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Avian Influenza Shoreland, Inc.

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Title: Avian Influenza Shoreland, Inc.


1
Avian Influenza Shoreland, Inc.
  • April 2006

2
Taipei Wet Market
China--Backyard Farms
3
Pandemic Influenza
  • Next pandemic inevitable in the near term
  • Wide agreement by WHO, CDC, others
  • Current H5N1 bird flu or another strain
  • Worldwide spread within 2-3 months possible
  • Initial quarantine may close borders for weeks to
    months
  • Highly contagious
  • Humans have no immunity to new strains
  • Vaccine availability will lag by months
  • Insufficient anti-viral drugs currently available
  • Significant mortality
  • 1 of worlds population (30 million) died in
    1918 pandemic
  • 1-2 million died in 1957 1968 pandemics
  • Similar mortality possible if no effective
    intervention

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H5N1 Confirmed Cases in Humans, Wild Birds,
Poultry (April 4, 2006)
6
H5N1 Confirmed Cases in Humans 192 cases / 109
deathsWHO counts only lab-confirmed cases
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The 2 Mechanisms Whereby Pandemic Influenza
Originates
9
WHO Pandemic Phases
  • Inter-Pandemic Period
  • Phase 1 Animal virus present no human
    transmission
  • Phase 2 Animal virus with features posing risk
    of human transmission
  • Pandemic Alert Period
  • Phase 3 Human infection through animal contact
    but no human-to-human spread (rarely, spread to a
    close contact)
  • Phase 4 Small clusters of limited human-to-human
    transmission highly localized
  • Phase 5 Larger clusters of human-to-human
    transmission but still localized
  • Pandemic Period
  • Phase 6 Worldwide human-to-human infection
    increased and sustained transmission in general
    population

10
Terminology Pathogenic Avian Serotypes(defined
according to disease caused in birds)
  • Influenza A has many subtypes, classified
    according to 16 H and 9 N proteins
  • Poultry cases
  • H5 (generally highly pathogenic)
  • H7 (high or low pathogenic varies by strain)
  • H9 (always low pathogenic)
  • Human cases
  • H5 (generally severe)
  • H7 (mild disease even if highly pathogenic in
    birds)
  • H9 (mild disease only 3 cases documented)

11
Avian Influenza A (H5N1)
  • Occurs primarily in poultry, waterfowl, or other
    birds
  • Mammals are susceptible to infection--ingested
    chicken
  • Become ill and die
  • Thus far dont serve as natural carriers
  • 2004 pigs (China) tigers domestic cats
    (Thailand)
  • 2006 domestic cat, stone marten (Germany)
  • Emerged in Asia sometime before 1997 in poultry
  • 1997 - Mutated into highly pathogenic form
  • Infected 18 humans (6 deaths) in Hong Kong
  • 2003 - Re-emerged in poultry
  • Mutated slightly to Z strain
  • Current wave of bird to human cases since Dec.
    03

12
Reasons for Concern for Pandemic H5N1
  • H5N1 can infect many avian and animal species
  • Facilitates geographic spread
  • Recombination event is not necessary for a
    pandemic
  • 1918 strain pure avian virus that underwent 10
    spontaneous mutations, became infective for
    humans, and was exceptionally virulent
  • Several similar mutations present in currently
    circulating H5N1 virus
  • NS1 gene possible virulence factor
  • one variant of a specific NS1 gene
    present in all AI isolates
  • (plus 1918 strain), but no human
    influenza A

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H5N1 Outbreaks in Birds
  • Countries with H5N1 Outbreaks in 2005-06
  • Asia Africa Europe
  • Cambodia Cameroon Albania Serbia
    Montenegro
  • China Egypt Austria Slovakia
  • Hong Kong Niger Bosnia Herzegovina
    Slovenia
  • Indonesia Nigeria Bulgaria Sweden
  • India Burkina Faso Croatia Switzerland
  • Kazakhstan Denmark Ukraine
  • Malaysia France United Kingdom
  • Mongolia Mid-East Germany
  • Pakistan (H5) Azerbaijan Greece
  • Russia Iran Hungary
  • Thailand Iraq Italy
  • Viet Nam Israel Poland
  • Georgia Jordan Romania
  • Burma (Myanmar) Turkey
  • Cases were reported in birds in the following
    provinces or autonomous regions during 2005
    and/or 2006 Anhui, Guizhou, Hubei, Hunan, Inner
    Mongolia, Jiangxi, Liaoning, Ningxia, Qinghai,
    Shanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, Xizang (Tibet), and
    Yunnan.

17
Transmission
  • Spread by domestic ducks, poultry, wild migratory
    birds
  • Transmitted bird to human through
  • Direct contact with sick / infected birds
  • Surfaces contaminated with droppings, respiratory
    secretions, ocular secretions
  • Possibly eating under-cooked eggs poultry,
    duck blood
  • Human-to-human transmission non-existent or rare
    with existing H5N1 strain
  • Incubation period unknown -- 2-8 days
  • Pandemic virus (after human adaptation) likely
    1-4 days

18
Transmission (contd)
  • Mainly large droplet spread
  • 3 feet
  • Emphasis on social distancing
  • Environmental contact (H5N1 viruses can survive
    for up to 6 days)
  • Airborne transmission possible?
  • Isolate first cases with airborne precautions
  • Infectious period
  • 1 day before onset of symptoms to 5 days after in
    adults and 3 weeks in young children
  • Big contrast to SARS
  • Seasonally unclear winter may be still be higher

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H5N1 Clinical -- Symptoms
  • Initially cannot differentiate from other cases
    of severe influenza
  • Presents with fever and influenza-like symptoms,
    cough, sore throat, rhinitis, muscle aches,
    headache
  • Conjunctivitis
  • Rapid onset of viral pneumonia, ARDS
  • H5N1 mouse studies indicate diffuse
    extrapulmonary involvement, macrophage
    activation, cytokine storm effect
  • Severest mortality in young adults
  • Other symptoms, e.g., severe diarrhea,
    encephalitis, etc. (see notes)

31
Use of Antivirals
  • Stand-by treatment
  • For use (after medical consultation) after
    becoming ill in an outbreak situation
  • Dosing as per treatment regimen on Treatment of
    Avian Influenza slide
  • Prophylaxis
  • In an outbreak situation, antivirals to be taken
    as instructed before becoming ill

32
Types of Antivirals
  • Oseltamivir (Tamiflu) -- recommended
  • Active against H5N1 in vitro and likely effective
    in vivo (mice)
  • Shelf life at least 5 years
  • Supplies limited not currently in retail stores
  • Until this year 2 million doses per year
  • U.S. current stockpile of antiviral drugs 5.5
    million treatment courses
  • an additional 12.4 million treatment courses of
    Tamiflu and 1.75 million treatment courses of
    Relenza due by Sept 2006
  • ? production issues
  • Zanamivir (Relenza) -- may also be effective
  • Taken via inhalation - less convenient to use
  • Amantadine, rimantadine H5N1 is resistant to
    these drugs

33
Treatment of Avian Influenza
  • Need to start antiviral treatment in first 48
    hours
  • Reduce mortality / complications
  • Non-severe cases
  • 75 mg oseltamivir (Tamiflu) po bid for 5 days
  • 2 Vietnamese cases with oseltamivir-resistant
    mutation developing during therapy with death.
  • Higher dosing may be necessary
  • Resistant virus not necessarily infectious
  • OR
  • 10 mg zanamivir (Relenza) inhaled bid for 5 days
  • Almost none currently available
  • Severe cases
  • 150 mg oseltamivir po bid for 7-10 days
  • Consider adding inhaled zanamivir (Relenza)
  • Consider po/IV ribavirin

34
Prophylaxis of Avian Influenza
  • Oseltamivir 75 mg po once daily during period of
    exposure and for 7-10 days after last exposure
  • If staying in an area of on-going epidemic with
    no vaccine available, this could mean taking
    prophylaxis for 2 months or longer.
  • Prophylaxis of general public not in current HHS
    plan

35
Prevention for the Traveler Pre-travel
  • Check for any travel restrictions
  • Prohibit travel with a fever to/from H5N1 areas
  • Educate provide handout on avian influenza
  • Provide travel health kit
  • Supply antivirals (e.g., oseltamivir) if
    traveling to H5N1-affected area (Freedman DO,
    Leder K. J Trav Med 2005 12 36-44)
  • Vaccinate with conventional influenza vaccine
  • Does not protect against H5N1 but may decrease
    chance of confusing human influenza with H5N1
  • Identify in-country health care resources

36
Education Preventive Measures During Travel
  • Avoid contact with birds, animal markets / farms,
    bird droppings or secretions, and potentially
    contaminated surfaces
  • Frequent thorough hand washing
  • Carry and use alcohol hand sanitizer / wipes
  • Need for paper towels in washrooms
  • After shaking hands
  • Ingestion of eggs and poultry that are well
    cooked
  • Good respiratory hygiene
  • When possible, change of airplane seats to avoid
    travelers with respiratory symptoms masks when
    appropriate
  • Seek early medical consultation for any fever or
    influenza-like symptoms during or after travel to
    H5N1 areas

37
Travel Kit for H5N1 Areas
  • First aid and medical supplies
  • Oral thermometer and probe covers
  • Household disinfectant
  • Disposable gloves and plastic storage bags
  • Alcohol-based wipes / hand sanitizer
  • Masks (2- or 3-ply surgical, N95, others)
  • Consider antivirals (e.g., oseltamivir)

38
Masks
  • Surgical masks 2- or 3-ply
  • Benefit controversial but may be cultural mandate
  • N-95 masks
  • Fit testing required some limitations but may be
    good stand-by protection and useful on airplanes
  • N-95 or N-100 with exhalation valve
  • Alternative to N-95
  • Exhalation valve increases comfort, temperature,
    and wetness of mask
  • May be difficult to ensure compliance unless high
    risk exists

39
Employees/Visitors After Return from H5N1 Areas
  • Employees/visitors with fever or respiratory
    illness lt 10 days from H5N1-affected area should
    inform appropriate contact point by telephone and
    have their illness assessed by the corporate or
    other health care provider before going into the
    workplace

40
Pandemic Planning Assumptions
  • Two or more waves in same year or in successive
    flu seasons
  • Second wave may occur 3-9 months later may be
    more serious than first (seen in 1918)
  • Each wave lasts about 6 weeks in a given community

41
30 Attack Rate 10 of Workforce
42
Community-based Containment Measures
  • Slow spread locally allow for preparation
  • Slow spread to other communities
  • Local containment plan
  • Care, food, services to the isolated or
    quarantined
  • Legal preparedness
  • Flu/fever clinics hotlines
  • Community communication cooperation
  • Voluntary quarantine can work

43
Pandemic Public Health Measures
  • Respiratory etiquette
  • Cover mouth/nose with sneeze/cough
  • Use tissues
  • Dispose of tissues
  • Immediate hand hygiene
  • Avoid large gatherings
  • Surgical masks in public controversial
  • Social distancing (3 feet) more effective
  • Symptomatic individuals to wear masks
  • Snow days Closure of public places
  • Cordon sanitaire

44
Avian Vaccines - Poultry
  • Avian vaccines used in poultry
  • Used extensively in several locales, including
    China
  • Feb 2004 to Jan 2005 China inoculated 2.68
    billion birds
  • Not currently thought to be an effective control
    measure

45
Avian Vaccines - Human
  • Human monovalent H5N1-only vaccines undergoing
    trials in U.S. and elsewhere
  • Sanofi 2 doses were needed at 90 µg given 1
    month apart--only 50 of subjects protected
    (seasonal flu vaccine contains 15 µg)
  • GSK Human trials have begun in Europe with low
    antigen content vaccines with adjuvants
  • 8 million H5N1 doses on hand by 2/06 (4 million
    people)
  • NIH long-term project (MedImmune) to develop seed
    virus strains against all known H types,
    including H5N1
  • Egg technology Long time-line (3-6 months) for
    additional doses once decision made, current
    capacity 5 million doses / month
  • Cell culture techniques new investment, several
    years off
  • Priority plans HCWs at top
  • 50 of the population that are healthy and 2-64
    years at bottom
  • Current flu vaccines do NOT include avian strains
    and offer no partial or cross-protection

46
Eliminate pandemic virus strain at source?
  • Recent mathematical models of massive antiviral
    administration in a localized epidemic situation
  • Ring eradication feasible if
  • Low to moderate transmissibility (R0 lt 1.8)
  • Chemoprophylaxis of 90 of population within 1-3
    weeks
  • 1-3 million courses of oseltamivir needed
  • Movement restrictions high compliance

47
Recombined pandemic H5N1 strain vs. SARS
  • Much more explosively contagious than SARS
  • Airborne spread
  • Easy in-flight spread compared to SARS
  • More difficult to contain with simple quarantine
    measures than SARS
  • Will still more rapidly lead to definitive
    international travel prohibition
  • May not be seasonal

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