PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS

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PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS THREATS OF
TERRORISMHOW GRAVE IS THE DANGER?
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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• INTRODUCTION
• THE ISSUE
• NUCLEAR TERRORISM
• DEFINING THE THREAT
• THREAT SCENARIOS
• CONCERNS OVER NUCLEAR SECURITY
• HOW DOES PAKISTAN LOOK AT THE ISSUE
• GROUND REALITIES
• CONCLUSION

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Potential for nuclear/radiological terrorism
  rises from inter-related factors global
  terrorism which does not recognize any
  boundaries, regional tensions and non-resolution
  of core disputes, hegemonic policies and
  threatening sovereignty of smaller countries,
  growth of nuclear arsenal and induction of new
  weapons.

• Dangers emerge from terrorists acquisition of
  nuclear weapons or sabotage thereof, dirty bombs,
  RDDs, and radiation hazards caused by
  sabotage/attack on a nuclear facility or a
  transport vehicle.

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Two prong strategy needed fighting
  terrorism/extremism and securing nuclear weapons,
  material and other radiation sources.

• Some steps are-

• Revitalizing existing multilateral mechanism,
  regimes and treaties for their contribution to
  prevent terrorist activities.
• Creating comprehensive legal framework and
  national and international measures to control,
  and account for all sensitive materials,
  particularly the loosely controlled fissile
  material in certain countries.
• Enhancing capacity of states to implement their
  treaty obligations.

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• A large information gap and general lack of
  official communication about the Pakistan nuclear
  program had led to a snowballing effect of worry
  about the issues of safety and security of
  Pakistans nuclear facilities, technology, and
  materials
• Director General Pakistans Strategic Plans
  Division

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM
Defining the Threat

• 438 NPPs, 250 nuclear fuel cycle plants, more
  than 10,000 teletherapy sources, several tons of
  thousands industrial radiography sources 1855
  metric tons of plutonium (1700 tons in civil
  stocks 155 tons in military), 1900 tons of HEU
  (175 tons in civil and 1725 tons military)
  enough for 100,000 nuclear weapons.

• More than 130 research reactors still use HEU.
  Most of these facilities have a very modest
  security in many cases, no more than a night
  watchman and a chain link fence.

• Pakistan possesses 0.884 out the total world
  stock of 3870 tones.

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Potential Threats Emerge From

• Acquisition of nuclear weapons by theft
• Creation of nuclear explosive device using stolen
  nuc material
• Use of radiological sources in RDD
• Attack/sabotage against nuclear facility or
  transport vehicle

• Harvard Universitys Project on Managing the Atom
  reports Nuclear attack would be among the most
  difficult types of attacks for terrorists to
  accomplish.

• Steve Coll suggests, The available evidence,
  then, suggests that while jihadi leaders might
  like to acquire a proper fission weapon, their
  pragmatic plans seem to run to dirty bombs a
  more plausible ambition

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM
Defining the Threat

• Significant security lapses have occurred in many
  nuclear weapons programs.

• There are unconfirmed reports of small, fully
  built Russian nuclear weapons going missing.

In 1996, the Russian General Alexander Lebed
claimed that 40 of these so called suitcase
weapons were unaccounted for.
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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Defining the Threat

• Reports of theft and unauthorized removal of
  radioactive materials in other countries as well.
  In some cases the material involved highly radio
  active isotopes.

• Although Pakistan has put in place effective
  remedies to prevent recurrence of past
  malpractice, no nation can be satisfied as
  improvement is a continuous phenomenon. Reports
  of safety and security failures in many developed
  countries emphasize the need for constant
  improvement.

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM
Threat Scenarios

• Improvement in technology and globalization have
  widened security parameters, threats and
  corresponding approach to deal with todays
  realities.

• DG IAEA stated, In the 20th Century, the advent
  of airplanes, submarines, ballistic missiles and
  weapons of mass destruction began to undermine
  this approach to security by making borders
  increasingly porous and by enabling the remote
  delivery of destruction on a scale previously not
  envisioned.

• Potential nuclear terrorism threat can be shaped
  into any possible scenario including its use
  within or out side Pakistan.

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Threat Scenarios
• Manifestation of threat scenario would involve-

• Outsider threat
• Insider threat
• Insider/outsider threat

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Concerns Over Nuclear Security of Pakistan

• Theft of nuclear weapon or weapon-grade material
• Vulnerability during war time, movement, and
  deployment
• Control by extremist elements
• Worries that experts from the nuclear complex
  could steal sensitive information or assist
  programs of other countries or terrorist groups.
• Sabotage on nuclear facility or NPPs
• Accidental or unauthorized launch

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• How does Pakistan Look at the Issue

• Reasons leading to suspicions are-

• Legacy of A.Q Khans proliferation network
• Proximity to region where Al Qaeda and Taliban
  remnant are located
• Conservatism in some segments of society

• Instances of illicit trafficking of nuclear
  material and loss of control over nuclear assets
  in other countries should not be made the basis
  to raise suspicions over Pakistans nuclear
  safety and security

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• How does Pakistan Look at the Issue

• Disregard to Pakistans security concerns

• Technology denial regimes

The United States failed to prevent Pakistan
from building nuclear weapons because US
officials never fully grasped Pakistans
perception of its security situation relative to
India, especially after the 1971 Bangladesh
War Feroz Hassan Khan, Naval Post Graduate School
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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• How does Pakistan Look at the Issue

• Strategizing preemptive or preventive use of
  force against nuclear facilities/weapons has
  potentially dangerous consequences for security,
  stability, and peace.

Although such responses appear possible in
theory, their implementation could be extremely
difficult and dangerous David Albright

• Pretext of non-state actors for preemption or
  prevention undermines state sovereignty and
  violates Article 51 of the UN Charter.

This reversion to realpolitik combined with the
threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapon
terrorism, continued regional instability and the
existence of revisionist powers in various
security complexes increases the potential for
instability the world over
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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Ground Realities

• Renewed strategic partnership with US and
  frontline role in the global war against
  terrorism elevate dangers to sensitive materials

• The geo-political environment and maintenance of
  strategic stability present other challenges

• No reported case of security failure subsequent
  of the AQ Khans case.

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Ground Realities

• Theft of Nuclear Weapon or Fissile Material

• States closely guard their nuclear assets.

• Smaller size of nuclear assets decreases the
  chances of theft vis-à-vis a larger stockpile.

• Road blocks for fabricating a nuclear device-

• Relevant knowledge and expertise
• Requisite equipment and material
• A huge engineering and industrial structure
• States security apparatus
• Manufacturing a suitable delivery mechanism
• Diagnostic and test facilities

• Pakistans strategic organizations are in the
  public sector.

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Ground Realities

• Theft of Nuclear Weapon or Fissile Material

• To prevent theft nuclear facilities employ a
  range of protection measures.

• Pakistan is a state party to CPPNM, CNS, has
  elaborate legal framework to ensure
  implementation of UNSCR-1540

• All safeguarded facilities regularly inspected by
  IAEA experts

• Separate storage of nuclear and non-nuclear
  components would greatly complicate seizure of
  intact device

Fissile material components (pits) are thought
to be kept separately from the rest of the
warhead. Such a physical separation helps deter
unauthorized use and complicates theft CRS
Report on Nuclear Threat Reduction for India and
Pakistan February 2005
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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Ground Realities

• Vulnerability during Movement and Deployment

• Security during peace time at its best.

• Level of security procedurally rises during
  crisis and war like situations implied dangers
  also get pronounced.

• Both India and Pakistan lack real time warning
  and surveillance capabilities. This raises the
  chances for faulty or imperfect decisions.

• Geographical contiguity place the two countries
  into an awkward state.

• During crisis force deployment becomes necessary
  not for offensive intent but for just-in-case
  probabilities.

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Ground Realities

• Vulnerability during Movement and War Time
  Deployment

• For regional stability India and Pakistan should
  establish a regime of restraint, crisis
  management, and risk reduction.

• Pakistan has initiated a Composite Dialogue
  Process with India. This process needs expansion
  to bring in more transparency and confidence.

• Adequate measures are taken by the strategic
  forces for defense against ground and aerial
  threats.

• Pakistan has incorporated technical safety
  features into weapon designs to ensure safety and
  security during peace, movement/deployment and
  crisis conditions.

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Ground Realities

• Accidental/Unauthorized Launch

• Given the absence of a comprehensive crisis
  management system between India and Pakistan,
  accidental or unauthorized launch can result in
  imperfect decision.

• This is a matter of nuclear safety, as well as
  physical security to ensure positive control.

• Pakistan nuclear weapons are in de-mated status
  technical design features supplement safety
  against accidental/unauthorized launch.

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Ground Realities

• Accidental/Unauthorized Launch

Pakistani nuclear controls include some
functional equivalent to the two-men rule and
Permissive Action Links that the US and some
other nuclear weapon states rely on to protect
against loss of control, inadvertent weapon use,
accidents, and other mishaps Director General
Pakistans Strategic Plans Division

• Both India and Pakistan face nuclear command and
  control challenges somewhat similar to US and FSU
  during early decades of Cold War.

• Security set up arranged since the beginning has
  been reinforced since 1998 nuclear tests.

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Ground Realities

• Theft of Nuclear Material and Radiological
  Sources

• The level of security at nuclear facilities
  containing sensitive material is believed to be
  high, security of industrial radiation sources,
  medical, agriculture, engineering etc is
  comparatively weak in many countries.

• PNRA controls, regulates, and supervises all
  matters related to nuclear safety and radiation
  protection in Pakistan.

• All the radioactive sources are under strict
  regulatory control right from import until their
  disposal.

• Security ensured through periodic physical
  verification and regulatory inspections.

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Ground Realities

• Theft of Nuclear Material and Radiological
  Sources

• PNRA has initiated a five year Nuclear Security
  Action Plan
• The plan aims at establishing a more robust
  nuclear security regime. Seeks capacity building
  to plan for, respond to, and recover from
  terrorists incidents. Main features are-

• Management of radioactive sources in category 1,
  2 and 3, and evaluation of vulnerable facilities
  and supporting their efforts
• Establish Nuclear Safety/Security Center
• Establish National Nuclear Security Emergency
  Coordination Center
• Locating and securing orphan radioactive sources
• Provision of detection equipment at strategic
  points

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Ground Realities

• Instability, Religious Extremism and Coup

• The fear of Islamist threat has influenced most
  Western countries foreign policies towards
  Pakistan.

• Analogy based on conservatism in some segment of
  the society and presence of Taliban sympathizers
  in remote areas of NWFP/North South Waziristan.

• Overwhelming majority of Pakistani society
  consists of moderates.

• Religious parties are politically oriented and
  there is no rhetoric for Islamic bomb.

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Ground Realities

• Instability, Religious Extremism and Coup

No one elses bomb is called Hindu, Jewish,
Christian, capitalist, or communist, yet somehow
our bomb becomes Islamic, as if that makes it
illegitimate. The idea is illogical and
essentially racist. This is an example of how
Muslims continually feel unjustly singled out and
alienated President Pervez Musharrafs
Memoir, In the Line of Fire
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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Ground Realities

• Instability, Religious Extremism and Coup

• Religious parties electoral support historically
  varied between 5-8, trailing far behind other
  parties.

• Security of Pakistans nuclear installations or
  its nuclear command and control mechanism has
  never been in jeopardy from internal political
  instability or Islamists or terrorists forces
  inside Pakistan.

• Thus far no report of theft involving nuclear
  material neither any attempt by
  extremist/terrorist group to gain access to
  sensitive materials in Pakistan

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Ground Realities

• Instability, Religious Extremism and Coup

• Scott Parrish William C. Potter of the WMD
  Commission say, As a result, while many states
  may view Islamic fundamentalism as a significant
  threat, there appears to be much less agreement
  on the nature of that threat and its relationship
  to nuclear terrorism or proliferation

• Frightening thinking that extremists in military
  will stage a coup and seize control, is an
  overstretch.

• An institutional mechanism exists to control all
  strategic assets irrespective of whosoever is in
  power.

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Ground Realities

• Sabotage and Concern Over Proliferation by
  Nuclear Establishment

• Sabotage and proliferation relate to reliability
  and trustworthiness of scientists, technicians,
  and others who work in nuclear establishment.

• Creation of NCA, PNRA, Security Division,
  Strategic Force Command, promulgation of laws,
  setting up a system of monitoring, supervision
  and auditing are some of the steps to meet
  potential challenges.

• Not a single case of leakage of nuclear material,
  components or technology has come up since the
  creation of NCA.

• Most recently the government has approved
  creation of Strategic Export Control Division.

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Ground Realities

• Sabotage and Concern Over Proliferation by
  Nuclear Establishment

• PRP cover periodic security clearance,
  screening, recruitment, training of security
  personnel etc.

• All Civil NPPs under facility specific IAEA
  safeguards.

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Priority Areas for Pakistan-US Cooperation

• Assistance in expanding PRP.

• Strengthen institutional capacity for crisis
  management and consequence management.

• For regional stability India and Pakistan should
  evolve a strategic restraint regime covering both
  nuclear and conventional forces.

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Priority Areas for Pakistan-US Cooperation

• Carry forward the ongoing Composite Dialogue
  Process

• Establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Center.
• Extend existing agreement on pre-notification of
  ballistic missile testing to cruise missiles.
• An agreement not to produce and deploy tactical
  nuclear weapons.
• Lay out comprehensive procedures for authorized
  use.
• Establish a procedure to deal with false
  warnings.
• Launcher and warhead separation to mutually
  agreed geographical locations.
• Move towards conflict resolution.
• Keep the communication channels open during peace
  as well as crisis situations.

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• Priority Areas for Pakistan-US Cooperation

• At international level negotiating a
  non-discriminatory and universal treaty on
  preventing non-state actors access to WMD and
  components thereof. Alternatively existing
  treaty regime could be strengthened specifically
  against threats of nuclear terrorism.

• There is a need to de-link the issues of nuclear
  safety from nuclear proliferation and redefine
  the non-proliferation regime in a more realistic
  manner.

• Promote twinning between various agencies of the
  two countries.

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SECURITY OF PAKISTANS NUCLEAR ASSETS AND THREATS
OF TERRORISM

• CONCLUSION