Bruce Schneier

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Bruce Schneier
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Article to read

• http//www.theatlantic.com/doc/200209/mann
• Systems must fail smartly

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Secrets Lies

• Dynamic linking DLL created a whole new set of
  problems, versus previous fixed linking.
• There is no tamper proof hardware, only tamper
  resistance, how resistant is it.
• People want security but they do not want to see
  it working
• http//usablesecurity.com/

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Secrets Lies

• Attack
• Identify target and collect information about
  target (footprinting)
• Analyze target identify vulnerability that will
  achieve attack objectives
• Gain appropriate level of access to target
• Perform attack
• Complete attack, hide tracks

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Secrets Lies

• Safe ratings
• TL-15 can survive attack for 15 minutes
• Protection, detection, reaction work in tandem
• If no one responds to an IDS then it is not
  helpful.
• BTW one thing that his company does is respond to
  IDSs.
• I can see outsourcing this in certain situations.

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Secrets Lies

• Must get the threat model right
• Pages 304-305
• This is an iterative process you must not stop
  looking at your threats.
• Software
• Imagine just compiling a product then shipping
  it, no testing
• Imagine how bad it would be
• Rarely is software security tested so imagine how
  bad it is

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Secrets Lies

• Future products pages 361-363
• Security systems must fail-safe
• If firewall fails must not just let in all
  traffic
• If credit card terminal fails go back to zip-zap
  which is less secure
• This causes a lot of DOS attacks
• This called safety engineering in automobiles

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Secrets Lies

• Detection is more important that prevention
• Prevention is impossible
• Detect, fail-safe, recover, maintain chain of
  evidence
• Banks do not eliminate alarm systems because they
  have safes
• Modern society does not prevent crime, police
  detect and respond to crime