POSC 2200

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POSC 2200 The Individual

• Russell Alan Williams
• Department of Political Science

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Unit Four The Individual (Feb 9 11)

• Required Reading
• Mingst, Chapter 5
• Jervis, Hypotheses on Misperception, Mingst and
  Snyder, pp. 189-199,
• Outline
• Introduction
• The Role of Elites
• Individuals in Decision-making
• The Role of the Public

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1) Introduction

• Role of individual open to debate . . . (?)
• Some see individuals as largely unimportant in
  international relations including leaders
• Neorealists National interest and international
  structure
• Radicals International capitalist system

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• Some see large role for individuals
• Liberals as policymaking elites . . .
• Lots of latitude of decision-makers to implement
  policies that pursue their interests
• Constructivists as holders of values
• Major change in IR can be associated with new
  leaders bringing new values to forefront
• E.g. Gorbachev and Soviet security concerns

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• In practical terms . . .
• Hard not to see a role for individuals in IR
  particularly heads of state
• However
• Complicates analyses hard to predict foreign
  policy becomes more like History
• At a general level, possible to overstate
  importance of individuals
• E.g. Continuity in foreign policy regardless of
  who is in office
• Canadas foreign policy may have more to do with
  international structure then individuals . . .

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• How can we clarify, or hypothesize, the role of
  individuals?
• Several strategies
• Clarify the conditions under which individuals
  are more important
• Examine individual and group psychological
  effects that may allow us to predict responses to
  events
• Examine role in foreign policy decision making
  and diplomacy

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2) The Role of Elites

• a) Under what conditions are the actions and
  values of individual leaders more important?
• 1) When political institutions are unstable
• Gives decisive leaders opportunity to pursue own
  goals
• Institutions new Post colonial states and new
  democracies
• E.g. Golda Miair
• E.g. Vladimir Putin
• Institutions in crisis or failing
• E.g. Weimar Germany and Adolph Hitler

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• 2) When institutional constraints are limited
• E.g. Totalitarian states limited channels to
  put pressure on leaders
• E.g. China and Nixon
• 3) When the situation does not result in a
  clearly defined national interest
• Issue is peripheral or unimportant
• Issue is ambiguous lack of information for a
  rational assessment of the national interest
• E.g. Surprise situations

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• Does this describe most situations in IR?
• If so, doesnt this mean IR is driven by
  individual level????
• Or, does this just mean individuals effect things
  that dont matter

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• b) What is the role of leaders personalities?
• Can they help us understand states behavior?
• Research underdeveloped leaders wont submit to
  detailed observation and psychological
  analyses!!!!
• However, Herman (1980) suggested a typology that
  some think can guide analyses
• Argued Two main types of leader personality that
  may effect foreign policy
• The Independent Leader
• The Participatory Leader

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The Independent Leader

• Policy Orientations
• High nationalism
• High belief in control
• High need for power
• High distrust of others
• Low understanding conceptual clarity

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The Independent Leader

• Policy Orientations
• High nationalism
• High belief in control
• High need for power
• High distrust for others
• Low understanding conceptual clarity
• Bush Chavez Stalin

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The Participatory Leader

• Policy Orientations
• Low nationalism
• Low belief in control
• Low in distrust of others
• High need for friendly affiliations
• High understanding conceptual complexity

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The Participatory Leader

• Policy Orientations
• Low nationalism
• Low belief in control
• Low in distrust of others
• High need for friendly affiliations
• High understanding conceptual complexity
• Trudeau Clinton ?

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• Risk of circularity(?)
• Problem We dont know their real personalities,
  only what they show in public roles
• International structures and events make leaders
  exhibit personality traits
• E.g. Clinton and Bush not so different . . .

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2) Individuals in Decision Making

• Individual decision making never totally rational
• IR presents observer with information overload
• People use psychological shortcuts to make
  sense of what they observe
• May influence foreign policy . . . .

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• Psychological processing concepts or shortcuts
• 1) Belief System Organized, integrated
  perceptions of individuals in society about how
  the world is
• Influence leaders decisions
• Constructivism comes from history and norms
• E.g. Cold War seeing Soviet Union as a threat
  because of image of communism

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• 2) Cognitive Consistency
• Tendency to see images in a way that is
  consistent with belief systems or previous
  interpretation of facts
• E.g. US and the Falkland War . . . .

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• 3) Evoked Set Tendency to look for details in
  current situation that are similar to those
  previously observed
• E.g. US and Chinese Relations
• Realist view?
• Liberal view?
• Both based on selecting details that confirm past
  lessons . . .

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• 4) Mirror Images Tendency to see other
  individuals and groups as having opposite
  characteristics from oneself
• E.g. Orientalism
• Jervis Hypotheses on Misperception
• Also a tendency to see behavior of others as
  centralized and coordinated
• A kind of paranoia?

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• 5) Groupthink Tendency of small groups to form
  a consensus and resist criticism of consensus
• Disregard contradictory facts
• Ostracize members who do not share view
• E.g. US intelligence and Iraqi WMDs

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• 6) Satisificing Tendency to accept minimally
  acceptable solution rather then best possible
  outcome
• In order to support consensus (bureaucratic
  politics)
• Or, because people are lazy

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Jervis Hypothesis and Misperception

• Classic piece on the irrationality of rational
  foreign policy
• Argues
• Decision makers fit new information into existing
  beliefs
• More likely when
• Facts ambiguous situation complex
• People think existing theory well proven
• Result Decision makers more likely to ignore new
  discordant information then to change their
  existing theories

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Jervis Hypothesis and Misperception

• Example Domino Theory
• Theory that communist revolutions spread like a
  chain reaction
• I.e. Success in North Vietnam meant it would
  spread to rest of S. E. Asia
• Required containment
• Support for anticommunist allies
• Result US intervention in Vietnam

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Jervis Hypothesis and Misperception

• Example Domino Theory
• US supports corrupt, unpopular, anti-democratic
  regimes
• Supplant French colonial role in S. E. Asia

• US suffers 60,000 casualties, ends war effort in
  defeat
• No Domino effect . . . .
• Theory was well established and situation complex

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Jervis Hypothesis and Misperception

• Solutions? See Jerviss Safeguards good
  advice!
• 1) Be aware that observations are not unbiased
• 2) Be skeptical of supporting ideas that are not
  logically linked to one another
• E.g. Iraq WMD and Democracy
• WWII Stalin and Barbarossa

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Jervis Hypothesis and Misperception

• 3) Be sure concepts are clearly spelled out
  makes it possible to know when your ideas are
  wrong or failing
• E.g. Victory Conditions
• 4) Be sure to consider critical interpretations
  of new facts dont be surrounded by like-minded
  ideologues

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4) Role of the Public

• Traditionally little role for the public in
  foreign policy
• Perhaps . . . More impact in practice then in
  theory
• 1) Private individuals
• Some people have resources necessary to have
  influence
• Financial Bill Gates
• Expertise George Sorros
• Play a role in conflict resolution
• E.g. Carter Foundation
• Track-two Diplomacy
• Play a role in changing perceptions of foreign
  policy
• E.g. Hanoi Jane Fonda and Sean Penn

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• 2) The Mass Public impact on Foreign Policy?
• a) Psychological factors?
• Filtering and interpretation problems
  (shortcuts) may be similar to policymaking
  elites
• E.g. Groupthink and Mirror Images
• May be specific mass psychology effects in IR
• Territorial Imperative Humans innate desire
  to control territory
• Frustration-Aggression Syndrome Societies
  whose desires are thwarted likely to become
  aggressive
• Hard to predict much based on these people do
  not always respond in the same fashion

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• b) Public Opinion?
• Public orientations may have large impact on
  limiting range of policy options open to elites
• Media coverage and opinion polling can be a big
  factor in what leaders may think is viable
• E.g. Walter Cronkite and the Vietnam War
• However, public opinion never unified creates
  opportunities to move opinion in necessary
  direction
• Result New techniques
• Priming and propaganda
• E.g. The Kuwaiti victims . . .
• Public Diplomacy Diplomatic techniques
  designed to improve image of a state in other
  societies
• E.g. Gorbechevs New York walkabout

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5) For Next Time . . .

• MID TERM EXAM (October 26 - In class)
• Format Multiple choice short answer definition
  questions
• Definitions do not need to be exact just show
  you know what they mean . . .
• Lectures Mingst textbook as well as items
  from the reader
• Up to, and including Chapter 6 The Individual
• Be sure to complete all of the reading!

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• MID TERM EXAM (October 26 - In class)
• Do not look at other peoples exams!
• Do not write in pencil
• Guess . . . if you have no other answer. . .