Dangerous Dyads - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Loading...

PPT – Dangerous Dyads PowerPoint presentation | free to download - id: 5961e3-OWM1O



Loading


The Adobe Flash plugin is needed to view this content

Get the plugin now

View by Category
About This Presentation
Title:

Dangerous Dyads

Description:

Dangerous Dyads Bargaining in the Shadow of Power I. The Puzzle of Dyadic Interaction A. Why do some pairs of states have dramatically different relationships? – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:558
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 96
Provided by: Jeff1220
Learn more at: http://www2.tamuct.edu
Category:

less

Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Dangerous Dyads


1
Dangerous Dyads
  • Bargaining in the Shadow of Power

2
I. The Puzzle of Dyadic Interaction
  • A. Why do some pairs of states have dramatically
    different relationships?

3
B. Example Six Dyad-Years
  • US-Iraq 1987 US forgives Iraqi attack on USS
    Stark, aids Iraq
  • US-Iran 1987 US destroys Iranian oil platforms,
    ships
  • Iran-Iraq 1987 Bloody war continues

4
B. Example Six Dyad-Years
  • US-Iraq 2003 War
  • US-Iran 2003 No War
  • Iran-Iraq 2003 No War
  • Why the differences? No single state has become
    more or less warlike.but the dyads have!

5
C. Forms of Cooperation
  • Between Cooperation and Conflict Bargaining
  • Formal Bargaining Treaties, etc.
  • Tacit Bargaining Reciprocal Action
  • Arbitration Third-party resolution
  • Mediation Third-party support

6
2. Alliances Only 25 reliable at first glance.
War occurs Allied Not Allied
Intervene, YES 25 2
Intervene, NO 75 98
7
From Leeds, Long, and Mitchell (2000)
8
but examining the fine print reveals a different
story!
9
3. Behavior Convergence
  • Example Mutual Tariff Reduction

10
D. Forms of Conflict
  1. War Standard definition is 1000 battle-deaths
  2. Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) use,
    threat, or display of force

11
(No Transcript)
12
(No Transcript)
13
E. Are Conflict and Cooperation Opposites?
  • 1. The Continuum View

14
2. High-Conflict Events
15
3. High-Cooperation Events
  • Are these mutually exclusive with the conflict
    list?

16
3. Sometimes Conflict and Cooperation Co-Exist
17
II. A Model of Dyadic Interaction
18
A. Political Relevance
Interaction
  • Interaction
  • Ability to communicate
  • Ability to act

19
c. Measures of Interaction
Interaction
  • Contiguity Countries that border each other (or
    narrow body of water)
  • (Countries
  • surrounded by blue are contiguous to Red) ?

20
ii. Major power status
Interaction
  • State-level finding Major powers do more of
    everything conflict and cooperation
  • Result Dyadic effect If at least one dyad
    member is major power, increased levels of
    cooperation and conflict

21
iii. Politically-Relevant International
Environments (PRIE), 1816-2001
Criteria Dyad-Years of Dyad-Years of Wars of MIDs
All Dyads 675,015 100 100 100
Land Contiguity 19,723 2.9 65.9 50.3
Land/Sea Contiguity 32,881 4.9 75.8 63.7
Either is major power 71,770 10.6 51.6 45.8
PRIE (Any of these) 86,393 12.8 94.5 85.2
22
A. Political Relevance
Interaction Salience Issues
  • Issue Salience
  • Priority relative to other concerns
  • Determines amount of power applied
  • Low salience inaction

23
B. What leads to dyadic conflict?
Conflict- Producing Factors
24
1. Opportunity Contiguity and Proximity
Conflict- Producing Factors
25
Proximity Loss of Strength Gradient
Conflict- Producing Factors
Resources that can be applied to a conflict decay
at distance Shift in gradient due to technology
or development
26
2. Dyadic Balance of Power
Conflict- Producing Factors
  • a. Disparity Peace
  • b. Parity War Risk

27
c. Transitions Dangerous?
Conflict- Producing Factors
28
3. Issue Type Territory
Conflict- Producing Factors
29
4. Rivalry Shadow of the Past
Conflict- Producing Factors
  1. Repeated disputes ? Future disputes
  2. Easier for diversionary war

30
c. Question Is rivalry the cause of conflict?
Conflict- Producing Factors
  1. Rivals fight more wars or do states likely to
    fight become rivals?
  2. Repeated crises ? Use of more aggressive
    bargaining strategies
  3. Rivals use more forceful strategies against
    non-rivals!

31
iv. Rivals Learn Over Time
32
5. Arms Races
Conflict- Producing Factors
  1. Rivalry Arms Race Risk of War?
  2. Most arms races difficult to demonstrate

33
Can You Pick Out the 3 Arms Races?
Canada-Mexico
US-USSR
Israel-Syria
Belgium-Netherlands
Australia-NZ
India-Pakistan
34
C. What Leads to Cooperation?
Cooperation- Producing Factors
35
1. Joint Democracy
Cooperation- Producing Factors
  • Effects of Joint Democracy
  • The Democratic Peace Virtually no wars
    between democracies
  • Alleged Exceptions US-UK 1812 (UK not
    democracy), UK-Germany WW1 (Germany not
    democracy), Finland-UK WW2 (no real combat),
    Peru-Ecuador (few casualties), India-Pakistan
    (civilians left out of the loop)
  • Fewer MIDs (1/3 to 2/3 reduction)
  • Shift to covert from overt when force is used
  • MIDs less likely to escalate to higher levels of
    violence
  • Increased reliance on mediation, arbitration
  • Increased common interests (alliances, UN votes,
    IOs, etc)
  • Increased Trade Why should this be?

36
v. Formal Agreements
Cooperation- Producing Factors
37
b. Institutional Explanation
Cooperation- Producing Factors
38
c. Norms Explanation
Cooperation- Producing Factors
39
2. Shared Interests
Cooperation- Producing Factors
  • Power Transition Theory
  • Mutual Satisfaction Peace

Side A Side B Outcome
Satisfied Satisfied Peace
Satisfied Dissatisfied Conflict
Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Peace or Intense Conflict
40
Evidence for Peace Through Shared Interests
Cooperation- Producing Factors
  • Alliance portfolios Similarity generally reduces
    conflict
  • Better predictor than dyadic alliance!
  • UN Votes Similar votes closer economic ties

41
3. Similar Institutions
Cooperation- Producing Factors
  • Even after controlling for democracy / autocracy,
    similar government mechanisms (executive-legislati
    ve relations, etc) increase cooperation / reduce
    conflict.

4. Advanced Economies
  • Joint advanced economies trade, cooperate, ally
    more / fight less with each other than other dyads

42
5. Economic Interdependence
Cooperation- Producing Factors
  • Mutual gains from trade
  • Short explanation Trade is voluntary
  • Absolute and Comparative Advantage

43
Absolute Advantage
USA Colombia
Missiles OR 20 5
Coffee 10 200
Given 100 resources, what can each country
produce?
  • Production possibilities without trade
  • Trade allows specialization. US buys Coffee at lt
    10 resources. Colombia buys Missiles at lt 20
    resources.
  • Example Coffee 1, Missiles 10. US
    trades 5 missiles (50 resources) for 50 coffee
    (50 resources)
  • Result Both sides can achieve levels of
    consumption outside of the original production
    possibilities!

44
Comparative Advantage
USA Britain
Wheat OR 100 20
Cars 10 5
Given 100 resources, what can each country
produce?
  • US has absolute advantage in both goods 5 to 1
    in wheat, 2 to 1 in cars -- so has comparative
    advantage (bigger relative advantage) in wheat
  • UK has comparative advantage (smaller relative
    disadvantage) in cars (½ as productive rather
    than 20 as productive)
  • UK buys wheat at lt 5 resources,
    US buys cars at lt 10 resources
  • Example Wheat 1.5, Cars 9. US sells 24
    wheat (36 resources), buys 4 cars (36 resources)

45
5. Economic Interdependence
Cooperation- Producing Factors
  • Mutual gains from trade
  • Short explanation Trade is voluntary
  • Absolute and Comparative Advantage
  • Reinforces democratic peace

46
5. Economic Interdependence
Cooperation- Producing Factors
  • Mutual gains from trade
  • Short explanation Trade is voluntary
  • Absolute and Comparative Advantage
  • Reinforces democratic peace
  • Allies trade more than enemiesbut sometimes
    trade continues during war!

47
(No Transcript)
48
III. Outcomes The results of bargaining,
conflict, and cooperation
Bargaining Conflict Cooperation
  • A Theory of Bargaining Game Theory as a tool to
    predict behavior and outcomes
  • Game theory formal way to represent strategic
    interaction

49
2. Assumptions of Game Theory
Bargaining Conflict Cooperation
  • Rational choice
  • Connected preferences Some outcomes better than
    others
  • Transitive preferences If A is better than B,
    and B is better than C ? A is better than C
  • Choice Pick the option believed to lead to
    preferred outcome

50
b. Elements of a game
Bargaining Conflict Cooperation
  1. Players In IR, this means states
  2. Strategies The choices players have
  3. Outcomes The results of the players choices
  4. Payoffs How much each player values each Outcome

Player 2 Player 2 Player 2
Player 1 Strategy A Strategy B
Player 1 Strategy A Outcome 1 Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff Outcome 2 Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff
Player 1 Strategy B Outcome 3 Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff Outcome 4 Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff
51
3. Making Predictions Solving a Game
Bargaining Conflict Cooperation
  • Goal Find an equilibrium (stable behavior,
    unlikely to change without change in conditions)
  • Basic tool Nash Equilibrium ? Neither player
    could do any better by unilaterally changing its
    strategy choice
  • Example

Player 2 Player 2 Player 2
Player 1 Strategy A Strategy B
Player 1 Strategy A 2,3 3,4
Player 1 Strategy B 0,0 4,2
52
c. Limitation No Equilibrium
Bargaining Conflict Cooperation
  • Not every game has a Nash Equilibrium.
    Prediction no stable pure strategy, stability
    only results from mixing strategies
    (probabilistic prediction)
  • Example

Player 2 Player 2 Player 2
Player 1 Strategy A Strategy B
Player 1 Strategy A 2,3 3,4
Player 1 Strategy B 0,5 4,2
53
d. Limitation Multiple Equilibria
Bargaining Conflict Cooperation
  • Some games have multiple Nash Equilibria.
    Prediction either equilibrium can result
  • Example

Player 2 Player 2 Player 2
Player 1 Strategy A Strategy B
Player 1 Strategy A 2,5 3,4
Player 1 Strategy B 0,4 4,5
54
4. Games Nations Play
Bargaining Conflict Cooperation
  1. Prisoners Dilemma Used to model Security
    Dilemmas -- Efforts to increase own security
    make others less secure (arms races, etc.)
  2. Both players end up worse, even though each plays
    rationally!

Player 2 Player 2 Player 2
Player 1 Remain Silent Confess
Player 1 Remain Silent Misdemeanor, Misdemeanor Life, Walk Free
Player 1 Confess Walk Free, Life Felony, Felony
55
4. Games Nations Play
Bargaining Conflict Cooperation
  • b. Chicken
  • Equilibria Someone swerves but who?
  • Used to model nuclear crises
  • Credible commitment throw away the steering
    wheel!

Player 2 Player 2 Player 2
Player 1 Swerve Drive Straight
Player 1 Swerve Status Quo, Status Quo Wimp, Cool
Player 1 Drive Straight Cool, Wimp DEAD, DEAD
56
4. Games Nations Play
Bargaining Conflict Cooperation
  • c. Battle of the Sexes
  • Equilibria Both do better than nothing, but
    someone benefits more
  • Used to model environmental cooperation, border
    demarcation, etc.
  • Incentive to deceive Convince other player you
    would prefer no agreement to getting your way

Player 2 Player 2 Player 2
Player 1 Tearjerker Action
Player 1 Tearjerker 2, 1 0,0
Player 1 Action 0,0 1, 2
57
5. Is There Hope for Cooperation in a Realist
World?
Bargaining Conflict Cooperation
  • Realists argue that Prisoners Dilemma (PD)
    represents the international system
  • BUT Tournament of Strategies showed that when
    playing repeated PD the best strategy is not
    Always Defect its Tit-for-Tat!
  • Tit-for-Tat Cooperate, then Reciprocate Allows
    cooperation even in the most hostile
    circumstances BUT also risks escalation
  • Conclusion Anarchy need not ? war. Cooperation
    can evolve in a world full of PD players!
  • Institutions and tying hands can allow credible
    commitment, allowing cooperation. Cooperative
    win-win strategies (maximize joint payoffs)
    include
  • Commit to silence in PD (join a gang that
    punishes squealers)
  • Commit to no play in Chicken
  • Commit to take turns in Battle of the Sexes, PD,
    or Chicken

58
B. Empirical Outcomes of Dyadic Bargaining
Outcomes
  • Who gets more?
  • More power
  • Cost Tolerance Willing to take losses
  • Salience ? Power predicts better than Power alone
  • Tied Hands and Costly Signals Ability to
    convince opponent that further concessions are
    impossible / unacceptable
  • Will bargaining fail?
  • Zones of Agreement Area of mutually acceptable
    outcomes (better than no agreement which often
    means war -- for both sides)
  • Expected costs of failure What happens if there
    is no agreement?
  • Shadow of the Future Bargaining over future
    bargaining power (i.e. territory) is most
    difficult

59
C. Outcomes of Conflict
Outcomes
  • Economic conflict (tariffs) ? increased political
    conflict (and vice versa)
  • Dyadic war is rare
  • 193 sovereign states ? 18,528 dyads. Formula
    n(n-1)/2
  • Nearly 1 million dyad-years over the past two
    centuries
  • Less than 1 war per 1,000 opportunities No
    current interstate wars!

60
c. Who Wins Wars?
Outcomes
  1. Total victory uncommon (2/3 end by negotiation)
  2. 59 of wars won by initially stronger side --
    BUT initiators of wars victorious 68 of the
    time, yet only stronger 59 of the time
  3. Implication Which side started it? better
    predicts victory than military power, though
    advantage declines over time
  4. Extension Democracies win more often, though
    advantage declines over time (they lose long
    wars)

61
3. Outcomes of Cooperation
Outcomes
  1. Some evidence that political cooperation ?
    economic cooperation (US/USSR)
  2. Mediation and Arbitration appear unreliable BUT
    selection bias probably responsible (they get the
    tough cases)
  3. Foreign aid ? increases dyadic trade gains ?
    increased interdependence

62
Back to the Model
63
IV. Puzzles of Dyadic Relations
  • Do IGOs promote dyadic peace?
  • Do alliances create peace between dyads, or do
    they raise the specter of war?
  • What bargaining strategy best avoids war and
    produces cooperation?
  • If we want peace, should we prepare for war?

64
A. Do IGOs produce dyadic peace?
  • 1. Unexplained finding Same IGOs increased war
    risk
  • 2. Possible reasons
  • Coincidence (IGOs not associated with war)
  • Similar interests (IGOs and war have common
    causes)
  • Interaction (IGOs cause war)
  • Levels of Analysis (Improperly Aggregating to
    System Level)
  • Differences between IGOs (Lets study this more)
  • Universal No effect
  • Limited-purpose Depends
  • Regional Political or Social Increased war risk
  • Regional Military or Economic Decreased war
    risk
  • 3. Another puzzle Same IGOs decreased MIDs!

65
4. IGOs can produce convergence
66
B. Alliances
  1. Statistical evidence disputed. After
    controlling for contiguity, alliances seem to
    make war less likely between the allies
  2. Why might allies be more likely to fight each
    other?

67
Alliances and PreferencesAllies Nowhere to go
but downNonaligned Equal chance of increased
conflict and increased cooperationRivals If
not already fighting, nowhere to go but up
68
3. When have allies fought each other?
69
4. How do most alliances end?
70
5. When are alliances broken?
71
C. Which bargaining strategies promote peace?
  • Known hazards Bully and Fight
  • Bully one OR both sides respond to concessions
    by increasing demands (i.e. appeasement fails)
  • Fight Reciprocal escalation (BOTH sides respond
    to conflict with higher level of conflict)
  • Appeasement also fails Of six known cases in
    crises, five were diplomatic defeats for appeaser
    and one led to war

72
3. Reciprocity A Strategy for Cooperation?
  • Yes But ALSO a recipe for conflict spirals!

73
D. Deterrence
Melians It may be your interest to be our
masters, but how can it be ours to be your
slaves? Athenians To you the gain will be that
by submission you will avert the worst and we
shall be all the richer for your preservation.
Melians But must we be your enemies? Will you
not receive us as friends if we are neutral and
remain at peace with you? Athenians No, your
enmity is not half so mischievous to us as your
friendship for the one is in the eyes of our
subjects an argument of our power, the other of
our weakness.
  • Historical Background
  • Ancient Greece Melian Dialogue
  • The strong do what they will and the weak do
    what they must.
  • Athens demands submission by Melians, even
    though Melos is insignificant
  • Why fight a war over something so small?

74
b. Masada
  • Jewish revolt against Rome
  • Last 1000 holdouts on fortress of Masada

75
b. Masada
  • Jewish revolt against Rome
  • Last 1000 holdouts on fortress of Masada
  • Rome imports 15,000 laborers from around empire,
    spends a year building ramp
  • Why?

76
c. 1919-1938 Intra-War Deterrence Fails
  • Giulio Douhet Opening hours of any major war ?
    destruction of cities with explosives, gas,
    incendiaries ? panic and social collapse
  • 1922, 1932-4 Attempts to ban bombers
  • Despite fear of bombers, Britain actually
    initiated city warfare in World War II!
  • Deterrence failed
  • Mass killing / city destruction generally didnt
    have the expected effect on civilian morale

77
d. Nuclear Deterrence Strategies
  1. Massive Retaliation Depended on atomic
    superiority
  2. Mutually-Assured Destruction Tripwires
  3. Flexible Response Credibility at every level
  4. Proportional Deterrence Enter the French.
  5. Warfighting Soviet and US Hard-liners doctrine

78
2. Requirements
  • Clarity Threat must be understood
  • Failures

79
(No Transcript)
80
The Dead Hand System
  • Underground command post
  • If communications fail AND nuclear explosions
    detected by sensors
  • Rocket is launched with internal radio
  • Radio broadcasts launch orders / codes to Soviet
    ICBMs
  • Thus, even if all Soviet leaders killed and
    communications disrupted, Soviet missiles will
    annihilate the USA
  • Problem They didnt TELL us about it!

81
Iraq Invades Kuwait, 1990
  • All evidence suggests that Saddam did not expect
    opposition from the US misinterpreted generic
    statement that US doesnt take a position on the
    border disputes of other nations as permission to
    invade

82
2. Requirements
  • Clarity Threat must be understood
  • Failures Soviet dead hand, Iraqi invasion of
    Kuwait
  • Credibility Opponent must believe threat will be
    carried out if line is crossed
  • Failures

83
Examples US Nuclear Threats
Year Issue Threat US Nuclear Position Result
1945 Iran Truman We're going to drop it on you. Monopoly USSR Withdraws
1955 Quemoy/ Matsu Eisenhower Atomic bombs can be used... as you would use a bullet. Dominance PRC ceases shelling
1961 Berlin Kennedy One chance in five of a nuclear exchange Superiority Draw USSR builds Wall
1969 Vietnam Kissinger USA will take measures of the gravest consequence. Advantage No Effect
84
2. Requirements
  • Clarity Threat must be understood
  • Failures Soviet dead hand, Iraqi invasion of
    Kuwait
  • Credibility Opponent must believe threat will be
    carried out if line is crossed
  • Failures Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall,
    Vietnam
  • Cost Threat must be great enough to outweigh
    benefits of crossing the line
  • Failures

85
Sanctions on the PRC
  • US Demand Stop anti-democracy crackdown (i.e.
    Dont preserve Communist government authority)
  • Sanctions
  • Ban on arms sales
  • Ban on direct high-level military contacts
  • Ban on some government financing
  • suspension of export licenses for satellites
    contracted to be launched in China
  • suspension of export licenses for crime control
    and detection instruments and equipment
  • denial of export licenses for any goods or
    technology used in nuclear production, if the
    President finds that such products could be
    diverted to the research or development of a
    nuclear explosive device
  • Outcome China ignores sanctions, most of which
    are lifted within a year or two

86
Iraq Violates the Geneva Protocol, 1982-1983
  • Iran-Iraq war is intense and bloody
  • Iraq begins using tear gas, then blister agents,
    then nerve gas
  • West is silent because Iran is considered the
    greater threat
  • Iran retaliates, but lacked enough chemical
    weapons to do serious damage

87
2. Requirements
  • Clarity Threat must be understood
  • Failures Soviet dead hand, Iraqi invasion of
    Kuwait
  • Credibility Opponent must believe threat will be
    carried out if line is crossed
  • Failures Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall,
    Vietnam
  • Cost Threat must be great enough to outweigh
    benefits of crossing the line
  • Failures Sanctions on China, Chemical weapons
    in Iran-Iraq war
  • Restraint Opponent must believe threat will NOT
    be carried out if line is NOT crossed
  • Failures WMD Inspections before current Iraq
    conflict, Hitler declares war on America
  • Rationality Opponent must weigh costs and
    benefits
  • Possible failures Paraguayan War, Nuclear war
    termination

88
3. Types of Deterrence
  1. General Deterrence You wont dare attack me
    because you know Im armed and ready
  2. Immediate Deterrence Im warning you right now
    attack and Ill shoot!
  3. Extended Deterrence Dont attack my friend
    either -- or Ill shoot
  4. Existential Deterrence I dont have a gun but I
    could go buy one if needed

89
4. Dilemmas of Deterrence
  1. Security Dilemma Increased costs and credibility
    also mean decreased restraint
  2. Vulnerability Dilemma If you dont attempt to
    counter deterrent threat, maybe you intend to
    strike first (Soviet silos)
  3. Rational Irrationality Fait accompli and The
    threat that leaves something to chance
    Rationality decreases credibility, but
    irrationality decreases restraint

90
5. Does deterrence work?
  1. Inherent uncertainty If opponent does nothing,
    is deterrence working?
  2. General deterrence creates bias unstated threats
    may deter. Perhaps having to state a threat
    means it is unlikely to succeed
  3. Some evidence supports extended immediate
    deterrence

91
V. The Fundamental Puzzle Vicious Circle or
Virtuous Circle?
  • Most conflict-producing factors reinforce each
    other

92
The Vicious Circle
93
V. The Fundamental Puzzle Vicious Circle or
Virtuous Circle?
  • Most conflict-producing factors reinforce each
    other
  • So do most cooperation-producing factors

94
The Virtuous Circle
95
V. The Fundamental Puzzle Vicious Circle or
Virtuous Circle?
  • Most conflict-producing factors reinforce each
    other
  • So do most cooperation-producing factors
  • Which of these two feedback loops is more
    powerful in the long run?
About PowerShow.com