Title: Future Forms of Terrorism: Threat of Biological Weapons and Bio-Terrorism
1Future Forms of Terrorism Threat of Biological
Weapons and Bio-Terrorism Assoc. Prof. MUSTAFA
KIBAROGLU Department of International
RelationsBILKENT UNIVERSITY 27 January 2006
- DEFINITION, DIMENSION CATEGORIES OF TERRORISM
- CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM
- TURKISH GENERAL STAFF
- ANKARA - TURKEY
- 23 - 27 January 2006
2Future Forms of Terrorism Threat of Biological
Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof.
Mustafa Kibaroglu
-
- We stand on the threshold of a new era in which
hundreds of millions of people will at least be
safe from some form of the worlds most terrible
diseases We also stand on the brink of a global
crisis in infectious diseases. No country is safe
from them. No country can any longer afford to
ignore their threat. -
- Dr. Hiroshi Nakajima
- Former Director General
- World Health Organization (WHO)
-
-
- Biological warfare is the deliberate spreading
of (infectious) diseases among humans, animals,
and plants in order to cause incapacitation or
death of the target population. - Hon. Prof. Graham S. Pearson CB
- Former Director General
- Chemical Biological Defence Establishment
- Porton Down, Salisbury, England
3Future Forms of Terrorism Threat of Biological
Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof.
Mustafa Kibaroglu
-
- Topics of the Day
- Biological Agents of Military Significance
-
- Characteristics and Symptoms of Some Anti-Human
Biological Agents -
- Past Record of Uses of Biological Agents for
Military Purposes -
- Knowledge Required to Manufacture Biological
Weapons -
- Military-Strategic Advantages Drawbacks of
Biological Weapons -
- An Emerging Threat Bio-Terrorism
-
- Means of Protection Active Passive Defences
-
- International Efforts to Counter the Threat of
Biological Weapons
4Future Forms of Terrorism Threat of Biological
Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof.
Mustafa Kibaroglu
-
- Biological Agents of Military Significance
-
- Bacteria Single-cell organisms that cause
diseases as anthrax, plague, and tularemia.
Although many pathogenic bacteria are susceptible
to antibiotic drugs, strains can be selected that
are resistant to antibiotic and occur naturally.
Bacteria can be readily grown in artificial media
using facilities similar to those found in the
brewery industry -
- Virus 100 times smaller than bacteria and occur
in large numbers in nature. Among
disease-producing viruses are smallpox, Ebola,
and Venezuelan equine encephalitis. Viruses must
be grown on living tissue and they can mutate
naturally or be genetically engineered to
increase their effectiveness -
- Rickettsiae Similar to bacteria in structure and
form but must be grown on living tissue. Diseases
caused by rickettsiae include Q-fever, typhus,
and Rocky Mountain spotted fever -
- Fungi Occur greatly in nature and could be used
to destroy crops. Relatively few species appear
to have potential for deliberate use against
humans. The fungal pathogens that cause hardship
and famine are potato blight and cereal rust -
- Toxins Non-living products of micro-organisms,
plants or living creatures such as botulinum
toxin, ricin from castor beans, or saxitoxin from
shellfish. Toxins can only affect those exposed
to the toxin and cannot produce transmissible
diseases.
5Future Forms of Terrorism Threat of Biological
Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof.
Mustafa Kibaroglu
-
- Characteristics and Symptoms of Some Anti-Human
Biological Agents - Type of Name of Incubation Length
of Effective Symptoms - Agent Agent Period
Illness Dosage Effects -
- Bacteria Bacillus Anthracis 1 to 6 day
3 to 5 days 10,000 Fever and fatigue often
(anthrax) spores followed by improvement,
then abrupt onset of severe
respiratory problems shock
pneumonia and death within 2-3 days -
- Yersinia pestis 2 to 10 day 1 to 2 days
100 to Malaise, high fever, can lead
(bubonic plague) 20,000 to
hemorrhage (shed blood),
organisms circulatory failure and death -
-
- Brucella Suis 1 to 3 week days
1,300 Fever and chills, headache,
(brucellosis) organisms loss
of appetite, mental depression, extreme
fatigue -
- Pasteurella 3 to 5 days half of 10 to
50 General pain, an irritant, tularensis
victims die organisms
cough, feeling of general (tularemia)
in 30 days illness -
6Future Forms of Terrorism Threat of Biological
Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof.
Mustafa Kibaroglu
-
- Characteristics and Symptoms of Some Anti-Human
Biological Agents (continued) - Type of Name of Incubation Length of
Effective Symptoms - Agent Agent Period Illness
Dosage Effects -
- Viruses Venezulean 1 to 5 days days to
25 Fever, chills, gastro- equine
weeks infectious intestinal
hemorrage, encephalitis
units severe headache, nausea, vomiting,
can lead to coma, shock and death
- Rickettsiae Coxiella burnetii 10 to 20 days 2
days to 10 or less Pneumonia, cough, chest
(Q-fever) 2 weeks organisms pain -
- Toxins Saxitoxin minutes to fatal after
150 Dizziness, paralysis of
hours inhalation micrograms
muscles of respiration, and causes death
in minutes -
- Botulinum Toxin hours to days 1 to 3 days
70 Dizziness, dry throat
nanograms mouth, blurred
vision abrupt respiratory failure,
and causes death -
- Ricin hours days
200 Rapid onset of nausea,
micrograms
vomiting, cramps, vascular
collapse, fever and cough
7Future Forms of Terrorism Threat of Biological
Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof.
Mustafa Kibaroglu
-
- Potential Effects of Biological Agents If Used
for Military or Terrorist Purposes -
- Disseminating by airplane of 50 kg of an agent
Along a 2 km line upwind of a population of
500,000. -
- Agent Downwind Reach (km) Dead
Incapacitated -
- Tick-Borne Encephalitis 1 9,500 35,000
-
- Typhus 5 19,000 85,000
-
- Brucellosis 10 500 100,000
-
- Q-fever gt 20 150 125,000
-
- Tularemia gt 20 30,000 125,000
-
- Anthrax gtgt 20 95,000 125,000
-
8Future Forms of Terrorism Threat of Biological
Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof.
Mustafa Kibaroglu
- Past Record of Military Uses of Biological
Warfare Agents -
- 1346-1347 Mongols catapult corpses contaminated
with plague over the walls into Kaffa (in
Crimea), forcing besieged Genovans to flee -
- 1710 Russian troops allegedly used
plague-infected corpses against Swedes -
- 1767 During the French and Indian Wars, the
British gave blankets used to wrap British
smallpox victims to hostile Indian tribes -
- 1916-1918 German agents used anthrax and the
equine disease glanders to infect livestock and
feed for export to Allied forces. Incidents
include the infection of Romanian sheep with
anthrax and glanders for export to Russia,
Argentinian mules with anthrax for export to
Allied troops, and American horses fed with
glanders for export to France -
- 1937 Japan began its offensive biological
weapons program. Over the course of the program,
at least 10,000 prisoners are killed in Japanese
experiments -
- 1939 Nomonhan Incident - Japanese poisoned
Soviet water supply with intestinal typhoid
bacteria at former Mongolian border. First use of
biological weapons by Japanese
9Future Forms of Terrorism Threat of Biological
Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof.
Mustafa Kibaroglu
- Past Record of Military Uses of Biological
Warfare Agents (continued) -
- 1940 The Japanese dropped rice and wheat mixed
with plague-carrying fleas over China and
Manchuria -
- 1942-1943 Great Britain conducted trials on
Gruinard Island off the northwest coast of
Scotland to investigate the feasibility of
biological warfare. The British government
decontaminated the Gruinard Island in 1986 and
returned the island to its original owners in
1990 -
- June, 1966 The United States conducted a test of
vulnerability to covert BW attack by releasing a
harmless biological simulant into the New York
City subway system -
- April 2, 1979 Outbreak of pulmonary anthrax in
Sverdlovsk, Soviet Union. In 1992, Russian
president Boris Yeltsin acknowledges that the
outbreak was caused by an accidental release of
anthrax spores from a Soviet military
microbiological facility
10Future Forms of Terrorism Threat of Biological
Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof.
Mustafa Kibaroglu
- Knowledge Required to Manufacture Biological
Weapons -
- ...The most elemental step for the production of
biological agents is acquisition of a seedstock
of agent. This step is easy to accomplish.
Biological agents can be isolated from their
natural sources, or a seedstock can be requested
from culture collections, or obtained from anyone
who has micro-organisms for medical or research
purposes. The next step is to grow the amount
desired. Actual production of agent requires
simple equipment such as fermenters and other
containers and an understanding of microbiology
and how growth media work. The scientific
know-how and equipment to culture micro-organisms
are essential capabilities pervasive in the
biotechnology industry all over the world. -
- The infective dose of the potential biological
agent -
- The method of attack on the target population
(e.g., inhalation, ingestion, or by an insect
vector) -
- The means of dispersion of the biological agent
-
- The ability of the biological agent to survive
until it reaches the target -
- The time to effect or cause disease in the
target population -
- The biological agent needs to be producible.
11Future Forms of Terrorism Threat of Biological
Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof.
Mustafa Kibaroglu
- Military-Strategic Advantages Drawbacks of
Biological Weapons -
- Advantages
-
- Since biological agents (except toxins) multiply
inside the host bodies, small amounts --just a
few micro-organisms of a biological agent-- may
be sufficient to devastate a crop, a herd of
animals, and a citys inhabitants -
- Effects of biological agents take time to
develop. A number of days or weeks must
transpire, depending on the micro-organism and
the rate at which it multiplies in the body -
- Due to delayed effects of biological agents they
can be used for attacking fixed targets such as
airbases, ports, naval headquarters, troop
assembly areas, and logistic concentrations -
- The delayed effect of biological agents makes
attribution difficult, especially when an endemic
disease is used. Hence, it is plausible to both
hide and deny biological weapons attack -
- The cost of establishing a biological weapons
program has steadily reduced with the advances in
microbiology and biotechnology that make agent
production much easier. The comparative cost of
civilian casualties is 2,000/km2 with
conventional weapons, 800 with nuclear weapons,
and 1 with biological weapons (poor mans
atomic bomb)
12Future Forms of Terrorism Threat of Biological
Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof.
Mustafa Kibaroglu
-
- Military-Strategic Advantages Drawbacks of
Biological Weapons (continued) -
- Drawbacks
-
- Because of the delayed effects of biological
agents they may not be effectively used in the
battlefield -
- The area that will be contaminated by biological
weapons will have to be decontaminated by proper
methods while the result may not be assuring.
Hence, military victory over the combatant may
not be coupled with territorial gain -
- Effective dissemination of biological weapons is
a challenging task because the biological agent
is a fragile living organism that has to survive
until it reaches the target. If bombs or rockets
are employed to disseminate the agent, the heat
and shock produced by the detonation of the
explosive may kill the living micro-organisms -
- Once living micro-organisms are dispersed into
the atmosphere, the agents will then be exposed
to environmental and climatic conditions. Hence,
effectiveness of biological weapons will be
determined, among others, by meteorological
conditions. The distance downwind at which an
effective dose will be delivered to the target
population will be determined by local weather
condition. For instance, under ideal conditions,
such as calm night with steady wind, the agent
will probably be disseminated over hundreds of
kilometers, while under turbulent, sunny
conditions the distance that the agent will be
carried downwind will be greatly reduced, and a
proportion of the agents may be killed before
reaching the target population
13Future Forms of Terrorism Threat of Biological
Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof.
Mustafa Kibaroglu
- An Emerging Threat Bio-Terrorism
-
- Since weaponization of biological agents does
not require extremely demanding high technology
and since biological agents are rather easily
accessible, well organized terrorist groups
including members from various scientific fields
have the potential to produce biological weapons.
For instance the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo
which is responsible for the Sarin attack in the
Tokyo subway in March 1995 is known to have a
cadre of thousands of scientists, engineers,
technicians and experts in various disciplines -
- Because of the low cost of producing biological
weapons, terrorist groups can afford such a
lethal weapon which may cause mass casualties -
- Biological agents can be dispersed by simple
non-military vehicles such as civilian aircraft,
agricultural sprayers, a van equipped with a fan
and specialized ventilators, or by simply
choosing an upwind location close to population
areas -
- As rivalry between big country - small country
sharpens, small countries may resort to war by
proxy strategy by giving wide support to
terrorist groups equipped with biological agents
produced by the sponsor state -
- For the time being the likelihood of a
biological terrorist attack is not high. However,
this is a typical low probability high
consequences scenario. Thus, states need to take
elaborate and costly counter-measures.
14Future Forms of Terrorism Threat of Biological
Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof.
Mustafa Kibaroglu
-
- Means of Protection Active Passive Defenses
-
- Active Defense
-
- Preventing delivery systems by military means
reaching the vicinity of the target population by
intercepting and destroying incoming delivery
vehicles -
- Preemptive strike against the potential
aggressors biological weapons facilities -
-
- Passive Defense
-
- Conducting hazard assessment by evaluating the
area and the size of the population at risk in
the event of the biological attack -
- Increasing the detection capability by
furnishing an alarm system alerting officials
that a biological attack is imminent. Ideally,
detection systems are situated a sufficient
distance upwind of the asset being produced to
enable sufficient warning before the agent cloud
arrives over the target downwind
15Future Forms of Terrorism Threat of Biological
Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof.
Mustafa Kibaroglu
- Means of Protection Active Passive Defenses
(continued) - Increasing physical protection capability such
as using physical barriers to protect the target
population from exposure to a biological agent -
- Since the risks of illness from skin exposure to
biological agents are minimal, respirators and
masks are the principal personal protective gear -
- Medical counter-measures can negate or blunt the
effects of some biological agents. Therefore,
personnel can be vaccinated against some agents.
Vaccinations are available to counteract against
some biological agents such as anthrax, Plague,
Q-fever, and tularemia -
- Medical counter-measures can also be
administered after exposure to a biological agent
such as applying antibiotics The effectiveness
of medical treatment depends on the availability
of advance knowledge of the specific biological
agent involved.
16Future Forms of Terrorism Threat of Biological
Weapons and Bio-TerrorismSeminar byAssoc. Prof.
Mustafa Kibaroglu
- International Efforts to Counter the Threat of
Biological Weapons -
- Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
signed in 1972 and entered into force in 1975
prohibits countries from developing, producing,
acquiring, stockpiling and retaining an entire
class of biological and toxin weapons -
- The major weakness of the BTWC is that it does
not have a verification mechanism. Therefore, it
is not possible to verify that no such an
activity takes place in suspect countries some of
which are in the Middle East -
- Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament
(CD) in the United Nations Offices in Geneva
resulted in a full-fledged and effective
verification mechanism in the Spring of 2001,
which was however objected by the United States
in July the same year -
- Informal cooperation and collaboration among
states, especially in the field of intelligence,
is probable. However, there is reluctance in most
states in sharing sensitive national intelligence
with other states unless there exists a common
interest or there is a strategic partnership
between the states.