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Title: Multi-Agent%20Systems%20Lecture%203%20University%20


1
Multi-Agent SystemsLecture 3University
Politehnica of Bucarest2004 - 2005Adina
Magda Floreaadina_at_cs.pub.rohttp//turing.cs.pub
.ro/blia_2005
2
Formal models for representing agentsLecture
outline
  • 1 Knowledge representation for agents
  • 2 FOL
  • 3 Modal logic
  • 4 Logics of knowledge and belief
  • 5 Dynamic logic, temporal logic
  • 6 BDI logics
  • 7 Commitments as change

3
1 Knowledge representation for agents
Cognitive agents declarative representaton, AI
  • Logic based representation
  • unique (almost) syntax ?x?y loves(x,y)
  • formal (clear, well-defined) semantics BelAloves(B
    ill, Mary)
  • ?shape(round) ? ?color(green) ? type(apple)
  • Rule based representation
  • situation-action or condition-conclusion rules
    facts
  • subset of logic (Horn clauses) that emphasize
    implication
  • if shape(round) and color(green) then
    typeapple
  • Frame-based representation
  • units, frames
  • subset of logic, represents relationship
    structured around objects in the universe
  • apple01
  • shape round color green type apple

What the agent knows/ believes
3
4
  • Plan representation
  • represent actions
  • may be combined with any of the previous
    representations
  • partial representation of states stack(x,y)
  • Precond hold(x) ? clear(y)
  • Postcond ?clear(x) ? ? hold(x)
  • ? on(x,y) ? armempty
  • BDI representations
  • combines most (all) of the above
  • A big diversity of techniques and formalisms to
    represent interactions
  • communication
  • cooperation
  • coordination
  • No symbolic representation

When and what to do
What the agent believes and when and what to do
How to cope with other agents in the environment
Reactive agents
4
5
  • Logic based representations
  • 2 possible aims
  • to make MAS function according to the logic
  • to specify and validate the design
  • Conceptualization of the world / problem
  • Syntax - wffs
  • Semantics - significance, model
  • Model - the domain interpretation for which a
    formula is true
  • Model - linear or structured
  • M S ? - "? is true or satisfied in component S
    of the structure M"
  • Model theory
  • Generate new wffs that are necessarily true,
    given that the old wffs are true - entailment KB
    ?
  • Proof theory
  • Derive new wffs based on axioms and inference
    rules KB -i ?

5
6
  • PrL, PL

Linear model
Extend PrL, PL
Sentential logic of beliefs Uses beliefs atoms
BA(?) Index PL with agents
Tropistic agents (reactive)
Situation calculus Adds states, actions
Symbol level
Modal logic Modal operators
Structured models
Knowledge level
Dynamic logic Modal operators for actions
Temporal logic Modal operators for time Linear
time Branching time
Logics of knowledge and belief Modal operators B
and K
CTL logic Branching time and action
BDI logic Adds agents, B, D, I
6
7
2 First order logic
  • LP - the language of Propositional logic
  • ? - the set of atomic propositions
  • Sin-1) ? ?? implies that ? ? LP
  • Sin-2) p, q ? LP implies that p?q ? LP, ?q ? LP
  • M0 ltLgt is the formal model for LP
  • L? ? - interpretation
  • Sem-1) M0 ? iff ??L, where ? ??
  • Sem-2) M0 p?q iff M0 p and M0 q
  • Sem-3) M0 ?p iff M0 / p
  • p A ? B A - it rains
  • q A ? B B - take umbrella
  • r A ? ?A

Knowledge represents atomic propositions
A B A ? B A?B A??A T T T
T T T F F F
T F T T F T F F
T F T
7
8
  • Predicate logic
  • Knowledge represents
  • Extensional knowledge
  • existence of objects (?x)(P(x)) is true
    exactly when P is true for at least one object of
    D, (?x)(P(x))
  • facts about objects, not about properties of
    objects
  • p (?x) young(x) ? success(x)
  • q (?x) young(x) ? success(x)
  • D Bill, Tom, Alice M M p
  • x young(x) success(x) M / q
  • Bill T T
  • Tom F T
  • Alice F F

8
9
  • (from Lecture 2)
  • (a) Deduction rules
  • At(0,0) ? Free(0,1) ? Exit(east) ?
    Do(move_east)
  • Facts and rules about the environment
  • At(0,0)
  • Wall(1,1)
  • ?x ?y Wall(x,y) ? ?Free(x,y)
  • (b) Use situation calculus describe change in
    FOPL
  • Define a function Result(Action,State)
    NewState
  • At((0,0), S0) ? Free(0,1) ? Exit(east) ?
  • At((0,1), Result(move_east,S0))

9
10
  • c) Sentential logics of beliefs
  • Uses beliefs atoms BA(?)
  • Index PL with agents
  • Inference rule attachment
  • BA(p1) ? q1 p1 ? p2 ? .. pn -A pn1
  • BA(p2) ? q2
  • BA(pn) ? qn
  • ? BA(pn1) ? qn1
  • q1 ? q2 ? .. ? qn ? qn1

10
11
Higher order logic
11
12
3 Modal logic
  • LM - the language of Modal logic
  • 2 modal operators
  • ? p - p possible true ? p - p necessarily true
  • Sin-3) the rules of LP are in LM
  • Sin-4) p ? LP implies that ?p, ?p ? LM
  • Possible worlds
  • The structure of the model is given by relating
    different worlds via a binary accessibility
    relation
  • M1 ltW, L, Rgt W - a set of worlds
  • LW ? P(?) - set of formula true in a world, R
    ? W X W
  • ? p p - it rains in NY
  • ? q q - the sun will rise tomorrow

12
13
  • Sem-4) M1 W ? iff ??L(w), where ? ??
  • Sem-5) M1 W p?q iff M1 W p and M1 W q
  • Sem-6) M1 W ?p iff M1 /W p
  • Sem-7) M1 W ? p iff (?w' R(w,w') ? M1 W'
    p)
  • Sem-8) M1 W ? p iff (?w' R(w,w') ? M1 W'
    p)
  • in w0 ? ? p, ? ?q, ? ??r
  • ? ? q
  • The accessibility relation
  • - reflexive iff (?w (w,w)?R) ? p ? p
  • - serial iff (?w (?w' (w,w')?R)) ? p ? ? p
  • - transitive iff (?w1,w2,w3 (w1,w2)?R ? (w2,
    w3)?R ? (w1,w3)?R)
  • ? p ? ? ? p
  • - symmetric iff (?w1,w2 (w1,w2)?R ?
    (w2,w1)?R) p ? ? ?p
  • - euclidian iff (?w1,w2,w3 (w1,w2)?R ? (w1,
    w3)?R ? (w2,w3)?R)
  • ? p ? ? ?p

13
14
4 Logics of knowledge and belief
  • FOL augmented with two modal operators
  • K(a,?) - a knows ?
  • B(a,?) - a believes ?
  • Associate with each agent a set of possible
    worlds
  • Mk ltW, L, Rgt W - a set of worlds
  • LW ? P(?) - set of formula true in a world, R
    ? A x W X W
  • An agent knows/believes a propositions in a given
    world if the proposition holds in all worlds
    accessible to the agent from the given world
  • B(Bill, father-of(Zeus, Cronos))
  • ? B(Bill, father-of(Jupiter,Saturn))
  • referential opaque operators
  • The difference between B and K is given by their
    properties

14
15
  • Properties of knowledge
  • (A1) Distribution axiom K(a, ?) ? K(a, ? ? ?)
    ? K(a, ?)
  • (A2) Knowledge axiom K(a, ?) ? ? -
    satisfied if R is reflexive
  • (A3) Positive introspection axiom K(a, ?) ? K(a,
    K(a, ?))
  • - satisfied if R is transitive
  • (A4) Negative introspection axiom ?K(a, ?) ? K(a,
    ?K(a, ?))
  • - satisfied if R is euclidian

in w0 ?K(a,p), ?K(a, ?r), ?K(a,q)
Properties of beliefs (A1) - OK, (A2) - no, (A3)
- yes, (A4) - maybe but more problematic Inferenc
e rules (R1) Epistemic necessitation
- ? infer K(a, ?) (R2) Logical omniscience
? ? ? and K(a, ?) infer K(a,
?) problematic
15
16
  • Two-wise men problem - Genesereth, Nilsson
  • (1) A and B know that each can see the other's
    forehead. Thus, for example
  • (1a) If A does not have a white spot, B will
    know that A does not have a white spot
  • (1b) A knows (1a)
  • (2) A and B each know that at least one of them
    have a white spot, and they each know that the
    other knows that. In particular
  • (2a) A knows that B knows that either A or B has
    a white spot
  • (3) B says that he does not know whether he has a
    white spot, and A thereby knows that B does not
    know

1. KA(?White(A) ? KB(? White(A)) (1b) 2.
KA(KB(White(A) ? White(B))) (2a) 3.
KA(?KB(White(B))) (3)
Proof
4. ?White(A) ? KB(?White(A)) 1, A2 A2 K(a, ?)
? ? 5. KB(?White(A) ? White(B)) 2, A2
6. KB(?White(A)) ? KB(White(B)) 5, A1 A1 K(a,
?) ? K(a, ? ? ?) ? K(a, ?) 7. ?White(A) ?
KB(White(B)) 4, 6
8. ?KB(White(B)) ? White(A) contrapositive of
7 9. KA(White(A)) 3, 8, R2
16
17
  • 5 Dynamic logic, temporal logic
  • Dynamic logic - the modal logic of action
  • LD and LR Builds on LP , A - set of action
    symbols
  • ab - do a and b in sequence
  • ab - do either a or b - nondeterministic
    choice
  • p? - an action based on the truth value of p -
    deterministic choice
  • a - 0 or more (finitely many) iterations of a
  • ltagtp - the execution of a will possibly make p
    true
  • ap - the execution of a will necessarily make p
    true
  • ltagt, a ? LR , p ? LD
  • M2 ltW, L, Rgt W - a set of worlds
  • LW ? P(?) - set of formula true in a world, R
    ? A X W X W
  • R - accessibility relation based on LR - a world
    is accessible by executing an action a
  • Sem-9) M2 W ltagt p iff (?w' Ra(w,w') ? M2
    W' p)
  • Sem-10) M2 W a p iff (?w' Ra(w,w') ? M2
    W' p)

17
18
  • Temporal logic - the modal logic of time
  • Linear vs. branching the branching can be in the
    past, in the future of both
  • Time is viewed as a set of moments with a strict
    partial order, lt, which denotes temporal
    precedence.
  • Every moment is associated with a possible state
    of the world, identified by the propositions that
    hold at that moment
  • In a branching logic of time, a path at a given
    moment is any maximal set of moments containing
    the given moment and all the moments in the
    future along some particular branch of lt
  • Modal operators of temporal logic
  • p U q - p is true until q becomes true - until
  • Xp - p is true in the next moment - next
  • Pp - p was true in a past moment - past
  • Fp - p will eventually be true in the future -
    eventually
  • Gp - p will always be true in the future always
  • F ? U
  • G ? F

Fp ? true U p
Gp ? ?F ?p
18
19
  • Branching temporal and action logic - CTL
  • Temporal structure with a branching time future
    and a single past - time tree
  • Situation - a world w at a particular time point
    t, wt
  • State formulas - evaluated at a specific time
    point in a time tree
  • Path formulas - evaluated over a specific path in
    a time tree
  • Modal operators over both state and path formulas
  • Temporal logic Fp - p will sometime be true in
    the future - eventually
  • Gp - p will always be true in the future -
    always
  • Xp - p is true in the next moment - next
  • p U q - p is true until q becomes true - until
  • Modal operators over path formulas - Branching
    temporal
  • Ap - at a particular time moment, p is true in
    all paths emanating from that point - inevitable
    p
  • Ep - at a particular time moment, p is true in
    some path emanating from that point - optional p
  • Dynamic logic indexed over agents xap xltagtp
  • Other modal operators
  • Vap - there is a under which p comes true

19
20
  • s is true in each time point (situation) and on
    all path
  • r is true in each time point on a single path
  • p will eventually be true on a single path
  • q will eventually be true on all path

s
p s q
F - eventually G - always A - inevitable E -
optional
AGs EGr AFq EFp
r s
r s
r s q
s q
s
r - Alice is in Italy p -Alice visits Paris s
Paris is the capital of France q - it is spring
time
20
21
  • Each situation has associated a set of accessible
    words - the worlds the agent believes to be
    possible. Each such world is a time tree.
  • Within these worlds, the branching future
    represents the choices (options) available to the
    agent in selecting which action to perform
  • Similar to a decision tree in games of chance

Decision nodes
Player 1
Dice
  • Each arc emanating from
  • a chance node corresponds
  • to a possible world

Player 2
1/18
1/36
Chance nodes
Dice
  • Each arc emanating from
  • a decision node corresponds
  • to a choice available in a
  • possible world

Player 1
1/36
1/18
21
22
  • LB - set of moment formula
  • LS - set of path-formula, X - set of agents, A -
    set of actions
  • Semantics
  • M4 ltW, T, lt, , Rgt - every t?T has associated
    a world wt?W
  • Sem-14) M4 t ? iff t??, where ? ??
  • ? is true in the set of moments for which ?
    holds
  • Sem-15) M4 t p?q iff M4 t p and M4 t q
  • Sem-16) M4 t ?p iff M4 /t p
  • Sem-17) M4 s,t pUq iff (?t' t?t' and M4
    s,t' q and
  • (?t" t ? t"? t' ? M4 s,t" p))
  • p holds on a path starting in the current
    moment until q comes true
  • Sem-18) M4 s,t X p iff M4 s,t1 p)
  • Fp ? true Up
  • Gp ? ?F ?p

22
23
  • Sem-19) M4 s,t xap iff (?t'?s
    st,t'?ax ? M4 s,t' p)
  • p is true on all the set of moments t' on a
    given path s starting at the current moment t
    while agent x executes action a
  • Sem-20) M4 s,t xltagtp iff (?t'?s
    st,t'?ax ? M4 s,t' p)
  • p is true at a moment t' on a given path s
    starting at the current moment t while agent x
    executes action a
  • Sem-21) M4 t A p iff (?s s?St ? M4 s,t p)
  • s is a path, St - all paths starting at the
    present moment
  • E ?A
  • Sem-22) M4 t (V a p) iff (?b b?B and M4
    t pab)
  • there is an action, be it b, under which p
    comes true, if executed at t
  • Sem-23) M4 t R p iff M4 R(t),t p)
  • R picks out at each moment the real path at
    that moment
  • p holds in the real path at the present moment

Ep ? ?A ?p
23
24
  • 6 BDI logic
  • Modal operators Bel, Des, Int, (Kw)
  • L I based on LB and LS, set of agents A
  • Sin18) if p?LS and x ?A then xBelp, xIntp,
    xDesp, xKwp?L I
  • xDes(A Fwin) ? xInt(E Fbuy) ? ?xBel(A Fwin)
  • M5ltW, T, lt, , R, B, D, Igt
  • B - belief accessible relation - belief
    accessible worlds the worlds the agent believes
    possible
  • Require the desires to be consistent therefore
    Desires ? Goals
  • D - desire (goal) accessible relation
  • Each situation has associated a set of goal
    -accessible worlds - realism
  • Strong realism for each belief-accessible world
    w at a given time moment t, there must be a
    goal-accessible world that is a sub-world of w at
    time t
  • I - intention accessible relation
  • Intentions - similarly represented by sets of
    intention-accessible worlds. These are the worlds
    the agent has committed to realize.
  • Corresponding to each goal-accessible world at
    some time t there must be an intention-accessible
    world that is a subworld of w at time t

24
25
intention accessible world
belief accessible world
s
s
p s q
p s q
s
r s
s q
r s
r s q
r s q
r s
r s
goal accessible world
r - Alice is in Italy p -Alice visits Paris s
Paris is the capital of France q - it is spring
time
25
26
  • Sem-24) M5 t xBelp iff (?t' (t,t')?B(x,t) ?
    M5 t' p)
  • an agent x has a belief p in a given moment t
    if and only if p is true in all belief accessible
    worlds of the agent in that moment
  • Sem-25) M5 t xDesp iff (?t' (t,t')?D(x,t) ?
    M5 t' p)
  • an agent x has a desire p in a given moment t
    if and only if p is true in all goal accessible
    worlds of the agent in that moment
  • Sem-26) M5 t xIntp iff (?s s?I(x,t) ? M5
    s,t Fp)
  • at each moment t, I assigns a set of paths
    that the agent x has selected or preferred, i.e.,
    if the agent has selected p as an intention, p
    will hold eventually in the future
  • Properties of BDI and KW

(A2) Knowledge axiom aKwp ? p (A3)
Positive introspection axiom aBelp ?
aBel(aBelp)) - satisfied if B is
transitive (A4) Negative introspection
axiom ?aBelp ? aBel(?aBelp)) -
satisfied if B is euclidian
26
27
  • Belief-goal compatibility
  • If an agent adopts p as a goal, the agent
    believes that there is a path on which p will be
    true as it is an adopted desire but it needs not
    believe that it will ever reach that point
  • xDesp ? (xBel (E G p)
  • Goal-intention compatibility
  • If an agent adopts p as an intention, it should
    have adopted it as a goal to be achieved
  • xIntp ? xDesp
  • Beliefs about intentions
  • xIntp ? xBel(xIntp))
  • No infinite deferral
  • The agent should not procrastinate with respect
    to its intentions if the agent forms an
    intention, then sometimes in the future it will
    give up this intention
  • xIntp ?A F(?xIntp))

F - eventually G - always A - inevitable E -
optional
27
28
  • 7 Commitments as change
  • Desires (goals) and intentions are quite similar
    in their semantic structure. The difference in
    these modalities arises in their relationships
    with the other modalities and in terms of how
    they may evolve over time.
  • An agent is treated as being committed to its
    intention but, cf. no infinite deferral, it will
    give up these intentions eventually - when?
  • Different types of agents will have different
    commitment strategies.
  • Blindly committed agent
  • maintains its intentions until it believes it has
    achieved them
  • xInt(A Fp) ?A (xInt(A Fp) ? xBelp) (exclusive
    ?)
  • an agent can be committed to means (p is an
    action) or to ends (p is a formula)
  • defined only for intentions toward actions or
    conditions that are true for all paths in the
    agent's intention accessible worlds.

F - eventually G - always A - inevitable E -
optional
28
29
  • Blindly committed agent (same as the prev slide)
  • maintains its intentions until it believes it has
    achieved them
  • xInt(A Fp) ?A (xInt(A Fp) ? xBelp)
  • Single-minded committed agent
  • maintains its intentions as long as it belives
    they are still options
  • xInt(A Fp) ?A (xInt(A Fp) ? (xBelp ? ?xBel(E
    Fp)))
  • Open-minded committed agent
  • maintains its intentions as long as these
    intentions are still its desires (goals)
  • xInt(A Fp) ?A (xInt(A Fp) ? (xBelp ? ?xDes(E
    Fp)))

F - eventually G - always A - inevitable E -
optional
29
30
  • References
  • M. P. Singh, A.S. Rao. Formal methods in DAI
    Logic-based representation and reasoning. In
    Multiagent Systems - A Modern Approach to
    Distributed Artficial Intelligence, G. Weiss
    (Ed.), The MIT Press, 2001, p.331-355.
  • M. Wooldrige. Reasoning about Rational Agents.
    The MIT Press, 2000, Chapter 2
  • A.S. Rao, M.P. Georgeff. Modeling rational agents
    within a BDI-architecture. In Readings in Agents,
    M. Huhns M. Singh (Eds.), Morgan Kaufmann,
    1998, p.317-328.
  • M.R. Genesereth, N.J. Nilsson. Logical
    Foundations of Artificial Intelligence. Morgan
    Kaufmann, 1987, Chapter 9.
  • D. Kayser La représentation des connaissances.
    Hermès, 1997.
  • J.Y. Halpern. Reasoning about knowledge A
    survey. In Handbook of Logic in Artificial
    Intelligence and Logic Programming, Vol.4, D.
    Gabbay, C.A. Hoare, J.A. Robinson (Eds.), Oxford
    University Press, 1995, p.1-34.
  • A. Florea. Bazele logice ale inteligentei
    artificiale. UPB, 1995.

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