COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE OF TRANSPORTATION IN METRO VANCOUVER: CIVIL SOCIETYS CONTRIBUTION

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COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCEOF TRANSPORTATIONIN
METRO VANCOUVER CIVIL SOCIETYS CONTRIBUTION

• Peter Boothroyd, Professor Emeritus
• University of British Columbia
• August 2009

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Transportation Governments Quasi-governments Van
couver Region Government of British Columbia
(Province) Departments TransLink (South Coast
British Columbia Transportation Authority)
Municipalities Metro Vancouver (federation
of 22 munis, electoral area, First
Nation) Agricultural Land Commission Universitie
s Government of Canada Departments Airport
Authority Port Authority First Nations
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Civil Society Transportation Interests Vancouver
Region WEAK
STRONG lt------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-----------gt Pedestrians
Bicyclists
Transit riders
Transit workers
Truckers Car drivers
Railway companies lt-----------------------
------------Neighbourhoods------------------------
-----------gt

Construction businesses/
unions/professionals/
banks Retailers
Land developers
Academics
Environmentalists Mass media
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The Lying GameEUR Business, June 2003, 60-62

• by
• Bent Flyvbjerg
• (Aalborg U., now Oxford U.)

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The Lying Game

• Our survey, the first and largest of its kind,
  looked at several hundred large public works
  projects in more than 20 countries.
• transport, the main focus
• there seemed to be a formula at work
• underestimated costs
• overestimated revenues
• undervalued environmental impacts
• overvalued economic development effects
• project approval.

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The Lying Game

• Many project proponents dont hesitate to use
  this Machiavellian formula for project approval,
  even if it means misleading parliaments, the
  public and the media about the true costs and
  benefits of projects.
• Nine times out of 10, costs begin to soar after
  projects have been approved
• For rail projects, for example, half of all
  projects have cost overruns of 45 per cent and
  higher Ridership for half of all rail
  projects is more than 50 per cent lower than
  forecasted

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The Lying Game

• But are the proponents of these projects
  intentionally deceiving governments and
  taxpayers? In an uncomfortable number of cases
  the answer is yes.
• Either the people who do the forecasts of costs
  and benefits are incredibly incompetent, which is
  unlikely, or they deliberately manipulate costs
  and benefits to help projects get approved.

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The Lying Game

• The professional expertise of engineers,
  economists, planners and administrators is
  certainly indispensable to building the
  infrastructures that make society work.
• Our studies show, however, that their claims
  about costs and benefits mostly cannot be trusted
  and should be carefully examined by independent
  specialists and organizations.

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Delusions of SuccessHarvard Business Review,
July 2003, 57-63

• by
• Dan Lovallo and Daniel Kahneman

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Delusions of Success

• In planning major initiatives, executives
  routinely exaggerate the benefits and discount
  the costs, setting themselves up for failure.
• Most large capital investment projects come in
  late and over budget, never living up to
  expectations. More than 70 of new
  manufacturing plants in North America, for
  example, close within their first decade of
  operation.

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Delusions of Success

• We dont believe that the high number of
  business failures is best explained as the result
  of rational choices gone wrong. Rather managers
  make decisions based on delusional optimism
  rather than on a rational weighing of gains,
  losses and probabilities. They overestimate
  benefits and underestimate costs.

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Delusions of Success

• Executives overoptimism can be traced both to
  cognitive biases to errors in the way the mind
  processes information and to organizational
  pressures.
• The optimistic biases of individual employees
  become mutually reinforcing, and unrealistic
  views of the future are validated by the group.

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Delusions of Success

• Recent studies have shown that when people are
  asked simple questions requiring them to take an
  outside view, their forecasts become
  significantly more objective and reliable.

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Delusion and Deception

• Misaligned ?
• Deception
  Delusion Deception
• Incentive
  rail projects
• Alignment
  road projects
• Relatively Error Free
  Delusion
• Aligned ? weather forecasts
• ? - - - - - - - - -
  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -?
• Good
  Poor
• 
  Ability to Learn from Decision
  
  (includes how frequently decision type
  presents itself)
• From B. Flyvbjerg, M. Garbuio, D. Lovallo.
  2009. Delusion and Deception in Large
  Infrastructure Projects. California Management
  Review. 512 17-194.

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Vancouver Case 1SkyTrain Expansion to the
East

• In 1990s, the plan for a 2nd rapid transit line
  to eastern suburbs was suddenly changed by the
  Province from a surface line (Light Rail
  Transit) to total grade separation (SkyTrain).
• Civil society groups opposed the additional
  costs, and the impact on transit system and urban
  design.

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SkyTrain Expansion to the East(more)

• Internal Provincial report on the change
• The most relevant information advanced in
  support of the SkyTrain option was misleading,
  incomplete, or unsubstantiated
• Cost comparisons appear to have been contrived to
  favour SkyTrain over LRT
• no ridership (demand) analysis was reported to
  justify the high capacity system
• air quality and transportation benefits are
  unsubstantiated
• (Memo from Alan Greer, April12, 1999, released
  following a Freedom of Information request)

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Vancouver Case 2Tunnel to the South

• Rapid transit in a tunnel to the airport and a
  southern suburb promoted in 2001-- by a bank
  (Macquarie), the CEO of the regional
  transportation authority (TransLink), the
  airport authority (semi-private), the
  construction industry (including trades), and the
  Province.
• Promises of funding support from the Province and
  federal government linked to the 2010 Winter
  Olympics bid.
• Costs and benefits of cheaper alternatives (e.g.
  along the surface of an abandoned rail-line) not
  studied.
• Civil society organizations and some local
  politicians objected to
• inadequate planning
• cost to the transit system, to riders, and to
  taxpayers.

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Tunnel to the South(more)

• Public-private partnership (P3) established to
  design/build/operate/maintain the line. Plans
  thus deemed to be secrets even kept from
  elected city councillors.
• TransLink Board (local politicians appointed by
  the Greater Vancouver Regional District) had 3
  closely decided votes on whether or not to
  support plan. Impact on local taxes primary
  concern.
• In response, the Province changed the Board,
  appointing non-politicians.
• TransLink now desperate for funds to operate
  system. Further expansions in doubt.

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Canada Line Thousands jam rail line for a first
glimpse and free ride
Newspaper headline 17-08-09
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Vancouver Civil Societys Contributions

• Rail Mega-Projects
• Near term an outside view provided to local
  councillors to no avail .
• Long term
• bridging social capital modestly weakened by
  cynicism
• social learning about transportation planning
  modestly increased.

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Vancouver Civil Societys Contributions

• Freeway Mega-Projects
• 1960s Proposed downtown freeway stopped
• by neighbourhood
  (Chinatown)
• environmentalists
• 2000s Regional freeway expansion debated,
• but proceeding

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Provincial government unveils 3.3-billion
project to span the Fraser River with 10
lanes The provincial government has scrapped
its plan to twin the Port Mann Bridge in favour
of a building a new 10-lane crossing over the
Fraser River, at a cost of 3.3 billion. Premier
Gordon Campbell said the new bridge, which will
be built to accommodate rapid bus service,
expanded cycling and pedestrian lanes and a
possible light rail line, will ease congestion
clogging the crossing and commuter delays by
about one-third. Vancouver Sun 05-02-09
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Vancouver Civil Societys Contributions

• Urban Design
• Cyclists gaining road space
• Neighbourhoods
• -- calming traffic
• -- increasing density

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Collaborative Governance of Urban Transportation
Challenges

• Tragedy-of-the-commons dynamic strong
• Affected natural environment unseen/global
• Economic stakes high
• Power differentials immense
• Technical experts accept delusion, deceit
• Civil society oriented to public-interest lacks
• funding

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Result

• Individual neighbourhoods becoming more livable
• better for walking, cycling, transit thus, more
  sustainable
• this trend supported by all civil society
  interests
• BUT
• Region as a whole continuing to sprawl
• costs to farmland, servicing, mobility
• because road and rail mega-projects are supported
  by dominant interests