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Computationally Secure Hierarchical Self-Healing Group Key Distribution for Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks

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Title: Computationally Secure Hierarchical Self-Healing Group Key Distribution for Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks


1
Computationally Secure Hierarchical Self-Healing
Group Key Distribution for Heterogeneous Wireless
Sensor Networks
  • Y.J. Yang, J.Y. Zhou, R.H. Deng, F. Bao
  • Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore

2
Agenda
  • Introduction
  • Heterogeneous WSN Architecture
  • Basic Hierarchical Self-healing group Key
    Distribution Scheme
  • Extended Scheme
  • Conclusion

3
  • Introduction
  • Heterogeneous WSN Architecture
  • Basic Hierarchical Self-healing group Key
    Distribution Scheme
  • Extended Scheme
  • Conclusion

4
Wireless Sensor Networks
  • Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)

5
Self-healing Group Key Distribution
  • Key Distirubtion Management is Fundamental to
    Other Security Issues
  • Pairwise key distribution
  • Group key distribution
  • Self-healing group key distribution especially
    suits WSNs lossy channel.

6
Homogeneous WSNs
  • All Existing Work Consider Homogeneous WSNs
  • Homogeneous WSN
  • All sensor nodes have the same capability
  • Homogeneous WSNs have scalability problem.
    Theoretical and empirical studies have
    corroborated this

7
Hierarchical Self-healing Key Distribution
  • Motivated to Study Self-healing Group Key
    Distribution for Heterogeneous WSNs
  • Hierarchical Self-healing Group Key Distribution
  • Adapting to the heterogeneous WSN architecture

8
  • Introduction
  • Heterogeneous WSN Architecture
  • Basic Hierarchical Self-healing group Key
    Distribution Scheme
  • Extended Scheme
  • Conclusion

9
Heterogeneous WSNs
  • Heterogeneous WSNs Are A Better Alternative to
    Homogeneous ones
  • The network is partitioned into groups, and each
    group is placed a group manager
  • Group managers have better capability than sensor
    nodes
  • A group manager acts an intermediary between
    sensor nodes and the base station

10
Heterogeneous WSNs
11
  • Introduction
  • Heterogeneous WSN Architecture
  • Basic Hierarchical Self-healing group Key
    Distribution Scheme
  • Extended Scheme
  • Conclusion

12
Key Hierarchy
13
Key Generation
rK rk1, rk2
mKi mk1, mk2 h(Gi,rk1), h(Gi,rk2)
gKi
14
Key Generation
reverse hash chain
foward hash chain
gKij kRm-j1kFj
kRj hRj(mk1) hR(hR(hR(hR(mk1)))) kFj
hFj(mk2) hF(hF(hF(hF(mk2))))
15
Key Distribution
gKij kRm-j1kFj
  • mk2 is given to each sensor as seed sF for the
    forward hash chain
  • At the start of each session, the group manager
    generates kRm-j1 using mk1 as seed for the
    reverse hash chain, and broadcasts to sensors
    within its group
  • The broadcast scheme is essentially the Dutta et
    al.s scheme, with a slight modification to
    rectify its weakness

16
Key Distribution
  • The reverse hash chain is used to achieve
    self-healing property
  • The forward hash chain is used to achive forward
    secrecy, i.e., sensors joined later cannot
    compute group keys of earlier sessions

17
  • Introduction
  • Heterogeneous WSN Architecture
  • Basic Hierarchical Self-healing group Key
    Distribution Scheme
  • Extended Scheme
  • Conclusion

18
Untrusted Group Manager
Untrusted Group Manager
  • For the basic scheme, group managers are assumed
    trusted.
  • However, group managers cannot be guaranteed
    trusted.
  • We consider some group managers are compromised
    in the extended scheme

19
Secret sharing of mk1
Secret sharing of mk1
  • In basic scheme, if mk1 is compromised, all
    sessions are compromised
  • We are left to secret sharing of mk1 among group
    managers and compute kRm-j1 in a distributed
    way
  • The point is that hR() can be computed in a
    distributed way

20
Choice of hR()
  • Normal hash function cannot be used as hR()
  • We define hR()
  • hR() ZN ? QRN
  • hR(x) x2 (mod N)
  • mk1 is partitioned into t shares mk1
    s1.s2st-1.st (mod N)
  • hRj(mk1) (s1)2j (s2)2j(st)2j (mod N)

21
  • Introduction
  • Heterogeneous WSN Architecture
  • Basic Hierarchical Self-healing group Key
    Distribution Scheme
  • Extended Scheme
  • Conclusion

22
Conclusion
Conclusion
  • Heterogeneous WSNs have better scalability and
    performance, as the introduction of powerful
    group managers provides shortcut for data
    transmission from sensors to base station
  • We proposed hierarchical self-healing group key
    distribution tailored to heterogeneous WSNs
  • Our constructions are based Dutta et al.s idea

23
QA
Thank You!
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