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Philosophy 100

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Title: Philosophy 100


1
Philosophy 100
  • Lecture Skepticism

2
  • Some background logic

3
The Logic of Skepticism
  • Some basic logic Modus Ponens
  • (1) If we have eggs, then Jim went to the store.
  • (2) We have eggs.
  • (3) ? Jim went to the store.

4
The Logic of Skepticism
  • Some basic logic Modus Ponens
  • (1) If we have eggs, then Jim went to the store.
  • (2) We have eggs.
  • (3) ? Jim went to the store.
  • - Logic deals with the form, not the content of
    arguments. So, to consider only the form of this
    argument, we will cut the content out.

5
The Logic of Skepticism
  • Some basic logic Modus Ponens
  • (A)
  • (1) If we have eggs, then Jim went to the store.
  • (2) We have eggs. (A)
  • (3) ? Jim went to the store.

6
The Logic of Skepticism
  • Some basic logic Modus Ponens
  • (1) If we (A)veeggs, then Jim went to the store.
  • (2) (A)
  • (3) ? Jim went to the store.

7
The Logic of Skepticism
  • Some basic logic Modus Ponens
  • (B)
  • (1) If we (A)veeggs, then Jim went to the store.
  • (2) (A)
  • (3) ? Jim went to the store. (B)

8
The Logic of Skepticism
  • Some basic logic Modus Ponens
  • (1) If we (A)veeggs, then Jim (B)t to the store
  • (2) (A)
  • (3) ? (B)

9
The Logic of Skepticism
  • Some basic logic Modus Ponens
  • (1) If we have eggs, then Jim went to the store.
  • (2) We have eggs.
  • (3) ? Jim went to the store.

10
The Logic of Skepticism
  • Some basic logic Modus Tollens
  • (1) If we have eggs, then Jim went to the store.
  • (2) Jim didnt go to the store.
  • (3) ? We dont have eggs.

11
The Logic of Skepticism
  • Some basic logic Modus Tollens
  • (1) If we (A)veeggs, then Jim (B)t to the store
  • (2) (B)
  • (3) ? (A)

12
The Logic of Skepticism
  • Some basic logic Modus Tollens
  • (1) If A, then Bt to the store
  • (2) B
  • (3) ? A

13
The Logic of Skepticism
  • Some basic logic Modus Tollens
  • (1) If A, then Bt to the store
  • (2) B
  • (3) ? A
  • Skepticism in contemporary philosophy is usually
    put forth as a Modus Tollens argument.

14
  • Descartes Argument for Skepticism

15
Skepticism
  • In contemporary terminology, the ground for
    doubt proposed by Descartes can be put like this
  • U My epistemic equipment is untrustworthy.
  • The Cartesian-style argument for Academic
    Skepticism can now be put like this
  • (1) If I know that p, then there are no genuine
    grounds for doubting that p.
  • (2) U is a genuine ground for doubting that p.
  • (3) Therefore, I do not know that p.
  • (SEP Skepticism)

16
Skepticism
  • In contemporary terminology, the ground for
    doubt proposed by Descartes can be put like this
  • U My epistemic equipment is untrustworthy.
  • The Cartesian-style argument for Academic
    Skepticism can now be put like this
  • (1) If I know that p, then there are no genuine
    grounds for doubting that p.
  • (2) U is a genuine ground for doubting that p.
  • (3) Therefore, I do not know that p.
  • (SEP Skepticism)

17
  • The Contemporary Argument for Skepticism

18
Skepticism
  • O Ordinary Beliefs
  • (e.g. I have two hands, Class begins at
    1030, Blackholes exist)
  • S Skeptical Hypotheses

19
Skepticism
  • O Ordinary Beliefs
  • (e.g. I have two hands, Class begins at
    1030, Blackholes exist)
  • S Skeptical Hypotheses
  • (e.g. Dreams, Brain-in-a-vat, Subjective
    Contributions)

20
Skepticism
  • O Ordinary Beliefs
  • (e.g. I have two hands, Class begins at
    1030, Blackholes exist)
  • S Skeptical Hypotheses

21
Skepticism
  • O Ordinary Beliefs
  • S Skeptical Hypotheses

22
Skepticism
  • O Ordinary Beliefs
  • S Skeptical Hypotheses
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

23
  • The Arguments Against Skepticism

24
The Arguments Against Skepticism
  • Reject The Principle of Closure
  • Contextualism
  • Invariantism
  • Verificationism
  • Hilary Putnam
  • G.E. Moore
  • Wittgenstein
  • Paper Doubt

25
The Arguments Against Skepticism
  • Reject The Principle of Closure
  • Contextualism
  • Invariantism
  • Verificationism
  • Hilary Putnam
  • G.E. Moore
  • Wittgenstein
  • Paper Doubt

26
Skepticism
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

27
Skepticism
  • Closure If person P knows p and p entails
  • q, then P knows q.
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

28
Skepticism
  • Closure If person P knows p and p entails
  • q, then P knows q.
  • Reject Closure?
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

29
Skepticism
  • Closure If person P knows p and p entails
  • q, then P knows q.
  • Reject Closure?
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

30
The Arguments Against Skepticism
  • Reject The Principle of Closure
  • Contextualism
  • Invariantism
  • Verificationism
  • Hilary Putnam
  • G.E. Moore
  • Wittgenstein
  • Paper Doubt

31
Skepticism
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

32
Skepticism
  • Contextualism Knows is an indexical term.
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

33
Skepticism
  • Contextualism Knows is an indexical term.
  • Indexical (e.g. I or small)
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

34
Skepticism
  • Contextualism Knows is an indexical term.
  • Know-1 Ordinary Contexts
  • Know-2 Philosophy Class
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

35
Skepticism
  • Contextualism Knows is an indexical term.
  • Know-1 Ordinary Contexts
  • Know-2 Philosophy Class
  • (1) If person P knows-2 O, then person P knows-2
    S.
  • (2) Person P does not know-2 S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know-1 O.

36
Skepticism
  • something's being a zebra implies that it
    is not a mule cleverly disguised by the zoo
    authorities to look like a zebra. Do you know
    that these animals are not mules cleverly
    disguised? If you are tempted to say "Yes" to
    this question, think a moment about what reasons
    you have, what evidence you can produce in favor
    of this claim. The evidence you had for thinking
    them zebras has been effectively neutralized,
    since it does not count toward their not being
    mules cleverly disguised to look like zebras.
    (Dretske 1970, 1015-1016)

37
The Arguments Against Skepticism
  • Reject The Principle of Closure
  • Contextualism
  • Invariantism
  • Verificationism
  • Hilary Putnam
  • G.E. Moore
  • Wittgenstein
  • Paper Doubt

38
Skepticism
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

39
Skepticism
  • Invariantism Knows is interest relative.
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

40
Skepticism
  • Invariantism Knows is interest relative.
  • Know-1 Low-risk contexts
  • Know-2 High-risk contexts
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

41
Skepticism
  • Invariantism Knows is interest relative.
  • Know-1 Low-risk contexts
  • Know-2 High-risk contexts

42
Skepticism
  • Invariantism Knows is interest relative.
  • Know-1 Low-risk contexts
  • Know-2 High-risk contexts
  • Bank cases (1) High-risk bank case,
  • (2) Low-risk bank case.

43
Skepticism
  • Invariantism Knows is interest relative.
  • Know-1 Low-risk contexts
  • Know-2 High-risk contexts

44
Skepticism
  • Invariantism Knows is interest relative.
  • Know-1 Low-risk contexts
  • Know-2 High-risk contexts
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

45
Skepticism
  • Invariantism Knows is interest relative.
  • Know-1 Low-risk contexts
  • Know-2 High-risk contexts
  • (1) If person P knows-2 O, then person P knows-2
    S.
  • (2) Person P does not know-2 S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know-1 O.

46
The Arguments Against Skepticism
  • Reject The Principle of Closure
  • Contextualism
  • Invariantism
  • Verificationism
  • Hilary Putnam
  • G.E. Moore
  • Wittgenstein
  • Paper Doubt

47
(No Transcript)
48
Where?
49
I dont see it.
50
Well then Ill just walk over there and feel it.
51
Then lets group up and corner him.
52
And so on
53
Philosophy of Science
  • When someone puts forth a theory that can
    never in-principle be falsified, the theory is on
    that grounds defective.

54
Philosophy of Science
  • When someone puts forth a theory that can
    never in-principle be falsified, the theory is on
    that grounds defective.
  • - E.g. Freudian Psychology

55
Skepticism
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

56
Skepticism
  • Verificationism
  • Untestable positions are linguistically
  • meaningless.
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

57
Skepticism
  • Verificationism
  • Untestable positions are linguistically
  • meaningless.
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

58
Skepticism
  • Verificationism
  • Untestable positions are linguistically
  • meaningless.
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P cannot know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

59
Skepticism
  • Verificationism
  • Untestable positions are linguistically
  • meaningless.
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P cannot know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

60
Skepticism
  • Verificationism
  • Untestable positions are...
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P cannot know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

61
The Arguments Against Skepticism
  • Reject The Principle of Closure
  • Contextualism
  • Invariantism
  • Verificationism
  • Hilary Putnam
  • G.E. Moore
  • Wittgenstein
  • Paper Doubt

62
Skepticism
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

63
Skepticism
  • H. Putnam
  • Words can only refer to what they are
  • casually connected to.
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

64
The Arguments Against Skepticism
  • Reject The Principle of Closure
  • Contextualism
  • Invariantism
  • Verificationism
  • Hilary Putnam
  • G.E. Moore
  • Wittgenstein
  • Paper Doubt

65
Skepticism
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

66
Skepticism
  • Commonsense philosophy
  • Arguments work when we are more certain
  • of the premises than the conclusion.
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

67
Skepticism
  • Commonsense philosophy
  • Arguments work when we are more certain
  • of the premises than the conclusion.
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

68
The Arguments Against Skepticism
  • Reject The Principle of Closure
  • Contextualism
  • Invariantism
  • Verificationism
  • Hilary Putnam
  • G.E. Moore
  • Wittgenstein
  • Paper Doubt

69
Skepticism
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

70
Skepticism
  • Wittgensteins On Certainty
  • O cannot be rejected without undermining
  • all beliefs.
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

71
The Arguments Against Skepticism
  • Reject The Principle of Closure
  • Contextualism
  • Invariantism
  • Verificationism
  • Hilary Putnam
  • G.E. Moore
  • Wittgenstein
  • Paper Doubt

72
Skepticism
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

73
Skepticism
  • Paper-Doubts
  • Doubts need real reasons just like beliefs.
  • (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
  • (2) Person P does not know S.
  • (3) ? Person P does not know O.

74
The Arguments Against Skepticism
  • Reject The Principle of Closure
  • Contextualism
  • Invariantism
  • Verificationism
  • Hilary Putnam
  • G.E. Moore
  • Wittgenstein
  • Paper Doubt

75
The Arguments Against Skepticism
  • Reject The Principle of Closure (Epistemology)
  • Contextualism (Philosophy of Language)
  • Invariantism (Epistemology)
  • Verificationism (Philosophy of Language)
  • (5) Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Language)
  • (6) G.E. Moore (Epistemology)
  • (7) Wittgenstein (Epistemology)
  • (8) Paper Doubt (Epistemology)
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