CIGRE WG C2'03

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CIGRE WG C2.03
Lessons learnt and to be learnt from the 2003
blackouts seen from the viewpoint of
operators and control centers performance
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Overview of Observed Blackouts
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Blackout Presentations
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WG C2.03 Human Performance

• How did the control centers / operators
  perform in the situation of developing
  disturbance ?
• How did the control centers / operators
  handle the subsequent restoration process ?

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WG C2.03 Human Performance

• How did the control centers / operators
  perform in the situation of developing
  disturbance ?
• How did the control centers / operators
  handle the subsequent restoration process ?

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2003 Blackouts
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Topics of Investigation

• Information
• - was the required information available in the
  control room ?- which information was missing ?
• Co-operation and communications between entities
  - within the CC- with neighboring CCs- with
  ISO, power producers, reliability coordinators,
  market operator
• Regulations / procedures
• - were they appropriate ?- were they sufficient
  ?- were they correctly followed ?
• Availability and use of technical tools
• Preparedness of operators

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Deficiencies during Emergency
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Deficiencies during Emergency
Details follow
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Deficiencies during Emergency USA/CDN
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Deficiencies during EmergencyHelsinki London
S/DK
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Deficiencies during Emergency CH/IT
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Deficiencies during Restoration
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Deficiencies during Restoration
Details follow
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Deficiencies during Restoration USA/CDN
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Deficiencies during Restoration Helsinki -
London
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Deficiencies during Restoration S/DK
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Deficiencies during Restoration CH/IT
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Lessons Learnt Further Actions
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Lessons Learnt Further Actions

• USA / Canada (from final report)
• Shield operators who initiate load shedding
  pursuant to approved guidelines from liability or
  retaliation.
• Improve near-term and long-term training and
  certification requirements for operators,
  reliability coordinators, and operator support
  staff.
• Regular training should comprise detection of
  abnormal situations and coordination of actions
  among different ISOs.
• Establish clear definitions for normal, alert and
  emergency operational system conditions.
• Clarify roles, responsibilities, and authorities
  of reliability coordinators and control areas
  under each condition.

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Lessons Learnt Further Actions

• USA / Canada (contd)
• Evaluate and adopt better real-time tools for
  operators and reliability coordinators.
• Implement tools for prevention of inappropriate
  actions.
• Strengthen reactive power and voltage control
  practices in all NERC regions.
• Improve quality of system modeling data and data
  exchange practices.
• Determine communications protocols, especially
  for communications during alerts and emergencies.
  
• Evaluate and disseminate lessons learnt during
  system restoration.

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Lessons Learnt Further Actions

• Helsinki
• Acquisition of tools to prevent human
  errorswhich lead to major incidents(? advanced
  interlocking system)
• Achievement of more rapid restoration(? training
  measures ?)

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Lessons Learnt Further Actions

• London
• Despite sound control actions and smooth
  restoration
• (in consequence of regular operators training)
  review of
• co-ordination with other network operators
• communications with relevant parties
• operational procedures and
• control room systems

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Lessons Learnt Further Actions

• Sweden / Denmark
• No significant lack in human / control center
  performance identified.
• Good overview of situation.
• But improvements possible
• Alarm presentation
• More of general information to external CC
• Organisation for support functions in CC
• Experiences from disturbance gave input to
  regular
• restoration training (simulator based)

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Lessons Learnt Further Actions

• Switzerland / Italy
• Need for Swiss regulator which co-ordinates
  transfer capacities together with regulators of
  Italy and France
• Larger control areas (Swiss national TSO instead
  of 7 regional TSOs)
• Adjustment of operational procedures and joint
  training programs of Swiss and Italian TSOs to
  avoid misunderstanding and delay
• More open and flexible communication between
  Swiss and Italian TSOs
• Extended mutual exchange and visibility of grid
  (contingency) data
• Contincency analysis considering voltage angles
  based on real time data (not reference scenarios)

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Lessons Learnt Further Actions

• UCTE
• More awarenss of actual system states
• Improved cross border data exchange to better
  determinethe system state
• More effort for loadflow calculation on cross
  border transits
• More sensitivity for alert situations (e.g.
  differences occurring in cross border exchanges)
• But despite of blackouts
• Market participants force operation beyond limits
• Politicians force increase of impredictible
  generation (wind)

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Conclusions

• Information
• Co-operation and communications
• Regulations / procedures
• Authorities / obligations of operators
• Availability and use of technical tools
• Preparedness of operators

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Conclusions

• Information
• ? Improved visibility of bulk system
• Co-operation and communications
• Regulations / procedures
• Authorities / obligations of operators
• Availability and use of technical tools
• Preparedness of operators

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Conclusions

• Information
• ? Improved visibility of bulk system
• Co-operation and communications
• ? Demand of clear communication protocols
• Regulations / procedures
• Authorities / obligations of operators
• Availability and use of technical tools
• Preparedness of operators

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Conclusions

• Information
• ? Improved visibility of bulk system
• Co-operation and communications
• ? Demand of clear communication protocols
• Regulations / procedures
• ? Adjustment / certification of procedures of
  entities involved
• Authorities / obligations of operators
• Availability and use of technical tools
• Preparedness of operators

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Conclusions

• Information
• ? Improved visibility of bulk system
• Co-operation and communications
• ? Demand of clear communication protocols
• Regulations / procedures
• ? Adjustment / certification of procedures of
  entities involved
• Authorities / obligations of operators
• Preventive actions may affect commercial
  transactions
• Availability and use of technical tools
• Preparedness of operators

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Conclusions

• Information
• ? Improved visibility of bulk system
• Co-operation and communications
• ? Demand of clear communication protocols
• Regulations / procedures
• ? Adjustment / certification of procedures of
  entities involved
• Authorities / obligations of operators
• Preventive actions may affect commercial
  transactions
• Availability and use of technical tools
• ? Bring technical CC equipment on up-to-date
  state / automatic load shedding schemes and
  status alarm systems
• Preparedness of operators

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Conclusions

• Information
• ? Improved visibility of bulk system
• Co-operation and communications
• ? Demand of clear communication protocols
• Regulations / procedures
• ? Adjustment / certification of procedures of
  entities involved
• Authorities / obligations of operators
• Preventive actions may affect commercial
  transactions
• Availability and use of technical tools
• ? Bring technical CC equipment on up-to-date
  state / automatic load shedding schemes and
  status alarm systems
• Preparedness of operators
• ? Consequent and regular training of taking
  preventive actions and restoration
  certification

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Thank you !
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Emergency/Restoration Training

• Example Training at national TSO (Sweden)
• Use of simulator with realtime power system
  dynamics
• Connected to replica of SCADA/EMS original system
• Simulator training 2-3 days 2-3 days other per
  year
• Restoration training sessions include -
  interaction within CC- interaction with external
  entities such as other CCs or power plants
• Long term plans for operator training

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Emergency/Restoration Training

• Example Training at independent training company
  (Germany)
• Simulator with SCADA time resolution
• Simulator setup for power system(s) under regard
• Training course contents tuned with utilities
• Restoration training sessions include-
  interaction within CC- interaction with external
  entities in open (one room) or distance (phone
  communications) mode