Good Fences in a Bad Neighborhood: AntiInfiltration Border Defense in Iraq

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Good Fences in a Bad NeighborhoodAnti-Infiltrati
on Border Defense in Iraq
2
Porous Borders, Tenuous Sovereignty
The Challenge At Present Insurgent infiltration
into Sunni Triangle from Jordanian Syrian
borders Future Contingency Iranian low-level ret
aliation in response to military strike, economic
sanctions, diplomatic pressure.
Counterinsurgents must eliminate sanctuaries,
and insurgents require them to succeed.
- Shafer, Deadly Paradigms.

3
Objectives

• Increase difficulty of current and potential
  future cross-border infiltration of men and
  materiel
  
• Improve options regarding Iran by reducing
  US/Iraqi vulnerability
  
• Provide basic trappings of sovereignty to nascent
  Iraqi state

4
Assumptions

• Existing but weak central Iraqi state and
  mediocre security forces
  
• Diminished but continuing American troop
  presence
  
• Jordan and Syria either unable or unwilling to
  engage in serious border control
  
• Continuing supply of jihadist recruits
• Iranian willingness and ability to cause
  trouble in Iraq as plausibly deniable
  retaliation for political/economic/military
  pressure

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Dimensions of the Problem

• that border Syrian has been porous and people,
  terrorists, have come across that border.
  
• Donald Rumsfeld (05/17/04)
• -Reducing the flow of extremists and their
  resources across the borders is critical to
  success in the counterinsurgency.
  
• General David Petraeus (WP 9/26/04)
• - US Monitors Iran Border for Insurgents
• (AP 03/22/05)
• Violence is 'off the chart' in area on Iraq
  border
  
• (USA Today 4/18/05)
• officials describe setbacks in the security
  situation in the Sunni Muslim city of Husaybah on
  the Syrian border
  
• (WP 4/24/05)

Iraq is concerned about militants crossing
borders into Iraq and joining the insurgency.
(CNN 4/30/05)
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Dimensions of the Problem Striking Distance
Western Borders to the Sunni Triangle and Beyond
Syria
From Jordanian Border (approx.)
Baghdad 320 mi. Samarra 300 mi. Fallujah 250
mi. Kirkuk 315 mi. From Syrian Border Baghd
ad 235 mi. Samarra 150 mi. Fallujah 160 mi.
Kirkuk 160 mi. By comparison from Boston Ne
w York 190 mi. Philly 268 mi.
From Jordan
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Dimensions of the Problem Striking Distance
The Western Borders of Concern

• From Turaybil (southern Jordan) to Rubiah
  (bordering Kurdistan on Syrian border)
  
• 250 mi. along flat, empty but large desert (Al
  Anbar province 33,000 sq. mi)
  
• Infiltration across both isolated border areas
  and through major highways (2 primary highway
  arteries) and border towns (discussed later as
  strongpoints)
• Small groups of infiltrators
• Also heavy vehicle traffic for normal trade and
  transportation (particularly from Jordan)
  
• Unclear external government competence (Jordan)
  and willingness (Syria) to control borders

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Dimensions of the Problem Striking Distance
The Eastern Border with Iran Al Faw to Badrah

• Iranian presence among parties and militias
  (SCIRI/Badr Brigades, al-Sadr?)
  
• Shiite Muslim southern heartland
• Proximity to important sites and coalition
  forces (from nearest border)
  
• Basra 20 mi.
• Rumaila and Az Zubayr oilfields 30-50 mi.
• Najaf 195 mi.
• Karbala 125 mi.
• Baghdad 100 mi.
• Mixed terrain
• Focus on area opposite Khuzestan and somewhat
  into Zagros Mtns. more north difficult for
  serious infiltration mountains, Sunnis, and
  Kurds.

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Dimensions of the Problem Striking Distance
Roads, Population Centers, Railroads, Border
Crossings, Pipelines, Airfields
Infrastructure (often protected by US/UK forces)
Oilfields
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Dimensions of the Problem Striking Distance
Terrain
300 mi.
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A Solution?

• Border barriers must be a primary consideration
  in developing strategies for countering guerrilla
  sanctuaries, especially for United States forces
  who are well equipped to efficiently use them.
• But. . . . United States forces have developed
  little doctrine on the subject.
  
• - Marine Corps University Command and Staff
  College, 1985

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Research Design Lessons of History

• Find cases of anti-infiltration defense in
  context of counter-insurgency and/or civil war
  
• Assess motivation, implementation, and
  success/failure (15 cases since 1900)
  
• Generalizeable factors that contribute to
  success or failure from medium-N survey?
  
• Case studies (3) to investigate possible causal
  mechanisms
  
• Apply to Iraq case with attention to
  differences, idiosyncracies

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(No Transcript)
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Israels Separation Fences

• Lebanon (1948-78 2000-Present) 50 mi. along
  Blue Line
  
• Gaza (1994-Present) 32 mi.
• West Bank (2003-Present) 400-500 mi. (ultimate
  length somewhat unclear)

• Shared features
• Patrol
• Fixed barrier
• Buffer zones
• Surveillance
• Relatively little margin for error compensate
  with capital and labor at point of infiltration.
  
• Success(?)
• Infiltration drastically reduced
• However, assumed need for long-term political
  resolution.
  

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The Morice Line France in Algeria

• 200 miles along Tunisian border
• 40,000-80,000 French soldiers
• 8 foot tall electrified fence - sensors detect
  where cut
  
• 45-meter wide minefield on each side
• Mobile paratroopers in helicopters pursue and
  destroy breakthrough groups
  
• Artillery brought to bear on fence breaks
• Success(?)
• FLN loses 6,000 men Spring 1957-December 1958
  attempting to infiltrate
  
• forces in Tunisia cut off from Algeria
• insurgents in Algeria lose supplies
• France eventually driven out of Algeria, Morice
  Line notwithstanding.

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The McNamara Line America in Vietnam

• Never completed
• Plan 10 firebase strongpoints, 47-mi. fence
  across DMZ (also Ho Chi Minh sensor/aerial
  interdiction)
  
• 600-1,000 m. wide
• Barbed wire, minefields, sensors, watchtowers,
  air power
  
• 1 division 1 armored cavalry regiment
• 800 million/yr
• Failure
• 360-degree battlefield
• Tet Offensive
• Use of electronic sensors more effective at Khe
  Sanh
  
• Flanked on west
• Cost- and manpower-ineffective.
• Tet (USMA) -
  

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Standing Guard Three Keys to Success

• Resources and Competence
• Fixed barriers/surveillance/maintenance
• Pursuit and Intelligence
• Margin For Error space and sympathizers?
• Mobility
• Integration of pursuit
• Political Context
• Linear battlefield offensive action either
  diplomatically or militarily necessary for final
  resolution of conflict.

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Standing Guard Western Strongpoints

• 7 Strongpoints
• 4 on the border (1 Jordan, 3 Syria) 3
  backstopping
  
• 2 battalions Iraqi Border Patrol per
  strongpoint 1 company American forces to
  advise/operate technology per location.
  
• 6 border posts (500 each) plus 4 second-layer
  checkpoint posts.

Strongpoint Border post Second-layer
Checkpoint

Approximate manpower requirements 14 Iraqi
Border Patrol battalions (battalion 700 total
8,400) at strongpoints 10 posts of 500 Iraqis
each (5,000) 7 American companies (700-900).
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Standing Guard Western Borders
Barriers, Surveillance and Pursuit in the West

• Continuous concertina barbed wire (a la India in
  Kashmir) and sand berms
  
• Passive ground sensors acoustic/motion/magnetic
  along border and in depth. Systems like
  IREMBASS-II linked to networked receiving
  stations
• Air surveillance satellites, UAVs, low-flying
  patrol aircraft
  
• Central coordinating entity like Vietnam-era
  Infiltration Surveillance Center with heavy
  American presence.
  
• Equipment/manpower needs currently unknown
  (2,000-5,000 passive ground sensors? 15-20
  UAVs? Battalion of American surveillance?).
  
• Pursuit
• 1 Iraqi armored cavalry regiment for pursuit
  (3,000 4,000). Perhaps drawn from Iraqi
  Intervention Force and other somewhat
  combat-capable Iraqi military forces. Yoked to
  surveillance and intelligence integration
  crucial. Helicopters central to mobility
• Some American mobile advisory force.
• Total Iraqi forces 16,000 21,000.

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Standing Guard The al-Jaafari Line in the East?

• Not conventional defense.
• Little margin for error pursuit less important.
  Stop at barriers or soon thereafter.
  
• Secure crossing areas first
• 5 key crossings (north-south)
• Baramadad (Badrah)
• Shamsari
• Shaikh Faris
• Shatt el-Ali
• Shatt al-Arab (Khorramshahr)

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Standing Guard the East
Barriers Border, Waterways, Highways

• First Layer of Defense Border Posts Barbed
  Wire Surveillance Patrol.
  
• Border Post every 10 miles 25-30 watchtowers
  with garrisons active and regular patrols based
  out of these posts. On Shatt-al-Arab use patrol
  boats.
• UAVs, sensors, eyeballs, helicopters, aircraft.
  
  
• Second Layer of Defense Internal Checkpoints,
  Patrols
  
• Backstopping along eastern side of main
  north-south highway, at key highway junctions,
  bridges. In event of contingency, frequent
  patrols and checkpoints.
• Particular security around key pieces of
  infrastructure highways, pipelines, foreign
  troop installations.

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Standing Guard Badrah to Shatt el-Ali 150
miles 4 border crossings.
Border crossing Border post Second-l
ayer Checkpoint

25 mi
40 mi
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Standing Guard Shatt el-Ali to Al Faw 155
miles 1 border crossing.
Border crossing Border post Second-l
ayer Checkpoint

25 mi
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The al-Jaafari Line

• Serious manpower needs.
• 5 border crossings X 1,400 (2 bat.) 7,000
• 25 border posts X 500 12,500
• 20 2nd-layer checkpoints X 500 10,000
• Pursuit 3,000 ?
• Infrastructure protection as part of
  anti-infiltration 15,000 (very roughly based
  on Facilities Protection Service southern
  allotment)
• Total Iraqis 35,000 45,000.
• Plus unknown quantity Americans (1 company per
  crossing, surveillance/advisers elsewhere)
  
• Plus conventional deterrent military forces along
  border.
  
• Unclear linearity of contest how sympathetic
  Shiites to Iranians? Only takes small number for
  large problems.

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Conclusion

• Mixture of barriers, surveillance, and pursuit on
  and behind borders adapted to differing
  circumstances on western and eastern borders
  
• Very roughly 50,000 65,000 men close to twice
  as large as planned total Iraqi Border Patrol
  force in addition several thousand Americans
  
• Key unknown political context. Can this be a
  linear battlefield, or will behind-the-lines
  insurgency make guarding the borders
  impossible/meaningless?