The Cold War at its Height, 1953-1963

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The Cold War at its Height, 1953-1963
Young Kent International Relations since 1945
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The paradox of a thaw and a Cold War
Intensification after Stalin

• Improved Soviet-American relations thaw?
• - the importance of avoiding Hot War
• - Molotovs peace offensive
• - Khrushchevs reformist ambition and rise to
  domestic pre- eminence
• - Khrushchevs commitment to peaceful
  co-existence
• - disarmament proposals and diplomacy
• Cold War intensification
• - spies, psy-war, covert ops and propaganda
• - growing Soviet interest in the non-European
  world
• - the strengthening of the blocs

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Tensions over the future of Germany before the
East German revolt

• The dangers and opportunities of unification
• - harnessing united Germanys economic and
  military strength
• - less control through better integration in
  the Soviet Eastern zone
• - more control through better integration in
  the American Western zones
• Soviet fears
• - German revanchism
• - West German acquisition of nuclear weapons
• - the creation of a West European Defence
  Community with a rearmed West Germany
• Soviet aims
• - demilitarization
• - unity only through a provisional government
  before elections
• - preventing the ratification of the EDC
• US fears
• - negotiations bringing divisions in the
  alliance and
• - the strengthening of communism in a united
  Germany
• Western aims
• - strengthening West Germany
• - West German rearmament
• - the Eden plan to allow a united Germany to
  take over W Germanys alliance commitments

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Instability in the Soviet bloc the East German
Revolt 1953

• The East German challenge
• - to reduce the attractiveness of the Berlin
  gateway to the West
• - to make East Germany more controllable
  through rigid economic discipline
• The intensified collectivization
• The Soviet East German challenge
• - to make communism a more successful movement
  by displaying its alleged achievements
• - to make East Germany more attractive through
  reducing controls
• The liberalization proposals from Beria
• The 1953 revolt
• - more extensive than first believed
• Consequences
• - greater Soviet incentive to consolidate and
  formalize the division of Germany
• - slowing of the pace of change in East Germany

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Instability in the Soviet bloc the initial
Hungarian Revolt 1956

• Nagys reforms
• - against concentration on heavy industry
• - release of some political prisoners
• - led to replacement by Rakosi
• Workers wanted factory committees not control
  through Communist party
• Protests wide ranging
• - resentment at Moscow control
• - student demo in Budapest 23 October spreads
  to other areas
• Soviet troops arrive 24 October after Nagy appeal
  to demonstrators
• As armed resistance grows 25 October Mikoyan and
  Suslov call for political solution
• 28 October Soviet withdrawal of troops from
  Budapest

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The revolts bloody conclusion in Hungary

• Domestic opposition to withdrawal in Moscow
• - Soviet bloc cohesion and the forms of control
• - personalities in the Kremlin
• - ideological competition with the West and
  anti-colonial opportunities
• New international developments
• - Israeli invasion of Egypt 29 October
• - British bombing of Egypt 31 October
• - US announcement of non-intervention in the
  affairs of other countries
• Soviet fear of losing out in Europe and the
  Middle East influencing Moscows troop
  redeployment in Hungary
• - no confidence in Egyptian resistance
• Hungarian decision to withdraw from Warsaw Pact I
  November AFTER Soviet forces redeployed around
  Budapest

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Early postStalin peace efforts and arms control

• Soviet proposals
• - Malenkovs 1953 call for an international
  body to supervise comprehensive disarmament
  after the creation of the UN Disarmament
  Commission in 1951
• - no first use agreement, 1954
• The American response
• - 5 point plan Anglo-American plan for arms
  reduction
• - Eisenhowers Chance for Peace speech, April
  1953
• - Dulles and European neutral zones
• - Eisenhowers Atoms for Peace speech,
  December 1953
• Genuineness of the Soviet and American plans
• - links to Cold War liberation
• US views on the role of talks and the Disarmament
  Dilemma

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Improved Soviet-American relations in 1955

• The Post New Look position
• - disarmament and the ending of the Cold War
  cause or consequence for the future of U S Cold
  War policy
• - Soviet disarmament priorities
• - Soviet acceptance of on-site inspections
• 1955 Geneva Summit and the Austrian peace treaty
• Eisenhowers Open Skies speech July 1955 and
  the reactions in Washington and Moscow
• Malenkov, Khrushchev and peaceful co-existence
• The situation by the end of 1956
• - success or failure for peace progress

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American fighting of the Cold War through new
Hot War strategies

• Defining the New Look strategy autumn 1953
• - the deterrent value of thermo-nuclear weapons
• - the cost benefits
• - the covert operations Cold War emphasis of
  the New Look
• - the importance of allies in the New Look
• Sputnik 1957
• - US hysteria after the launch
• - its value to the Soviet Union
• The Gaither Committee
• - the hydrogen bomb and civil defence
• - Curtis Le May and nuclear weapons
• Eisenhower and the bomber and missile gaps
• - The rationale for Cold War and Hot War
  strategy

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The 1958 Berlin Crisis

• Importance of Berlin
• - important enough for US to risk general war
• - centre of western offensive Cold War measures
• - tunnel for eavesdropping
• Soviet concerns over Berlin in the 1950s
• - western subversion
• - the flow of refugees to the West
• - the construction of West German nuclear
  storage facilities and West German bomber units
  becoming nuclear capable
• US concerns
• - maintaining access through East Germany
• - no practical conventional defence for Berlin
  in Hot War
• Soviet aims
• - enhancing East Germanys position by changing
  Berlins position in Germany
• - preventing domestic hard line opponents of
  peaceful co-existence benefiting from any
  apparent weakness in Germany and Berlin
• -preventing West German economic or military
  pre-eminence affecting Berlin
• Soviet attempts to achieve them November 1958
• - transferring Soviet occupation rights to East
  Germany
• - demanding Berlin become a free city in 6
  months or East Germany should be given full
  sovereignty over the city

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The 1961 Berlin Crisis

• Expiring of Soviet ultimatum 1959
• - Eisenhower and Macmillan summit and CFM
  suggestions
• - Khrushchev waiting to exploit the new Kennedy
  administration
• Pressure from Ulbricht to solve the growing
  exodus problem
• - by making Berlin a free city
• - by formalizing the division of Germany in a 4
  power treaty
• - by giving East Germany control of the access
  routes
• Khrushchevs ultimatums
• - a separate peace with East Germany if no
  solution
• - Vienna meeting with Kennedy 1961-
  intimidation tactic
• American determination to preserve the status quo
• - attitudes of De Gaulle and Macmillan and fear
  of war
• - vital to preserve Western sector
• - preventing any change in Berlin affecting the
  Cold War balance in ways appearing beneficial to
  the Soviets
• The growing crisis
• - US conventional arms build up
• - Soviet defence budget increases
• - Shelepins offensive proposals
• - the defensive solution with the building of
  the wall

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Fighting the Cold War the US Offensive
Strategies

• Criticism of NSC 68 in 1953
• - no disintegration of Soviet power
• - no transformation of Soviet ideology and
  diplomacy
• - no psychological war plan to overthrow the
  Soviet regime
• Operation Solarium defines the Cold War/Hot War
  options and the choices of means of realizing
  them in June 1953
• -Teams A and C and the choices of fighting the
  Cold War
• -Team B and the nuclear issue
• Solarium Team A
• - the aim of East European rollback but a
  willingness to accept the means of peaceful
  co-existence in the interim
• Solarium Team C
• - the aim of destroying the Soviet Union and
  the rejection of medium term peaceful
  co- existence
• US doubts over an offensive Cold War strategy and
  its modification
• - NSC 162
• - aim of getting arrangements in accordance
  with US interests
• - NSC 5501
• Tensions and contradictions between subversion
  and peaceful coexistence in the Cold War

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Stability in the Western bloc European unity

• The failure of EDC
• The Western European Union
• - German rearmament and NATO
• - Britains European military role
• The Messina Conference and the European Economic
  Community
• - different European approaches to closer
  economic integration
• - The Spaak Committee
• The British rejection of a Common Market
• - EFTA and the Commonwealth
• US policy to European nuclear co-operation
• - the MLF idea
• - Britains independent deterrent
• - Grand Designs

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Offensive Cold War Chinese strategies the first
Offshore Island crisis

• Chinas position in the communist world
• The Formosa problem
• - sovereignty
• - Beijings quest for status
• US relations with Formosa
• Maos aims in the First Offshore Island Crisis
• -in shelling Jinmen Sept ember1954
• -in attacking Dachen January 1955
• US response and the divisions in Washington
• - use of force
• - role of tactical nuclear weapons
• Chinese relations with Moscow

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Offensive Cold War Chinese strategies the 2nd
Offshore Is Crisis

• Maos aims in the Second Offshore Island Crisis
  August 1958
• -changes in Chinese foreign policy 1957
• - policy to the US
• - policy to the Soviet Union and dislike of
  peaceful coexistence
• US reactions
• - the dilemma of needing to assist Chiang while
  restraining him
• - the ambiguous nature of US military
  commitments
• Stalemate and compromise autumn 1958
• Consequences
• Effect on the Sino-Soviet split
• - the nature of military force and strategy
  (Hot War) in the Cold War as seen in Beijing and
  Moscow

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Offensive Cold War Soviet strategies and the
Missile Crisis

• Explanations for Khrushchevs decision to install
  the missiles April1962
• - Khrushchevs penchant for brinkmanship and
  risk taking
• - to protect Castro from American aggression
  and assassination
• - to create the impression of reducing the
  Soviet nuclear disadvantage
• - to appease domestic critics
• - Khrushchevs perceptions of Kennedy as a weak
  president
• US reactions to the discovery of the missiles in
  October 1962
• - nature of the Executive Committee
• - the initial reactions and support for an air
  strike
• - Kennedy, McNamara and quarantine
• - the Soviet letters and Robert Kennedys role
• - Khrushchevs retreat and the secret Jupiter
  deal
• Consequences for the Cold War
• -increased need to reduce the risk of Hot War
  and the renewed peaceful co- existence commitment
• - more disarmament pressures
• - protection of Cuba