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Housing, Housing Finance, and Public Policy

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Overview of residential mortgage finance. Sub-prime lending. Over ... Banks and thrifts need 4% capital to hold a mortgage, but only 1.6% capital to hold MBS ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Housing, Housing Finance, and Public Policy


1
Housing, Housing Finance, and Public Policy
  • Lawrence J. White
  • Stern School of Business
  • New York University
  • Lwhite_at_stern.nyu.edu
  • Presentation at the Hudson Institutes discussion
    on Where Did the Risk Go?, Washington, DC, May
    3, 2007

2
Summary
  • Housing and home ownership
  • Overview of residential mortgage finance
  • Sub-prime lending
  • Over-arching questions
  • Conclusion

3
Housing and home ownership
4
Housing policy
  • Widespread subsidy of housing consumption
  • Income tax deductions and exemptions
  • Tax breaks and subsidies for rental
  • GSEs (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, FHLBs)
  • FHA, VA, Ginnie Mae
  • Direct provision (public housing)
  • Too much is never enough!

5
Home ownership
  • Encouraging home ownership is a major goal of
    housing policy
  • There are genuine positive externalities from
    home ownership
  • But home ownership is not for everyone
  • Rental subsidies do not encourage home ownership

6
Housing policy consequences
  • Much of the subsidy encourages larger, better
    appointed homes on larger lots, second homes,
    etc.
  • The U.S. invests too much in housing and not
    enough in other productive assets
  • The tax advantages mostly benefit higher income
    households
  • Housing policy is not especially well focused on
    encouraging greater home ownership

7
Overview of Residential Mortgage Finance
8
The components of residential mortgage finance
  • Originate mortgages
  • Service mortgages
  • Collect the savings for funding the mortgages
  • Issue deposits or liabilities to funders
  • Guarantee deposits or liabilities

9
Traditional portfolio lender vs. securitization
summary
  • Traditional portfolio lender
  • Vertically integrated (bundled) components, by
    banks thrifts
  • Securitization
  • Vertically dis-integrated (unbundled) components,
    by a wider variety of specialized parties

10
Traditional portfolio lender vs. securitization
(1)
  • Originate mortgages
  • Trad Thrifts banks
  • Sec Thrifts banks mortgage banks
  • Service mortgages
  • Trad Thrifts banks
  • Sec Thrifts banks mortgage banks

11
Traditional portfolio lender vs. securitization
(2)
  • Collect savings for funding mortgages
  • Trad Thrifts banks
  • Sec Thrifts banks insurance cos. pension
    funds mutual funds hedge funds
  • Issue deposits or liabilities to funders
  • Trad Thrifts banks
  • Sec Thrifts banks Fannie Mae Freddie Mac
    Ginnie Mae private label issuers

12
Traditional portfolio lender vs. securitization
(3)
  • Guarantee deposits or liabilities
  • Trad FDIC (FSLIC)
  • Sec Ginnie Mae Fannie Mae (?) Freddie Mac
    (?) FHLBs (?) private label senior/sub
    structures

13
An extra element
  • In the 1990s (and through 2003) Fannie Mae and
    Freddie Mac greatly expanded their portfolio
    holdings of residential mortgages

14
FFs recent growth
  • Residential Mortgages and MBS
  • Fannie Freddie Tot Mkt
  • Year Mtgs MBS Mtgs MBS
  • 1980 56B 0 5 17 1,100
  • 1990 114 288 22 316 2,903
  • 2000 608 707 385 576 5,514
  • 2002 821 1,040 590 730 6,856
  • 2003 920 1,301 661 752
    7,725
  • 2004 925 1,408 665 852 8,847
  • 2005 727 1,598 710 974
    10,046
  • 2006 724 1,784 701 1,123 10,921

15
The forces driving securitization
  • Efficiencies of the MBS process
  • The revolution in data processing and
    transmission
  • Differential capital requirements
  • Banks and thrifts need 4 capital to hold a
    mortgage, but only 1.6 capital to hold MBS
  • Aggressive portfolio growth by Fannie and Freddie
    since 1990
  • Advantageous funding costs
  • Freddie went fully public in 1989
  • Differential capital requirements Fannie
    Freddie need 2.5 capital to hold a mortgage
    specialist thrifts are constrained by the 5
    leverage requirement

16
The pluses and minuses of securitization
  • Securitization provides access to more sources
    of funding, allows more parties to invest in
    residential mortgages diversification
  • Securitization allows more customization of risk
  • But securitization (because of the vertical
    unbundling) increases the problems of asymmetric
    information

17
Sub-prime lending
18
The expansion of sub-prime lending
  • Partly due to the revolution in data processing
    and transmission
  • Partly due to expanded securitization
  • Partly due to pursuit of the American dream
  • Partly due to the recent history of rising home
    prices

19
The debacle in sub-prime lending
  • Partly due to excessive optimism about rising
    home prices
  • Partly due to securitization (asymmetric
    information, moral hazard)
  • Partly due to poor borrower information

20
A new focus for public attention sympathy
  • The focus is on the borrowers, not on the lenders
  • Because of securitization, lender losses will be
    wide but not especially deep
  • In foreclosures, borrowers lose downpayments
    transactions costs credit reputation

21
Overarching questions
22
Housing (1)
  • To what extent should home ownership be
    subsidized?
  • What are the best ways of subsidizing home
    ownership?
  • Beyond encouraging homeownership, should housing
    consumption itself be subsidized?
  • Is too much is never enough a sensible policy
    standard?

23
Housing (2)
  • How can the transactions costs of house
    buying/selling be reduced?
  • What to do about RESPA?
  • What to do about real estate brokerage?

24
Housing finance (1)
  • With mortgage securitization now a well-developed
    technology and with mortgage finance now a
    national market, is there still a need for the
    special status of Fannie Freddie the FHLBs?
  • With commercial banks now as the dominant
    portfolio lenders, to what extent does deposit
    insurance subsidize banks mortgage lending (any
    more than it subsidizes banks other loans)?

25
Housing finance (2)
  • Are the large portfolios of Fannie Freddie a
    potential systemic problem?
  • How necessary are these large portfolios to their
    efficient operation?
  • Is the 30-year fixed rate mortgage a necessary
    fixture in American mortgage markets?
  • Does all of the prepayment risk have to be borne
    by lenders (i.e., no prepayment fees)?

26
Housing finance (3)
  • What can/should be done for current borrowers in
    distress?
  • What should be done in sub-prime for the future?
  • Should there be a suitability requirement placed
    on originators?
  • How deep into the unbundled chain should
    responsibility be placed?
  • Is there a role for greater education of
    borrowers?

27
Conclusion
  • Housing and housing finance issues are important
  • They are likely to be with us for a long time
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