Conceptual Frameworks and Ontological Priority: An Analytic Approach to Transcendental Metaphysics Krak

1
Conceptual Frameworks and Ontological
Priority An Analytic Approach to Transcendental
Metaphysics Kraków, 2 Dec 2010

• Winfried Löffler
• Department of Christian Philosophy
• University of Innsbruck / Austria
• Winfried.Loeffler_at_uibk.ac.at
• Strawson on descriptive and revisionary
  metaphysics
• Some closer characteristics of DM
• Some minor points in need of clarification
• Thesis I Strawson regards DM as a sort of
  transcendental metaphysics
• Thesis II DM is indeed indispensable
• On what there is A proposal for ontological
  priority
• An outlook at the philosophy of religion

2
1. Strawson on descriptive and
revisionary metaphysics

• Peter F. Strawson, 1919-2006
• Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive
  Metaphysics (1959)
• (Indywidua. Próba metafizyki opisowej (1980))
• Starting-point of modern analytic metaphysics
• A possible connection to Kant Aquinas The
  Bounds of Sense Aristotelian tendency

3

• Result of Individuals (roughly)
• Distinction between DM and RM
• DM the categorial framework that factually
  guides our thinking about the world
• RM a better framework better in respect to
  what?
• ? Aristotelian ontology persons as primitive
  category
• Objects of DM are ontologically prior
• Ambiguous only descriptive ? transcendental

4

• 2. Some closer characteristics of DM (i)
• Forms of RM might be useful, but are indebted to
  DM
• DM is only indebted to research/investigation in
  general
• Can be found in depth grammar
• More general than mere conceptual analysis
• DM is mostly trans-historical and trans-cultural
• Concepts of DM are not sophisticated, but
  commonplaces behind any form of thinking, more or
  less elaborate
• DM provides reasons for what we believe
  instinctively

5

• 2. Some closer characteristics of DM (ii)
• Criterion for ontological priority As are prior
  to Bs iff As are identifiable without reference
  to Bs, but not conversely
• ? Aristotelian, i.e. mid-size objects of
  Lebenswelt are prior
• Special importance of persons in their double
  aspect physical mental predicates
• Only persons admit of referring to and acting
  within our spatio-temporal world

6

• 3. Some minor points in need of clarification
• Is DM an empirical or non-empirical discipline?
  (Dilemma If empirical, it would be as
  inconsistent as folk ontology if
  non-empirical, is it still descriptive?)
• Relatively to folk-ontology, any DM has
  revisionary aspects e.g. colour-predicates are
  dispositional predicates
• Do the natural, social etc. sciences influence
  DM? (Körner 1984)
• In relation to what is RM better than DM? What is
  the difference between a mere model and a RM?
  (Löffler 2007)

7

• 4. Thesis I Strawson regards DM as a sort
  of transcendental metaphysics
• Usual reading DM is descriptive / just our
  factual conceptual framework
• But
• Strawsons wordings like indispensable core
• Individuals contains at least 4 transcendental
  arguments (retorsive type doubting p presupposes
  the truth of p)

8

• Four transcendental arguments in Individuals
• The argument for diachronic identity of
  individuals(Summary formulating doubts about
  the identity of x presupposes the identity of
  the objects other than x)
• The argument against no-ownership doctrine of
  mental states (Summary my mental states have
  non owner, they are just causally dependent from
  a body but in order to single out a bundle of
  mental states as mine, one must presuppose an
  owner)
• The argument for the adequacy of the attribution
  criteria for mental predicates (Summary you
  couldnt understand yourself as a case of mental
  life if you couldnt successfully attribute
  mental predicates to others)
• The argument for the indispensability of singular
  terms (Summary anyone who wants to replace all
  singular terms (à la Russell/Quine) must have
  understood the applicability conditions for
  singular terms)

9

• 5. Thesis II DM is indeed indispensable
• Result so far Strawson if he succeeds shows
  that DM is factually indispensable.
• But what exactly is the function of DM?

10

• 5. Thesis II DM is indeed indispensable
• A proposal of DM, somewhat richer
• Basic ontology of mid-size, meso-scopic
  objects Persons, animals, Tools, etc.
• bear monadic and relational properties of various
  kinds
• Human persons with double aspect (mental
  physical)
• Basic principles (causality, identity Leibniz
  law, )
• Further objects (electrones, genes, magnetic
  fields, edges, gross national products, social
  groups, symphonies etc.) make up other, regional
  ontologies
• Discourse about such objects is stable, provided
  discourse about DM-objects is stable

11

• 5. Thesis II DM is indeed indispensable
• The function of DM
• Recall ch.2 DM provides reasons for what we
  believe instinctively (i.e. what we presuppose
  in our acting etc.)
• Proposals
• what we believe instinctively ?
  Weltanschauung/ Swiatopoglad (?Muck!)
• Weltanschauung has integration function (see next
  slide)
• DM then explicates general structures behind
  Weltanschauung that fulfils its integrative task,
  or
• Any Weltanschauung that fulfils its integrative
  task has Aristotelian-Strawsonian DM as its core

12

• 5. Thesis II DM is indeed indispensable
• What we believe instinctively The contents
  of Weltanschauung / Swiatopoglad
• Theories of more/less generality, all-day and
  scientific
• Valuations and preferences, local and ultimate
• Beliefs about various fields of inquiry
  practice
• (Rudimentary) beliefs about how those fields
  relate
• Beliefs which domains of objects are presupposed
  in those fields
• Beliefs about which theory-approach fits to what
  problem
• etc.
• and the operative structure behind such
  Weltanschauung is a Strawsonian / Aristotelian
  DM

13

• 6. On what there is A proposal for ontological
  priority
• Further question Does the traditional idea of
  ontological priority make sense?
• Recall Strawsons criterion for ontological
  priority
• As are prior to Bs iff As are
  (re-)identifiable without reference to Bs, but
  not conversely
• ? Strategy Elaboration of this idea

14

• 6. On what there is A proposal for ontological
  priority
• Strawsons criterion for ontological priority
• As are prior to Bs iff As are identifiable
  without reference to Bs, but not conversely
• Can be read (i) as a broader methodological
  priority of DM
• Dependent objects within DM (accidents, events,
  processes ) cannot be identified without
  reference to DM-objects
• Objects in revisionary metaphysics (boundaries,
  fields, tropes, ) cannot be identified without
  reference to DM-objects
• Even the vocabularies of such metaphysics could
  not be introduced without reference to DM-objects
• The same holds for theoretical objects within
  scientific disciplines (potentials, inflation
  rates, )
• Judgements on reasonable application-cases of
  scientific theories and the success/failure of
  applications are being made on DM level

15

• 6. On what there is A proposal for ontological
  priority
• Three examples
• Usual introductory examples in trope theory
  (tropes non-unversal, individual property)
  the brown of my table, the temperature of this
  wire,
• The way we handle disturbance cases in scientific
  practice, e.g. singling out a broken-down
  thermometer activities of comparing,
  standardizing etc. at the level of meso-scopic,
  Lebenswelt objects (not by reference to natural
  laws they explain the behaviour of the
  broken-down thermometer just as well!)
• The description of a medical syndrome bundling
  reported headache, blood-pressure, paleness,
  temperature, as properties of one DM-object -
  similarly judgements about success/failure of
  therapy (ultimately) on DM level

16

• 6. On what there is A proposal for ontological
  priority
• Strawsons criterion can be read/extended (ii)
  as ontological priority of DM
• Objects of category A are ontologically prior
  iff
• The (re-)identification of objects of all other
  categories B, C, D, is dependent on objects
  of category A
• The linguistic handling of the objects of
  category A is the basis for the introduction of
  concepts for the objects of categories B, C, D,
  (abstractors in various directions)
• plausible that DM objects are indeed
  ontologically prior.

17

• 6. On what there is A proposal for ontological
  priority
• Is this explication of ontological priority
  preferable?
• At least 2 reasons
• What else could be the criterion? What stronger
  requirement could be demanded? (Simple appeal
  to reality, appeal to evidence etc. relies on
  obscure phenomenology!)

18

• 6. On what there is A proposal for ontological
  priority
• Is this explication of ontological priority
  preferable?
• Avoids some common mistakes
• Taking abstractions as ontologically prior (i.e.
  in naturalist, materialist ontologies, trope
  theories etc.)
• Fruitless attempts to reconstruct the initial
  phenomenon from such abstractions (e.g.
  naturalist accounts of the mind, trope theories)
  Fallacy of reciprocal constitution of
  concepts broken symmetry between initial
  phenomenon and abstraction (indication e.g.
  appeal to structure tropes!)
• Throwing objects of different into one
  ontological pot e.g. treating atoms and tables
  as material objects
• Misunderstanding metaphysics as the great
  collection of all things, by summing up all
  regional ontologies

19

• 6. On what there is A proposal for ontological
  priority
• What about the inhabitants of other ontological
  regions?
• Do tropes / universals / boundaries / electrons
  / points / lines / edges / tunes / masses /
  weights / groups / really exist?
• Yes, as long as a stable discourse on such
  objects is possible.
• But not in the same way as DM-objects exist.
• Traditionally entia rationis cum fundamento in
  re

20

• 7. An outlook at the philosophy of religion
• So far DM is transcendental in the sense of
  indispensable
• No reference to a special notion of being
• No reference to God
• But Re-established rationality of
  Weltanschauung and its explication in DM
• Concepts of traditional metaphysics are not an
  extravagant addendum, but explicate the core
  of our access to reality. (Reveiling
  apriori, not conceiling apriori)
  Plausible arguments for Gods
  existence, if any, are formulated in terms of
  DM, not in some RM.
• Under some plausible evaluation criteria
  (consistency, coherence, completeness etc.),
  DM-plus-theism scores better than a
  naturalist world-view which usually rests on
  RM. (Löffler 2006, ch. 5)