PO377 Ethnic Conflict and Political Violence Week 15 Seminar: Internal Frameworks for Managing Conflict

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PO377 Ethnic Conflict and Political
ViolenceWeek 15 Seminar Internal Frameworks
for Managing Conflict
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Core Seminar Question

• Critically assess the potential of
  (consociational) power-sharing arrangements to
  prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent
  ethnic conflict.

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A quick quiz

• Answer the following questions (in groups if you
  prefer) within 10 minutes. Refer to readings
  where possible.
• What is a political institution?
• Why do the features of political institutions
  arguably have an impact on the prospects of
  ethnopolitical stability?
• Why, according to Lijphart, is majoritarian
  democracy not suitable for multiethnic societies?
  Do you agree?
• What is the purpose of power-sharing
  arrangements?
• What are the primary characteristics of
  consociationalism?
• In your own opinion, what is the biggest
  shortcoming of consociationalism? Do you think it
  is a suitable framework for managing conflict?

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Question 1 What is a political institution?

• A Political institutions are enduring structures
  which shape political interactions, and whose
  properties are in turn based on repetitive or
  frequently occurring human interactions. (See
  North 1990 and Crawford Ostrom 1995).

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Question 2 Why do the features of political
institutions arguably have an impact on the
prospects of ethnopolitical stability?

• A (i) Because they structure political behaviour
  and, in doing so, have an impact on the
  socioeconomic and cultural-ideological conditions
  of society (March and Olsen 1984).
• A (ii) Because the features of political
  institutions determine who will hold power and
  have access to resources that are controlled by
  the state (ibid.).

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Question 3 Why, according to Lijphart, is
majoritarian democracy not suitable for
multiethnic societies? Do you agree?

• A According to Lijphart, the core problem of
  majoritarianism (i.e. institutional design that
  relies on winner-takes-all principles) is its
  potential for majority dictatorship (Lijphart
  1985 102) and the permanent exclusion of
  minorities Simply put, simple majority rule
  results in minimum winning coalitions that tend
  to exclude a significant minority when minority
  preferences are intense and there is little
  chance of the minority becoming a majority, a
  recipe for conflict exists (Sisk 1996 32).

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Question 4 What is the purpose of power-sharing
arrangements?

• A Power-sharing arrangements are supposed to
  overcome the risks for ethnopolitical stability
  arguably inherent to majoritarian democracy.
  Their aim is to increase the inclusivity of the
  political system more generally, and to ensure
  that the representatives of all major ethnic
  groups in society are included in the political
  decision-making process more specifically. (See
  Rothchild and Roeder 2005 or Sisk 1996.)

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Question 5 What are the primary characteristics
of consociationalism?

• A Sharing of executive power and group autonomy.
  Proportionality and mutual veto are secondary
  characteristics.

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Grand coalition Elites of each pillar come together to rule in the interests of society because they recognize the dangers of non-cooperation.
Mutual veto Consensus among the groups is required to confirm the majority rule. Mutuality means that the minority is unlikely to successfully block the majority. If one group blocks another on some matter, the latter are likely to block the former in return.
Proportionality Representation is based on population. If one pillar accounts for 30 of the overall society, then they occupy 30 of the positions on the police force, in civil service, and in other national and civic segments of society.
Segmental autonomy Creates a sense of individuality and allows for different culturally-based community laws.
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Question 6 In your own opinion, what is the
biggest shortcoming of consociationalism? Do you
think it is a suitable framework for managing
conflict?

• A Up to you!
• Some of the main criticisms against
  consociationalism are
• that it is too elite-centred (Daalder 1974,
  Horowitz 2002 etc.)
• that it lacks incentives for inter-ethnic
  compromise, freezes group boundaries in the
  political system and cements ethnic cleavages
  (Horowitz 2000 Reilly 2002 Sisk 1996 etc.)
• that it is arguably undemocratic (see Lijphart
  2002).

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Group work

• Split into four different groups, depending on
  whether you want to focus on Northern Ireland or
  Rwanda, and whether you are in favour of or
  against (consociational) power-sharing
  arrangements as an internal framework for
  managing conflict. Answer the questions on the
  next slide.
• (Bosnia with the Dayton Agreement is another
  example but is more complex due to the federal
  and confederal territorial structure in addition
  to central power-sharing arrangements.)

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Group work

• Answer the following questions
• Think about what you consider to be the main
  causes of ethnic violence (e.g. tensions over
  resource distribution, colonial legacies,
  discrimination, elite manipulation etc.). Bearing
  these factors in mind, do you think
  that institutional design can help prevent the
  outbreak or recurrence of ethnic violence? 
• Do you think that assured participation in the
  political decision-making process helps more to
  prevent ethnic violence (as Lijphart would argue)
  or that it in fact freezes ethnic identities and
  inter-ethnic tensions in the political system (as
  Horowitz would say)?
• Under which conditions can consociationalism work
  (if it can work at all)?

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Power-sharing in two case studies

• Power-sharing in Rwanda according to the 1993
• Arusha Accords
• power-sharing at the level of the executive
  (quasi-) proportionality in parliament and within
  the armed troops
• Consociationalism in Northern Ireland according
  to the 1998 Agreement
• cross-community executive power-sharing (e.g.
  election rules for First Minister and deputy
  First Minister) proportionality rules throughout
  the governmental and public sectors
  autonomy/community self-government veto rights
  for minorities (e.g. through procedures of
  parallel consent).

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Peace and democratic stability following the
power-sharing arrangements?

• Rwanda 1994 genocide no transition to
  democracy
• note that post-genocide attempts for executive
  power-sharing arrangement failed and current
  majoritarian system is weakly democratic, quite
  authoritarian.
• Northern Ireland more sporadic incidences of
  violence ongoing/increased incidents of
  inter-communal localised violence numerous
  suspensions of devolved institutions
• note that 1973 power-sharing executive
  (Sunningdale Agreement) had collapsed in 1974.

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• Since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement
  in 1998, Northern Ireland is largely
  self-governing. According to the agreement,
  Northern Ireland co-operates with the Republic of
  Ireland on some policy areas, while other areas
  are reserved for the British Government, though
  the Republic of Ireland "may put forward views
  and proposals" with "determined efforts to
  resolve disagreements between the two governments

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• Northern Ireland was created in 1921, when
  Ireland was partitioned between Northern Ireland
  and Southern Ireland by an act of the British
  parliament.
• Unlike Southern Ireland, which would become the
  Irish Free State in 1922, the majority of
  Northern Ireland's population were unionists or
  loyalists, who wanted to remain within the United
  Kingdom.
• Most of these were the Protestant descendants of
  colonists from Great Britain however, a
  significant minority, mostly Catholics, were
  nationalists or republicans who wanted a united
  Ireland independent of British rule

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• Today, the former generally see themselves as
  British and the latter generally see themselves
  as Irish some people from both communities
  describe themselves as Northern
  Irish.Historically, Northern Ireland was marked
  by discrimination and hostility between these two
  communities
• In the late 1960s, conflict between the two
  communities, and involving state forces, erupted
  into three decades of violence known as the
  Troubles

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• The Good Friday Agreement in 1998 was a major
  step in the peace process although sectarianism
  and religious segregation still remain major
  social problems.
• 48 of the population came from a Protestant
  background, 45 from a Catholic background

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Conditions to make consociationalism work
according to Lijphart (1977)

• A multiple balance of power among the segments of
  society
• small size of the country involved
• overarching loyalties
• segmental isolation (territorial or social)
• prior tradition of elite accomodation
• the presence of crosscutting cleavages.

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Why did the Arusha Accords fail? (Lemarchand 2006)

• Possible explanations
• Exclusion of pro-Hutu CDR extremists from
  negotiating process
• rise of Hutu Power after killing of Melchior
  Ndadaye (first Hutu President of Burundi,
  assassinated in Oct. 1993)
• lack of trust between crucial negotiating
  parties
• civil war context (anxieties, suspicions and
  strong external pressure at the negotiating
  table).

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Northern Ireland following the 1998 Agreement a
complex consociation

• According to OLeary (2001) complex
  consociations are
• complex, because they
• address specifically national self-determination
  disputes between communities
• simultaneously involve peace processes
• involve at least one additional strategy other
  than consociation
• are characterised by international involvement in
  the making, ratification and maintenance of the
  relevant consociational settlements.