1609'2 Status

1
1609.2 Status

• William Whyte, Security Innovation
• December 9, 2009

2
Activity since October

• Completed WSA text
• Worked on SAE J2735 security profile with VSC(A)
• Signed message with external payload, partial
  payload
• No further discussion in this presentation
• Timing Advertisement
• Next presentation
• Will post a version following this discussion

3
WSAs

• Completed specification of
• WaveSecurityServices-SignedWsa.request
• WaveSecurityServices-SignedWsa.confirm
• WaveSecurityServices-SignedWsaValidation.request
• WaveSecurityServices-SignedWsaValidation.confirm
• Per recent discussion, SignedWsa.confirm returns
  three versions of the signed WSA
• With WSA cert indicated by digest
• With WSA cert explicitly
• With entire cert chain
• Addition Use generation time to protect against
  replay of previous WSAs.
• Replay of the current WSA does not count an
  attack, replay of previous ones does
• WSA validity periods are likely to overlap so an
  old WSA may still appear valid
• Required changes to 5.2 and 7.5.4.2
• WME profile rationalized

4
Profile

• Separated into send and receive sections for
  clarity
• Open Issues
• Profile a problematic term
• policy?
• SignerIdentifierType
• AcceptableSignerType

5
Basic Safety Message profile

• RequireEncryptedMessages False
• DetectReplay True
• MessageValidityPeriod Adaptive, with default 5
  s
• MessageValidityDistance n/a
• GenerationTimeConfidenceMultiplier Adaptive,
  with default 0
• GenerationLocationHorizontalConfidenceMultiplier
  n/a
• AcceptableSignerTypes OBU Anonymous discuss
  further
• RequiredCRLFreshness Adaptive, default CRL
  Freshness check not required
• Security Management profile
• SigningKeyAlgorithm ECDSA-224
• EncryptionAlgorithm n/a

• For each registered PSID
• Use1609Dot2 True
• SignMessages True
• VerifyMessages - Adaptive
• SetGenerationTime True
• UseGenerationTime True
• ExternalGenerationTime False
• SetExpiryTime False
• UseExpiryTime False
• ExternalExpiryTime n/a
• SetGenerationLocation False
• UseGenerationLocation False
• ExternalGenerationLocation n/a
• SignerIdentifierType Adaptive (min. rate 1 Hz)
• SignerInfoCertChainLength Adaptive (default
  TBD)
• EncryptMessages False

Assumes application layer is checking relevance
of location in BSM
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Open Questions

• WW
• 7.5.2.4 We use PSID 24 to support signing WSAs.
  Is it okay to use this?
• John Moring
• Use of application-specific security MIBs is
  unorthodox
• Should we define MIBs explicitly in ASN.1?
• Use of SAPs to access support services is
  unorthodox

7
Security MIBs
8
Internal SAPs

• The signing process is illustrated above. For
  reasons of space some of the SAP names have been
  abbreviated as follows
• WSS-SM WaveSecurityServices-SignedMessage
• WSSS-LT WaveSecuritySupportServices-LocalTime
• WSSS-Loc WaveSecuritySupportServices-Location
• WSS-CRC WaveSecurityServices-CertificateRevocatio
  nCheck
• WSS-SCS WaveSecurityServices-StoredCertificateSea
  rch

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Remaining to do for v2

• PAR change
• Clause 4 Sequence diagrams
• Security Management
• PICS
• Examples
• Motivation
• Small amount of tidying up in profile text

10
System Architecture Diagram the controversy
continues
1609.2 (October 2009)
ETSI
11
Remaining to do for current round of standards
outside 1609.2

• 1609.1 security
• TA security?

12
Remaining to do for v3

• Application communication patterns
• Security management
• Platform security
• Interop