Briefing for PoliticalNational Leaders on Options Available for the US Space Program Prepared by Mic

1
Briefing forPolitical/National
LeadersonOptions Available for theUS Space
Program Prepared by Michael
BrazeltonVersion 4 / July 2009
2
Purpose of Briefing

• The statements on the space program by most
  national leaders have been vague and superficial
  indicating that they have only superficial
  knowledge of the space program.
• Articles indicate that they are not fully
  knowledgeable on the limitations and
  consequences of NASAs Constellation Program
• Most politicians do not seem to be aware of what
  options are available to them regarding the
  future of the US Space Program
• They are under the impression that we are
  committed to the current program and have no
  other choice

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Background

• 2003 The loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia
  motivated the United States to reevaluate its
  space exploration and development policy
• 2004 President Bush proposed his Vision for
  Space Exploration (VSE)
• Appoints Aldridge Commission to establish
  guidelines for constructing new civilian space
  policy
• 2005 NASA publishes its Exploration of Space
  Architecture Study (ESAS)

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Vision for Space Exploration (VSE)

• - Finish the International Space Station
• - Develop a new manned space vehicle to take
  astronauts beyond Earth orbit
• - Return to the Moon
• - Explore Mars and other parts of the solar
  system

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Aldridge Commission

• Formed to implement the provisions of the VSE
• Imperatives established by Aldridge Commission
• Sustainable - over several decades with visible
  demonstrations of progress and success
• Affordable not requiring large peaks in annual
  funding or significant decreases in other
  important space initiatives
• Credible leverages the current infrastructure
  and workforce whenever possible

6
NASA Authorization Act of 2005

• Complete the International Space Station
• Maintain US access to space on a continuous basis
• Maximize the use of personnel, capabilities,
  assets and infrastructure of the Space Shuttle
  Program in developing a heavy-lift launch vehicle
• Return to the Moon NLT 2020

7
NASAs Exploration Systems Architecture Study
(ESAS)

• Conducted by NASA to determine architecture for
  new space program
• Initially recommended development of separate
  crew launch vehicle and heavy lift vehicle - both
  based on current Space Shuttle architecture
• Subsequently decided on development of two
  completely new and different launch systems NOT
  Shuttle related
• The Ares I to place the CEV in low earth orbit
  and
• The Ares V as a super-heavy-lift cargo rocket to
  send large amounts of equipment and components to
  the Moon and beyond

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Ares V Ares I Launch Vehicles
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Crew Exploration Vehicle
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NASAs ESAS

• Started with a blank page rather than taking
  advantage of the current Space Shuttle
  architecture as required by the Aldridge
  Commission
• Two all new launch rockets
• All new solid rocket lower stage for Ares I
• All new upper stage for Ares I
• All new first stage/main tank for Ares V
• All new solid rocket boosters (SRBs) for Ares V
• All new upper stage for Ares V (EDS)
• All new version of J-2 rocket engine for EDS
  (J-2X)
• Substituted RS-68 engines for SSMEs

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The Advantages of NASAs ESAS

• Super-heavy lift capability
• If and when developed
• Capable of supporting large, sustained Lunar
  exploration program
• If that is what the national space exploration
  objective is
• Some sources do not want to get bogged down
  supporting a huge Moon base program when we
  decide to go to Mars
• In the same manner that our plans to return to
  the Moon have forced us to abandon support for
  the ISS
• Able to send large payloads to Mars

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The Disadvantages of NASAs ESAS

• The Ares I duplicates CEV lift capability
  currently available in the Delta IV-Heavy And
  Atlas V launch rockets
• The Ares-I can barely get a stripped-down CEV
  into LEO
• Development time for the Ares I has slipped so
  much that there is a 5-year (possibility 6 or 7
  year) gap between the retirement of the Space
  Shuttle and earliest manned launch of the Ares I
• The combination of the Ares I and the
  super-heavy-lift Ares V negates the possibility
  of building a family of rocket vehicles to launch
  a variety of payloads not necessarily
  Moon-related
• Eventual funding for Ares V is not assured

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Disadvantages of ESAS (Cont.)

• Two separate, dissimilar rocket launchers to
  design and build
• Complete modification of current launch pads
• Modification of crawler that is not capable of
  supporting the weight of the Ares V
• Modification of crawler pathway that is not
  capable of supporting the weight of the Ares V
• Major modifications to the Vertical Assembly
  Building
• Decimation of KSC workforce

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Disadvantages of ESAS (Cont.)

• High cost and time associated with design,
  testing and production of all-new rocket launch
  hardware
• Heavy, expensive modification of rocket launcher
  support facilities
• Loss of economy of scale
• Maintenance of dissimilar production lines,
  facilities and technical force

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Advertised Options to Close the Gap

• Add additional Space Shuttle flight(s)
• Very costly
• Wont solve the problem
• Speed development of CEV and Ares I
• - Very costly
• - Can only be advanced up to a point
• - Still would not provide flexible launch
  architecture
• - Still would not provide heavy lift launch
  capability

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Lesser Known Options

• Make maximum use of current hardware
• Develop Delta IV-Heavy as near-term LEO booster
  for CEV
• Adopt program, such as DIRECT 3.0, for early
  return to manned space operations including
  heavy-lift
• Use combination of architecture under development
  for Constellation Program and current Space
  Shuttle architecture

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Delta IV Heavy Launch Vehicle

• Advantages
• Currently in production
• Disadvantages
• Not man-rated
• Risk factor too high (according to NASA)
• Stated that safety margin must be designed in
  and not added on to new launcher
• - Previous non-man-rated boosters were upgraded
  as NASA launch platforms - all with 100 success
  launch rate for manned missions
• Redstone (Mercury)
• Atlas (Mercury)
• Titan (Gemini)

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Delta-IV Heavy

• In production
• Capable of placing
• 56,800 pounds in LEO at 28.7 degrees
• 52,800 pounds to LEO at 51.6 degrees (ISS)
• CEV weighs approx. 44,000 pounds
• Launch rate success 100
• Upgrades could increase payloads up to 80

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DIRECT 2.0 (Now DIRECT 3.0)

• Grass-roots effort to produce a new launcher
  system based on a true derivative of Space
  Shuttle components, facilities and KSC work force
• Based on early study by NASA that was initially
  discarded in favor of Ares I and Ares V
• Supported by a growing variety of space
  engineers, scientists, educators, industry
  leaders, space enthusiasts, astronauts,
  ex-astronauts and political leaders as well as
  many NASA engineers

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DIRECT 3.0

• Realigns the VSE implementation plan with the VSE
  policy objectives by adhering to the directives
  set forth in the 2005 NASA Authorization Act and
  imperatives for success identified by the
  Aldridge Commission
• Develops one basic, heavy-lift rocket launcher
  concept
• Jupiter 130 rocket
• Follow-on extra-heavy-lift rocket launcher for
  Moon and Mars exploration
• Jupiter 24X rocket
• Multiple heavy-lift configurations

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DIRECT 3.0 (Cont.)

• Utilizes most components of current Space Shuttle
  architecture
• Main tank Same as Space Shuttle/Currently in
  production
• Launch pads Same as used by Space Shuttle
• Crawler ( crawler pathway) No change
• Rocket engine SSME/Currently in production
• 4-segment solid rocket boosters Same as used by
  Space Shuttle/Currently in production
• KSC technical force Trained in Space Shuttle
  operations and currently in place

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DIRECT 3.0 Concept
Ares I 55,000lb to LEO
Jupiter 130 102,800lb to LEO
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Jupiter 130 Jupiter 24X Launch Vehicles
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Jupiter 130
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Jupiter 130
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Advantages of DIRECT 3.0

• Better
• One basic rocket vehicle design
• Supports a family of payload options
• Upgradeable with 2nd stage to extra-heavy-lift
  configuration
• Faster
• A true, direct derivative of the Space Shuttle
• Most components are currently in production and
  tested
• Cheaper
• Majority of development costs have already been
  paid
• Minimal tooling-up costs
• Minimal learning curve expenses
• Minimal testing required

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Advantages of DIRECT 2.0/3.0 (Cont.)

• Both Jupiter 130 and 24X can be man-rated
• Permitting single launch of heavy configurations
  with crew aboard
• Permitting manned missions to Moon orbit with
  single launch

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Disadvantages of DIRECT 3.0

• No single super-heavy-lift launch capability
• Although launch of two (identical) Jupiter 24X
  rockets puts more mass in LEO than the launch of
  (dissimilar) Ares I and Ares V rockets
• Ares V-class launch vehicle could be considered
  as long-range follow-on space transport
• NASA claims that the Jupiter 130 offers too much
  capability for required LEO operations
• The Saturn V was designed to launch missions to
  the moon but it was versatile enough to be
  adapted to launch SkyLab into LEO a mission
  that was not envisioned for it when it was
  designed
• During the next two decades, there will probably
  be numerous payloads that are not currently
  contemplated
• More LEO docking/assembly operations required
  with DIRECT 3.0

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DIRECT 3.0 Lunar Exploration Concept
EDS
Ares I
Ares V
EDS
Jupiter 24X
Jupiter 24X
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Alternative Missions with DIRECT 3.0

• Lunar rescue
• Single Jupiter 24X can launch a manned rescue
  vehicle to the orbit of the Moon
• Manned asteroid mission
• L-2 missions
• Follow-on manned and unmanned payloads
• Winged crew mini-shuttle
• New/enhanced space station modules
• Large inflatable space structures
• Large unmanned space probes
• Mars sample return mission
• Landers to the surface of Jupiters moons
• ISS crew service, re-supply and renovation

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Summary of Space Lift Capability

• Launcher LEO
  TLI
• Saturn IB 41,000 lb
  N/A
• Saturn V 260,000
  107,300
• Space Shuttle 59,000
  N/A
• Delta IV-Heavy 56,800
  21,000
• Ares I 55,000
  N/A
• Ares V 410,000
  157,000
• Jupiter 130 102,800
  N/A
• Jupiter 24X 233,000
  93,200
• - Lunar Cargo Mission
• Two Jupiter 24Xs --- 186,000
• - Manned Lunar Mission

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Jupiters 130 24XCompared to Ares I V
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Jupiter 130 SpacePlane

• Jupiter 130 can launch a variety of payloads
• that are not yet envisioned but will
• come of age during the next two decades
• Payloads much
• heavier and diverse
• than the CEV
• Requiring a launcher
• with greater capability
• than Ares I

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Payload Gap with Constellation Program
410,000lb to LEO
55,000lb to LEO
No Capability to launch payloads greater than
55,000 pounds and less than 400,000 pounds
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Possible Actions

• Use the Delta-IV Heavy as the near-future launch
  vehicle to return US astronauts to LEO and
  service the ISS in the shortest possible time
  (See Note)
• Develop the Jupiter 130 as the workhorse of LEO
  space operations and heavy probes to the Moon and
  planets
• Develop the Jupiter 24X as the initial launch
  vehicle with which to return to the Moon.
• Initiate a long-range program to build a
  super-heavy-lift rocket launcher such as the Ares
  V

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Note on Delta IV-Heavy v Jupiter 30

• It may take the same amount of time to man-rate
  the Delta IV-Heavy as it would to build the
  Jupiter 130
• It would not be cost effective to build two
  launch systems to do the same job
• Modifying a Delta IV-Heavy for man-rated CEV
  operations would not provide the basis for a
  future family of heavy space launch vehicles
• The US needs only one launch system
• The Delta IV-Heavy is available NOW for unmanned
  re-supply of the ISS

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Advantages of Revised Space Program

• Saves billions of dollars in construction of next
  generation of space vehicles
• Saves billions of dollars of investment already
  made in Space Shuttle program
• Significantly narrows the space gap between end
  of Space Shuttle operations and a follow-on space
  program
• Speeds the return-to-the-Moon program
• Advances the prospect of manned missions to Mars
• Permits the US to maintain unsurpassed leadership
  in space exploration
• Informed public opinion would appreciate the
  DIRECT 3.0 approach over the current NASA plans
  to build the Ares I and Ares V

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Consequences of Not Acting

• Long space gap during which time a few US
  astronauts will be relegated to using Russian
  transportation to the ISS if available
• Destruction of existing space program
  infrastructure billions of dollars of
  investments that have already been paid for
• Loss of technical expertise at the KSC
• Inability to service and support the ISS in any
  meaningful manner between 2010 and 2015-2020
• And then only minimally since Ares I has small
  payload capability
• No heavy-lift space transport capability for 10
  years
• After 50 years, US will have a space program no
  more advanced or capable than that of the current
  Chinese space program

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Resistance to Canceling Major Contracts

• NASA senior management
• Particularly from NASA Administrator senior
  staff
• Companies contracted to design/build major Ares I
  and Ares V components
• Lobbyist of concerned parties
• Senators and Congressmen from states affected

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Canceling Major Contracts

• Concerned companies will have cancellation
  clauses that prevent them from losing money
• It is very expensive to cancel a contract so it
  would be beneficial to try to combine the work
  that has been done so far with any new space
  launch architecture
• Historically, major contracts have been cancelled
  when necessary (due to unacceptable cost,
  changing military/political environment or
  duplication of effort)
• X-20 DynaSoar
• Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL)
• Navy AX
• Navy version of F-111

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Ameliorating Major Contractors

• Bring them together in consensus-building effort
  before announcing major changes/cancellations
• Replace discontinued contracts with new contracts
• Use work accomplished so far in new architecture

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Utilizing Work Done So Far

• Investigate use of new SRBs on Jupiter 130 and/or
  Jupiter 24X for enhanced performance
• Incorporate new J2X engine on Jupiter 24X
• Speed development of CEV
• With full-up systems necessary for maximum safety
  and landing-on-land capability (since Jupiter 130
  would be capable of handling the additional
  weight)

43
Public Perception

• The US public takes great pride in its leadership
  position in space exploration
• The public regards the Space Shuttle and the ISS
  as a cornerstone to its manned space program and
  does not want to see either of them sacrificed or
  abandoned for a less capable space program
• A gap in US space operations will become
  increasingly embarrassing and intolerable as time
  goes on especially if the Ares I program slips
  beyond 5 years, and Russia and China continue
  making noteworthy progress in space exploration

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The Real Cost of The Space Program

• NASA states that, in the long run, the
  Constellation Program will be the most affordable
• The other costs
• Loss of US prestige as leading nation in space
  exploration
• Loss of access to ISS/Inability to service ISS
• No Heavy-lift capability for 10 years
• Possible loss of return-to-the-moon race to the
  Chinese and even first manned mission to Mars
• - A world perception of space leadership issue

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Recommendations for National Leaders

• Announced that you have become increasingly
  concerned about the direction of the US space
  program especially the gap in time during
  which the US will have no space lift capability
• Add that you are also concerned about
  accumulating costs and total cost of NASAs
  Constellation Program especially in light of
  current economic problems
• Allow no action to be taken that will destroy the
  infrastructure of the current Space Shuttle
  program
• Support the formation of an impartial (non-NASA)
  commission to analyze the options available to
  the future US Space Program
• Advise the selection of the next NASA
  administrator that you want these options and all
  others considered impartially for future
  direction of the US manned space program

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Personal Observations of Michael Brazelton

• NASA is reluctant to admit that it might have
  made a mistake in deciding on the Constellation
  architecture
• NASA has put on a full court advertising press to
  convince policy-makers and the public that it is
  too late to change its current course of action
  i.e. to change horses in the middle of the
  stream.
• However, the horse we are on now is the Shuttle
  architecture. The change is what NASA is
  proposing
• It is not too late to change as long as the
  infrastructure of the Space Shuttle architecture
  has not been torn up
• NASA over-estimated how much money it would have
  in its budget to develop the Constellation
  Program
• NASA did not anticipate the development problems
  that it is currently experiencing with Ares I.
  Developments problems with Ares V are unknown.

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Personal Observations (Cont.)

• - NASA did not anticipate the dire economic
  condition of the US economy
• The Ares V super-heavy lift capability might be
  ideal for a mission to Mars but a shuttle-derived
  space launch capability is more than sufficient
  for exploring the Moon
• - And is capable of mounting an initial manned
  Mars program
• By staying with the basic Space Shuttle
  architecture, it may be possible to fly through
  the gap with limited Space Shuttle missions until
  the Jupiter 130 is on line
• Regarding the Chinese space program The Apollo
  Program took eight years to put a man on the
  Moon. The Chinese already have an Apollo-class
  manned spacecraft. According the Mike Griffin,
  the NASA Administrator, China could conceivably
  put a man on the Moon by 2017-2018 two to three
  years before NASA hopes to return to the Moon

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End of Briefing

• Reference directlauncher.com

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Resume of Michael Brazelton

• Current as of July 2009
• Resume of MICHAEL L. BRAZELTON
• 12313 Cannonball Road, Fairfax, Virginia 22030 /
  Tel [phone] / Fax [phone] / E-Mail
  michaelbrazelton_at_aol.com
• DATE OF BIRTH 19 March 1942
• PLACE OF BIRTH Los Angeles, California, USA
• MARITAL STATUS Widowed
• CHILDREN 3 Daughters Adriana (24), Ashley
  (22), Allison (18)
• MILITARY BACKGROUND
• RANK Colonel, US Air Force
• CURRENT STATUS Retired (as of Nov 1987
• EMPLOYMENT
• PREVIOUS Colonel/Fighter Pilot, US Air Force
  / 1964 1987
• Pilot/Captain, American Airlines / 1989 -
  2002
• CURRENT Licensed Real Estate Agent /
  Real Estate Investor
• EDUCATION

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Resume of Michael Brazelton (Cont.)

• MILITARY ASSIGNMENTS US Air Force Pilot
  Training (1964) / F-105 Fighter Training (1965) /
  Combat Pilot in Vietnam - 111 Combat Missions
  (1966) / Prisoner of War in Vietnam (1966-1973) /
  USAF Instrument Pilot Instructor School (1973) /
  USAF Aggressor Pilot, Wing Staff Officer
  Maintenance Test Pilot (1973-1977) / USAF Command
  Staff College (1978) / F-5 Instructor Pilot
  Squadron Operations Officer (1977-1981) /
  Chief, Military Security Assistance Office,
  Mexico (1982-1884) / Industrial College of the
  Armed Forces (1985) / HqUSAF Foreign Military
  Sales - Chief, Latin American Division
  (1985-1986) / Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
  Staff, Current Operations - Chief, Western
  Hemisphere Branch
• AIRLINE EXPERIENCE B-727 FE 1989-1991
  500hrs / B-727 FO 1991-1993 1,306hrs / MD-11
  FO 1993-1994 303hrs / B-757 B- 767 FO
  1994-1999 3,824hrs / B-727 CA 1999-2001 395hrs
• FLYING TIME (Hours) Total Time 8,654 /
  Combat 348 / Multi-engine 8,049 / Jet 8,519 /
  Instructor 893 / Military Jet Fighter 2,327
  / Civilian Jet Transport 5,828 / PIC 3,380 /
  International 6,195 / Flight Engineer 500
• MILITARY DECORATIONS Silver Star (4) / Defense
  Superior Service Medal / Defense Meritorious
  Service Medal / Legion of Merit /
  Distinguished Flying Cross / Bronze Star V
  (2) / Air Medal (9) / Air Force Commendation
  Medal / Distinguished Presidential Unit
  Citation / National Defense Service Medal /
  Vietnam Service Medal 8 Bronze Service Stars
  / Purple Heart (2) / Prisoner of War Medal