Title: National Series Lecture 3 The Web of Prevention
1National SeriesLecture 3 The Web of Prevention
- Bradford Disarmament Research CentreDivision of
Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK
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2Outline
- The new reality What should be done?
- Exercise 1
- The Web of Prevention
- Exercise 2
- References
3Reviewing the threats (Lecture 2)
Natural outbreaks of infectious disease
Safety/accidental risks at laboratories
Manmade threats warfare, crime and terrorism
Unpredictable future of the life sciences
- No single focal point of threats
- Many potential actors, materials and information
can be related to dual-use issues, existing at
international, regional, national, local and
individual levels
4What should be done?
- The aim of bisecurity measures
- To persuade those contemplating the misuse of
modern biology for hostile purposes that the
effort and costs are just not worth it at many
different levels. - (Dando 2006)
- The new reality action is required at ALL
levels - Individual, sub-national, national, regional,
like minded, and international, public, private,
government and intergovernmental levels. - (Littlewood 2005)
5The Web of Prevention (WoP)
- A multifaceted construct of national and
international efforts to mitigate and respond to
the potential for the destructive use of the life
sciences, accidental risks and natural threats of
disease, has been broadly conceptualised as a Web
of Prevention (WoP). - (Pearson 1993, International Committee of the Red
Cross 2003 - British Medical Association 1999, 2004 Feaks et
al. 2007)
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6Exercise 1
- The WoP what should be done?
- Discuss what kind of international and national
measures should/could be developed as part of the
WoP (10 min) - Specify security measures to mitigate risks from
public health and terrorist threats, and from the
unpredictable future of the life sciences. - Report to the class.
7Possible components of a WoP
- To address risks of natural outbreaks of
infectious disease - Public health preparedness and response planning
- To address safety/accidental risks
- Laboratory regulations to safely manage
dangerous pathogens and toxins, to prevent an
accidental release into the environment and
unauthorized access also to consider preventing
the release of methodological information and
outcomes to unauthorised people - To address manmade threats
- Strong international arms control agreements with
effective national implementation - Internationally coordinated export controls
- Intelligence
- Biodefence
- To address the unpredictable future of the life
sciences - Oversight Review of security-sensitive science
and technology developments - Promotion of the responsible conduct of research
through education
8Natural threats
Safety risks
Manmade threats
Governance of science
9Disease Detection Prevention
- Need for global capacity building in
- Diagnostic capacity for relevant diseases
- Tools for sampling, epidemiological intelligence
and investigation - Diagnostic and detection techniques, tools and
equipment - Adequate technical expertise
- International, regional and national laboratory
networks - Relevant standards, standard operating procedures
and best practices - Cooperation on the research and development of
vaccines and diagnostic reagents, and between
international reference laboratories and research
institutions. - (United Nations 2010)
- International policy
- International Health Regulations (WHO 2005)
10Public health/biodefence nexus
- Public health response and preparedness for
natural outbreaks share characteristics with
biodefence against terrorism, while the latter
also requires specific measures to counter
attacks with weapons (see Franz 2011) - Being better prepared to deal with terrorism
can mean better public health systems overall.
(Remarks by Kofi Annan 2006)
Terrorism, Crime warfare
Natural outbreaks
11Public health/arms control nexus
Since there is no single technology or process
that could be applied to prevent or deter
biological weapons international instruments
for nonproliferation and public health are
critical factors in achieving global health
security. (Bakanidze, Imnadze and Perkins 2010)
12Laboratory measures
- WHO Biosafety Guidelines (2004)
- Laboratory biosafety is the term used to
describe the containment principles, technologies
and practices that are implemented to prevent
unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins,
or their accidental release. - Laboratory biosecurity refers to institutional
and personal security measures designed to
prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion or
intentional release of pathogens and toxins.
Effective biosafety practices are the very
foundation of laboratory biosecurity activities.
13Laboratory measures
- No one size fits all
- The Guidelines state that biosafety levels,
practices and equipment relates but does
not equate risk groups to the biosafety level
of laboratories designed to work with organisms
in each risk group
- National standards should be developed to
recognize and address the ongoing responsibility
of countries and institutions to protect
specimens, pathogens and toxins from misuse
(For risk groups, see the note section of this
slide)
14Laboratory measures
- WHO Biosafety Guidelines but no international
standards - Difficult to develop a national standard or
guidelines - Is physical protection enough to ensure safety?
(are there other social elements relevant to the
issue?) - Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard
(CWA-157932008) - The CWA 157932008 is the first internationally
recognised management standard to specifically
address hazards associated with microbiological
laboratories at all containment levels. - The standard also provides a structured
approach to managing risk associated with people,
facilities and working procedures in laboratory
environments.
(Huntly 2011)
15International prohibition regimes
- Geneva Protocol of 1925
- Bans the use of bacteriological weapons
- The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC) of 1972/1975 - Adds further bans e.g. on development of BW of
all kinds - The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1995
- Also covers toxins
- UN Security Council Resolution 1540 of 2004
- Requires all UN member states to ban nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons by non-state
actors
16International prohibition regimes
- Article I of the BTWC
- Each State Party to this Convention undertakes
never in any circumstances to develop, produce,
stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain - 1. Microbial or other biological agents, or
toxins whatever their origin or method of
production, of types and in quantities that have
no justification for prophylactic, protective or
other peaceful purposes
17Export Controls
- Aim ensuring that exports do not contribute to
the development of chemical or biological weapons - Targets agents, equipment and expertise
- (e.g. control lists)
- Challenges controlling the intangibles
- (e.g. scientific findings, DNA sequences for
certain pathogens, methods of weaponization)
18Export Controls
- Security and development dilemmas
- Article III of the BTWC prohibits the transfer
of any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment
or means of delivery specified in article I of
this Convention. - Article X of the BTWC allows the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials and
scientific and technological information for the
use of bacteriological (biological) agents and
toxins for peaceful purposes. - Strengthening non-proliferation regimes while
not hampering economic and technological
development is a critical agenda for both
dual-use technology and for security
19Effective Intelligence
- Effective intelligence
- essential for founding good policy and ensuring
the effective understanding of emerging
challenges - Failures in intelligence
- Intelligence failures are nothing new and will
certainly occur again in the future (Dando
2006)(e.g. Allied overestimation of German
biological weapons capabilities in the World War
period recent Iraq WMD and former Soviet BW
programmes in reaction to the US biodefence
programme) (Bansak 2011) - Accurate information analysis is not
straightforward, but is essential for good
policy decisions
20Biodefence
- Snapshot of biodefence broader than medical
counter measures
Biodefence Activities Equipment and Facilities
Detection and surveillance Sample collection of biological agents Information gathering and analysis Decontamination Determination of the medical treatment priority of infected victims and their transportation Counter BW programmes Portable sample collection devices Infectious disease designated medical facilities Micro-organism identification facility Advanced outdoor testing facility Reconnaissance vehicle Biological agent warning equipment
21Biodefence
- Closely intertwined offensive and defensive
capabilities - A defensive programme not supported by an
offensive programme can be worthless. You cannot
know how to defend against something unless you
can visualise various methods which can be used
against you. - (General Creasy, 1958)
- The order in the US tended to be, first, weapon
development, then development of safety measures
for troops using the weapons, and, last,
development of protective countermeasures against
enemy biological weapons. - (SIPRI Vol.2)
- Transparency is a key against arms
race/proliferation - (Wright and Ketcham 1990)
22Oversight of Research
- Oversight of dual use research (i.e. research
which serves, or could serve, both a benign and a
malign purpose) - Crucial in minimising the possibility of the
assimilation of biological and toxin weapons into
states military arsenals - Often difficult to tell where to draw the line
between prohibited and permitted research - Crucial in avoiding the possibility of
unnecessary restrictions to scientific freedom - (Miller and Selgelid 2007, Smith et. al 2010)
Dual-use dilemma
23Oversight of Research
- Statement on the consideration of biodefence and
biosecurity (2003) - Signed by editors of various prestigious
scientific journals, including - Nature, Science and some 30 other journals.
- We recognize that on occasions an editor may
conclude that the potential harm of publication
outweighs the potential societal benefits. - .....the paper should be modified, or not be
published. - However, Journals and scientific societies can
play an important role in encouraging
investigators to communicate results of research
in ways that maximize public benefits and
minimize risks of misuse. - .....seminars, meetings, electronic posting,
etc.
24Exercise 2
- Role of scientists in the WoP?
- Discuss the role of scientists in the effort to
enhance the elements of the WoP (10 min). Who
should be responsible for identifying and
monitoring possible research areas of
concern(scientists, institutions, professional
bodies, or government) ? - How should the balance between security and the
freedom of science be struck? - Report to the class.
25Reviews of Science and Technology
- Reviewing of Science and Technology (ST) is key
to security -
- The formulation of national security policy is
partly informed by states in regional and
international security arrangements. - ST developments in the life sciences will
continue to be considered in the chemical and
biological weapon (CBW) arms control framework. - (Hart and Trapp 2011)
26Reviews of Science and Technology
- BTWC Article XII
- ...a conference of States Partiesshall be held
at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation
of the Convention, with a view to assuring that
the purposes of the preamble and the provisions
of the Convention - Such review shall take into account any new
scientific and technological developments
relevant to the Convention.
There is overwhelming acceptance that advances
in ST have implications for a number of articles
of the BTWC.
(McLeish and Revill 2011)
27 A pre-requisite for life scientists as
they engage with the WoP
Education
- Needed to effectively review ST under the BTWC
and to strengthen biosecurity measures requires
the engagement of practicing scientists - Needed to prevent unnecessary restrictions to
scientific freedom,
Engagement of informed life scientists about
biosecurity issues is key to successful security
- Education of, and capacity building among,
scientists on biosecurity issues is necessary for
successful security - Uninformed scientists no effective science
policy inputs to the WoP
28Education
- Accumulation of international calls for education
- Inter-Academy Panel Statement on Biosecurity
2005 - WHO Working Group Reports 2005, 2007
- OECD Best Practice Guidelines 2007
- US National Strategy for Countering Biological
Threats 2009 - BTWC Final Report of MSP 2005, 2008, 2011
29Education
- 2011 BTWC Final Document of the 7th Review
Conference Education will be featured in
future - As an annual discussion point under the Standing
Agenda Item on review of science and
technological development (the governance of
science and technology under the BTWC) - As a capacity building method for strengthening
the implementation of the prohibition aspect of
the BTWC (security purposes) - As a capacity building method for developing
international cooperation in science and
technology (development purposes)
Education A prerequisite for security,
education and governance under the BTWC
30Lack of biosecurity education programmes at the
level of higher education an urgent need for
international efforts
Education
Region/ Country Year Sampled Courses Principal Results
Europe 2008 142 courses in 29 countries Only 3 out of the universities surveyed in Europe offered some form of specific biosecurity module
Japan 2009 197 courses in 62 universities Implementation of ethics education for scientists rarely included dual-use issues
Israel 2009 35 courses in 7 universities A biosecurity act exists along with a report on bioterrorism by its national academy and security council but no education courses
Asia- Pacific 2010 197 courses in 58 universities Few biosecurity education courses, but nascent and growing interest in regional cooperation to promote education
31Nationalizing the WoP?
- How can the WoP be implemented nationally?
- Different countries have different
socio-economic contexts, - therefore, no one size fits all approach will
work
32List of References
- The references cited in this lecture are viewable
in the Notes section of this presentation.