Title: UCLA Center for Public Health and Disasters Bioterrorism Training for Physicians Updated March 2003 Over 1700 Downloads Since Going Online October 2001 Available at: http://www.ph.ucla.edu/cphdr/bioterrorism
1 UCLA Center for Public Health and
DisastersBioterrorism Training for
PhysiciansUpdated March 2003 Over 1700
Downloads Since Going Online October
2001Available at http//www.ph.ucla.edu/cphdr/b
ioterrorism
2BIOTERRORISM
Are You Prepared?
3Bioterrorism 101
- Why is this a problem?
-
- Who and what
- are the agencies worrying about?
4 Biological Terrorism
- Intentional or threatened use of viruses,
bacteria, fungi or toxins from living organisms
to produce death or disease in humans, animals or
plants
5(No Transcript)
6(No Transcript)
7Anthrax Mail Attacks - 2001
8Biological Terrorism Why?
- Small amounts devastating effects
- Invisible, odorless, tasteless
- Easy to obtain
- Difficult to detect
- Civilian populations unprotected
- Delayed onset - difficult to trace
- Publicity, fear, chaos
9What Happens in a Bioterrorism Incident?
- That depends on whether the attack is
-
- OVERT
-
- or
- COVERT
10Overt Attack
- Threat Validation
- Coordinated System Response
- Traditional First Responders Fire, Police, EMS
- Hospitals
- Community Practitioners
- Public Health - Information Management
- Law Enforcement
11Overt Attack
- Problems
- Verifying if an attack has taken place
- Fear, chaos
- Large numbers of worried well
- Decontamination
- Limited supply of treatment, prophylactic drugs,
and vaccines
12Real or Hoax?
- Public health and law enforcement will determine
credibility, and need for decontamination or
prophylaxis - Test results may take 24-48 hours
13Covert Attack
- EMS system may be used by cases (not yet
recognized as a bioterrorist event) - Likely detected through hospitals, medical care
practitioners - Clinical labs contact local PH department
- PH department refers to State or CDC
14Covert Attack
- Problems with recognition
- Symptoms overlap common illnesses
- Delayed onset of symptoms
- Victims present to different centers
- Secondary spread may occur before attack is
recognized
15Likely Scenarios
- Aerosol release
- Major city, large event, or key function
- Victims presenting to different centers
- Recognition of attack through symptoms,
epidemiologic patterns or microbio lab
16Aerosol Delivery
- Considered the most likely route for BT
- Aim is to generate invisible clouds of particles
0.5-10 microns in diameter - Can stay suspended for long periods of time
- Perfect size to reach the alveoli in lungs
- Aerosols of most agents produce systemic disease
17Key Indicators of a BT Event
- Sudden increase in severity or incidence of
illness - Appearance of unusual (non-endemic) illness or
syndrome in your community - Geographic and/or temporal pattern of illness
- Occurrence of vector-borne disease where there is
no vector
18Key Indicators of a BT Event
- Cluster of sick or dead animals
- Atypical seasonality
- Unusual expression of endemic disease
- Multi drug-resistant pathogens
19Bioterrorism The Agents
- Category A
- Top Priority
- Easily disseminated or transmitted
- High mortality
- Causes social disruption
- Special preparation needed
- Category A Agents
- Anthrax
- Botulism
- Plague
- Smallpox
- Tularemia
- Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers
20Bioterrorism The Agents
- Category B
- Q Fever
- Brucellosis
- Viral encephalitides
- Staphylococcal enterotoxin B
- Food/Waterborne
- Ricin
- Category C
- Nipah virus
- Hantavirus
- Tickborne hemorrhagic fever
- Yellow fever
- Multidrug-resistant TB
21Overview of the AgentsClinical Manifestations
and Treatment
22Pneumonic Syndromes
- Inhalational Anthrax
- Pneumonic Plague
- Pneumonic/Typhoidal Tularemia
23Anthrax
- Source Bacillus anthracis
- Bacterial spores and toxins
- Cutaneous, inhalational and intestinal
24Cutaneous Anthrax
25Cutaneous Anthrax
- Incubation 1-12 days
- Papule gt vesicle or ulcer gt black centerover
several days - Diagnosis Gram stain and culture of unroofed
vesicle, base of ulcer, under edge of eschar - Usually responds well to treatment
26Inhalational Anthrax
- Incubation 1 - 6 days (rarely up to gt 60 days)
- Prodrome 1-2 d fever, malaise, dry cough
- Severe respiratory distress, septic shock, may
have meningitis - Diagnosis
- Hemorrhagic mediastinitis wide on CXR
- Isolation
- Standard not contagious
27Inhalational AnthraxMediastinal Widening
28Anthrax vs. Viral Illness
- Anthrax Flu Other Viral
- Elev. Temp 70 68-77 40-73
- Cough 90 84-93 72-80
- SOB 80 6 6
- Pleuritic Pain 60 35 23
- Headache 50 84-91 74-89
- Sore Throat 20 64-84 64-84
- Rhinorrhea 10 79 68
- Nausea / Vom. 80 12 12
- MMWR Nov 9 200150984
29Evaluation of Possible Inhalation Anthrax
- History of exposure or risk Symptoms
- WBC (bandemia), Blood culture highest yield
- CXR wide mediastinum, effusion, or infiltrate
Consider CT if CXR normal - If results abnormal or pt. seriously ill
- Multi-drug treatment
- If results normal and pt mildly ill
- Observe and initiate single-drug prophylaxis
30Anthrax - Treatment
- Combination Rx for seriously ill
- Cipro or Doxy other drug(s)
- Other drugs with activity include
- Rifampin, Vancomycin, Clindamycin, Imipenem,
Clarithromycin, PCN - Post-Exposure Prophylaxis
- Cipro or Doxy X 60 d
- (X 30 d if given with vaccine)
31Anthrax Exposure?
- Most patients need only reassurance
- Higher risk
- Threatening message
- Sandy brown color powder
- Suspicious letter or package
- High-profile person or postal worker
- If exposure is credible, contact police
- Nasal swab NOT sensitive enough to r/o exposure
for an individual
32Plague
- Source
- Bacterium Yersinia pestis
- Forms
- Bubonic, septicemic, and pneumonic
- Suspect Bioterrorism
33Pneumonic Plague
- Incubation 2-3 d
- Symptoms
- Fulminant pneumonia, bloody sputum, septic shock,
high fever, chills, headache, possible
disseminated intravascular coagulation - Diagnosis
- Laboratory Gram stain blood, sputum, node
- Small, Gram-neg, bipolar (safety-pin), poorly
staining coccobacilli
34Pneumonic Plague
- Isolation
- Highly contagious
- Strict respiratory isolation until Rx for 3d
- Followed by standard respiratory droplet
precautions (masks, gown, gloves, eye protection) - Treatment
- Streptomycin, doxycycline, or chloramphenicol
- High mortality, but may respond to early treatment
35Tularemia
- Source
- Bacterium Francisella
- tularensis
- Gram neg. coccobacillus
- Zoonotic (rabbit fever)
- Forms
- Ulceroglandular and typhoidal/pneumonic
- Suspect Bioterrorism
36Tularemia
- Incubation 2-10 days
- Prodrome
- Fever, headache, chills, myalgia, cough, nausea,
vomiting, diarrhea - May present as pneumonia
- Diagnosis
- Laboratory Culture/Gram stain blood, sputum,
node - Culture can be difficult and is risky to lab
personnel
37Tularemia
- Isolation
- Standard not contagious
- No human-human transmission
- Treatment
- Streptomycin, gentamicin, or doxycycline
- If exposed watch for 7 days, treat if fever
develops - Vaccine under review by FDA
- Mortality 30 untreated lt 10 treated
38Paralytic Syndrome
39Botulism
- Source
- Clostridium botulinum
- neurotoxin
- Types A, B, E, and F
- Most potent toxin known
- Lethal dose 1 ng/kg
- 100,000 times more toxic than sarin
40Botulism
- Incubation 1-5 days
- Symptoms
- Blocks cholinergic synapses
- Dry mouth, blurred/diplopia, muscle weakness,
dysphagia - Descending flaccid paralysis can last for weeks
to months - Diagnosis
- Clinical
- A few labs can do serum toxin assay
- Death from respiratory failure
41Botulism
- Isolation
- Standard not contagious
- No human-human transmission
- Decontaminate clothing, skin with soap and water
- Treatment
- Ventilatory support
- Botulinum antitoxin - equine
- Skin test for horse serum sensitivity
- More effective if given early will not reverse
paralysis that has already occurred
42Rash and Fever Syndromes
- Smallpox
- Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers
43Smallpox Variola major
44Smallpox Presentation
- Incubation 12 days (up to 17 days)
- Early symptoms nonspecific
- Fever, malaise, aches for 2-4 days then severe
illness - Rash then appears on extremities with uniform
appearance
- Scabs over in 1-2 weeks
- Contagious until ALL scabs have fallen off
45Smallpox
- Notify Public Health IMMEDIATELY
- Diagnosis
- Laboratory
- Rule out chickenpox PCR
- Isolation
- Strict contact and respiratory isolation
(negative pressure) - Trace contacts up to 17 days prior to illness
- Treatment
- None known effective
- Questionable effectiveness of Cidofovir
- Mortality 30
46Smallpox vs. Chickenpox
- Variola Varicella
- Incubation 7-17 d 14-21 d
- Prodrome 2- 4 d minimal/none
- Distribution extremities trunk
- Progression similar growth dissimilar growth
- Scab formation 10-14 d p rash 4-7 d p rash
- Scab separation 14-28 d p rash lt14 d p rash
47Smallpox vs Chickenpox
Rash trunk, different stages of development
- Rash extremities, uniform size
48Smallpox Vaccine
- Live Vaccinia virus
- Given intradermal on bifurcated needle
- Pustule scab in 1 week, mild fever
- Can potentially spread to others until scab is
gone - Lifelong immunity is questionable
- Vaccinated persons probable reduced risk of
mortality - Vaccine is effective up to several days AFTER
exposure
49Administering the Vaccine
50Administering the Vaccine
51Vaccinia Common Reactions
- Sore arm
- Adenopathy
- Fever
- Up to 1/3 may have reactions severe enough to
miss work, school, or usual activities
52Smallpox Vaccine - Reactions
- Risks for primary vaccinees
- Accidental Inoculation gt 500 / million
- Generalized Vaccinia 242 / million
- Eczema Vaccinatum 12 39 / million
- Progressive Vaccinia 1 2 / million
- Encephalitis 3 12 / million
- Death 1 - 2 / million
- Risks are much less if previously vaccinated
53Vaccinia Immune Globulin-VIG
- Primary treatment for adverse reactions
- Produced from plasma of vaccinated individuals
- Stored at CDC
- IM forms only at present
- Indications for use
- Eczema vaccinatum
- Progressive vaccinia
- Accidental implantations (extensive lesions)
- Generalized vaccinia(severe)
- Not recommended in vaccinia keratitis
54Accidental Inoculation
55Generalized Vaccinia
56Eczema Vaccinatum
57Progressive Vaccinia
58Progressive Vaccinia
59Fetal Vaccinia
60Viral Hemorrhagic Fever (VHF)
- Ebola
- Lassa
- Marburg
- Sabia Brazilian HF
- Machupo Bolivian HF
- Rift Valley Fever
- Crimean-Congo HF
Ebola virus
61Viral Hemorrhagic Fever
- Incubation 4-21 days
- Symptoms vary between viruses
- Fever, myalgia, prostration
- Petechiae, hemorrhage, shock
- Neurologic, pulmonary, hepatic involvement
- Mortality varies 10 90
62Viral Hemorrhagic Fever
- Diagnosis
- Primarily clinical
- Viral isolation, serology, immunohist. at CDC
- Isolation
- Strict contact isolation
- Strict respiratory isolation
- Strict bodily fluid isolation
63Viral Hemorrhagic Fever
- Treatment
- Supportive
- Fluids, transfusion
- Watch for pulmonary edema
- Avoid unnecessary lines, procedures, etc.
- Ribavirin may be effective for Lassa, Bolivian
HF, Crimean-Congo HF, Rift Valley Fever
64Risk of Secondary Transmission
- Agents to worry about
- Smallpox
- Plague
- Viral Hemorrhagic Fever
- Isolation is critical if any of these are
suspected - Notify hospital infection control immediately
65Bioterrorism Agents Decon
- For most agents, it is very unlikely that anyone
- would be infected from clothing, skin, etc.
- Decon when there is
- Gross contamination by dust, powders, spray, etc.
- A body fluid agent, such as in the case of Ebola
- Generally, no special equipment needed
- Remove clothing and seal it in plastic bag
- Shower with soap water
66Laboratory Risks of BT Agents
- Agent BSL Laboratory Risk
- B. anthracis 2 low
- Y. pestis 2 medium
- Botulinum toxin 2 medium
- F. tularensis 2/3 high
- Smallpox 4 high
- Viral Hemorrhagic Fever 4 high
67Laboratory Response Network for Bioterrorism
68Special Problems with BT
- Identifying a covert attack
- Social disruption
- Prophylaxis for large populations
- National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS)
- Vaccination plans
- Secondary transmission
69Special Problems with BT
- Specialized labs needed for some agents
- Risks to laboratory workers
- Communication between agencies
70Limited Health Care Resources
- Isolation rooms
- Ventilators
- Protective Equipment
- Medications
- Vaccines
- Morgue facilities
71Challenges in Recognizing a Bioterrorist Attack
- Delayed onset - hours to weeks
- Early signs/symptoms nonspecific
- Physicians/laboratorians not familiar with rare
diseases/organisms - Current public health surveillance may not be
adequate for early detection
72Early Detection of a BT EventFinding a Zebra
Among Horses
- Early detection and control of bioterrorism will
depend on alert clinicians reporting unusual
illnesses or patterns of illness to Public Health - BEFORE definitive diagnosis
- When you hear hoof beats, think zebras
- (as well as horses)
73Public Health Bioterrorism Surveillance Plan
- Enhance traditional surveillance for all
potential BT agents and unusual illnesses - Novel surveillance methods
- Hospital diversion data
- Medical examiner data
- Syndrome-based ER/ICU admissions
- School absences
- Animal disease surveillance
- Pharmacy sales
74Agencies Responding to a BT Attack
- Local
- Public Health
- Police, Fire, EMS
- State
- Public Health
- Disaster management
- National Guard
- Federal
- CDC
- FBI, Dept of Justice
- Homeland Security, FEMA
- Dept of Defense
75BT Hospital Preparedness IssuesDevelop plans for
- Infection control
- Lab support
- A large influx of patients triage, pt placement,
pt transport - Pharmacy inventories
- Psychological aspects of BT
76BT Hospital Preparedness IssuesDevelop plans for
- Hospital Emergency Incident Command System
(HEICS) - Internal and external communication
- Evidence collection
- Discharging or post-mortem care
- Decon
77Preparation for a BT Attack
- Familiarize medical staff with BT agents
- Incorporate into disaster planning
- Infection control and decontamination
- Communication plan with key agencies
- Public Health Dept
- Laboratory, CDC, police, FBI, etc.
- Identify contacts to obtain stockpiled supplies
antibiotics, immune sera, vaccines, antidotes,
decon equipment, PPEs, etc. - Security preparations
78Local Health Department Actions
- Determine whether situation is unusual
- Case finding/case investigation
- Laboratory confirmation
- Alert medical community
- Identify source of outbreak and at-risk persons
- Coordinate with State DHS, CDC, FBI, and other
authorities
79Public Healths Role in Bioterrorism Event
- Incorporation of State Epidemiology BT Materials
- Epi/surveillance
- Labs
- Notification
- Media/Public Information Officer (PIO)
- Integration with FBI
- Integration with CDC
80Public Healths Role in Bioterrorism Event
- Infectious Disease/epidemiology tracks infectious
diseases - Public Health Laboratories identify agents
(either in-house or through referral to State or
CDC) - Environmental Health assesses sanitation and
safety of food and water
81Public Healths Role in Bioterrorism Event
- Health Officer coordinates information for the
public and medical providers - Community Health and PH nurses provide education,
information to the public and to community
providers - Treatment and prophylaxis
- Quarantine
82What To Do if You Suspect a Bioterrorist Disease
- IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY
- Hospital Infection Control
- Isolation Smallpox, plague, hemorrhagic fevers
- Laboratory
- Hospital Administration
- Local Public Health Department
83Case Studies
84Case 1 - Dyspnea, Hypotension
- 46 year old stock trader
- Fever, malaise, cough 2 days prior
- Abrupt onset severe dyspnea
- 38.1o 115 86/40 32 O2sat 83
- Diaphoretic, Disoriented
- CXR - no infiltrate, small pleural eff.
85Mediastinal Widening
86Case 1 - Dyspnea, Hypotension
- Patient admitted to ICU
- Fluids, Intubation, Ceftriaxone, Vanco., Gent.
- Later the same day a similar patient presents
- Also a stock trader in the same building
- Both patients deteriorate and die the next day
87Case 2 - Rapid Progressive Pneumonia
- 10 y/o boy with fever, dry cough for 1 day
- 8 y/o sister also ill
- VS 38.6o 110 96/60 91 sat
- Scattered crackles in both lungs
- CXR - Bilateral infiltrates
- Later develops severe dyspnea, hemoptysis, shock
88Case 3 - Fever
- 52 y/o male c/o 3 days malaise, fever, vomiting,
myalgias - 39.1o 92/50 124 28
- WBC 18 platelets 45 BUN 48 Creatinine
2.9 - Within hours becomes confused, vomits blood
89Case 4 Vesicular Rash
- 34 y/o woman with fever, malaise X 2 days
- Today, a rash appeared
- 39.4o 106/78 116 18
- A O X 3 Lungs clear
90Case 5 - Overt Attack
- A terrorist group says they have released 10 kg
of botulinum toxin over your city - Clostridium botulinum neurotoxin Lethal dose 1
ng/kg
91Bioterrorism Addendum A
- Selected Category B and C Agents
92Q Fever
- Source
- Bacterium Coxiella burnetii
- Resistant to heat, drying and many common
disinfectants - Incubation 10-40 d
- Sx variable - Fever, HA, myalgia, malaise
- Occ. cough, rales, CXR infiltrate
- WBC usually normal, but LFTs common
- Low mortality, but malaise may last months
93Q Fever
- Diagnosis
- Laboratory serology, antibody or ELISA
- Isolation Standard
- Treatment
- Antibiotics will shorten course
- Tetracyclines
- Erythromycin, azithromycin, quinolones,
Chloramphenicol, TMP/SMX
94Brucellosis
- Source
- Brucella species
- Zoonotic
- Slow-growing gram negative rod
- Presentation Incubation 5-60 d or longer
- May last weeks or months, but rarely fatal
95Brucellosis
- Diagnosis
- Serology Culture of bone marrow, liver or spleen
tissue - Isolation
- Standard
- Contact if open lesions
- Treatment
- Combination antibiotics
- Most recover even without antibiotics
96Viral Encephalitis
- Alphaviruses Venezuelan, Eastern, Western Equine
Encephalitis - Presentation Incubation 2-14 d
- Fever, HA, myalgia, photophobia, vomiting
- Small of VEE progress to neurologic Sx
- Delirium, coma, seizures
97Viral Encephalitis
- Diagnosis
- Viral isolation or serology, PCR for some
- Isolation Standard
- Treatment
- Supportive analgesics, anticonvulsants
- Vaccines available, but poorly immunogenic
98Ricin
99Ricin
- Source
- Derived from castor beans (Ricinus communis)
- 1 million tons of castor beans produced annually
worldwide - 5 ricin by weight
- Stable
- Inhibits protein synthesis via ribosome
- Toxic via inhalation, ingestion, injection
100Ricin
- Ricin was used to assassinate Bulgarian exile
Georgi Markov in London in 1978. - A weapon disguised as an umbrella was used to
implant a ricin-containing pellet
101Ricin
- Symptoms begin in 4-8 hours
- Weakness, fever, cough, hypothermia, sweating
- Inhalation
- Severe respiratory symptoms from necrosis and
edema, hypoxia with respiratory failure in 36-72
hours - Ingestion
- Nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, GI hemorrhage,
vascular collapse, death in 3 d - May cause DIC, multi-organ failure
102Ricin
- Diagnosis
- Serum ELISA available in few labs
- Treatment
- Primarily supportiveO2, hydration
- If ingested
- Gastric lavage
- Activated charcoal
103Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B
- Presentation Incubation 1-6 hrs
- Diagnosis
- Clinical and epidemiological
- Isolation Standard
- Treatment
- Supportive
104Clostridium perfringens Toxin
- Source
- Episilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens
- Organism ubiquitous in soil
- Present in stool of every vertebrate
- Can produce gas gangrene, necrotizing
enterocolitis, food poisoning - Secretes gt 12 toxins
- Could be toxic if inhaled or ingested
105C. perfringens Toxin
- Symptoms within hours
- GI symptoms prominent, rare fever
- If inhaled, could cause resp. distress
- Mortality
- Death is rare
- Could result from vascular leaks, lung damage
106C. perfringens Toxin
- Diagnosis Clinical
- Stool tests for enterotoxin are not widely
available - Treatment
- Supportive
- Antibiotics active against organism penicillin,
clindamycin
107Trichothecene Mycotoxins
- Source
- Group of gt 40 fungal toxins
- Produced by Fusarium, other common fungi
- Stable to heat and UV
- Inhibits protein and nucleic acid synthesis
affecting rapidly proliferating tissues - If aerosolized, appears as yellow droplets,
yellow rain - Toxic via inhalation, ingestion, and skin
108Trichothecene Mycotoxins
- Symptoms onset minutes to 4 hours
- Skin blistering, eye irritation, nose/throat
pain, - Cough, dyspnea, chest pain, hemoptysis
- Abdominal pain, vomiting, bloody diarrhea
- Bone marrow suppression can lead to diffuse
hemorrhage - If severe prostration, ataxia, shock and death
in hours to days
109Trichothecene Mycotoxins
- Diagnosis
- Urine, blood, tissue samples for liquid
chromatography-mass spectrometry in specialized
labs - Treatment Supportive
- Remove and isolate clothing, irrigate eyes, wash
with soap/water - If ingested, Activated charcoal
- ? Benefit of ascorbic acid, dexamethasone
110Case 1 Headache, Vomiting
- 39 y/o woman presents with 2 d worsening HA,
nausea, vomiting, fever, malaise - Better after fluids, acetaminophen and is
released -
- Returns following day with confusion, seizure
111Case 2 Vomiting, Diarrhea
- Multiple patients present to ER with
- Vomiting, diarrhea, headache, myalgias, malaise,
fever, chills, cough - All had been at a large outdoor festival
112Case 3 Malaise
- High numbers of people present to ERs and clinics
over several weeks in Nov. - Dec. - Fevers, malaise, cough, headaches
- Some have pneumonia on CXR
- Most have elevated LFTs
- Public health department finds no influenza or
other pathogens
113Bioterrorism Addendum B
- Additional Resources and References
114Additional Web Resources
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
- www.bt.cdc.gov
- US Army Medical Research Institute on Infectious
Disease (USAMRIID) - www.usamriid.army.mil
- World Health Organization (WHO) Communicable
Disease Surveillance and Response (CSR) - www.who.int/emc/
115Additional Print Resources
- Emergency Medicine Clinics of North America May
2002 (entire issue devoted to bioterrorism) - Kortepeter MG and Parker GW. Potential
biological weapons threats. Emerging Infectious
Diseases. 1999 5 523-27. - Inglesby TV et al. Anthrax as a Biological
Weapon, 2002 Updated Recommendations for
Management. JAMA. May 01, 2002287(17)
2236-2252. - Arnon SS et al. Botulinum Toxin as Biological
Weapon Medical and Public Health Management.
JAMA. Feb 8, 2001285(8) 1059-1070, 2081. - Inglesby TV et al. Plague as a Biological
Weapon Medical and Public Health Management.
JAMA. May 03,2000283(17) 2281-2290.
116Additional Print Resources
- Henderson DA et al. Smallpox as a Biological
Weapon Medical and Public Health Management.
JAMA. June 09, 1999 281(22)2127-2137. - Dennis DT et al. Tularemia as a Biological
Weapon Medical and Public Health Management.
JAMA. June 02, 2001 285(21)2763-2773. - Borio L et al. Hemorrhagic Fever Viruses as
Biological Weapons Medical and Public Health
Management. JAMA. May 08, 2002 287(18)
2391-2405. - Franz DR, Jahrling PB, Friedlander DJ et al.
Clinical recognition and management of patients
exposed to biological warfare agents. JAMA.
1997278(5)399-411.
117Additional Print Resources
- Bryan JL, Fields HF. An ounce of prevention is
worth a pound of cure shoring up the public
health infrastructure to respond to bioterrorist
attacks. Amer J of Infection Control.
199927465-7. - CDC. Biological and Chemical Terrorism
Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response.
Recommendations of the CDC Strategic Planning
Workgroup. MMWR. April 21,2000, Vol 49, No.
RR-4. - Wetter DC, Daniell WE and Treser CD. Hospital
preparedness for victims of chemical or
biological terrorism. Amer J of Public Health.
200191(5)710-16.
118Additional Print Resources
- Pavlin J. Epidemiology of bioterrorism. Emerging
Infectious Diseases. 19995528-530 - Macintyre AG, Christopher GW, Eitzen E et al.
Weapons of Mass Destruction Events with
Contaminated Casualties Effective Planning for
Health Care Facilities. JAMA. 2000
283242-249. - Meltzer MI, Damon I, LeDuc JW, and Millar JD.
Modeling potential responses to smallpox as a
bioterrorist weapon. Emerging Infectious
Diseases. 20017(6)959-969. - DiGiovanni C Jr . Domestic terrorism with
chemical or biological agents psychiatric
aspects. Am J Psychiatry 19991561500-5.
119UCLA Center for Public Health and Disasters
- 1145 Gayley Avenue, Suite 304
- Los Angeles, CA 90024
- Tel 310/794-0864
- Fax 310/794-0889
- Email cphdr_at_ucla.edu
- http//www.ph.ucla.edu/cphdr