School of Public Affairs at University of Maryland. Paper presented Nautilus Institute's USDPRK Next

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School of Public Affairs at University of
Maryland. Paper presented Nautilus Institute's
US-DPRK Next Steps Workshop on January 27, 2003

• DPRK Strategic Intentions and US Policy Goals
• John Steinbruner

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Background Observations

• Internal DPRK deliberations are not closely
  monitored or directly understood by anyone
  outside the country.
• All international comprehension of their
  intentions depends primarily on imputed logic

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• Starkly different intentions are being imputed by
  engaged observers
• Outcomes can diverge substantially from any set
  of formulated intentions

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Contending Assumptions

• Implacable dedication to the acquisition of
  nuclear weapons
• a) emanating from the ruling regime
• b) inherent in the culture
• c) dictated by the strategic situation

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• 2. Commitment to productive international
  engagement
• Reversal of traditional self-reliance doctrine
• Presumably motivated by acknowledged pressures of
  globalization

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• 3. Regime survival, whatever it takes
• 4.Response in kind as a procedural rule
• force against force
• concession for concession

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Plausible Judgments

• Productive Accommodation is the most plausibly
  imputed intention
• Pressures of globalization demonstrated in other
  instances to be capable of overriding traditional
  inclinations
• DPRK grasp of that fact demonstrated in their
  negotiating behavior

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• 2. Implacable dedication to the acquisition of
  nuclear weapons is far less plausible
• DPRK can expect to defend the right but not the
  actual fact of weapons deployment
• Observable, active deployment would be quire
  dangerous under doctrine of preemption
• Negotiating history suggests understanding of
  that

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• 3. Ambiguity about the current status and
  ultimate disposition of DPRK nuclear weapons
  capability is a very plausible interim
  negotiating objective
• Nuclear materials program is a major source of
  leverage in efforts to negotiate terms of
  productive accomodation

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• 4. The procedural rule response in kind is
  more plausibly seen as an behavioral inclination
  than as the DPRKs central determining
  commitment,
• but the inclination is strong enough to be a
  major source both of opportunity and of danger.

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Implications

• US policy has not yet tested the assumption of
  intended accommodation the most plausible and
  most constructive of those available.
• Terms of political, security and economic
  accommodation offered up to this point are not
  adequate to determine ultimate DPRK commitment to
  an overall settlement

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• 2. Given that widely appreciated fact, it is
  quite unlikely the US could successfully extend
  the recently declared doctrine of coercive
  preemption to the Korean situation under current
  circumstances.

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• 3. There is considerable danger, however, that an
  interaction between the US procedural rule do
  not reinforce blackmail and the DPRK procedural
  rule of response in kind might produce a violent
  confrontation that neither side intends or
  expects.

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Evident Conclusions

• A comprehensive settlement is the common
  interest.
• It would fundamentally involve
• termination of the DPRK nuclear materials
  production and long range ballistic missile
  programs and reduction/redeployment of its
  conventional forces
• In exchange for full political normalization,
  formal security protection regionally endorsed,
  and a program of international economic
  engagement commensurate with the DPRKs inherent
  needs

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• A comprehensive settlement of that sort must
  be initiated by the stronger party the US in
  this case particularly if the corrosive
  dynamics of blackmail are to be avoided.