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Title: Adam Hennen


1
Dialing in on Fraud Eliminating its Impact on
the Bottom Line
  • Presented By
  • Adam Hennen

2
The Global Impact of Fraud
  • In 2010, the Association of Certified Fraud
    Examiners compiled a study of 1,843 fraud cases.
    It was estimated that the typical organization
    loses 5 of its annual revenue to fraud. Applied
    to the estimated 2010 Gross World Product, this
    figure translates to a potential total fraud loss
    of more than 3.15 trillion (733 billion dollars
    in the U.S. alone).
  • The frauds lasted a median of 18 months before
    being detected.

3
Fraud in Telecommunications?
  • Based on average operating revenues of telephone
    companies in 2010, the effect of fraud could
    result in the following losses

4
Fraud in Telecommunications?...REALLY?
5
Whos Responsible?
6
How Did it Happen?
  • Occupational Frauds by Category (U.S. only)
    Frequency4

4The sum of percentages in this chart exceeds
100 because several cases involved schemes from
more than one category.
7
How Did it Happen? (Cont.)
  • Occupational Frauds by Category (U.S. only)
    Median Loss

8
How Did it Happen? (Cont.)
  • Schemes Committed by Perpetrators in the
    Accounting Department 367 Cases23

23The sum of percentages in this chart exceeds
100 because several cases involved schemes from
more than one category.
Data from the 2010 ACFE Report to the Nations on
Occupational Fraud and Abuse.
9
How Did it Happen? (Cont.)
  • Schemes Committed by Perpetrators in the
    Purchasing Department 103 Cases28

28The sum of percentages in this chart exceeds
100 because several cases involved schemes from
more than one category.
Data from the 2010 ACFE Report to the Nations on
Occupational Fraud and Abuse.
10
How Did They Do it?
  • Schemes Committed by Perpetrators in the Primary
    Operations of the Victim Organization 299 Cases1

1The sum of percentages in this chart exceeds
100 because several cases involved schemes from
more than one category.
11
Our Accountants Did What?
  • CHECK TAMPERING Any fraud scheme in which a
    person steals his employers funds by
    intercepting, forging or altering a check drawn
    on one of the organizations bank accounts.
  • EXAMPLE Thomas Bell, a fiscal officer of Let
    it Ring Phone Company, had access to company
    checks but was not authorized to sign them.
    Toms company used an automated check signer
    (a.k.a. a signature stamp), which was guarded
    by a custodian. Tom took some blank checks and
    made them payable to himself, then snuck into the
    custodians office and signed them with the check
    signer.

12
Check Tampering
  • How many companies keep their signature stamp in
    a locked drawer.
  • Does the accountant who prints checks have access
    to that drawer?
  • Is the accountant who prints checks the custodian
    of the signature stamp?

13
Shifting Responsibilities
  • Banks responsibility for check fraud
  • Under UCC Regulations, changes were made to
    articles 3 and 4, which shifted liability for
    check fraud back to the companies that wrote the
    checks in question.
  • The banks obligation to provide ordinary care
    may not include signature verification.

14
Our Purchasing Department Did What?
  • BILLING SCHEMES Any scheme in which a person
    causes his employer to issue a payment by
    submitting invoices for fictitious goods or
    services, inflated invoices or invoices for
    personal purchases.
  • EXAMPLE Jon Bell (Toms Brother) is in charge
    of purchasing on behalf of Let it Ring Phone
    Company. Instead of buying merchandise directly
    from a vendor, Jon sets up a shell company and
    purchases the merchandise through that fictitious
    entity. He then resells the merchandise to his
    employer from the shell company at an inflated
    price, thereby making an unauthorized profit on
    the transaction.

15
Billing Segregation
  • Purchase requisitions should be reviewed and
    approved by someone other than the employee
    initiating the request.
  • Purchase orders should only be generated by
    employees in the purchasing department. These
    employees should not have access to generate or
    authorize purchase requests or receive goods.
  • Vendor invoice approval should be restricted to
    the employee who initiated and authorized the
    purchase request or a person independent of the
    purchasing function.
  • A report of all Pos issued to vendors should be
    reviewed by a supervisory-level employee not
    involved in initiating purchase orders with
    vendors.

16
Fraud by Credit Card
  • James, the chief of a small fire district in the
    state of Washington, obtained an unauthorized
    credit card in the districts name. He
    circumvented the districts internal controls by
    intercepting the mail, removing the monthly
    credit card statement and making personal
    payments on the account to conceal the
    unauthorized purchases. The chief made personal
    charges in excess of 7,700, and was finally
    detected after retiring for personal reasons and
    the signatories were changed on all the bank
    accounts. The chief reimbursed the district for
    the personal charges and was not charged
    criminally.

17
Fraud by Credit Card (Cont.)
  • To better prevent fraud by credit card,
    organizations should
  • Establish written policies and procedures for
    credit card use and train employees to ensure
    they use the cards only for official business.
  • Always obtain purchase receipts from employees
    and never pay bills using only the monthly credit
    card statements.
  • Properly train employees on the authorization and
    approval procedures for all disbursements.
  • Appropriately segregate employee duties and
    periodically monitor the work of key employees to
    ensure its expectations are being met.

18
WE SUSPECT FRAUDNOW WHAT?
  • Perform an internal investigation.
  • Make inquiries.
  • Observe Red Flag activity.
  • Hire a professional investigation (CFE, CPA,
    Lawyer, etc..)

19
Profile of a Fraudster
  • Living the fraud life. According to the 2010
    Report to the Nations, there are several
    behaviors that serve as red flags displayed by
    perpetrators. The two most common traits are a
    tendency to live beyond ones means, and a
    struggle with financial difficulties. More than
    a third of those identified displayed at least
    one of the aforementioned behaviors, and about 20
    percent had either a wheeler-dealer attitude,
    control issues (unwillingness to share duties),
    or personal problems, such as a divorce. Other
    red flags might include irritability or
    defensiveness, addiction problems, past legal
    problems, refusal to take vacation and
    complaining about inadequate pay.

20
Red Flags of Fraud
  • Behavioral Red Flags of Perpetrators29

29The sum of percentages in this chart exceeds
100 because in many cases perpetrators displayed
more than one behavioral red flag.
21
Making Inquiries
  • Suspects and witnesses often reveal more than
    they intend through their choices of words.
  • Start by asking the question.
  • Look for deviations that might suggest a person
    may be withholding, altering, or fabricating
    information.

22
10 Tell-Tale Signs of Deception
  1. Lack of Self-Reference
  2. Verb Tense
  3. Answering Questions with Questions
  4. Equivocation
  5. Oaths
  6. Euphemisms
  7. Alluding to Actions
  8. Lack of Detail
  9. Narrative Balance
  10. Mean Length of Utterance

23
Lack of Self Reference
  • Truthful people make frequent use of the pronoun
    I to describe their actions
  • EXAMPLE I arrived home at 630. The phone was
    ringing as I unlocked the front door, so I walked
    straight to the kitchen to answer it. I talked
    to my mother for 10 minutes before noticing that
    my TV and computer were missing from the living
    room.

24
Lack of Self Reference (Cont.)
  • Deceptive people often use language that
    minimizes references to themselves, usually by
    describing events in the passive voice.
  • EXAMPLES The safe was left unlocked rather
    than I left the safe unlocked. or The shipment
    was authorized rather than I authorized the
    shipment.

25
Answering Questions with Questions
  • Even liars prefer not to lie. Outright lies
    carry the risk of detection. Before answering a
    question with a lie, a deceptive person will
    usually try to avoid answering the question at
    all. A common method of dodging questions is to
    respond with a question of ones own.

26
Answering Questions with Questions (Cont.)
  • EXAMPLES
  • Why would I steal from the company?
  • Do I seem like the kind of person who would do
    something like that?
  • Dont you think somebody would have to be pretty
    stupid to remove cash from their own register
    drawer?

27
Oaths
  • Although deceptive people attempt to give as
    little useful information as possible, they try
    very hard to convince others that what they say
    is true. They do this by using oaths to try to
    make their statements sound more convincing.
  • Deceptive people are more likely than truthful
    people to use statements such as I swear, on
    my honor, as God is my witness, cross my
    heart.
  • Truthful people are more confident that the facts
    will prove their statements and feel less need to
    back their statements with oaths.

28
Lack of Detail
  • Truthful statements usually contain specific
    details, some of which may not even be relevant
    to the question asked. This happens because
    truthful subjects are retrieving events from
    long-term memory, and our memories store dozens
    of facts about each experience (the new shoes we
    were wearing, the song that was playing in the
    background, the woman at the next table, etc.).
    At least some of these details will show up in a
    truthful subjects statement.

29
Lack of Detail (Cont.)
  • Those who fabricate a story, however, tend to
    keep their statements simple and brief.
  • Deceptive people will want to minimize the risk
    that an investigation will discover evidence that
    could contradict their story. (i.e., the fewer
    facts proven false, the better.)

30
Additional Investigation
  • The endorsement on this check was made by a blind
    woman. The signature was forgedhow do we know?

31
Additional Investigation (Cont.)
32
Fraud is FoundNow What?
  • Do you know the extent of the losses?
  • Can you get it back?
  • Have you already been made whole?
  • Do you intend to prosecute?
  • Discuss the situation with legal counsel or a
    CPA/CFE.

33
Fraud Prevention
  • Small organizations are disproportionately
    victimized by occupational fraud. These
    organizations are typically lacking in anti-fraud
    controls compared to their larger counterparts,
    which makes them particularly vulnerable to
    fraud.
  • As part of the 2010 study of fraud cases, the
    examiners compared the presence of anti-fraud
    controls at companies with fewer than 100
    employees to the controls at companies with more
    than 100 employees.
  • Study results reveal that smaller companies have
    fewer fraud preventative controls in place than
    the larger companies.

34
Fraud Prevention (Cont.) Frequency of Anti-Fraud
Controls by Size of Victim Organization
35
Detection of Fraud Schemes
36
Detection of Fraud Schemes (Cont.)
37
Fraud Prevention
  • While tips have consistently been the most common
    way to detect fraud, the impact of tips is, if
    anything, understated by the fact that so many
    organizations fail to implement fraud reporting
    systems (a.k.a Hotlines).
  • Such systems enable employees to anonymously
    report fraud or misconduct by phone or through a
    web-based portal.

38
Fraud Prevention (Cont.)
  • Formal codes of conduct and anti-fraud policies
    cost very little to implement, but serve as an
    effective way to make a clear and explicit
    statement against fraudulent and unethical
    conduct within an organization.
  • Hotlines are consistently the most effective
    fraud detection method and would go a long way in
    helping small-business owners protect their
    assets from dishonest employees.
  • The median loss for frauds at companies with
    hotlines was 59 smaller than the median loss for
    frauds at organizations without such a mechanism.

39
Fraud Prevention (Cont.)
17KEY External Audit of F/S Independent
external audits of the organizations financial
statements Internal Audit / FE Department
Internal audit department or fraud examination
department External Audit of ICOFR Independent
audits of the organizations internal controls
over financial reporting Management Certification
of F/S Management certification of the
organizations financial statements
40
Fraud Prevention (Cont.)
  • How Important is Segregation of Duties?
  • In nearly two thirds of the fraud schemes
    covered by the ACFEs 2010 report to the nations,
    the person committing the fraud acted alone.
  • However, when collusion of two or more employees
    existed in a fraud case, the damages were much
    more costly.

41
Fraud Prevention (Cont.)
  • Primary Internal Control Weakness Observed by CFEs

42
Creating the Perception of Detection
  • The best way to prevent fraud is by creating a
    perception of detection. Generally speaking,
    occupational fraud perpetrators only commit fraud
    if they believe they will not be caught.
  • The threat of surprise audits increases
    employees perception that fraud will be detected
    and thus has a strong deterrent effect on
    potential fraudsters.
  • Surprise audits, fraud policies, hotlines,
    etcare only effective if people KNOW THEY EXIST!

43
Creating the Perception of Detection (Cont.)
44
Creating the Perception of Detection (Cont.)
45
THANK YOU!
  • Adam J. Hennen, CPA, CFE
  • Olsen Thielen, CPAs
  • ahennen_at_otcpas.com
  • 651-483-4521 (main office)
  • 651-621-8523 (direct)
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