SALW Production Case of Central and Eastern Europe

1
SALW Production- Case of Central and Eastern
Europe
Consequences of Armed Violence

• Assoc. Prof. Dr Dimitar Dimitrov
• Department National and Regional Security, UNWE

COST Action A25, Final Conference on Armed
Violence, 17-19 March, Brussels
2
Consequences of Armed Violence

• Many efforts to improve arms export control - the
  results are not always satisfactory
• Number of social and economic factors that create
  conditions favourable to the illicit trade
• over-capacity of the defence industries

COST Action A25, Final Conference on Armed
Violence, 17-19 March, Brussels
3
Consequences of Armed Violence

• The restriction of SALW exports to countries of
  concern and the economic viability of production
  companies should not be seen as opposing
  alternatives
• Further reduction of industry using purely
  administrative or legal measures may not bring
  positive results

COST Action A25, Final Conference on Armed
Violence, 17-19 March, Brussels
4
Consequences of Armed Violence

• My thesis - real need for restructuring of
  defence industries. Such measures are not in the
  priorities of national governments and EU.
• No measures for imposing stricter SALW export
  controls would be successful without taking full
  account of the overall effect of the defence
  industrial restructuring. Thus, export control
  and restructuring policies need to be
  coordinated.

COST Action A25, Final Conference on Armed
Violence, 17-19 March, Brussels
5
Consequences of Armed Violence

• Short overview of defence industrial
  transformation in selected CEECs
• Bulgaria
• Lagging restructuring and modernization,
• Increasing technological backwardness,
• Over-dependence on the traditional markets (i.e.
  Africa, Middle East)
• Influence of transition associated problems on
  the overall economic development

COST Action A25, Final Conference on Armed
Violence, 17-19 March, Brussels
6
Consequences of Armed Violence

• the Czech Republic
• Important advances in regulating its foreign
  trade in military equipment and non-military
  weapons.
• Provisions regulating handling activities of
  military equipment by Czech dealers outside the
  territory of the Czech Republic

COST Action A25, Final Conference on Armed
Violence, 17-19 March, Brussels
7
Consequences of Armed Violence

• Romania
• Efforts to support and promote closer
  co-operation with international and regional
  organisations
• Steps to strengthen the national mechanisms for
  controlling the export and import of strategic
  goods.
• The government introduced steps to radically
  restructure the defence industry after 2001
• The collapse of both the domestic and foreign
  markets in the 1990s resulted in a corresponding
  dramatic reduction in the size of Romanias
  defence industry.

COST Action A25, Final Conference on Armed
Violence, 17-19 March, Brussels
8
Consequences of Armed Violence

• General characteristics of the transformation in
  CEECs
• General crisis of the defence-related sector
• Most firms drastically reduced their scope of
  activity, output, and exports.
• The small arms and light weapons production base
  of Eastern, Central, and Southeast Europe
  declined dramatically (Kiss,2004)
• Most small arms and light weapons producers of
  the region are defined by meagre prospects and a
  limited ability to restructure

COST Action A25, Final Conference on Armed
Violence, 17-19 March, Brussels
9
Consequences of Armed Violence

• General characteristics of the transformation in
  CEECs Cont.
• The impact of NATO accession and membership on
  the regions defence industry was double-edged.
• Privatization programmes are underway elsewhere
  in the region
• One of the main obstacles - relatively big role
  played by social facilities in defence
  enterprises.

COST Action A25, Final Conference on Armed
Violence, 17-19 March, Brussels
10
Consequences of Armed Violence

• Government policies
• State regulations related to the arms trade, but
  not limited only to arms control and trade
  licenses.
• No special attitude toward SALW.
• The exceptions are in the programs of disposal of
  surplus weapons, but often without sufficient
  resources and real actions.
• Domestic SALW and ammunitions have some
  advantages on their internal market, thus
  providing more power to producers to survive.

COST Action A25, Final Conference on Armed
Violence, 17-19 March, Brussels
11
Consequences of Armed Violence

• International efforts
• A number of international and regional
  agreements.
• Special attention to the EU Strategy to combat
  illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and
  their ammunition (December 2005).
• Has to be supplemented by preventive action which
  will tackle illegal supply and demand as well as
  controls on exports of conventional weapons.

COST Action A25, Final Conference on Armed
Violence, 17-19 March, Brussels
12
Consequences of Armed Violence

• Conclusions
• Further cutbacks in defence production.
• Increased costs in social assistance allowances,
  and benefits and retraining for the unemployed.
• Decrease of tax revenues and municipal budget
  revenues.
• Growth of company liabilities to suppliers,
  banks, the state budget, social security funds,
  etc.
• The problem with the Europeanization of the
  CEECs defence producers cannot be avoided any
  longer.
• Increased export control must be combined with
  concrete actions aimed at company restructuring
  both on the part of the state and the producers,
  which in many cases is not possible without
  international help.
• Preserved big production capacities and big
  surpluses create preconditions for export.

COST Action A25, Final Conference on Armed
Violence, 17-19 March, Brussels
13
Consequences of Armed Violence

• Recommendations
• Prioritize procurement contracts that include
  offset agreements involving SALW producers.
• participation in transnational co-operation in
  defence production within the EU as well as with
  other developed countries or international
  companies.
• Create incentives for the shift from SALW mass
  production towards civilian output,
• Develop alternative employment programs for
  workers laid off by large SALW producing
  companies,

COST Action A25, Final Conference on Armed
Violence, 17-19 March, Brussels
14
Consequences of Armed Violence

• Recommendations Cont.
• Set up government-supported programs for
  production restructuring and reorientation from
  SALW to modern arms systems and equipment.
• Purposeful measures, directed toward concrete
  production sites and research institutes.
• Special programs at European level, providing
  fast solution of the surplus SALW at least in
  European countries
• Increase research and development (RD) spending,
  particularly in non-SALW areas.

COST Action A25, Final Conference on Armed
Violence, 17-19 March, Brussels
15
Consequences of Armed Violence

• Thank you
• for your attention

COST Action A25, Final Conference on Armed
Violence, 17-19 March, Brussels