Proliferation dangers with dual purpose nuclear technology

1
Proliferation dangers with dual purpose nuclear
technology
Frank Boulton, Medact, UK boultonfrank_at_gmail.com
www.medact.org IPPNW Astana, Kazakhstan 28th
August 2014
2
Published August 15, 2013 E Harrell, D E.
Hoffman Belfer Center
Published June 2014 Published
2012 US Army War College
Cornell Univ Press
3

• Henry Sokolski 2014
• Summary of The Complete Proliferation
  Narrative
• (orthodox view military, defense
  experts etc.)
• Nuclear Weapon proliferation is manageable
• Nations getting civil nuclear power plants
  should
• not make their own fuel
• Future Nuclear Power Plants can be made
• proliferation-resistant by strengthening
  IAEA
• Although several countries WILL get nuclear
• weapons, this will not matter as they
  are not
• useful except to deter use, which we
  can
• easily accomplish
  3

4

• The reality
• Diversion and proliferation are NOT manageable
• Constant risks of diverting civil atoms for
  peace to making weapons
• Strengthening IAEA safeguards can only go so far
• Little signs that this is getting serious
  consideration
• Effective action against violators never
  guaranteed
• Costs of NPP has never been, and never will be
  justified
• The world not only does not need nuclear power,
  it would be better off with no NPPs
• There is NO logic or justification for possessing
  nuclear weapons.
• Possession will always matter
• Human frailty means that nuclear war is
  inevitable while nuclear weapons exist
• 
  
  4

5
There is no silver bullet technology
that can be built into an enrichment plant or
reprocessing plant that can prevent a country
from diverting its national fuel cycle
facilities to non- peaceful use. Review
of DOEs Nuclear Energy RD Program, 2008
http//www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id11998pa
ge50
6
France

• France has two kinds of nuclear materials
  those that are free for any use, and those that
  can be used only for peaceful purposes under
  international agreements . France has the
  options to use any free materials for our
  military program
• Michel Pecqueur Chair,
  French Atomic Energy
• Commission, 1978 -1983
• France built between 63 and 250 nuclear
  weapons using plutonium that was produced
• in civilian power plants
• 
  Moving beyond pretense 2014
• 
  
  6

7
Atomic Assistance (AA)

• Nuclear technology is dual use in nature
• Despite concerns about proliferation, nuclear
  states have regularly shared technology,
  materials, and knowledge for peaceful purposes
  with others.
• Governments use peaceful atomic assistance as
  economic tools of statecraft
• Nuclear suppliers hope they can reap the benefits
  of foreign aid without undermining security. Such
  trade
• improves relationships with allies,
• limits the influence of adversaries,
• enhances energy security by gaining favourable
  access to oil
• Result - providing peaceful nuclear assistance
  inadvertently helps to spread nuclear weapons
  7

8
AA cases resulting in weapons programmes

• U.S. civilian nuclear assistance to Iran 1957 to
  1979
• helped by Johnny Walker!
• Soviet aid to Libya from 1975 to 1986
• French, Italian Brazil exports to Iraq, 1975 to
  1981
• U.S. cooperation with India from 2001 to 2008
• Research on why states considered NW programs
• countries receiving more AA more likely to pursue
  get the bomb
• especially if they get into an international
  crisis after receiving aid
• In some of the more stable countries, the
  interval between AA and weapons pgm can be up to
  25 yrs
• often after a change of regime, e.g. Pakistan
  (early 1950s to
• late 1970s)
  
  8

9
Conclusions 1

• Countries give AA mostly to further commerce and
  foster trading relations
• Keep recipients on their good side
• Diversion to military use is a recognised risk
  but such recognition is sublimated to national
  interest
• Several successful and some unsuccessful
  diversions only one country has genuinely
  disarmed (S Africa)
• FW de Klerk 2014 Rautjärvi 2014. MCS vol 30
  suppl 1
• Ukraine, Belarus Kazakhstan deserve some
  commendation
• NPT bargain of limited success,
• home-enrichment etc is NOT prevented by NPT
• IAEA is poorly resourced already and woefully
  unprepared for probable increased workload,
• lacks enforcement powers in spite of the
  Additional Protocol
• 
  
  9
  
  
  

10
Conclusions 2

• A fundamental flaw in NPT thinking
• Civil Nuclear Energy (CNE) a safe compensation
• (sop) to powers not possessing nuclear
  weapons
• While the classic Three Pillars philosophy of
  NPT continues some NNWS will always hide their NW
  ambitions behind Atoms-for-Peace clothing.
• nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, peaceful
  use of CNE
• Meantime, the IAEA must be strengthened
• either itself or another agency given powers
• of enforcement, backed up by
• legal outlawing nuclear weapons, old and new 10

11
Additional observations 13

• Civil nuclear power is
• Very expensive
• Very dangerous (proliferation, waste, health)
• Can be downgraded, but only with difficulties
  (decommissioning technology, disposal and costs,
  etc)
• Is not needed
• Nuclear fusion prospects (ITER) remain far off
• Renewables hold much promise but need radical and
  very disruptive revolutions
• in Economy
• Technical infrastructure
• Social attitudes
• We cannot assume that Carbon Capture Storage
  (CCS) technology will provide reliable permanent
  solutions
• Which puts more pressure on Renewables and
  Nuclear sources
• But we can develop a nuclear-free and excess
  GHG-emission-free world for 10 billion or even
  more people

12

• Time line
• 1957 Accident at Windscale, Cumbria.
  IAEA established
• 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
• 1967 Israel acquires NWs 9 yrs after starting
  its weapons programme
• 1968 NPT opens to signature into force,
  1970 China France accede 1992
• 1972 Indias first test
• 1972 75 Rasmussen report (NPPs very safe
  but beware Tsunami ! )
• 1977 Sanctions applied to South African NW
  programme
• 1978 UNGA Session on Disarmament (Alarmed by
  the threat to the very survival of
• mankind posed by the existence
  of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race.
  )
• 1979 USSR invades Afghan. US ? restrictions
  on Pakistans civil programme
• TMI accident. South Africas
  first test
• 1986 Chernobyl
• 1987 Pakistans first test
• 1990 South Africa disarms
• 1991 Gulf War sanctions on Iraq. STARTI
  by US Russia (STARTII, 1994)

13
l l l
l l l l l l l
l l l l l
l l l
IAEA Fr Ch Isr NPT Ind SAf
Afg/USSR Pak GW AP NK US-
New Start
Cuba sanc UN TME
Start1 out
India

SAf SAf Uk/Bel/Kaz
14
(No Transcript)
15
April 1, 2011. 437 nuclear reactors operating in
30 countries July 1, 2014. 388 nuclear reactors
operating in 31 countries 72
more under construction, 174 planned, 299 proposed
16
http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generation_IV_reactor

17
Chemistry of spent nuclear fuel 1

• Fissile products of U235 Pu239
• Isotopes in groups of unequal sizes ,
• somewhat smaller e.g. Sr90
• somewhat larger e.g. I131, Cs137, and
  Lanthanides
• These are often very radioactive and
  short-lived
• Fast neutrons, which transmutate fuel (U238) to
• Transuranic heavy metals, incl actinides e.g.
  Pu239
• long half-lives remain after fission
  products decay in the spent
• fuel cooling ponds
• Pu239can be extracted from spent fuel

18
http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fission_products_(by_
element)
19
Once-through cycles

• In the once-through cycles, characteristic of
  USA practices, spent fuel is sent for permanent
  disposal ultimately in Geological Disposal
  Depositories
• In UK, spent fuel is recycled and is
  accumulating, originally for Pu bombs and
  therefore very proliferation-prone and also for
  making controversial MOX fuels which are still
  causes for concern (technical to NPP design, and
  proliferation-prone)

20
Problems of spent fuel

• Short term, need to be cooled which failed in
  Fukushima
• Long term, safe storage
• Surface casks, for decades
• Geological disposal but where??
• Recycle into Gen III and Gen IV NPPs
• Prone to proliferation

21
Current UK Nuclear Generation and Planned to
2030by NDA (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority)

• Current nuclear capacity in the UK is
  9.23GW. This is expected to decline
  substantially as plants end of life approaches
  in mid-2020s.
• 8 new nuclear designated sites contained
  within Nuclear National Policy Statement. Firm
  site development plans for Hinkley, Sizewell,
  Wylfa, Oldbury and Moorside

22
Windscale fire October 1957
Graphite overheated and fire broke out Air from
fan fuelled fire Nuclear contaminants travelled
up chimney Filter (Cockrofts folly) blocked
some but not all contaminated material Radioactiv
e cloud spread over UK and Europe 750 TBq
(20,000 curies) released incl 22 TBq Cs137 and
740 of I131
23
Sellafield notoriety

• Fire 1957,
• THORP grade 3 leak in 2005
• MOX quality fabrication in 1999 - 40m
  compensation to Kansai
• gt100 Tonnes Pu on site
• 10 20 thousand Nagasaki equivalents
• Between a third and a half of world military
  total
• Main waste storage site for UK
• Possible leukaemia cluster (also at Dounreay)
  
  
  
  
  23

24
Purpose of Windscale

• To produce military Pu then H3 for
  thermo-nuclear bombs, for which the air cooling
  was reduced and led to the 1957 fire!
• 1952 First UK test of a nuclear weapon used 7Kg
  Pu, yield 25 Kt
• Operation Hurricane, on HMS Plym, a WW2
  anti-submarine frigate
• moored off Trimouille Island, W Australia
• 
  Fall-out as far as Rockhampton
• But from where was the U
  (3000 Km away)
• mined for this Pu?
• answer - Australia!
• (TA Ruff, MCS 2014 vol 30 suppl 1)

25
World Nuclear Exhibition 14 16 October 2014,
Paris

• TRADESHOW ACCESS PROGRAMME (TAP) FUNDING OF
  1,500
• UKTI are offering 7 TAP grants to eligible
  SMEs for this exhibition. Contact us for more
  details.
• Please return the form to
• Raelene Wilcock
• Head of Overseas Events
• raelene.wilcock_at_the-eic.com
• EIC, 89 Albert Embankment, London, SE17TP

26
IAEA, 1957
IAEA is autonomous, with a Board of Governors and
a General Conference of its 164 Member States.
It relates to the NPT, and reports to UNGA and
UNSC
27
IAEA Missions and Priorities

• Promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by
  its member states,
• Implementing safeguards to verify that nuclear
  energy is not used for military purposes
• Nuclear safety Promoting high standards
• BUT
• It is not clear which should take priority
• No consensus on handling violators (IAEA NPT)

28
Iraq 1991 ( Gulf War 1 et seq )
https//www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Iraq/ir
aqindex.html

• Violations
• Undeclared nuclear materials and activities
• Conclusive evidence" of a
• complex, comprehensive NW development program
• with broad-based international procurement
• continued attempts to conceal its true extent
• Nov 15 The first removal of HEU
• Some fresh fuel for the Soviet IRT 5000 reactor
  of concern
• - they couldnt find it!
  28

29
Iraq 1991 ( Gulf War 1 et seq )
https//www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Iraq/ir
aqindex.html

• Feb 1992 Facilities to produce U feedstocks found
  at Mosul
• planned site of future production facility for
  UF4
• Fuel from Tammuz-2 reactor pond sent to
  emergency storage
• pits in a farmland area a few miles from the
  Nuclear Centre.
• 400 tons (incl natural U 6 gms Pu) declared
  during the 5th inspecn
• Oct Nov 1991 special equipment for warhead
  assembly found
• Iraq's response to IAEA
• denial of clandestine activities until evidence
  became overwhelming,
• followed by co-operation.
• As a consequence

30
Other IAEA performances in safeguarding

• South Africa, as part of self-declared
  disarmament
• Iran (reported by Iranian opposition party)
• Libya (self-revealed by Gaddafi)
• N Korea (revealed by US satellites)
• S Korea (self-admitted fake certificates for
  reactor parts, 2013-14)
• Degelen Mt (Semipalatinsk clear-up, 2000s) Not
  involved (trusted)
• The IAEA needs greater authority and better
  technology

31
Additional Protocol 1997including unintended
consequences

• Encouraged S Korea to admit fake safety
  certificates (?)
• But raises expectations in IAEA performance
  without increasing resources
• Might encourage fewer inspections of countries
  signing up to it
• Signing up may confer preferred traveller
  status

32
WILL MORE INSPECTIONS BE NEEDED?

• In 2010 the IAEA conducted
• 1,750 inspections,
• 423 design information verifications, and
• 142 complementary accesses
• UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon visits
  Semipalatinsk with IAEA Deputy Director-General
  Olli Heinonen.
• In 2012, IAEA had 1125 facilities under
  safeguards,
• By 2030,
• nuclear electrical generation may be 40 to 120
  more
• and 10 to 25 new countries may get NPPs
• We must do more with less without compromising
• But UN policy is to maintain zero real growth in
  budgets
• So more materials inspected but by the same staff
  number
• In spite of 115 countries agreeing to be
  subjected to the AP

33
The Madness of Semipalatinsk after 1991
At Degelen Mountain, Kazakhstan, in the wake of
the testings at Semipalatinsk, c 290 Kg Pu was
left in bore holes easily available to
scavengers on site when, in the after-math of
9/11, the US withdrew funds for clearing-up by
teams from Kazakhstan, US and Russia. The IAEA
was kept officially in the dark, according to two
former officials. 100 Kg more was admitted later
even now, some remains. But the clearingup
exercise was a very creditable example of
US-Russia-Kazak co-operation in a spirit sorely
needed now
http//belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23
327/plutonium_mountain.html
34
How do we know that the IAEAs safeguards system
is not ripe for catastrophic failure? Safeguards
could be like a Titanic that has been lucky
enough not to strike an iceberg
35
Energy sources at years 2000 and projected at
the various RCP in 2100 (IPCC, 2013) Figure 14
Energy sources by sector (van Vuuren et.al. 2011)
http//www.skepticalscience.com/rcp.php?t3
36
HMS Dreadnought (UK) coal-powered (oil later)
launched 1906 crew, 700-810 displacement
18,120 long tons cost 2,000,000 (1906) USN
Gerald R Ford Nimitz class aircraft carrier
(USA) launched 2013 nuclear powered crew 500
officers, 3,700 enlisted displacement 100,000
long tons cost 11,400,000,000 (2014) HMS
Victorious (UK) launched 1993 nuclear
powered crew 160 displacement 18,000
tonnes cost at least 1.5 billion each
37
Arms race 1906 to 1914 Dreadnought
battleships August 1914 England vs Germany
34 - 24
38
Top 10 Nuclear Power Countries in the
World http//www.whichcountry.co/top-10-nuclear-po
wer-countries-in-the-world/
39

• THANKS