Love And Money: Experimental Tests Of Theories Of The Household. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 10
About This Presentation
Title:

Love And Money: Experimental Tests Of Theories Of The Household.

Description:

Love And Money: Experimental Tests Of Theories Of The Household. ... Within and between task tests for consistency with Income Pooling. Income Pooling. Typically... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:83
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 11
Provided by: ITC61
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Love And Money: Experimental Tests Of Theories Of The Household.


1
Love And Money Experimental Tests Of Theories Of
The Household.
  • Ian Bateman, Tara McNally and Alistair
    MunroUniversity of East Anglia, Norwich, UK
  • Royal Holloway College, University of London.
  • http//personal.rhul.ac.uk/UQTE/003/Couples.htm

2
What are we testing?
  • Theories of the household, notably
  • Income pooling does the source of income affect
    choices?
  • Pareto efficiency
  • Unitary models
  • (theories of risky choice)
  • Altruistic behaviour

3
What do we do?
  • We
  • Recruit established couples
  • Separate them
  • Make them do choices separately
  • Most of these choices involve gambles
  • E.g. 20 for me versus a 60 chance of 40 for my
    partner
  • We make them predict their partners choices
  • Re-unite couples and face them with joint
    choices.
  • Pick one of their 36 choices at random and make
    them play it out.

4
How do we run the experiment?
5
Example task test
6
Does information matter?
  • Treatment 1 (n76),
  • separated couples in different rooms,
  • no revelation of answers to partner
  • private and separate payouts
  • in sealed envelopes.
  • These facts pre-announced
  • Treatment 2 (n40)
  • Separated couple in same room
  • All answers available to partner
  • Payments made in front of partner
  • These facts pre-announced

7
Within and between task tests for consistency
with Income Pooling
8
Income Pooling. Typically
  • cannot reject income pooling for joint choice
  • Pattern of deviations consistent with inequality
    aversion
  • For separated choice
  • Reject income pooling for separated choice
  • Pattern of deviations consistent with greater
    weight placed on own payoffs.
  • Information regime has little impact.

9
Pareto efficiency
  • Across a wide range of tasks couples who make the
    same choice separately, deviate from that choice
    in joint deliberation
  • Deviation is systematic away from risky choices.

10
Summing up
  • Strong rejection of unanimous decisions
  • Rejection of income pooling in separated choice
  • Widespread deviation from Pareto efficiency
  • Couples are more risk averse than the individual
    partners
  • Results are robust to information disclosure rule
  • Though some evidence that women are less risk
    averse with information disclosure
  • Suggestion is that standard household models are
    inappropriate.
  • More details on this sequence of experiments at
  • http//personal.rhul.ac.uk/UQTE/003/Couples.htm
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com