also very good at noticing certain properties
(e.g., relative sizes, deviations from square or
circle, collinearity, inside, and so on). These
capabilities can be exploited in graphical
layouts.
59Memorize this map so you can draw it accurately
60From your memory
- Which groups of 3 or more locations are
collinear? - Which locations are midway between two others?
- Which locations are closest to the center of the
island? - Which pairs of locations are at the same
latitude? - Which is the top-most (bottom-most) location?
- If you could draw the map from memory using
whatever properties you noticed and encoded, you
could easily answer the questions by looking at
your drawing even if you had not encoded the
relations in the queries.
61Draw a rectangle. Draw a line from the bottom
corners to a point on the opposite vertical side.
Do these two lines intersect? Is the point of
intersection of the two lines below or above the
midpoint? Does it depend on the particular
rectangle you drew?
B
A
C
D
62Which properties of a real diagram also hold for
a mental diagram?
- A mental diagram does not have any of the
properties that a real diagram gets from being on
a rigid 2D surface. - When you imagine 3 points on a line, labeled A,
B, and C, must B be between A and C? What makes
that so? Is the distance AC greater than the
distance AB or BC? - When you imagine drawing point C after having
drawn points A and B, must the relation between A
and B remain unchanged (e.g., the distance
between them, their qualitative relation such as
above or below). Why? - These questions raise what is known as the frame
problem in Artificial Intelligence. If you plan
a sequence of actions, how do you know which
properties of the world a particular action will
change and which it will not, given that there
are an unlimited number of properties and
connections in the world?
63One view Images as depictive representations
- A depictive representation is a type of picture,
which specifies the locations and values of
configurations of points in a space. For
example, a drawing of a ball on a box would be a
depictive representation. - The space in which the points appear need not be
physical, but can be like an array in a
computer, which specifies spatial relations
purely functionally. That is, the physical
locations in the computer of each point in an
array are not themselves arranged in an array it
is only by virtue of how this information is
read and processed that it comes to function as
if it were arranged into an array (with some
points being close, some far, some falling along
a diagonal, and so on). - Depictive representations convey meaning via
their resemblance to an object, with parts of the
representation corresponding to parts of the
object When a depictive representation is used,
not only is the shape of the represented parts
immediately available to appropriate processes,
but so is the shape of the empty space
Moreover, one cannot represent a shape in a
depictive representation without also specifying
a size and orientation.
(Kossyln, 1994, p 5)
64If all else fails there is always parsimony and
generality(they worked well in physics and
linguistics!)