Formulating and Estimating a Dynamic, General Equilibrium Model Useable for Policy Analysis based on work by Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, Linde - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Formulating and Estimating a Dynamic, General Equilibrium Model Useable for Policy Analysis based on work by Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, Linde

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Title: Formulating and Estimating a Dynamic, General Equilibrium Model Useable for Policy Analysis based on work by Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, Linde


1
Formulating and Estimating a Dynamic, General
Equilibrium Model Useable for Policy
Analysisbased on work byAltig, Christiano,
Eichenbaum, Linde
2
Objectives
  • Constructing a DSGE Model
  • Model Features
  • Estimation of Model using VARs
  • Resolve Apparent Conflict Between Macro and Micro
    Data
  • Macro Evidence
  • Inflation is Inertial
  • Micro Evidence
  • Prices Change Frequently
  • Indicate by example how macro models can be
    brought into contact with micro data

3
Example of Micro/Macro Conflict Analysis with
Calvo-Sticky Prices
  • Analysis with Aggregate European and US Data (see
    Smets-Wouters, Gali-Gertler)
  • Prices Re-optimized Every 6 Quarters
  • Micro Evidence
  • Prices Re-optimized Every 1.7 Quarters

4
Proposed Resolution of Conflict
  • Firms Re-optimize Frequently (As in Micro)
  • When Firms Re-optimize, They Change Price By a
    Small Amount
  • Firms Short Run Marginal Cost Increasing in Own
    Output
  • Firm-Specific Factors of Production (Capital)
  • Build on Sbordone, Woodford, others

5
Standard Model
  • Capital Is Homogeneous
  • Traded in Perfectly Competitive Markets
  • Firm Marginal Cost Independent of Own Output
  • Assumptions Unrealistic
  • Made for Computational Simplicity
  • Hope It Doesnt Matter
  • In Fact It Matters A Lot!

6
Intuition Rising Marginal Cost and Incentive to
Raise Price
MC1,f
MC0,f
P1
P2
MC1
B
P0
B?
MC0
A
Q
Q0
7
More Intuition Rising Marginal Cost and
Incentive to Raise Price
  • A Firm Contemplates Raising Price
  • This Implies Output Falls
  • Marginal Cost Falls
  • Incentive to Raise Price Falls
  • Effect Quantitatively Important When
  • Demand Elastic
  • Marginal Cost Steep

8
Strategy for Evaluating Proposed Resolution of
Conflict
  • Incorporate Idea Into Otherwise Standard
    Equilibrium Model
  • Estimate Model Parameters Using Macro Data
    (Elasticity of Demand and Slope of Marginal Cost
    Particularly Important)
  • Ask Is Model Consistent With
  • Macro Evidence on Inflation Inertia?
  • Micro Evidence on Price Changes?

9
Key results
  • Make Progress On Macro/Micro Conflict
  • Account for Macro Evidence of Inflation Inertia
  • Prices re-optimized on average once every 1.6
    quarters.
  • This finding depends on the assumption that
    capital is firm specific.
  • Wage-setting Frictions play Important Role.
  • Wage contracts re-optimized on average once every
    3 quarters.
  • Monetary Policy Crucial In Transmission of
    Technology Shocks
  • According to our model, in absence of monetary
    accommodation,
  • Output and hours would fall in the wake of a
    positive neutral technology shock
  • Output and hours worked would rise by much less
    than they actually do after a positive capital
    embodied technology shock.
  • Consistent with findings in Gali, Lopez-Salido
    and Valles (2002).

10
Outline
  • Model
  • Econometric Estimation of Model
  • Fitting Model to Impulse Response Functions
  • Model Estimation Results
  • Implications for Micro Data on Prices
  • Evaluate the Reliability of VAR Analysis

11
Model
  • Two Versions of Model
  • Homogeneous Capital
  • Firm-specific Capital
  • Describe Model Under Homogeneous Capital
    Assumption
  • What to Change to Obtain Firm-Specific Capital
    Version

12
Description of Model
  • Timing Assumptions
  • Firms
  • Households
  • Monetary Authority
  • Goods Market Clearing and Equilibrium

13
Timing
  • Technology Shocks Realized.
  • Agents Make Price/Wage Setting, Consumption,
    Investment, Capital Utilization Decisions.
  • Monetary Policy Shock Realized.
  • Household Money Demand Decision Made.
  • Production, Employment, Purchases Occur, and
    Markets Clear.
  • Note Wages, Prices and Output Predetermined
    Relative to Policy Shock.

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Evidence from Midrigan, Menu Costs,
Multi-Product Firms, and Aggregate Fluctuations
Lots of small changes
Histograms of log(Pt/Pt-1), conditional on price
adjustment, for two data sets pooled across all
goods/stores/months in sample.
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Households Sequence of Events
  • Technology shock realized.
  • Decisions Consumption, Capital accumulation,
    Capital Utilization.
  • Insurance markets on wage-setting open.
  • Wage rate set.
  • Monetary policy shock realized.
  • Household allocates beginning of period cash
    between deposits at financial intermediary and
    cash to be used in consumption transactions.

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Dynamic Response of Consumption to Monetary
Policy Shock
  • In Estimated Impulse Responses
  • Real Interest Rate Falls
  • Consumption Rises in Hump-Shape Pattern

c
t
26
Consumption Puzzle
  • Intertemporal First Order Condition
  • With Standard Preferences

Standard Preferences
c
c
Data!
t
t
27
One Resolution to Consumption Puzzle
  • Concave Consumption Response Displays
  • Rising Consumption (problem)
  • Falling Slope of Consumption
  • Habit Persistence in Consumption
  • Marginal Utility Function of Slope of Consumption
  • Hump-Shape Consumption Response Not a Puzzle
  • Econometric Estimation Strategy Given the Option,
    bgt0

Habit parameter
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Dynamic Response of Investment to Monetary Policy
Shock
  • In Estimated Impulse Responses
  • Investment Rises in Hump-Shaped Pattern

I
t
34
Investment Puzzle
  • Rate of Return on Capital
  • Rough Arbitrage Condition
  • Positive Money Shock Drives Real Rate
  • Problem Burst of Investment!

35
One Solution to Investment Puzzle
  • Adjustment Costs in Investment
  • Standard Model (Lucas-Prescott)
  • Problem
  • Hump-Shape Response Creates Anticipated Capital
    Gains

I
I
Optimal Under Standard Specification
Data!
t
t
36
One Solution to Investment Puzzle
  • Cost-of-Change Adjustment Costs
  • This Does Produce a Hump-Shape Investment
    Response
  • Other Evidence Favors This Specification
  • Empirical Matsuyama, Smets-Wouters.
  • Theoretical Matsuyama, David Lucca

37
Wage Decisions
  • Households supply differentiated labor.
  • Standard Calvo set up as in Erceg, Henderson and
    Levin and CEE.

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Contemporaneous Impact of Positive Monetary Shock
  • Quantities and Prices Dont Move
  • Money Market

Supply of Funds Households Deposits vs Cash
Demand for Funds Firm Wages
Money Injection
Monetary Authority
Financial Intermediary
Loans
Deposits
R Drops
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Implications for Wage and Price Re-Optimization
  • Our benchmark estimates imply that wage decisions
    are re-optimized on average 3.6 quarters.
  • The implication of our estimate of gamma for how
    frequently firms re-optimize prices depends
    critically on whether we assume capital is firm
    specific or homogeneous.
  • If capital is homogeneous, firms re-optimize
    prices on average once every 6 quarters,
  • If capital is firm specific, firms re-optimize
    prices once every 1.6 quarters.
  • At a broad level, this is consistent with micro
    evidence from Bils and Klenow, Lucas and Golosov
    and Klenow and Kryvtsov.
  • Ill provide intuition for this in a moment.

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Monetary Policy and Technology Shocks
  • Policy Issue
  • How would the economy have responded to
    technology shocks if monetary policy had not been
    accommodative?

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  • Cross Sectional Implications For Production Not
    Extreme

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Micro Findings
  • Homogeneous and Firm-Specific Capital Models are
    Indistinguishable from the Point of View of
    Aggregate Data
  • Very Different Implications for
  • Degree of Price Stickiness in Micro Data
  • Dispersion of Prices and Output Across Firms
  • Firm-Specific Capital Model Seems to Have Better
    Micro Implications

70
Summary
  • We constructed a dynamic GE model of cyclical
    fluctuations.
  • Given assumptions satisfied by our model, we
    identified dynamic response of key US economic
    aggregates to 3 shocks
  • Monetary Policy Shocks
  • Neutral Technology Shocks
  • Capital Embodied Technology Shocks
  • These shocks account for substantial cyclical
    variation in output.
  • Estimated GE model does a good job of accounting
    for response functions (However, Misses on
    Inflation Response to Neutral Shock)
  • Have Made Progress on Micro/Macro Conflict
  • But, Need to Further Investigate Cross-Sectional
    Implications of Model

71
Summary
  • Calvo Sticky Prices and Wages Seems Like Good
    Reduced Form
  • What is the Underlying Structure?
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