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Briefing for PoliticalNational Leaders on Options Available for the US Space Program Prepared by Mic


2004: President Bush proposed his Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) Appoints Aldridge Commission to establish guidelines for constructing new civilian space policy ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Briefing for PoliticalNational Leaders on Options Available for the US Space Program Prepared by Mic

Briefing forPolitical/National
LeadersonOptions Available for theUS Space
Program Prepared by Michael
BrazeltonVersion 4 / July 2009
Purpose of Briefing
  • The statements on the space program by most
    national leaders have been vague and superficial
    indicating that they have only superficial
    knowledge of the space program.
  • Articles indicate that they are not fully
    knowledgeable on the limitations and
    consequences of NASAs Constellation Program
  • Most politicians do not seem to be aware of what
    options are available to them regarding the
    future of the US Space Program
  • They are under the impression that we are
    committed to the current program and have no
    other choice

  • 2003 The loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia
    motivated the United States to reevaluate its
    space exploration and development policy
  • 2004 President Bush proposed his Vision for
    Space Exploration (VSE)
  • Appoints Aldridge Commission to establish
    guidelines for constructing new civilian space
  • 2005 NASA publishes its Exploration of Space
    Architecture Study (ESAS)

Vision for Space Exploration (VSE)
  • - Finish the International Space Station
  • - Develop a new manned space vehicle to take
    astronauts beyond Earth orbit
  • - Return to the Moon
  • - Explore Mars and other parts of the solar

Aldridge Commission
  • Formed to implement the provisions of the VSE
  • Imperatives established by Aldridge Commission
  • Sustainable - over several decades with visible
    demonstrations of progress and success
  • Affordable not requiring large peaks in annual
    funding or significant decreases in other
    important space initiatives
  • Credible leverages the current infrastructure
    and workforce whenever possible

NASA Authorization Act of 2005
  • Complete the International Space Station
  • Maintain US access to space on a continuous basis
  • Maximize the use of personnel, capabilities,
    assets and infrastructure of the Space Shuttle
    Program in developing a heavy-lift launch vehicle
  • Return to the Moon NLT 2020

NASAs Exploration Systems Architecture Study
  • Conducted by NASA to determine architecture for
    new space program
  • Initially recommended development of separate
    crew launch vehicle and heavy lift vehicle - both
    based on current Space Shuttle architecture
  • Subsequently decided on development of two
    completely new and different launch systems NOT
    Shuttle related
  • The Ares I to place the CEV in low earth orbit
  • The Ares V as a super-heavy-lift cargo rocket to
    send large amounts of equipment and components to
    the Moon and beyond

Ares V Ares I Launch Vehicles
Crew Exploration Vehicle
  • Started with a blank page rather than taking
    advantage of the current Space Shuttle
    architecture as required by the Aldridge
  • Two all new launch rockets
  • All new solid rocket lower stage for Ares I
  • All new upper stage for Ares I
  • All new first stage/main tank for Ares V
  • All new solid rocket boosters (SRBs) for Ares V
  • All new upper stage for Ares V (EDS)
  • All new version of J-2 rocket engine for EDS
  • Substituted RS-68 engines for SSMEs

The Advantages of NASAs ESAS
  • Super-heavy lift capability
  • If and when developed
  • Capable of supporting large, sustained Lunar
    exploration program
  • If that is what the national space exploration
    objective is
  • Some sources do not want to get bogged down
    supporting a huge Moon base program when we
    decide to go to Mars
  • In the same manner that our plans to return to
    the Moon have forced us to abandon support for
    the ISS
  • Able to send large payloads to Mars

The Disadvantages of NASAs ESAS
  • The Ares I duplicates CEV lift capability
    currently available in the Delta IV-Heavy And
    Atlas V launch rockets
  • The Ares-I can barely get a stripped-down CEV
    into LEO
  • Development time for the Ares I has slipped so
    much that there is a 5-year (possibility 6 or 7
    year) gap between the retirement of the Space
    Shuttle and earliest manned launch of the Ares I
  • The combination of the Ares I and the
    super-heavy-lift Ares V negates the possibility
    of building a family of rocket vehicles to launch
    a variety of payloads not necessarily
  • Eventual funding for Ares V is not assured

Disadvantages of ESAS (Cont.)
  • Two separate, dissimilar rocket launchers to
    design and build
  • Complete modification of current launch pads
  • Modification of crawler that is not capable of
    supporting the weight of the Ares V
  • Modification of crawler pathway that is not
    capable of supporting the weight of the Ares V
  • Major modifications to the Vertical Assembly
  • Decimation of KSC workforce

Disadvantages of ESAS (Cont.)
  • High cost and time associated with design,
    testing and production of all-new rocket launch
  • Heavy, expensive modification of rocket launcher
    support facilities
  • Loss of economy of scale
  • Maintenance of dissimilar production lines,
    facilities and technical force

Advertised Options to Close the Gap
  • Add additional Space Shuttle flight(s)
  • Very costly
  • Wont solve the problem
  • Speed development of CEV and Ares I
  • - Very costly
  • - Can only be advanced up to a point
  • - Still would not provide flexible launch
  • - Still would not provide heavy lift launch

Lesser Known Options
  • Make maximum use of current hardware
  • Develop Delta IV-Heavy as near-term LEO booster
    for CEV
  • Adopt program, such as DIRECT 3.0, for early
    return to manned space operations including
  • Use combination of architecture under development
    for Constellation Program and current Space
    Shuttle architecture

Delta IV Heavy Launch Vehicle
  • Advantages
  • Currently in production
  • Disadvantages
  • Not man-rated
  • Risk factor too high (according to NASA)
  • Stated that safety margin must be designed in
    and not added on to new launcher
  • - Previous non-man-rated boosters were upgraded
    as NASA launch platforms - all with 100 success
    launch rate for manned missions
  • Redstone (Mercury)
  • Atlas (Mercury)
  • Titan (Gemini)

Delta-IV Heavy
  • In production
  • Capable of placing
  • 56,800 pounds in LEO at 28.7 degrees
  • 52,800 pounds to LEO at 51.6 degrees (ISS)
  • CEV weighs approx. 44,000 pounds
  • Launch rate success 100
  • Upgrades could increase payloads up to 80

DIRECT 2.0 (Now DIRECT 3.0)
  • Grass-roots effort to produce a new launcher
    system based on a true derivative of Space
    Shuttle components, facilities and KSC work force
  • Based on early study by NASA that was initially
    discarded in favor of Ares I and Ares V
  • Supported by a growing variety of space
    engineers, scientists, educators, industry
    leaders, space enthusiasts, astronauts,
    ex-astronauts and political leaders as well as
    many NASA engineers

  • Realigns the VSE implementation plan with the VSE
    policy objectives by adhering to the directives
    set forth in the 2005 NASA Authorization Act and
    imperatives for success identified by the
    Aldridge Commission
  • Develops one basic, heavy-lift rocket launcher
  • Jupiter 130 rocket
  • Follow-on extra-heavy-lift rocket launcher for
    Moon and Mars exploration
  • Jupiter 24X rocket
  • Multiple heavy-lift configurations

DIRECT 3.0 (Cont.)
  • Utilizes most components of current Space Shuttle
  • Main tank Same as Space Shuttle/Currently in
  • Launch pads Same as used by Space Shuttle
  • Crawler ( crawler pathway) No change
  • Rocket engine SSME/Currently in production
  • 4-segment solid rocket boosters Same as used by
    Space Shuttle/Currently in production
  • KSC technical force Trained in Space Shuttle
    operations and currently in place

DIRECT 3.0 Concept
Ares I 55,000lb to LEO
Jupiter 130 102,800lb to LEO
Jupiter 130 Jupiter 24X Launch Vehicles
Jupiter 130
Jupiter 130
Advantages of DIRECT 3.0
  • Better
  • One basic rocket vehicle design
  • Supports a family of payload options
  • Upgradeable with 2nd stage to extra-heavy-lift
  • Faster
  • A true, direct derivative of the Space Shuttle
  • Most components are currently in production and
  • Cheaper
  • Majority of development costs have already been
  • Minimal tooling-up costs
  • Minimal learning curve expenses
  • Minimal testing required

Advantages of DIRECT 2.0/3.0 (Cont.)
  • Both Jupiter 130 and 24X can be man-rated
  • Permitting single launch of heavy configurations
    with crew aboard
  • Permitting manned missions to Moon orbit with
    single launch

Disadvantages of DIRECT 3.0
  • No single super-heavy-lift launch capability
  • Although launch of two (identical) Jupiter 24X
    rockets puts more mass in LEO than the launch of
    (dissimilar) Ares I and Ares V rockets
  • Ares V-class launch vehicle could be considered
    as long-range follow-on space transport
  • NASA claims that the Jupiter 130 offers too much
    capability for required LEO operations
  • The Saturn V was designed to launch missions to
    the moon but it was versatile enough to be
    adapted to launch SkyLab into LEO a mission
    that was not envisioned for it when it was
  • During the next two decades, there will probably
    be numerous payloads that are not currently
  • More LEO docking/assembly operations required
    with DIRECT 3.0

DIRECT 3.0 Lunar Exploration Concept
Ares I
Ares V
Jupiter 24X
Jupiter 24X
Alternative Missions with DIRECT 3.0
  • Lunar rescue
  • Single Jupiter 24X can launch a manned rescue
    vehicle to the orbit of the Moon
  • Manned asteroid mission
  • L-2 missions
  • Follow-on manned and unmanned payloads
  • Winged crew mini-shuttle
  • New/enhanced space station modules
  • Large inflatable space structures
  • Large unmanned space probes
  • Mars sample return mission
  • Landers to the surface of Jupiters moons
  • ISS crew service, re-supply and renovation

Summary of Space Lift Capability
  • Launcher LEO
  • Saturn IB 41,000 lb
  • Saturn V 260,000
  • Space Shuttle 59,000
  • Delta IV-Heavy 56,800
  • Ares I 55,000
  • Ares V 410,000
  • Jupiter 130 102,800
  • Jupiter 24X 233,000
  • - Lunar Cargo Mission
  • Two Jupiter 24Xs --- 186,000
  • - Manned Lunar Mission

Jupiters 130 24XCompared to Ares I V
Jupiter 130 SpacePlane
  • Jupiter 130 can launch a variety of payloads
  • that are not yet envisioned but will
  • come of age during the next two decades
  • Payloads much
  • heavier and diverse
  • than the CEV
  • Requiring a launcher
  • with greater capability
  • than Ares I

Payload Gap with Constellation Program
410,000lb to LEO
55,000lb to LEO
No Capability to launch payloads greater than
55,000 pounds and less than 400,000 pounds
Possible Actions
  • Use the Delta-IV Heavy as the near-future launch
    vehicle to return US astronauts to LEO and
    service the ISS in the shortest possible time
    (See Note)
  • Develop the Jupiter 130 as the workhorse of LEO
    space operations and heavy probes to the Moon and
  • Develop the Jupiter 24X as the initial launch
    vehicle with which to return to the Moon.
  • Initiate a long-range program to build a
    super-heavy-lift rocket launcher such as the Ares

Note on Delta IV-Heavy v Jupiter 30
  • It may take the same amount of time to man-rate
    the Delta IV-Heavy as it would to build the
    Jupiter 130
  • It would not be cost effective to build two
    launch systems to do the same job
  • Modifying a Delta IV-Heavy for man-rated CEV
    operations would not provide the basis for a
    future family of heavy space launch vehicles
  • The US needs only one launch system
  • The Delta IV-Heavy is available NOW for unmanned
    re-supply of the ISS

Advantages of Revised Space Program
  • Saves billions of dollars in construction of next
    generation of space vehicles
  • Saves billions of dollars of investment already
    made in Space Shuttle program
  • Significantly narrows the space gap between end
    of Space Shuttle operations and a follow-on space
  • Speeds the return-to-the-Moon program
  • Advances the prospect of manned missions to Mars
  • Permits the US to maintain unsurpassed leadership
    in space exploration
  • Informed public opinion would appreciate the
    DIRECT 3.0 approach over the current NASA plans
    to build the Ares I and Ares V

Consequences of Not Acting
  • Long space gap during which time a few US
    astronauts will be relegated to using Russian
    transportation to the ISS if available
  • Destruction of existing space program
    infrastructure billions of dollars of
    investments that have already been paid for
  • Loss of technical expertise at the KSC
  • Inability to service and support the ISS in any
    meaningful manner between 2010 and 2015-2020
  • And then only minimally since Ares I has small
    payload capability
  • No heavy-lift space transport capability for 10
  • After 50 years, US will have a space program no
    more advanced or capable than that of the current
    Chinese space program

Resistance to Canceling Major Contracts
  • NASA senior management
  • Particularly from NASA Administrator senior
  • Companies contracted to design/build major Ares I
    and Ares V components
  • Lobbyist of concerned parties
  • Senators and Congressmen from states affected

Canceling Major Contracts
  • Concerned companies will have cancellation
    clauses that prevent them from losing money
  • It is very expensive to cancel a contract so it
    would be beneficial to try to combine the work
    that has been done so far with any new space
    launch architecture
  • Historically, major contracts have been cancelled
    when necessary (due to unacceptable cost,
    changing military/political environment or
    duplication of effort)
  • X-20 DynaSoar
  • Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL)
  • Navy AX
  • Navy version of F-111

Ameliorating Major Contractors
  • Bring them together in consensus-building effort
    before announcing major changes/cancellations
  • Replace discontinued contracts with new contracts
  • Use work accomplished so far in new architecture

Utilizing Work Done So Far
  • Investigate use of new SRBs on Jupiter 130 and/or
    Jupiter 24X for enhanced performance
  • Incorporate new J2X engine on Jupiter 24X
  • Speed development of CEV
  • With full-up systems necessary for maximum safety
    and landing-on-land capability (since Jupiter 130
    would be capable of handling the additional

Public Perception
  • The US public takes great pride in its leadership
    position in space exploration
  • The public regards the Space Shuttle and the ISS
    as a cornerstone to its manned space program and
    does not want to see either of them sacrificed or
    abandoned for a less capable space program
  • A gap in US space operations will become
    increasingly embarrassing and intolerable as time
    goes on especially if the Ares I program slips
    beyond 5 years, and Russia and China continue
    making noteworthy progress in space exploration

The Real Cost of The Space Program
  • NASA states that, in the long run, the
    Constellation Program will be the most affordable
  • The other costs
  • Loss of US prestige as leading nation in space
  • Loss of access to ISS/Inability to service ISS
  • No Heavy-lift capability for 10 years
  • Possible loss of return-to-the-moon race to the
    Chinese and even first manned mission to Mars
  • - A world perception of space leadership issue

Recommendations for National Leaders
  • Announced that you have become increasingly
    concerned about the direction of the US space
    program especially the gap in time during
    which the US will have no space lift capability
  • Add that you are also concerned about
    accumulating costs and total cost of NASAs
    Constellation Program especially in light of
    current economic problems
  • Allow no action to be taken that will destroy the
    infrastructure of the current Space Shuttle
  • Support the formation of an impartial (non-NASA)
    commission to analyze the options available to
    the future US Space Program
  • Advise the selection of the next NASA
    administrator that you want these options and all
    others considered impartially for future
    direction of the US manned space program

Personal Observations of Michael Brazelton
  • NASA is reluctant to admit that it might have
    made a mistake in deciding on the Constellation
  • NASA has put on a full court advertising press to
    convince policy-makers and the public that it is
    too late to change its current course of action
    i.e. to change horses in the middle of the
  • However, the horse we are on now is the Shuttle
    architecture. The change is what NASA is
  • It is not too late to change as long as the
    infrastructure of the Space Shuttle architecture
    has not been torn up
  • NASA over-estimated how much money it would have
    in its budget to develop the Constellation
  • NASA did not anticipate the development problems
    that it is currently experiencing with Ares I.
    Developments problems with Ares V are unknown.

Personal Observations (Cont.)
  • - NASA did not anticipate the dire economic
    condition of the US economy
  • The Ares V super-heavy lift capability might be
    ideal for a mission to Mars but a shuttle-derived
    space launch capability is more than sufficient
    for exploring the Moon
  • - And is capable of mounting an initial manned
    Mars program
  • By staying with the basic Space Shuttle
    architecture, it may be possible to fly through
    the gap with limited Space Shuttle missions until
    the Jupiter 130 is on line
  • Regarding the Chinese space program The Apollo
    Program took eight years to put a man on the
    Moon. The Chinese already have an Apollo-class
    manned spacecraft. According the Mike Griffin,
    the NASA Administrator, China could conceivably
    put a man on the Moon by 2017-2018 two to three
    years before NASA hopes to return to the Moon

End of Briefing
  • Reference

Resume of Michael Brazelton
  • Current as of July 2009
  • 12313 Cannonball Road, Fairfax, Virginia 22030 /
    Tel 703-968-9893 / Fax 703-266-0934 / E-Mail
  • DATE OF BIRTH 19 March 1942
  • PLACE OF BIRTH Los Angeles, California, USA
  • CHILDREN 3 Daughters Adriana (24), Ashley
    (22), Allison (18)
  • RANK Colonel, US Air Force
  • CURRENT STATUS Retired (as of Nov 1987
  • PREVIOUS Colonel/Fighter Pilot, US Air Force
    / 1964 1987
  • Pilot/Captain, American Airlines / 1989 -
  • CURRENT Licensed Real Estate Agent /
    Real Estate Investor

Resume of Michael Brazelton (Cont.)
    Training (1964) / F-105 Fighter Training (1965) /
    Combat Pilot in Vietnam - 111 Combat Missions
    (1966) / Prisoner of War in Vietnam (1966-1973) /
    USAF Instrument Pilot Instructor School (1973) /
    USAF Aggressor Pilot, Wing Staff Officer
    Maintenance Test Pilot (1973-1977) / USAF Command
    Staff College (1978) / F-5 Instructor Pilot
    Squadron Operations Officer (1977-1981) /
    Chief, Military Security Assistance Office,
    Mexico (1982-1884) / Industrial College of the
    Armed Forces (1985) / HqUSAF Foreign Military
    Sales - Chief, Latin American Division
    (1985-1986) / Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, Current Operations - Chief, Western
    Hemisphere Branch
  • AIRLINE EXPERIENCE B-727 FE 1989-1991
    500hrs / B-727 FO 1991-1993 1,306hrs / MD-11
    FO 1993-1994 303hrs / B-757 B- 767 FO
    1994-1999 3,824hrs / B-727 CA 1999-2001 395hrs
  • FLYING TIME (Hours) Total Time 8,654 /
    Combat 348 / Multi-engine 8,049 / Jet 8,519 /
    Instructor 893 / Military Jet Fighter 2,327
    / Civilian Jet Transport 5,828 / PIC 3,380 /
    International 6,195 / Flight Engineer 500
  • MILITARY DECORATIONS Silver Star (4) / Defense
    Superior Service Medal / Defense Meritorious
    Service Medal / Legion of Merit /
    Distinguished Flying Cross / Bronze Star V
    (2) / Air Medal (9) / Air Force Commendation
    Medal / Distinguished Presidential Unit
    Citation / National Defense Service Medal /
    Vietnam Service Medal 8 Bronze Service Stars
    / Purple Heart (2) / Prisoner of War Medal
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