National Series Lecture 3 The Web of Prevention

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National Series Lecture 3 The Web of Prevention

• Bradford Disarmament Research Centre Division of
  Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK

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Outline

• The new reality What should be done?
• Exercise 1
• The Web of Prevention
• Exercise 2
• References

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Reviewing the threats (Lecture 2)
Natural outbreaks of infectious disease
Safety/accidental risks at laboratories
Manmade threats warfare, crime and terrorism
Unpredictable future of the life sciences

• No single focal point of threats
• Many potential actors, materials and information
  can be related to dual-use issues, existing at
  international, regional, national, local and
  individual levels

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What should be done?

• The aim of bisecurity measures
• To persuade those contemplating the misuse of
  modern biology for hostile purposes that the
  effort and costs are just not worth it at many
  different levels.
• (Dando 2006)
• The new reality action is required at ALL
  levels
• Individual, sub-national, national, regional,
  like minded, and international, public, private,
  government and intergovernmental levels.
• (Littlewood 2005)

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The Web of Prevention (WoP)

• A multifaceted construct of national and
  international efforts to mitigate and respond to
  the potential for the destructive use of the life
  sciences, accidental risks and natural threats of
  disease, has been broadly conceptualised as a Web
  of Prevention (WoP).
• (Pearson 1993, International Committee of the Red
  Cross 2003
• British Medical Association 1999, 2004 Feaks et
  al. 2007)

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Exercise 1

• The WoP what should be done?
• Discuss what kind of international and national
  measures should/could be developed as part of the
  WoP (10 min)
• Specify security measures to mitigate risks from
  public health and terrorist threats, and from the
  unpredictable future of the life sciences.
• Report to the class.

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Possible components of a WoP

• To address risks of natural outbreaks of
  infectious disease
• Public health preparedness and response planning
• To address safety/accidental risks
• Laboratory regulations to safely manage
  dangerous pathogens and toxins, to prevent an
  accidental release into the environment and
  unauthorized access also to consider preventing
  the release of methodological information and
  outcomes to unauthorised people
• To address manmade threats
• Strong international arms control agreements with
  effective national implementation
• Internationally coordinated export controls
• Intelligence
• Biodefence
• To address the unpredictable future of the life
  sciences
• Oversight Review of security-sensitive science
  and technology developments
• Promotion of the responsible conduct of research
  through education

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Natural threats
Safety risks
Manmade threats
Governance of science
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Disease Detection Prevention

• Need for global capacity building in
• Diagnostic capacity for relevant diseases
• Tools for sampling, epidemiological intelligence
  and investigation
• Diagnostic and detection techniques, tools and
  equipment
• Adequate technical expertise
• International, regional and national laboratory
  networks
• Relevant standards, standard operating procedures
  and best practices
• Cooperation on the research and development of
  vaccines and diagnostic reagents, and between
  international reference laboratories and research
  institutions.
• (United Nations 2010)
• International policy
• International Health Regulations (WHO 2005)

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Public health/biodefence nexus

• Public health response and preparedness for
  natural outbreaks share characteristics with
  biodefence against terrorism, while the latter
  also requires specific measures to counter
  attacks with weapons (see Franz 2011)
• Being better prepared to deal with terrorism
  can mean better public health systems overall.
  (Remarks by Kofi Annan 2006)

Terrorism, Crime warfare
Natural outbreaks
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Public health/arms control nexus
Since there is no single technology or process
that could be applied to prevent or deter
biological weapons international instruments
for nonproliferation and public health are
critical factors in achieving global health
security. (Bakanidze, Imnadze and Perkins 2010)
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Laboratory measures

• WHO Biosafety Guidelines (2004)
• Laboratory biosafety is the term used to
  describe the containment principles, technologies
  and practices that are implemented to prevent
  unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins,
  or their accidental release.
• Laboratory biosecurity refers to institutional
  and personal security measures designed to
  prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion or
  intentional release of pathogens and toxins.

Effective biosafety practices are the very
foundation of laboratory biosecurity activities.
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Laboratory measures

• No one size fits all
• The Guidelines state that biosafety levels,
  practices and equipment relates but does
  not equate risk groups to the biosafety level
  of laboratories designed to work with organisms
  in each risk group

• National standards should be developed to
  recognize and address the ongoing responsibility
  of countries and institutions to protect
  specimens, pathogens and toxins from misuse

(For risk groups, see the note section of this
slide)
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Laboratory measures

• WHO Biosafety Guidelines but no international
  standards
• Difficult to develop a national standard or
  guidelines
• Is physical protection enough to ensure safety?
  (are there other social elements relevant to the
  issue?)
• Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard
  (CWA-157932008)
• The CWA 157932008 is the first internationally
  recognised management standard to specifically
  address hazards associated with microbiological
  laboratories at all containment levels.
• The standard also provides a structured
  approach to managing risk associated with people,
  facilities and working procedures in laboratory
  environments.

(Huntly 2011)
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International prohibition regimes

• Geneva Protocol of 1925
• Bans the use of bacteriological weapons
• The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
  (BTWC) of 1972/1975
• Adds further bans e.g. on development of BW of
  all kinds
• The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1995
• Also covers toxins
• UN Security Council Resolution 1540 of 2004
• Requires all UN member states to ban nuclear,
  chemical and biological weapons by non-state
  actors

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International prohibition regimes

• Article I of the BTWC
• Each State Party to this Convention undertakes
  never in any circumstances to develop, produce,
  stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain
• 1. Microbial or other biological agents, or
  toxins whatever their origin or method of
  production, of types and in quantities that have
  no justification for prophylactic, protective or
  other peaceful purposes

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Export Controls

• Aim ensuring that exports do not contribute to
  the development of chemical or biological weapons
• Targets agents, equipment and expertise
• (e.g. control lists)
• Challenges controlling the intangibles
• (e.g. scientific findings, DNA sequences for
  certain pathogens, methods of weaponization)

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Export Controls

• Security and development dilemmas
• Article III of the BTWC prohibits the transfer
  of any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment
  or means of delivery specified in article I of
  this Convention.
• Article X of the BTWC allows the fullest
  possible exchange of equipment, materials and
  scientific and technological information for the
  use of bacteriological (biological) agents and
  toxins for peaceful purposes.
• Strengthening non-proliferation regimes while
  not hampering economic and technological
  development is a critical agenda for both
  dual-use technology and for security

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Effective Intelligence

• Effective intelligence
• essential for founding good policy and ensuring
  the effective understanding of emerging
  challenges
• Failures in intelligence
• Intelligence failures are nothing new and will
  certainly occur again in the future (Dando
  2006) (e.g. Allied overestimation of German
  biological weapons capabilities in the World War
  period recent Iraq WMD and former Soviet BW
  programmes in reaction to the US biodefence
  programme) (Bansak 2011)
• Accurate information analysis is not
  straightforward, but is essential for good
  policy decisions

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Biodefence

• Snapshot of biodefence broader than medical
  counter measures

Biodefence Activities Equipment and Facilities
Detection and surveillance Sample collection of biological agents Information gathering and analysis Decontamination Determination of the medical treatment priority of infected victims and their transportation Counter BW programmes Portable sample collection devices Infectious disease designated medical facilities Micro-organism identification facility Advanced outdoor testing facility Reconnaissance vehicle Biological agent warning equipment
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Biodefence

• Closely intertwined offensive and defensive
  capabilities
• A defensive programme not supported by an
  offensive programme can be worthless. You cannot
  know how to defend against something unless you
  can visualise various methods which can be used
  against you.
• (General Creasy, 1958)
• The order in the US tended to be, first, weapon
  development, then development of safety measures
  for troops using the weapons, and, last,
  development of protective countermeasures against
  enemy biological weapons.
• (SIPRI Vol.2)
• Transparency is a key against arms
  race/proliferation
• (Wright and Ketcham 1990)

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Oversight of Research

• Oversight of dual use research (i.e. research
  which serves, or could serve, both a benign and a
  malign purpose)
• Crucial in minimising the possibility of the
  assimilation of biological and toxin weapons into
  states military arsenals
• Often difficult to tell where to draw the line
  between prohibited and permitted research
• Crucial in avoiding the possibility of
  unnecessary restrictions to scientific freedom
• (Miller and Selgelid 2007, Smith et. al 2010)

Dual-use dilemma
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Oversight of Research

• Statement on the consideration of biodefence and
  biosecurity (2003)
• Signed by editors of various prestigious
  scientific journals, including
• Nature, Science and some 30 other journals.
• We recognize that on occasions an editor may
  conclude that the potential harm of publication
  outweighs the potential societal benefits.
• .....the paper should be modified, or not be
  published.
• However, Journals and scientific societies can
  play an important role in encouraging
  investigators to communicate results of research
  in ways that maximize public benefits and
  minimize risks of misuse.
• .....seminars, meetings, electronic posting,
  etc.

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Exercise 2

• Role of scientists in the WoP?
• Discuss the role of scientists in the effort to
  enhance the elements of the WoP (10 min). Who
  should be responsible for identifying and
  monitoring possible research areas of
  concern(scientists, institutions, professional
  bodies, or government) ?
• How should the balance between security and the
  freedom of science be struck?
• Report to the class.

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Reviews of Science and Technology

• Reviewing of Science and Technology (ST) is key
  to security
• The formulation of national security policy is
  partly informed by states in regional and
  international security arrangements.
• ST developments in the life sciences will
  continue to be considered in the chemical and
  biological weapon (CBW) arms control framework.
• (Hart and Trapp 2011)

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Reviews of Science and Technology

• BTWC Article XII
• ...a conference of States Partiesshall be held
  at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation
  of the Convention, with a view to assuring that
  the purposes of the preamble and the provisions
  of the Convention
• Such review shall take into account any new
  scientific and technological developments
  relevant to the Convention.

There is overwhelming acceptance that advances
in ST have implications for a number of articles
of the BTWC.
(McLeish and Revill 2011)
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A pre-requisite for life scientists as
they engage with the WoP
Education

• Needed to effectively review ST under the BTWC
  and to strengthen biosecurity measures requires
  the engagement of practicing scientists
• Needed to prevent unnecessary restrictions to
  scientific freedom,

Engagement of informed life scientists about
biosecurity issues is key to successful security

• Education of, and capacity building among,
  scientists on biosecurity issues is necessary for
  successful security
• Uninformed scientists no effective science
  policy inputs to the WoP

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Education

• Accumulation of international calls for education
• Inter-Academy Panel Statement on Biosecurity
  2005
• WHO Working Group Reports 2005, 2007
• OECD Best Practice Guidelines 2007
• US National Strategy for Countering Biological
  Threats 2009
• BTWC Final Report of MSP 2005, 2008, 2011

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Education

• 2011 BTWC Final Document of the 7th Review
  Conference Education will be featured in
  future
• As an annual discussion point under the Standing
  Agenda Item on review of science and
  technological development (the governance of
  science and technology under the BTWC)
• As a capacity building method for strengthening
  the implementation of the prohibition aspect of
  the BTWC (security purposes)
• As a capacity building method for developing
  international cooperation in science and
  technology (development purposes)

Education A prerequisite for security,
education and governance under the BTWC
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Lack of biosecurity education programmes at the
level of higher education an urgent need for
international efforts
Education
Region/ Country Year Sampled Courses Principal Results
Europe 2008 142 courses in 29 countries Only 3 out of the universities surveyed in Europe offered some form of specific biosecurity module
Japan 2009 197 courses in 62 universities Implementation of ethics education for scientists rarely included dual-use issues
Israel 2009 35 courses in 7 universities A biosecurity act exists along with a report on bioterrorism by its national academy and security council but no education courses
Asia- Pacific 2010 197 courses in 58 universities Few biosecurity education courses, but nascent and growing interest in regional cooperation to promote education
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Nationalizing the WoP?

• How can the WoP be implemented nationally?

• Different countries have different
  socio-economic contexts,
• therefore, no one size fits all approach will
  work

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List of References

• The references cited in this lecture are viewable
  in the Notes section of this presentation.