Puppetnets:%20Misusing%20Web%20Browsers%20as%20a%20Distributed%20Attack%20Infrastructure - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Puppetnets:%20Misusing%20Web%20Browsers%20as%20a%20Distributed%20Attack%20Infrastructure

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Paper By : V.T.Lam, S.Antonatos, P.Akritidis, K.G.Anagnostakis ... Clients are the Puppets they can be controlled till they have the webpage open ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Puppetnets:%20Misusing%20Web%20Browsers%20as%20a%20Distributed%20Attack%20Infrastructure


1
Puppetnets Misusing Web Browsers as a
DistributedAttack Infrastructure
  • Paper By V.T.Lam, S.Antonatos, P.Akritidis,
    K.G.Anagnostakis
  • Conference ACM Conference on Computer and
    Communications Security 2006
  • Presented By Ramanarayanan Ramani

2
Scenario
3.Clients Access Webpage and execute malicious
code
2.Embed Malicious Code in Webpage
Clients are the Puppets they can be controlled
till they have the webpage open in the browser.
3
Puppetnet vs Botnet
  • Not heavily dependent on the exploitation of
    specific implementation flaws
  • The attacker does not have complete control over
    the actions of the participating nodes
  • Participation in puppetnets is more dynamic

4
Overview
  • Attack Scenarios using Puppetnet
  • Analysis of attack scenarios
  • Defense against Puppetnets
  • Paper Review
  • Suggestions

5
DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service)
6
DDoS
  • Sample Code
  • ltscript languagejavascriptgt
  • setTimeout(pingVictim,1000)
  • Function pingVictim()
  • var image1 getElementById(img1)
  • image1.src www.victim.com/badurl.jpg
  • setTimeout(pingVictim,1000)
  • lt/scriptgt
  • ltbodygt ltimg idimg1 /gt lt/bodygt

7
Worm Propagation
8
Worm Propagation
  • Embed Worm Code in the Webpage
  • Perform scanning and try to propagate the worm
    code
  • If outbound from server blocked it can
    propagate using webpage
  • Client behind NAT/Firewall can propagate in the
    secure network

9
Reconnaissance probes
10
Reconnaissance probes
  • Problem Browsers refuse access to the contents
    of an inline frame, unless the source of the
    frame is in the same domain with the parent page
  • Sandwich the probe request between two requests
    to the malicious Web site
  • Use onLoad,onError event handlers to sandwich
    request

11
Protocols other than HTTP
  • Limitation of Puppetnets Bound to use HTTP as
    part of browser
  • Solution
  • Tunnel SMTP/IRC/FTP..
  • Protocol messages wrapped around the HTTP message
  • GET /index.html HTTP/1.1 Host
    www.example.com25
  • HELO mydomain.com
  • (For SMTP)

12
Exploiting cookie authenticatedservices
  • Constraints
  • The inline frame needs to be able to post
    cookies this works on Firefox, but not IE
  • Have knowledge about the structure and content of
    the form to be posted, as well as the target URL
  • Able to instruct browsers to automatically post
    such forms (Supported by all browsers)

13
Distributed malicious computations
  • Can be done through Javascript, Active-X or Java
    applets
  • ActiveX Produces Accept or Deny box
  • Applets Instantiate JVM but can be placed
    in hidden frames
  • Script Slower but can be hidden
  • Example MD5 computation
  • Javascript 380 checksums/sec
  • Applet 434K checksums/sec
  • 1,000-node puppetnet can crack an MD5 hash as
    fast as a 128-node cluster

14
Analysis - DDoS
15
Analysis - DDoS
16
Analysis - DDoS
  • Two types of attacks
  • A simple attack aiming to maximize SYN packets
    (maxSYN)
  • One aiming to maximize the ingress bandwidth
    consumed (maxURL)

17
Analysis - DDoS
Estimate for a 1000-node puppetnet
18
Analysis Worm PropagationCodeRed Worm
  • CodeRed attacks IIS server (Web Server)
  • A vulnerable population of 360,000 and a server
    scanning rate of 358 scans/min
  • Browsers performing 36 scans/min

19
Analysis Worm PropagationCodeRed Worm
20
Analysis Worm PropagationCodeRed Worm
21
Analysis - Reconnaissance probes
22
Analysis - Reconnaissance probes
23
Defense
  • Disabling Javascript
  • Careful implementation of existing defenses
  • Filtering using attack signatures
  • Client-side behavioral controls
  • Server-side controls and puppetnet tracing
  • Server-directed client-side controls

24
Advantages
  • Simple and very effective to attack
  • Light-weight compared to botnet
  • Uses HTTP which makes detection difficult

25
Disadvantages
  • No complete control over client
  • Tough to compromise web servers (not explained
    how to do it in the paper)
  • View Source Command on HTML page will reveal
    puppetnet code

26
Suggestions
  • Look into hiding code using encoding or embed
    code into objects like Flash
  • Use puppetnet to create botnet in the client
    machine
  • Provide ideas to compromise the web server

27
?Questions?
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