Estimated DPRK Military Energy Use: Analytical Approach and Draft Updated Results

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Estimated DPRK Military Energy Use Analytical
Approach and Draft Updated Results

• Dr. David F. Von Hippel
• Nautilus Institute Senior Associate
• Prepared for the DPRK Energy Expert Study Group
  Meeting, Stanford University, California
• June 26 - 27, 2006

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ESTIMATE OF DPRK MILITARY SECTOR ENERGY USE
OUTLINE OF PRESENTATION

• Approach to Nautilus DPRK Military Energy Use
  Analysis
• Key Assumptions for DPRK Military Energy Use
  1990/1996/2000 and 2005
• Overview of Draft Results by Subsector and Fuel
• Key differences from previous results
• Future Energy Paths, Military Sector
• What if Analysis DPRK Fuel Sufficiency During
  Combat

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DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND OVERALL APPROACH

• Overall Approach for Military Energy Use
• Estimate number of fuel-using vessels, vehicles,
  aircraft, armaments from non-classified sources
• Estimate hours of use for classes of equipment
• Use characteristics of equipment to estimate fuel
  use for equipment population in each year

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DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND KEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONS

• Number of vessels, aircraft, armaments assumed in
  use for the DPRK military in 2000 and 2005
  similar to 1996, 1990 levels
• Except additions of some naval vessels pre-2000
• Ground forces in 2005 assumed 950,000 troops
• Ground forces activity in 2000/2005 13-20 lower
  than estimated 1990 levels
• Due to shortage of fuel, parts
• Aircraft flight hours per year 50-60 of
  estimated 1990 levels by 2000/2005

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DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND KEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONS

• Naval force activity at 75 of estimated 1990
  levels for 1996 through 2005 for vessels in
  routine use
• Military manufacturing assumed the same in
  2000/2005 as in 1996 (80 of estimated 1990
  levels)

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DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND KEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONS
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DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND KEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONS
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DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND KEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONS

• Coal and Oil use in buildings and for other
  (non-vehicle/vessel/aircraft) use similar to 1990
• Electricity use falls to 50 of 1990 levels in
  1996, 2000, rising slightly again by 2005

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DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND KEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONS

• Military Sector Assumptions (continued)

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SELECTED UPDATED RESULTS, DPRK MILITARY ENERGY
DEMAND

• As of 2000, Military accounted for 8 of total
  DPRK energy demand, but 37 of oil products
  demand (27 if KEDO oil used for electricity
  production was included)
• Estimated Military fraction of DPRK gasoline and
  diesel use is much higher (more than 50)most in
  dual-use vehicles

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SELECTED UPDATED RESULTS, DPRK MILITARY ENERGY
DEMAND
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SELECTED UPDATED RESULTS, DPRK MILITARY ENERGY
DEMAND
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MILITARY FUEL USE UNDER DIFFERENT FUTURE PATHS

• In Sept. 2002, discussions of Military
  downsizing in DPRK
• Projected reduction in military energy use,
  activity in Redevelopment case versus Recent
  Trends case

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ESTIMATE OF DPRK FUEL SUFFICIENCY DURING COMBAT

• Based on our estimates of fuel use during routine
  exercises, fuel use by the DPRK military for 30
  days of full-time combat would be about 130,000
  tonnes
• Assumes 50 of ground force equipment inoperable
  by the end of 30 days
• Ground forces are moving (engines of vehicles and
  armaments running) about half the time
• Aircraft cease operations in 24 hours
• 90 of naval forces cease operation in 5 days

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ESTIMATE OF DPRK FUEL SUFFICIENCY DURING COMBAT

• At 2000 fuel import/production rates, would take
  3 months to restock military fuels, or 1.5
  months if refineries operate at 100 capacity
  (and if all supplies diverted to military)
• Even at equipment levels present after 30 days,
  180 of import/production would be needed to
  sustain combat (90 if refineries operate at full
  capacity)
• Assumes fuel supply lines are not disrupted,
  therefore an estimate of maximum capability

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• THANK YOU!