PO377 Ethnic Conflict and Political Violence

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PO377 Ethnic Conflict and Political Violence

• Week 18 Peace Processes and International
  Intervention

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Question to take home from todays and next
weeks lecture

• Are the prospects for sustainable peace lower
  after ethnic civil wars compared to other types
  of civil war?
• What might this mean for our case studies?

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Lecture Outline

• Introduction Data and definitions
• Data on civil war termination
• Definitions of peace
• More definitions
• Theorising the prospects for peace after
  large-scale ethnic violence
• Is (the recurrence of) violent ethnic conflict
  inevitable?
• Why do peace processes fail?

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Lecture Outline

• Peace processes and conditions for sustainable
  peace
• Possible conflict outcomes
• Third-party intervention and mediation
• Levels (Tracks) of intervention and mediation
• The two-step approach to ethnic conflict
  resolution
• Step 1 Questions of ripeness
• Step 2 Essential criteria for a successful peace
  accord
• Step 2 The trade-off between efficacy and
  sustainability
• The role of international intervention
• Why should external actors care?
• Forms of international intervention
• International intervention as a critical
  barrier for peace
• International intervention as a problem
• Dilemmas of international intervention
• Summary

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• Part I
• Introduction
• Data and definitions

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Data on civil war termination

• Only 20-25 of civil wars that have ended, ended
  in negotiated settlements (Licklider 1995 Mason
  and Fett 1996 Walter 2002 and 1997 Hartzell
  1999 Sambanis 2000).
• Removing the 5 year requirement produces about
  42 (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001 194).
• No real difference in this respect between
  identity-based civil wars and non-identity wars
  (Licklider 1995 Walter 2002, 1997).
• BUT only a third of identity-based civil wars
  ending in negotiated settlement ultimately remain
  peaceful (much lower than non-identity civil
  wars) (Licklider 1995).

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Definitions of peace

• Negative peace absence of direct or personal
  violence (Galtung 1969 1985) most often
  conceptualised as the absence of war (armed
  hostilities)
• Positive peace absence of structural violence
  (ibid.). According to Barnes (2009) positive
  peace has been achieved where democratic
  governance is established, where human rights are
  protected, and where sustained progress can be
  made towards development (ibid.18).

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More definitions

• Peace processes are persistent peace initiatives
  involving the main antagonists in a protracted
  conflict (Darby and MacGinty 2002 2).
• Darby and MacGinty distinguish four phases in
  peace processes pre-negotiation the management
  of the process, including negotiations and
  violence peace accords and post-accord
  reconstruction.
• While peacemaking is concerned with bringing
  hostile parties to an agreement (Barnes 2009),
  peacebuilding is more comprehensive, involving
  sustained and multidimensional efforts to address
  the structural causes of conflict and to
  reconcile relationships affected by conflict
  (ibid. 14).

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More definitions (2)

• Conflict settlement aims at establishing an
  institutional framework in which the conflicting
  interests of the different principal conflict
  parties can be accommodated to such an extent
  that incentives for cooperation and the
  non-violent pursuit of conflicts of interest
  through compromise outweigh any benefits that
  might be expected from violent confrontation
  (Wolff 2006 134-135).
• Conflict management is an attempt to contain or
  limit the effects of an ongoing ethnic conflict
  (ibid. 134).
• Both of the above are distinct from conflict
  resolution, conflict transformation and
  reconciliation we will come back to this.

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• Part II
• Theorising the prospects for peace after
  large-scale ethnic violence

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Is (the recurrence of) violent ethnic conflict
inevitable?

• From the three broad approaches to studying
  ethnicity and ethnic conflict primordialism,
  instrumentalism and constructivism
  primordialism is most pessimistic about the
  prospects of peace in divided societies
• Wherever ethnic nationalism has taken hold of
  populations, there one may expect to find
  powerful assertions of national
  self-determination that, if long opposed, will
  embroil whole regions in bitter and protracted
  ethnic conflict. Whether the peace and stability
  of such regions is better served in the short
  term by measures of containment, federation,
  mediation, or even partition, in the long run
  there can be little escape from the many
  conflagrations that the unsatisfied yearnings of
  ethnic nationalism are likely to kindle (Smith
  1993 40 cited in Lake and Rothchild 1998 5).

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Is (the recurrence of) violent ethnic conflict
inevitable? (2)

• Instrumentalists and constructivists, on the
  other hand, argue that ethnic violence is
  contingent upon elite behaviour (instrumentalism)
  or the wider social, political and economic
  circumstances (constructivism).
• Hence, they are more optimistic about the
  prospects of peacebuilding endeavours if these
  manage to reconstruct ethnic identities.

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Is (the recurrence of) violent ethnic conflict
inevitable? (3)

• Likewise, institutionalists believe that
  suitable political institutions however
  defined can help solve or at least manage
  violent ethnic conflict and prevent its
  recurrence (cp. weeks 14 to 17 of the module).

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Is (the recurrence of) violent ethnic conflict
inevitable? (4)

• Neorealist explanations focus on conditions of
  anarchy and the security dilemma (cp. Kaufmann
  1996 Posen 1993), so their prescriptions for
  conflict resolution are either restoring state
  authority through victory on the battlefield, or
  partition.
• Rationalist explanations focus on the reasons
  actors have for being unable to resolve a
  disagreement short of conflict (Hoddie and
  Hartzell 2005 24), so their prescriptions for
  conflict resolution are largely focused on the
  external enforcement of peace settlements.

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Why do peace processes fail?

• According to these different approaches, the
  failure of peace processes could thus in very
  simplistic terms be explained by
• Primordialism the inherently conflictual nature
  of ethnic identities
• instrumentalism and constructivism the lack of
  elite commitment to peace and failure to
  reconstruct ethnic identities
• institutionalism the establishment of
  unsuitable institutions
• realism the pervasiveness of the ethnic security
  dilemma
• rationalism the failure to overcome commitment
  problems.

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• Part III
• Peace processes and conditions for sustainable
  peace

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Possible conflict outcomes

• Parties to conflicts see their interests as
  diametrically opposed possible outcomes are
  win-lose or compromise. In violent conflicts
  usually lose-lose.
• Task of conflict resolution is to help parties
  who perceive their situation as zero-sum conflict
  to re-perceive it as non-zero-sum and then assist
  them to move towards positive-sum outcomes.
• Prisoners Dilemma in Game Theory is
  representation of tendency of competing
  strategies to end in lose-lose outcomes, but also
  of potential for cooperation to end in win-win
  outcomes.

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Third party intervention and mediation

• Third party intervention and mediation is often
  needed to break a deadlock. Third party changes
  conflict structure and allows different pattern
  of communication.
• Post-Cold War broadening in scope of third party
  interventions. Much wider view of timing of
  intervention. Bottom-up processes and roles of
  internal third parties and indigenous peacemakers
  now seen as more significant too.

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Levels (Tracks) of intervention and mediation

• Track I governmental or inter-governmental
  representatives. Negotiation, peacekeeping,
  arbitration, mediation with muscle. (UN,
  international and regional organisations,
  governments, international financial
  institutions.)
• Track II unofficial mediators. Conciliation,
  problem-solving, mediation. (International NGOs,
  churches, academics, private business.)
• Track III building social cohesion and common
  ground. (Grassroots, indigenous resources and
  local actors.)

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The two-step approach to ethnic conflict
resolution

• Establishing preconditions for effective
  intergroup dialogue and negotiations (through
  Track 1 or Track 2 procedures)
• the negotiation of specific constitutional and
  other arrangements to reach a conflict
  settlement.
• Each of these steps faces its own challenges.
• (See Ross 2000)

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Step 1 Questions of ripeness

• Zartman some political, social and economic
  moments are ripe for negotiation and dialogue
  and a move from violence to non-violence others
  are not
• Parties resolve their conflict only when they
  are ready to do so when alternative, usually
  unilateral, means of achieving a satisfactory
  result are blocked and the parties feel that they
  are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament.
  At that ripe moment, they grab onto proposals
  that usually have been in the air for a long time
  and that only now appear attractive (Zartman
  2002 19).
• This moment of ripeness is determined by the
  contending parties perception of a mutually
  hurting stalemate (MHS), involving both objective
  evidence and subjective perception.

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Step 1 Questions of ripeness (2)

• When a MHS is reached, parties to conflict
  realise status quo is a negative-sum situation
  zero-sum outcomes are now considered impossible
  positive-sum outcome must be attempted.
• This also requires a perceived way out and strong
  leadership.
• May be aided by presence of mutually enticing
  opportunities (MEO).

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Step 1 Questions of ripeness (3)

• Challenge to ripeness metaphor
• Quick fixes to long-standing violent conflict
  are like growing a garden with no understanding
  of seeds, soils and sweat. I believe in
  cultivation. Cultivation as a metaphor suggests
  that the core of the peacebuilding work
  fostering and sustaining committed, authentic
  relationships across the lines of conflict over
  time does not rise and fall with the temporal
  ups and downs of the conflict cycles. It answers
  the question is it possible to pursue peace
  when things are bad with a resounding Yes!
  Just as it also suggests that when things are
  suddenly headed towards an agreement the work is
  hardly over. It has only begun (Lederach 2002).

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Step 2 Essential criteria for a successful peace
accord

• The protagonists are willing to negotiate in good
  faith
• the key actors are included in the process
• the negotiations address the central issues in
  dispute
• force is not used to achieve objectives
• negotiators are committed to a sustained process.
  
• (See Darby and MacGinty 2000)

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Step 2 The trade-off between efficacy and
sustainability

• Fewer parties and issues involved in peace
  negotiations may be easier to manage and may make
  it easier to reach agreement (efficacy argument).
• BUT more inclusive and more comprehensive peace
  processes are more likely to be sustainable
  (sustainability argument) (Barnes 2009).
• See in this context also the dilemmas of public
  participation in peacemaking (ibid.).

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• Part IV
• The role of international intervention

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Why should external actors care?

• Because of
• their own hegemonic ambitions
• concerns for regional stability
• sympathy for oppressed groups or oppressors??
• sense of international responsibility
• humanitarianism (Cooper and Berdal 1993 cited in
  Rothchild and Lake 1998 217).
• The paradox of the post-Cold War world, however,
  is that in the absence of the bipolar competition
  that drove them into the far reaches of the
  globe, the United States and other powers now
  lack the political will necessary to make a
  sustained commitment to the role of external
  guarantor. (Rothchild and Lake 1998 218).
• This is probably even more the case now in our
  post-Afghanistan and Iraq world.

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Forms of international intervention

• Non-coercive intervention
• Coercive intervention (Rothchild and Lake 1998)
• Third party intervention can be formal or
  informal, need not be constant over time (Carment
  and Rowlands 2004).

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International intervention as critical barrier
for peace

• External actors can help bring security and
  stability to war-torn countries by
• making conflict either extremely difficult or
  unnecessary (Carment and Rowlands 2004)
• bringing representatives of contending groups
  together for peace negotiations (Barnes 2009)
• enforcing peace settlements and providing
  necessary security assurances (Walter 1997)
• encouraging opponents to design new institutional
  arrangements to manage conflict (Hartzell et al.
  2002 Sisk 1996).

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International intervention as a problem

• External actors can be driven by belligerent
  motives (cp. Gurr 2000)
• if external actors are biased or lack commitment
  to enforce conflict settlements, they can
  exacerbate rather than resolve conflict
  (Rothchild and Lake 1998)
• where external actors aim to rush peace
  negotiations or avoid difficult issues, the
  conflict is likely to recur (Barnes 2009)
• peace processes that neglect the conditions or
  interests of local communities increase
  dependence on external guarantees for peace
  (Darby and MacGinty 2002).

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Dilemmas of international intervention (for the
intervening party)

• Dilemmas faced by the intervening party
• The need to engage in confidence-building vs.
  efforts to punish particular groups
• the politicisation of international intervention
• information failures
• problems of regional or global organisations to
  agree on a course of action (Rothchild and Lake
  1998).

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• Part V
• Summary

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Summary

• Whether or not we believe that violent ethnic
  conflict can be truly resolved rather than
  merely managed or settled depends to a large
  degree on the theoretical framework we adopt (cp.
  Kaufmann 1996 Lake and Rothchild 1996).
• These frameworks notwithstanding, sustainable
  peace is unlikely to be achieved if the
  structural causes of ethnic violence and the
  challenges specific to each step of the peace
  process are not addressed (hence, a positive
  conceptualisation of peace as well as flexibility
  and constant innovation in the peace process are
  crucial).

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Summary

• Many of the issues to do with getting violent
  actors to the stage of peace negotiation are
  debated within the literature (no consensus)
  timing, ripeness, hurting stalemates, inclusion
  versus exclusion, the utility (and forms) of
  external intervention.
• Negotiations are extremely difficult and raise a
  host of issues regarding interpretation and
  implementation.

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Summary

• The usefulness of international intervention in
  ending ethno-national conflicts or mediating
  negotiations depends on a variety of contextual
  factors and is often limited, not least due to
  the lack of political will to intervene as
  external actor.
• Peace processes, just like the emergence of
  violent ethnic conflict, need not and do not
  follow the same trajectories, so that it is
  crucial to bear country-specific differences in
  mind.

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Summary

• Case Studies
• Rwanda and Sri Lanka show problems that arise
  when political leaders do not have genuine
  commitment to peace process.
• Rwanda shows how difficult peace is to establish
  where agreement is coerced rather than organic
  (hard to force an MHS). Bosnia and Kosovo also
  show this.

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Summary

• Case Studies
• Yugoslavia illustrates how the break-up of a
  multi-ethnic state is not necessarily a solution
  to ethno-political strife, even though it may
  bring about negative peace.
• Sri Lanka shows how difficult it can be in a
  long-running internal conflict to get warring
  parties to move beyond zero-sum attitudes.
• However, Northern Ireland shows us that as
  difficult as this is, it is possible though it
  is only the first step in an even harder process
  of implementation/consolidation.