German Aviation Research Society Competing Airports – Theory or Reality 19-20 November 2004

1 / 65
About This Presentation
Title:

German Aviation Research Society Competing Airports – Theory or Reality 19-20 November 2004

Description:

German Aviation Research Society Competing Airports Theory or Reality 19-20 November 2004 The Impact of Low-cost Carriers on Regional Airports Financial ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:37
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 66
Provided by: garsonlin

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: German Aviation Research Society Competing Airports – Theory or Reality 19-20 November 2004


1
German Aviation Research SocietyCompeting
Airports Theory or Reality19-20 November 2004
  • The Impact of Low-cost Carriers on Regional
    Airports Financial Performance Evidence from the
    UK
  • Zheng Lei
  • Dr Andreas Papatheodorou
  • Dr Edith Szivas
  • University of Surrey, UK

1
2
Overview
  • The Rise of Low-cost Carriers
  • Regional Airports
  • Low-cost Carriers and Regional Airports
  • Proposed Methodology A Panel Data Analysis
  • Some Preliminary Results

2
3
Airline Deregulation in the EU
  • Three Aviation Liberalisation Packages
    (1987-1997).
  • From 1993, EU airlines became able to fly between
    member states without restriction and within
    member states subject to some controls on fares
    and capacity.
  • From 1 April 1997, full cabotage was implemented
    and any airline with a valid Air Operators
    Certificate can operate within the EU at
    market-determined prices (Gillen Lall, 2004).

3
4
The Emergence of Low-cost Carriers
  • The first European LCC Ryanair- adopted
    Southwests low-cost, no frills strategy in 1995.
  • easyJet the first European airline which
    established as a LCC from its inception.
  • In 1998, there were three LCCs, the number was
    jumped to fifteen in 2002 and thirty-one in early
    2004.

4
5
Low-cost Carriers in Europe
5
6
The Structure of the European Airline Industry
  • Network carriers still control the majority of
    the market share. The top three network carriers
    accounted for 34 of total AEA RPKs in 2002, with
    the top six accounting for 56 (AEA, 2003).
  • Charter airlines serve 45 billion packaged tour
    market, accounting for about 21 of
    intra-European air travel (Binggeli Pompeo,
    2002).
  • LCCS has 30 of short-haul market share in the UK
    and Ireland (charter traffic included) European
    wide, less than 10 of capacity, but was forecast
    an annual growth of more than 10 per cent in the
    next 10 years (Dennis, 2004 Travel Tourism
    Analyst, 2003).

6
7
The Competition Strategy in the Airline Industry
(1)
  • Cost leadership lower the cost of production and
    compete by offering low rates protected by
    economy of scale facilities the firm builds to
    reduce the unit cost of production.
  • Differentiation to make some dimension of an
    airlines activity different from that of its
    competitors, e.g. better schedules, better
    amenities, better services it protects markets
    by establishing a group of loyal consumers.
  • Monopoly to restrict the ability of competitors
    to enter selected geographic markets, e.g.
    control over network hubs.

7
Source Sorenson, 1990
8
The Competition Strategy in the Airline Industry
(2)
  • The rise of LCCs are characterised by cost
    leadership strategy.
  • Cost leadership is an extremely difficult
    strategy in any competitive environment every
    decision that managers make must be guided by the
    principle of cost control.
  • It is an even more difficult strategy in the
    airline industry as there are strong indications
    that there are generally no increasing returns to
    scale associated with airline networks.

8
9
Economies of Density
  • Although an airline cannot substantially reduce
    unit costs by expanding scale, economies of
    density exist in the airline industry.
  • Supply side economies of density an airlines
    unit cost declines when the airline adds flights
    or seats on existing routes, all other things
    held constant.
  • Demand side economies of density an airline
    induces higher demand through higher route
    frequencies.
  • However, the strategy of focusing on economies of
    density is open to both network carriers and
    LCCs.
  • Network carriers explore economies of density
    through hub-and-spoke network, while LCCs achieve
    it from point-to-point operation on dense routes.

9
10
Point-to-point operation vs. Hub-and-spoke
Network (1)
  • Advantages of hub-and-spoke
  • Cost benefit
  • Demand benefit
  • Better allocation of capacity under demand
    uncertainty
  • Disadvantages of hub-and-spoke
  • Increase of circuity, which in turn, negatively
    affects airline costs (e.g. extra fuel
    consumption, extra cruise time, extra fixed
    costs).
  • Congestion at the hub airport, which severely
    limits the expansion of the hub-and-spoke
    network.
  • Cannot satisfy both business and leisure
    passengers business passenger prefers direct
    flight, while leisure passengers prefer the
    lowest possible fares.

10
11
Point-to-point operation vs. Hub-and-spoke
Network (2)
  • LCCs provide lower fares that leisure travellers
    are increasingly demanding and direct flight that
    business passengers prefer.
  • The sustainable advantages that LCCs have are
    mainly derived from the adoption of
    point-to-point operation (Gillen Lall, 2004).
  • 70 of the cost differences between LCCs and
    conventional scheduled airlines can be attributed
    to their business model choices (Booz Allen
    Hamilton, 2002).
  • However, no conclusive findings yet the debate
    is still continuing.
  • It is important for LCCs to maintain significant
    cost advantages over network carriers.

11
12
Cost advantages of low-cost carriers on
short-haul routes
Assumes 100 per cent direct sales and none
through agents for low-cost airlines. Source
Doganis (2001)
12
13
Non-airport Related (1) Higher Seating Density
  • By removing business class and reducing the seat
    pitch and gallery, LCCs can significantly
    increase the number of seat for sales in their
    aircraft.
  • However, the business class can bring higher
    yields to traditional airlines, thus the real
    cost advantage is likely smaller.
  • Moreover, this strategy is not well protected
    from the manoeuvres of network carriers, e.g. the
    removal of business class by Aer Lingus on
    certain intra-European routes.

13
14
Non-airport Related (2) Distribution Costs
  • By cutting off travel agents and using e-tickets
    LCCs could achieve 11 cost advantage over
    traditional airlines.
  • This strategy was adopted by conventional
    scheduled airlines as well
  • - Commissions paid by network carriers to
    travel agents are
  • now typically 1 on short-haul
    flights
  • - E-tickets are widely used by network
    carriers as well
  • - Network carriers also seek ways of bypassing
    GDSs by streamlining their Internet booking
    facilities
  • Therefore, the cost savings from distribution
    channels are unlikely to be sustainable.

14
15
Non-airport Related (3) Lower Staff Salary and
Smaller Administration Costs
  • By entering the industry with non-union labour,
    the LCCs were able to gain an initial cost
    advantage.
  • This advantage, however, will be eroded as the
    large carriers won labour concessions, while LCCs
    come under pressure to increase pay.
  • Similarly, when LCCs grow up, smaller
    administration costs that they enjoyed will be
    difficult to maintain.

15
16
Airport Related (1) High Aircraft Utilisation
  • Regional airports help LCCs to enhance their
    ability to sustain high employee productivity and
    reliable on time performance.
  • High aircraft utilisation is achieved through the
    greater aircraft and employee productivity from
    fast turnarounds in the uncongested regional
    airports.

16
17
Airport Related (2) Low Airport Charges
  • LCCs benefit enormously from low airport charges
    and station costs offered by regional airports.
  • For example, Frankfurt/Hahn costs Ryanair 4.25
    per departing passenger and there is no landing
    fee in contrast a 737 operator at Frankfurt/main
    pays 13 per departing passenger and a landing
    fee of about 1.75.

17
18
Major Sources of LCCs Sustainable Competitive
Advantages
  • When network carriers learn how to compete with
    LCCs over time, LCCs non-airport related cost
    advantages will be difficult to maintain.
  • Given the importance of business passengers and
    of network feed, it is unlikely for network
    carriers to choose secondary airports and
    traditional airlines would find it difficult to
    copy the high utilisation concept while
    maintaining complex satisfactory flight
    connections (Doganis, 2001).
  • In sum, the sustainable competitive advantages
    that a LCC has mainly derived from the adoption
    of point-to-point service operating from regional
    airports.

18
19
Overview
  • The Rise of Low-cost Carriers
  • Regional Airports
  • Low-cost Carriers and Regional Airports
  • Proposed Methodology A Panel Data Analysis
  • Some Preliminary Results

19
20
Airports From the Public Utility to Business
Entity
  • As strategically important asset, airports,
    traditionally, have been administered and
    controlled either by central or local government
    or state appointed body.
  • Trend towards commercialising and privatising
    airports from 1980s.
  • Rationales of the states to commercialise and
    privatise airports
  • To avoid the financial burden
  • To improve efficiency
  • To reduce the cost and maximise revenue
  • To improve customer service and quality
    standard

20
21
The UK Story
  • Airports Act 1986
  • All airports with turnover of over one million
    pounds in two of the previous three years had to
    be transformed into limited companies.
  • Part one of the Airport Act privatised seven
    airports of the British Airport Authority (BAA).
  • Part two of the Airport Act commercialised 16
    municipally owned airports.
  • Shares were initially being held by the original
    local authorities, but public borrowing
    restrictions prompted them to seek being
    partially or fully privatised (Graham, 2004)
  • By 2000, a total of 45 airports had been set up
    as companies

21
22
Ownership
22
23
Ownership (continued)
23
Source Modified from Humphreys and Francis
(2002)
24
Over time, non-aeronautical Revenue is becoming
more and more important
  • Pressure from airlines and governments to limit
    the increase in aeronautical revenue.
  • The motivation of increasing non-aeronautical
    revenue to maximise total profit makes airports
    have incentives not to increase aeronautical
    revenue (Starkie, 2002).
  • Therefore, airports have seen the income they
    derived from aeronautical activities decline over
    the past two decades.

24
25
Non-aeronautical revenue shares at Selected UK
Airports
25
Source Graham, 2004
26
Structure of the UK Airport Industry
  • Oligopolistic market four big players (Heathrow,
    Gatwick Manchester and Stansted) control 66 of
    market share, while the other 56 airports only
    share the rest 34.
  • Ownership concentration Three big airport groups
    control over 82 of market share (BAA 64
    Manchester Airport Plc 12 TBI 6).
  • Geographical imbalance 5 London airports control
    59 of market.

26
27
Market Share of the UK Airports
All other airport
All other London airport
Manchester
Heathrow Gatwick
27
Source UK CAA
28
Economies of Scale
  • Economies of scale in the airport industry
  • Less than 300,000 WLU - average unit cost of
    15
  • Between 300,000 and 2.5 million WLU average
    unit cost of 9.4
  • Between 2.5 25 million WLU average unit cost
    of 8 (ICAO
  • study, adopted from Graham, 2003)
  • Diseconomies of scale in the airport industry
  • When reaching a point, it is increasingly
    difficult and expensive for a large airport to
    design, build and operate facilities that
    co-ordinate (spatially and functionally)
    activities across and expanding area (Starkie,
    2002).
  • Empirical study by Pels (2002) demonstrates that
    a number of large European airports shows this
    was the case
  • In sum, regional airports have stronger
    incentives to grow in order to reach the critical
    mass of traffic.

28
29
Characteristics of Regional Airports
  • Serving defined area/catchment
  • Alternative to major airports
  • Dependent on intra-Europe traffic
  • Light financial regulation
  • Vital to local economy

29
30
Challenges Facing Regional Airports
  • Lack of locational advantage and characterised by
    thin traffic as a result of economic poverty,
    high unemployment, small-scale enterprises and
    sparse population in the peripheral regions where
    they are based.
  • Difficult for conventional scheduled airlines to
    stimulate sufficient traffic.
  • Overlapping of catchement areas.
  • Abolition of intra-EU duty free sales.
  • Limited ability to generate enough
    non-aeronautical revenue as a result of small
    volume of passengers.

30
31
Overview
  • The Rise of Low-cost Carriers
  • Regional Airports
  • Low-cost Carriers and Regional Airports
  • Proposed Methodology A Panel Data Analysis
  • Some Preliminary Results

31
32
The Impact of LCCs on Regional Airports
Performance
  • LCCs have begun to offer life to smaller airports
    and tourist destinations since they have searched
    for locations away from major congested hub
    airports and the low fares they offered have
    stimulated traffic from regional points (Barrett,
    2000).
  • LCCs can make regional airports work in a way
    that traditional airlines cannot by bringing in
    passengers from
  • a much wider catchment area (Barrett, 2000).

32
33
LCCs increase the catchment area for regional
airports the case of East Midlands
  • Original Catchment Area Enlarged
    Catchment Area

60 minutes accounts for 87 of passengers 7.3
million people
After the entry of LCCs in 2002 the average drive
time now is 120 minutes covering some 24
million people offering huge potential for
future growth
33
Source East Midlands Airport 2004
34
LCCs Impact on Stansted Airports Financial
Performance
No. of Passenger (mil.)
(mil.)
Low cost carrier passenger
Total number of terminal scheduled passenger
Airport operating profit
34
Source UK CAA
35
Comparison of Traffic Type in Large-sized UK
Regional Airports in 2002/03 with 1995/96
Number of passenger (000)
35
Manchester
Stansted
Gatwick
Source UK CAA
36

Comparison of Traffic Type in Medium-sized UK
Regional Airports in 2002/03 with 1995/96 (1)
Number of passenger (000)
Bristol
Cardiff
Leeds Bradford
Liverpool
36
Source UK CAA
37
Comparison of Traffic Type in Medium-sized UK
Regional Airports in 2002/03 with 1995/96 (2)
Number of passenger (000)
Belfast
East Midlands
Luton
Newcastle
37
Source UK CAA
38
Comparison of Traffic Type in Medium-sized UK
Regional Airports in 2002/03 with 1995/96 (3)
Number of passenger (000)
Glasglow
38
Aberdeen
Birmingham
Edingburg
Source UK CAA
39
Comparison of Traffic Type in Small-sized UK
Regional Airports in 2002/03 with 1995/96
Number of passenger (000)
39
Teesside
Bournemouth
Exeter
Source UK CAA
40
Conflicts between LCCs and Regional Airports
  • Attracting LCCs is an appealing way for airport
    management to attempt to improve their financial
    performance.
  • The adoption of the cost leadership strategy and
    lack of economies of scale in the airline
    industry force LCCs constantly seeking ways to
    reduce the cost.
  • For LCCs, airport charges make up a larger
    percentage of total costs. Having pushed all
    other cost inputs to minimal levels, the only
    cost variable that they can further reduce is
    that of airport charges.
  • LCCs have always been successful in forcing
    regional airports revenue down by negotiating low
    charges LCCs claim that their passengers provide
    more non-aeronautical revenue sources to regional
    airports than traditional airlines, hence the
    need for airport to trade off a reduction in
    aeronautical revenue s in return for extra
    non-aeronautical revenues (Barrett, 2004).

40
41
Impact of Airport Charges on Total Operating
Costs of Intra-European Air Services for selected
airlines in 1999
41
Source Doganis (2002)
42
The Bargaining Power of LCCs over Regional
Airports
  • An airport generally has most market power over
    network carriers
  • connecting services, while having least
    market power over LCCs
  • point-to-point operations (Starkie, 2002).
  • LCCs do not rely on transfer passengers.
  • LCC passengers are usually price sensitive they
    are willing to bypass the nearest airport and
    travel longer distance to the airport if the
    fares are low enough.
  • Therefore, LCCs have incentives to seek out
    airports that will minimise their operating and
    station costs and then create the market around
    them.
  • Consequently, LCCs have more scope for switching
    operations between different airports in order to
    reduce the costs.

42
43
Countervailing Power of Regional Airports
  • Regional airports with locational advantages,
    e.g. Luton Airport.
  • Airports with more than one LCCs and have more
    balanced traffic.
  • Airports take proactive measures in building
    transportation links (e.g. bus services) with
    neighbouring areas which are not served by a LCC
    to build an attractive catchment area (Gillen
    Lall, 2004).
  • However, there are more regional airports than
    LCCs. The competition for LCCs customs put
    regional airports in a disadvantaged position.

43
44
Crucial to Measure the impact of LCCs on Regional
Airports Financial Performance
  • Relationships between LCCs and airports are
    getting tougher and tougher (Graham, 2004).
  • LCCs are taking advantage of their bargaining
    power and sometimes push for a price below the
    airports marginal costs.
  • However, LCCs are also risking becoming the
    victim of their own success, e.g. the case of
    Ryanair in Charleroi.
  • Important to quantify the impact of LCCs and
    their passengers on regional airports financial
    performance.

44
45
Overview
  • The Rise of Low-cost Carriers
  • Regional Airports
  • Low-cost Carriers and Regional Airports
  • Proposed Methodology A Panel Data Analysis
  • Some Preliminary Results

45
46
The Classical Linear Regression Model
yit ai b'iXit eit

i 1, N regions t 1,T time periods X K
vectors of non-constant explanatory variables y
Dependant variable, which varies across i regions
over t time periods a intercept and b slope
coefficients both variables are allowed to vary
across regions e the error term, which is
identical and independently distributed for all i
and t
46
47
Advantages of Using Panel Data
  • By combining time series of cross-section
    observations, panel data give more informative
    data, more variability, less collinearity among
    variables, more degrees of freedom and more
    efficiency (Baltagi, 1995).
  • By studying the repeated cross section of
    observations, panel data are better suited to
    study the dynamics of change.
  • Panel data can better detect and measure effects
    that simply cannot be observed in pure
    cross-section or pure time series data.
  • But, the choice of an appropriate model depends
    inter alia on the degree of homogeneity of the
    intercept and slope coefficients and the extent
    to which any individual cross-effects are
    correlated with the explanatory variables.

47
48
Definition of Variables (1)
  • NAR ƒ(Lccpax, Charterpax, Fullservicepax)

  • Where
  • NAR Non-aeronautical revenue (000) in
    airport i
  • Lccpax Total number of terminal passengers
    carried by low-cost
  • carriers in airport i.
  • Charterpax Total number of terminal
    passengers carried by charter airlines in
    airport i.
  • FullservicepaxTotal number of terminal
    passengers carried by full service scheduled
    airlines in airport i.

48
49
Definition of Variables (2)
  • AR ƒ(Lccpax,
    Charterpax, Fullservicepax, Lccflights,
  • ?

    ?
  • Otherflights, Freight)

  • Where
  • AR Aeronautical revenue (000) in airport
    i.
  • Lccpax Total number of terminal passengers
    carried by low-cost carriers in airport i.
  • Charterpax Total number of terminal
    passengers carried by charter airlines in airport
    i.
  • FullservicepaxTotal number of terminal
    passengers carried by full service scheduled
    airlines in airport i.
  • Lccflights Total number of flight operated
    by low-cost carriers in airport i.
  • Otherflights Total number of flights
    operated by other carriers in airport i.
  • Freight Total tonnage of air cargo and
    mail carried by all carriers in
  • airport i

49
50
Data Source and Software
  • Airport revenue data was based on annual Airport
    Statistics published by the Centre for the
    Studies of Regulated Industries, UK, ranging from
    1995/96 to 2002/03 and covering 21 regional
    airports.
  • Passengers and flights data were obtained from
    the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). All the
    data were adjusted to financial years, i.e. from
    the 1 April to next years 31 March.
  • The software used was TSP.

50
51
Basic Empirical Models
  • NARit ai ß1Lccpaxit ß2Charterpaxit
    ß3Fullservicepaxit eit
  • 2. ARit ai ß1Lccpaxit ß2Charterpaxit
    ß3Fullservicepaxit ß4Lccflightsit
    ß5Otherflightsit ß6Freightit eit

51
52
Overview
  • The Rise of Low-cost Carriers
  • Regional Airports
  • Low-cost Carriers and Regional Airports
  • Proposed Methodology A Panel Data Analysis
  • Some Preliminary Results

52
53
Descriptive Statistics for Model 1
Variable Mean
Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum
Cases NAR 26476.7
46741.7 1181.0 247600.0
168 Lccpax 660614.7
1772666.2 0
14538522.0 168 Charterpax
1681345.2 2777612.6 3391.0
11246100.0 168 Fullservicpax
2297914.8 3859685.9 0
20468790.0 168
53
54
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
  • LCCP CHAP
    OTHP
  • LCCP 1
    .02295 .01972
  • CHAP .02295 1
    .90723
  • OTHP .01972 .90723
    1

54
55
 
Estimation Results of Pooled OLS, Fixed and
Random Effects Models for Model 1
Notes Figures in parentheses are t values.
indicate significance at the 1 levels
55
 
56
Discussions (1)
  • The F value of 6.584, which is less than the
    critical F value (10.996), indicates that the
    cross-sectional and time series data can be
    pooled.
  • The LM value of 63.439, is greater than the
    critical value at the 1 level of significance
    it indicates that the the null hypothesis that
    the fixed effect model is appropriate is clearly
    rejected.
  • The calculated Hausman statistics is 0.17 which
    is less than the critical value at the 1
    significant level. This results implies that the
    null hypothesis of no correlation cannot be
    rejected that is the model has random effects.

56
57
Discussions (2)
  • All variables are significant at 1 level and
    have the
  • expected signs.
  • Each LCC passenger adds 4.90 to the airports
    non-
  • aeronautical revenue, while each charter
    passenger and
  • full service airlines passengers bring 6.73
    and 6.97
  • respectively to the airport.
  • Claims that LCC passengers might bring more non-
  • aeronautical revenue to the airport are not
    supported.


57
58
Descriptive Statistics for Model 2
Variable Mean
Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum
Cases AR 27861.5 34423.5
819.0 144525.0 168 Lccpax 660614.7
1772666.3 0 14538522.0
168 Charterpax 1681345.2 2777612.6
3391.0 11246100.0 168 Fullservicepax
2297914.8 3859685.9 0
20468790.0 168 Lccflights 6233.5
15979.5 0 123 536.0
168 Otherflights 53358.9
54376.0 2000.0 253099.0
168 Freight 44868.0
74878.5 0 335690.0
168
58
59
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
  • LCCP CHAP
    OTHP FRE LF OF
  • LCCP 1 .02295
    .01972 .33575 .99634 .02827
  • CHAP .02295 1
    .90723 .72221 .02519 .90405
  • OTHP .01972 .90723 1
    .76116 .02424 .95099
  • FRE .33575 .72221
    .76116 1 .35172 .72548
  • LF .99634 .02519
    .02424 .35172 1 .03713
  • OF .02827 .90405
    .95099 .72548 .03713 1

59
60
Estimation results of Pooled OLS, Fixed and
Random effects models for Model 2
60
Notes Figures in parentheses are t values, ,
, indicate significance at the 10, 5 and
1 levels respectively
61
Discussions (1)
  • For the case (i) results, F value of 20.5, which
    is greater
  • than critical F value (10.6), indicates that
    the cross-
  • sectional and time series data cannot be
    pooled.
  • Problems of multicollinearity between the
    passenger
  • variables and flight variables.
  • After dropping variables of Lccpax, Chapax and
  • Fullservicepax, the data can be pooled.

61
62
Discussions (2)
  • LM test and Hausman test indicate the model has
  • random effect.
  • Both variables of LCCflight and Otherflight are
    significant
  • at 1 level and have expected signs
  • Although the variable of freight is significant
    at the 10
  • level the sign has wrong direction.

62
63
Summary
  • The sustainable competitive advantages that a LCC
    has mainly derived from the adoption of
    point-to-point service operating from regional
    airports.
  • Regional airports have strong incentives to grow
    in order to reach the critical mass of traffic.
  • LCCs can make regional airports work in a way
    that traditional airlines cannot.
  • However, conflicts are emerging between LCCs and
    regional airports.
  • Preliminary empirical results demonstrate that
    LCC passengers have significant impact on
    regional airports non-aeronautical revenue, but
    not as big as charter and full service airlines
    passengers.

63
64
Further Research
  • To re-estimate a model which can better measure
  • LCCs impact on regional airports Aeronautical
  • Revenue.
  • To study the airport specific effects and time
    effects.
  • To test whether the presence of Ryanair or
    easyJet at
  • an airport has significant different impact on
    airports
  • AR and non AR.
  • To estimate a third model to aggregate AR and
    non
  • AR.

64
65
Thank you for your attention. Any comments?
65
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)