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Markowitz theory separates the identification of the 'objective' assets' risk ... No penalization for exposure size. Adopts VaR as a risk measure encouraging cheating. ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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1
RISK AND REGULATION GIORGIO SZEGÖ University of
Rome La Sapienza and Università della Svizzera
Italiana, Lugano International Workshop on Risk
and Regulation Collegium Budapest Budapest,
Sept. 11-13, 2003
2
CONTENTS
  • RISK DEFINITION, MEASURES AND EVOLUTION
  • REGULATION, MOTIVATIONS AND FASHIONS
  • PROPOSALS



3
RISK DEFINITION, MEASURES AND EVOLUTIONWHAT IS
RISK?
  • Objective, or subjective?
  • Is it connected with an (economic) decision. See
    Arrow (Theory of Risk Bearing)
  • Is it unavoidable (actuarial risk)?
  • Markowitz theory separates the identification of
    the objective assets risk levels from the
    construction of the subjective utility
    function.
  • Does subjective attitude toward risk affect the
    identification of the assets risk levels? Are
    spectral measures the answer?

4
Qualitative properties of risk
  • Uncertainty?
  • Probability of loss or of undesirable events?
  • These events can either be predictable or
  • unpredictable, can be diversifiable and/or
  • controllable, they can also be extreme.

5
REGULATORY RISK CLASSIFICATIONS
  • By impact.
  • limited,
  • systemic i.e. affecting all parties.
  • systemic by contagion.
  • By cathegory
  • market risk,
  • counterparty (credit) risk,
  • operational risk.
  • By source
  • concentration,
  • political,
  • exchange,
  • legal,
  • fiscal, etc.

6
Finance the 3 revolutions.
  • 1952-56 Mean-Variance
  • 1969-73 Continuous-time models
  • 1999-03 Risk measures

7
WHAT IS A MEASURE?
  • Hopefully a non-negative real number!
  • FOR INSTANCE, DISTANCES BETWEEN POINTS.
  • The distance between any two points is 0 if and
    only if they coincide.
  • The distance between any two points does not
    depends on their order.
  • Given three points, the distance between any pair
    cannot be larger than the sum of the distances
    between the other two.
  • To try to measure distances without these
    restrictions is equivalent to measuring distances
    with a rubber band!

8
MANY FUNCTIONS ARE OK!
  • Different functions can be used to measure
    distances
  • In the space of ordered n-tuples of numbers
  • ?o(x,y) max ?o(x,y)?yk - xk 1 ? k ? n
  • as well as
  • ?(x,y) ?? (yk xk)2½ (Euclidean distance)
  • can measure the distance between any two points.
  • CHOOSE THE ONE YOU LIKE MOST. THEY BOTH PERFORM
    THE DESIRED TASK!

9
HOW TO BE A GOOD RISK MEASURE
  • Risk measures associate to any multivariate
    distribution F a nonnegative real number.
  • The functional F ? R must be restricted,
    like in the case of distances, utility functions
    or dynamical systems!
  • In order to be a risk measure a functional F
    be coherent i.e. satisfy the following four
    conditions.

10
RISK MEASURES
  • For all random variables X, Y ? F, a risk
    measure
  • ? F ? R must satisfy four conditions
  • Positive homogeneity ?(?X) ? ??(X) for all
    positive real numbers ?.
  • Subadditivity ?(X Y) ? ?(X) ?(Y).
  • It can be proved that any positively
    homogeneous functional ?, is subadditive if and
    only if it is convex.
  • Monotonicity X ? Y implies ?(X) ? ?(Y),
  • Transitional invariance ?(X ?r0) ? ?(X) - ?
    for all real numbers ?, and risk free rates r0.


11
WHAT DO YOU WANT FROM A RISK MEASURE?
  • FIRST COHERENCE AND REPEATIBILITY
  • WITHIN THE SAME MEASURE! OK. DONE!
  • CHOOSE YOUR OWN COHERENT MEASURE
  • SECOND POSSIBILITY OF COMPARING RESULTS
    OBTAINED FROM DIFFERENT MEASURES NO WAY!.
  • The only result is that a riskless event has
    a zero risk level for all possible risk
    measures.
  • REGULATORY PROBLEMSjust too bad.


12
HOW RISK HAS BEEN MEASURED
  • Expected returns adjusted to risk level.
  • In 1952 Markowitz introduced multivariate
    distributions in finance, and showed that
    diversification decreases risk level.
  • Risk (uncertainty) is measured via variance.
  • Dependence is measured via (linear) correlation.
  • 1994 The VaRmania.
  • 1999 Introduction of proper Risk Measures

13
WHEN CAN LINEAR CORRELATION BE USED?
  • Only if the joint distributions are elliptic,
    i.e. if their equi-density surfaces are
    ellipsoids, like in the case of normal
    distributions or of t-distributions with finite
    variance.
  • Symmetric distributions may not be elliptic. Most
    distributions of credit and high yield assets are
    not even symmetric.

14
LINEAR CORRELATION FOR NON-ELLIPTIC DISTRIBUTIONS
  • The linear correlation coefficient, if used in
    the case of non-elliptic distributions, may lead
    to incorrect results.
  • The concept of incorrect must however be
    specified, since it requires an agreement on a
    correct co-dependence measure.
  • In absence of such a measure one can compare
    numerical results achieved via simulations.
  • Simulations show that a variance-covariance model
    for non-elliptic distributions severely
    underestimates potential losses.

15
LINEAR CORRELATION MAY NOT EXPLAIN CO-DEPENDENCE!
  • Comparing two different distributions (one normal
    and one Gumbel) with the same linear correlation
    coefficient, in the vast majority of cases the
    two results agree. Most of the points of
    disagreement lay in the upper right corner of the
    distribution, corresponding to extreme losses.
  • It may not be always possible to measure
    co-dependence by a nonnegative real number!
  • SourceEmbrechts, McNeil, and Straumann, 1999

16
ENTER VALUE AT RISK
  • In 1994 the concept of Value at Risk, VaR, was
    introduced with drums and cymbals with the
    precise task of answering to the following very
    relevant and precise questions
  • How much one can expect to lose in on day, week,
    year,with a given probability?
  • What is the percentage of the value of the
    investment that is at risk?
  • Regulators fell in love with this easy-to-grasp
    concept and started misusing il!
  • Ref. J.P. Morgan, 1994, see also Phelan, 1995.

17
DEFINITION OF VAR
  • VaRk is the k-percentile of the loss
    distribution, i.e. it is the smallest value such
    that the probability that loss exceeds or equals
    this value is bigger or equal to k, 0ltklt1. Thus
    VaRk is the maximum loss in a specified period
    with confidence level k.
  • Formally
  • VaRk ? F-1X(k)
  • F-1X is the inverse of the distribution
    function FX.
  • The distribution function FX is often
    referred to as the Profit and Loss distribution
    function.

18
VAR MAY NOT EXIST!
  • While VaR sounds like a great idea, when the
    distribution is multimodal, for some values of
    k,VaRk is not even defined. Indeed in this case
    the inverse of FX(k) does not exist and the
    inverse image of FX(k) is not even connected!
  • In order to overcome this difficulty, VaR is
    defined as the lowest number belonging to the set
    F-1X(k), or as the k-quantile of the generalized
    inverse of FX, i.e.
  • VaRk inf xFX(x)? k
  • Keeping this caveat in mind, VaR could be used,
    albeit only in the case of the original question.
    The computational difficulties are not
    irrelevant.

19
VAR IS NOT A RISK MEASURE
  • VaR is not subadditive, i.e. it is not true that
  • VaRk(P1 P2 ) ? VaRk (P1 ) VaRk (P2)
  • This is like measuring distances with a rubber
    band!
  • VaRk discourages diversification! This is like
    saying that a large bank is more risky than two
    smaller banks holding he same assets. The hell
    with portfolio risk reduction!
  • Only when the joint distribution of returns is
    elliptic VaR is a risk measure. In this case a
    VaR-minimising portfolio the coincides with
    variance-minimising portfolio.
  • Thus VaRk, that was introduced with the aim of
    measuring risk for weird distributions, can then
    be used only when the computationally simpler
    variance can be used.


20
ENTHUSIASTIC ACCEPTANCE OF NEW RESULTSNO, GUT
REFUSALS
  • resistance to innovation from a good part of the
    academic establishment, and from the conservative
    regulatory groups complete defence of the
    cultural investment in obsolete and methods that
    proved to be wrong!
  • refusal even to be informed.
  • The supervisory groups of central banks
    isolate themselves from the research and
    statistical department of the same institution!


21
REGULATION, MOTIVATIONS AND FASHIONSWhy must
banks be regulated?
  • WHO? WHAT?Which intermediaries and markets
    should be controlled.
  • WHY?Motivations of regulation, i.e. a
    market-constraining public intervantion
  • HOW?How to control.
  • COSTS-BENFITS of regulatory intervantions.

22
WHY AN AD-HOC REGULATION?
  • Public Interest
  • and subordinate to that
  • Market inefficiency and consequent
  • lack of self-discipline
  • Insufficient protection from the core
  • of law.

23
PUBLIC INTEREST
  • Economic Interest
  • Can be measured by the costs associated with the
    lack of an efficient regulation and supervision,
    and by the consequent disruption of the
    activities of the subject
  • Ethical Interest
  • Protection of the weaker part of the users of
    financial services (the widows and the orphans)

24
AIMS OF FINANCIAL REGULATION
  • DAMAGE PREVENTION and/or CONTAINMENT
  • guaranty the economic functions
  • consumer protection
  • systemic risk control
  • guaranty market efficiency, fairness,
    transparency
  • containment of possible direct government losses

25
Regulatory Options
  • Structural
  • Institutional
  • Functional
  • Institutional-functional
  • Prudential, SEIR (Early Intervention and
    Resolution)
  • Market-enhancing.

26
Why prudential regulation?
  • Until the late 80 banks were controlled by
    structural regulation,
  •     advances in telecommunications,
  •     the introduction of derivatives,
  • regulatory and fiscal arbitrage,
  • forced its dismissal in favour of prudential
    regulation, aimed at
  •     enhancing internal controls,
  •     establishing an early warning system,
  •     reducing taxpayer costs in case of default.
  • It was implemented via capital requirements (1987
    UK-USA
  • Capital accord, 1988 Basle accord, signed by 12
    countries,
  • Group of 10 plus Luxembourg Switzerland)
  •  

27
1988 Capital Harmonization Accord.
  • YOU MUST SATISFY THE FOLLOWING RISK-ADJUSTED
    CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS (NO DEFINITION OF RISK
    PROVIDED)
  • (Own Funds)/(0.0 Sovreigns 0.2 Interbank 0.5
    Mortgages 1.0 Loans) gt 8
  •  
  • Own Funds Equity (Tier 1) Subordinated Debt
    (Tier 2)
  • Equity gt Subordinated Debt
  • EC Directives 89/299 and 89/647
  • FDICIA 1992

28
Why to Control Capital Level?(In spite of MM)
  • Banks are informationally segregated,
  • thus
  • They are not exposed to market-discipline
  • through the increase of the cost of debt with
    the degree of leverage
  • No reason for risk-adjusted!

29
Have Capital Requirements been Effective?
  • No
  • not always good indicators of financial
    conditions
  • Swedish banks before the fall in 1992, 9.3
  • Bank of Naples, 1994, 9.98
  • Very Inaccurate
  • Basel 5.304 5.304
    5.304
  • Credit Metric 2.264 11.336
    2.941
  • Very High Cost of Compliance

30
Why to change?
  • Official Critiques 1998-99 also from the
    Committee.
  • No incentives for risk mitigation
  • Disregard of maturity of claims
  • Unwanted Consequences (We warned you!!!!)
  • Excessive cost of credit to small business
  • Increase in overall risk (Blum, JBF, 23, 1999)
  • Regulatory arbitrages (Jones, JBF, 24, 2000)
  • Inefficient cap allocation (BHS, JBF, 19, 1995)
  • Credit crunch (Basel, WP N1, April 1999)
  • Signal distortion in equity issues (Szego, 1993)

31
Revision Process, alias a Path to Hell
  • 1998, September, Framework for Internal Control
    System in Banking Organization
  • 2001, January, The New Basel Capital Accord,
    Consultative Paper.
  • 2003, The New Basel Capital Accord Consultative
    Paper, Comments due by July 2003
  • What happened from 98 to 01? Lobbying!

32
Framework for Internal Control System in Banking
Organization, 1998
  • Safe and sound bank management is based on an
    efficient internal control system and on
  • Management oversight and control culture
  • Risk recognition and assessment
  • Control activities and segregation of duties
  • Information and communication
  • Monitoring activities, correcting deficiencies
  • Evaluation of internal control systems by
    supervisory authorities

33
The proposal of 2001 is based on three pillows
(sorry, pillars)
  • Minimal capital requirements 79.999
  • Market discipline 15
  • Prudential supervision 5
  • and..
  • Staff qualification
    0.001

34
Whats new in basel 2?
  • Good rating allows a discount on capital req.
  • Internal rating procedures are allowed, if
    validated by supervisory authorities within a
    precise (wrong) framework.
  • Concepts like DP and LGD play a major role.
  • Risk must be measured by VaR
  • Operational i.e. the risk of direct or indirect
    loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal
    processes, people and systems or from external
    events is taken into account.

35
Dire effects of Basel II
  • NO (very small) diversification bonus.
  • NO maturity accounting
  • NO control of bank size
  • No penalization for exposure size
  • Adopts VaR as a risk measure encouraging
    cheating.
  • Enhances systemic risk by uniformizing behavours
  • Requires very long data time series
  • Favours large banks
  • Memo the largest bank losses are due to loan
    concentration!!

36
NEW PROPOSALS
  • Advanced and more efficient market-discipline-enha
    ncing methods, like
  • secondary market of loans
  • continuous issues of subordinated debts
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