Command and control in peacebuilding operations: some reflections from the multilateral arena

1
Command and control in peacebuilding
operationssome reflections from the
multilateral arena

• Information Age Metrics Working Group (IAMWG)
  meeting
• 19 April 2006
• Adriaan Verheul
• Defense and Development Consultants, LLC
• www.d2cl.com

2
Peacebuilding

• Background
• A significant number of countries that emerge
  from war lapse back into violence within ten
  years
• Growing realization that comprehensive
  multi-layered approaches are needed over a longer
  period
• Definition and objectives
• Peace-building is understood to be the combined
  (emphasis AV) deployment of political, security,
  rule of law and socio-economic development
  instruments by the government and its partners to
  address underlying causes of conflict and lay the
  foundations for durable stability and development
  in a country emerging from conflict
• No real difference with conflict prevention
• Emphasis on governance and capacity building
• Partnership (none can do all)
• Local parties/government
• Multilaterals, the UN and regional organizations
• Bilateral government agencies
• INGOs
• IFIs

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Command And Control

• EBR website
• Joint Command and Control Functional Concept
• Command and control is the ability to recognize
  what needs to be done in a situation and to
  ensure that effective actions are taken. At its
  core, command and control is about decisionmaking
  and the individuals who make decisions.
• The central idea for future Joint C2 is that it
  will be agile across the range of military
  operations. Joint forces, interagency,
  multinational partners, and non-governmental
  organizations will be able to rapidly respond and
  decisively execute commander's intent in a
  complex, uncertain, and dynamic operating
  environment. This will be achieved through a
  collaborative information environment that
  enables cohesive teams, regardless of location,
  to develop a shared understanding of commander's
  intent and the battlespace, thereby enabling
  superior decisionmaking.
• Can we take this logic to peacebuilding by
  multilateral organizations?

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Challenges of planning and coordination

• Unity of effort elusive on the ground as it is
  in capitals
• Different entities needed for the full package
• Mandates and objectives differ
• Accountability to different cause, donor or
  client
• Corporate cultures and parochialism
• Sovereign procedures
• Competitors as well as colleagues on the same
  market
• One government, multiple players
• entities in charge in capitals cater to different
  constituencies and, in turn, provide different
  constituencies to participating organizations
• Democratic disconnect, including in the US local
  constituencies global responsibilities?
• Vertical discipline often lacking
• Horizontal understandings can be strong
• Timing of effort promises and pledges not
  delivered in time
• Coordination requires management and staffing,
  often lacking

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Example Rule of law planningCannot afford a gap
for sustainable result

Human capacity Material support Framework For Governance Fiscal sustain-ability
Police Vetting/ Training Equipment Regulation Oversight Doctrines salaries/ non-wage costs
Justice Selection/ training Buildings Legislative framework salaries/ non-wage costs
Prison system Training Capacity Standards, procedures salaries/ non-wage costs
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Management and leadershipin UN led missions

• Integration is the guiding principle for the
  design and implementation of complex UN
  operations in post-conflict situations and for
  linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding
  (political, development, humanitarian, human
  rights, rule of law, social and security aspects)
  into a coherent support strategy.
• An integrated mission is based on a common
  strategic plan and a shared understanding of the
  priorities and types of program interventions
  that need to be undertaken at various stages of
  the recovery process.
• Source UNSG guidance

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Management and leadershipin UN led missions

• Special Representative of the Secretary General
• Has (qualified) authority over the activities of
  the United Nations, including the military/police
  component.
• Reports to the Secretary-General, through the
  Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping
  Operations (who report to the Security Council).
• Two deputies PDSRSG (usually mission operations
  and management) and DSRSG/RC/HC (see below)
• Leads the UNs political engagement in
  country/region
• Establishes the overall framework and ensures a
  coordinated and coherent approach.

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Management and leadershipin UN led missions

• Special Representative of the Secretary General
• Internal to the mission sets up effective
  coordination mechanisms among the security,
  political, human rights, rule of law,
  humanitarian and development components of the
  mission
• External to the mission establishes a planning
  cell in the mission to engage the UN Country
  Team, the international financial institutions,
  non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other
  relevant actors.
• SRSG may request a given agency to re-orient its
  planned interventions in line with the broad
  strategic objectives of the mission, subject to
  the agency's mandate and available resources
• Engages with the UN Country Team, through the
  DSRSG/RC/HC, to ensure that mission planning and
  operations management are compatible with
  long-term national development goals and that
  mission exit strategies clearly articulate the
  hand-over of ongoing activities to the UN Country
  Team and other relevant actors.

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Management and leadershipin UN led missions

• DSRSG/RC (development)/HC (humanitarian)
• Reports to the SRSG
• Principal interface between the mission and the
  UN Country Team
• Leads the coordination effort for humanitarian,
  development and recovery activities and brings
  concerns raised by donors and the UN Country Team
  to the attention of the SRSG.
• Engages with non-governmental organizations
  (NGOs)
• Retains a secondary reporting line to the UNDP
  Administrator
• Retains a secondary reporting line to the UN
  Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC).
• Note these two secondary do not constitute a
  day-to-day supervisory relationship.

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Management and leadershipin UN led missions

• Success of integration is mixed
• Depends on personalities
• Lack of familiarity with partners cultures
• UN partners sometimes reluctant to subordinate
  privileged access and running programs to
  Security Council priorities
• Different loyalty bases
• UN agencies at times retain their distance and
  independence, depending on local press
• Inadequate rules and regulations for human
  resources, administration and financial
  management firewall between money and capacity
• Note UN peacebuilding commission not yet
  operational

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Critical gap in funding

• Assessed contributions for UN PKOs short term,
  only 10 stays in country, some QIPs
• Voluntary program-based funding for UN agencies
• Firewall between the two
• Bilateral and multilateral long term development
  funding
• WB, IMF other development banks
• Lack of flexibility
• Lack of visibility to end-user/client

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The way ahead

• UN peacebuilding commission does not solve
  underlying structural problems, but creates heavy
  reporting burden
• Clarity and continuous communication needed on
• end objectives,
• strategy
• division of labor
• responsibilities
• Cohesion and consensus at partner government
  levels end parochialism and establish whole of
  government doctrines and discipline
• New type of leadership and management needed
• Establish rules of the game
• Communication and transparency, frankness needed
• Timing resist the do something or quick
  impact urge better do it late and well than
  early and incomplete.
• Linkages between political and programmatic
  agendas