The story of the Southern Gulf of St.-Lawrence snow crab fishery

1
The story of theSouthern Gulf of St.-Lawrence
snow crab fishery

• Prepared by EXMAR inc
• Fisheries Management Consultant
• Shippagan, N.B.

2

• Presented by
• LAssociation des crabiers acadiens
• Les Crabiers du nord-est

3
The fishing fleets historical profile

• Approximately 700 fishers from the Acadian
  Peninsula in NB, from the Gaspé Peninsula and the
  Magdalene Islands in QC and from Cap Breton in
  NS 
• Prov. Licences Fishers
• NB 81 446
• QC 47 259
• NS 2 11
• Total 130 716

4
The main characteristic of thesnow crab stock

• Its biomass fluctuates according to a still
  unexplained natural cycle
• Phases of notable abundance increases are
  followed by periods of significant stock decline

5
Who are the snow crab fishers

• They are former groundfish fishers.
• They started this new fishery in the early 60s
  following the first collapse of the cod and
  redfish stocks in the Southern Gulf of
  St.-Lawrence
• The vast majority of the 130original family
  operated fishing enterprisesare still active in
  the Area 12 snow crab fishery today

6
Who are the snow crab fishers

• In 1978, DFO stopped issuing new snow crab
  licenses in their fishing territoryknown as Area
  12
• At the same time, the DFO proceeded to cut the
  edges of their fishing territory so that 6 new
  smaller Fishing Areas could be established along
  the coasts of Quebec, Cap Breton, and, later,
  Prince-Edward-Island.

7
NF
QC
12
NB
NS
8
In 1978

• Area 13 49 licenses
• Area 14 21 licenses
• Area 15 8 licenses
• Area 16 38 licenses
• Area 17 22 licenses
• Total 138 licenses

9
In 1979

• Area 18 31 licenses
• Area 19 79 licenses
• Total 110 licenses

10
NF
QC
12
NB
NS
11
NF
QC
12
NB
NS
12
In 1985

• Areas 25 and 26 30 licenses

13
NF
QC
12
NB
NS
14
The  boom and bust  period

• From 1979 onward, the crab industry will boom
  for a short while.
• The Japanese buyers are very active alongside a
  modern fleet of fishing vesselsand processing
  plants.
• Between 1978 and 1982, catches increased rapidly
  from 10 500 mt to 31 500 mt

15
The  boom and bust  period

• At the time, the DFO managers argued that these
  ever increasing catch rates testified to an ever
  increasing abundance of crab on the fishing
  grounds
• The fishermen disagreed with this assessment and
  ascribed their abundant catches to the improved
  performance of their fishing vessels and fishing
  gear

16
The  boom and bust  period

• The fishers assessment was eventually proven
  right by DFOs own scientists in 1992
• The increase in landings from 1978 (10
  462tm)to 1982 (31 582 tm) can be ascribed to
  this expansion and to a more efficient
  harvestingof the available resource rather than
  an increase of the stock biomass.
• Technical Report No. 1827F, CAFSAC,1992

17
The  boom and bust  period

• This erroneous perception of an abundant biomass
  of crab by DFO managers led to the
  over-exploitation which in turn led to a stock
  collapse in 1989
• From 31 500 tm in 1982, catches declined to25
  000 tm in 1985 and shrunk to a mere8 000 tm in
  1989
• In the spring of that year, DFO managers finally
  decided to close the fishery once a majority of
  crab fishermen had voluntarily put an end to
  their fishing activities

18
Rebuilding the stockand the industry

• In 1990, the crabbers willingly accepted the
  challenge of rebuilding the stock and their
  fishery
• Strong conservations measures were established
  based upon a strict control of the fleets
  fishing capacity
• The number of licenses was frozen and the TAC was
  divided into fixed individual shares between the
  existing license holders

19
Rebuilding the stockand the industry

• The crab fleet supported innovative stock
  assessment/protection activities as well as
  enhanced monitoring of their fishery
• Between 1994 and 2002, these local entrepreneurs
  invested over 10 millions in support of these
  measures

20
Rebuilding the stockand the industry

• For its part, DFO agreed to
• Incorporate crabbers know-how and influence in
  the management of the stock and of their fishery
• Establish a moratorium on snow crab fishing
  licenses in Area 12

21
The 1990 snow crab agreement

• The crab resource was divided into
  fixedindividual quotas
• TAC was not to exceed 70 of the lowest
  scientific estimate
• Landings were to be monitored independently at
  dockside
• Fishery would close when catches reach 20 of
  molting crab

22
Distribution of individual quotasin the Area 12
snow crab fishery

• Negotiations were highly structured
• No fewer than 6 different sharing formulas
  tabled by DFO

23
Distribution of individual quotasin the Area 12
snow crab fishery

• Difficult and intricate negotiations took place
  between
• Those who favored competitive fisheries
• Those who favored individual quotas
• The fishers with large historical catches
• The fishers with small historical catches

24
Distribution of individual quotasin the Area 12
snow crab fishery

• The following two examples reveal the extent of
  the snow crab sharing process implemented within
  the Area 12 fishery in 1990.
• Both cases presented hereare those of fishers
  who are still activein the Area 12 crab fishery
  today.

25
Distribution of individual quotasin the Area 12
snow crab fishery

• At the outset of the negotiations
• Fisher B with a quota history six (6) times
  larger than Fisher A
• Fisher A held 66, 000 lbs
• Fisher B held 380, 000 lbs

26
Distribution of individual quotasin the Area 12
snow crab fishery

• At the end of the negotiations
• Fisher As share had increased by 224
• He now held 148, 000 lbs
• Fisher Bs share had decreased by 45
• He now held 210 000 lbs

27
In 1993, Minister Crosbie stated

• Following the success of IQs under the 1991-92
  management plan, a five-year IQ plan was
  established with management measures similar to
  those of last yaer. The move to a five-year
  plan is supported by industry.

28
In 1993, Minister Crosbie stated

• The industry should be acknowledged for its
  commitment to preserving this important resource
  and promoting effective management of the
  fishery.
• -News release dated April 8, 1993-

29
Return of stock abundance in 1994

• The crab fleet funds DFOs scientific research
  program
• The crab fleet sets up a fund for cod fishers
  under moratorium
• DFO assigns new fishing sub zones in Area 12
• (in agreement with the crab fleet)

30
NF
QC
12
NB
NS
31
In 1994

• Area 12 A 10 licenses
• Area 12 B 8 licenses
• Area 12 C 5 licenses
• Area 12 D 531 licenses
• Total 554 licenses

32
The 1995 crisis

• The first crab lottery draw
• Numerous temporary allocations of 10 000 lbs
  each are made available for the draw
• Additional exploratory fishing areas(E and F)
  are imposed in Area 12
• (without the crab fleets consent)

33
NF
Qc
12
NB
NS
34
In 1995

• Area E 8 licenses
• Area F 16 licenses
• Total 24 licenses

35
Minister Tobins position in 1995

• Conservation remains our principal goal.We will
  ensure that the resource and the viability of the
  existing fleets are not threatened by a permanent
  shift in fishing effortfrom one fishery to
  another.

36
Minister Tobins position in 1995

•  In the past, such permits were allowedto
  become a permanent part of the fisheryto which
  they applied.
• This is not the case in this instance.
• These seasonal temporary permitswill expire at
  the end of 1995 and will not be renewed in future
  years.
• - News release April 13, 1995 -

37
Minister Mifflins position in 1996

• Temporary permits are reissued
• The crab and shrimp fleets fear forthe future of
  their fishery

38
First partnership agreements

• Area 12 snow crab agreement of 1997
• Gulf of St.-Lawrence shrimp agreementof 1998

39
First partnership agreements

• Crabbers and shrimppers agreed that
• other fishers be given temporary access to their
  fisheries above a preset economic/ quota
  threshold.
• Financial contributions be given to DFO to fund
  conservation and protection as well as management
  activities .

40
First partnership agreements

• DFO agreed to
• Incorporate fishers know-how in the management
  of their respective fisheries
• Comply with the 1990 permanent sharing
  agreements of individual quotas
• No new permanent licenses/allocations will be
  issued

41
The Marshall decision in 1999

• Crabbers believe that snow crab is not subjected
  to the Halifax Treaties
• The snow crab fishing grounds are located
  outside the traditional Micmac and Malecite
  territories
• Snow crab is not a specie that was fished by the
  First Nations at the time the treaties were
  signed

42
The Marshall decision in 1999

• However, they agree to integrate First Nations
  fishers in their fishery, as long as
• Existing commercial crab licenses (along with
  the vessels) are acquired on a voluntary basis
• The First Nations fish their allocations
  themselves

43
Situation at the end of 2002

• The 1990 the snow crab agreement has held for 12
  years
• The 1991 the Gulf shrimp agreement has held for
  11 years
• No new permanent license or allocation of crab
  or shrimp has been granted since 1990

44
Second partnership proposals

• Same proposals are made to DFO by the crab fleet
  and the shrimp fleet
• They propose that new temporary access be
  granted to other fishers above a preset economic
  or quota threshold
• They propose financial contributions from the
  crab and the shrimp fleets towards the funding of
  their fisheries scientific, conservation,
  protection as well as management activities .

45
The 2003 crisis

• Fisheries and Oceans Canada
• honors the shrimp fleets proposal
• rejects the snow crab fleets proposal

46
The 1990snow crab agreement is rejected

• Numerous non crabbers are given a permanent
  share of the Area 12 snow crab fishery
• Fishing over-capacity is install in the absence
  of any long term sustainability assessment
• and despite risky fluctuations in stock
  abundance.

47
The 1991shrimp agreement is honored

• No permanent Gulf shrimp licenses are issued
  even though continuous landings increases were
  registered annually
• from 13 000 tm in 1992 and 28 000 tm in 2003

48
The snow crabI.Q. system of management is
discredited

• Each crabber lost 26.5 of his individual share
• (without compensation)
• 10,35 to the First Nations
• (5,44 buy back 10,35) 15,80
• 12,64 to the lobster and the ground fish
  fleets
• 3,37 to the inshore fishers from Nova Scotia
  (Area 18)

49
DFOs shrimpI.T.Q. system of management is
honored

• No permanent lost of individual quota is
  sustained by any shrimp vessel DFO honors all
  Individual shares

50

• The Minister rejects a private/public partnership
  offer from the crab fleet worth2 500 000
  annually
• The Minister honors a private/public partnership
  offer from the shrimp fleet worth 140, 000
  annually

51

• DFO cancels out the crabbers influence on the
  management of their fishery
• The Department adds 33 new groups of players
  on the Area 12 snow crab advisory committee
• DFO protects the shrimpers influence on the
  management of their fishery
• Not even one group of new fishers gain access to
  the Gulf of St.- Lawrence shrimp advisory
  committee

52
The eviction of the crabbers influence in the
management of their fishery

• Before 2003
• The 8 crabbers associations held 100 of the
  harvesting sectors representation on the various
  DFO forums dedicated to the Area 12 crab stock
  and fishery.

53
The eviction of the crabbers influence in the
management of their fishery

• In March 2004
• - 13 new groups of lobster fishers had been
  given 32 of the crab sectors representation
• - 12 First Nations had been given 29 of
  harvesting sectors representation
• - 8 new groups of cod fishers had been given a
  further 20 of the sectors representation

54
The eviction of the crabbers influence in the
management of their fishery

• The influence of the 8 crabbers associations on
  the management of their fishery and of the Area
  12 stock had thus been reduced from 100 to 20.

55
First Nations representation (12 new groups)

• Indian Island
• Lennox Island
• Burnt Church
• Abegweit
• Big Cove
• Eel River Bar
• Maria
• Restigouche
• Pabineau

56
First Nations representation (12 new groups)

• Bouctouche
• Gaspé
• Red Bank

57
Non-crabbers representation (21 new groups)

• Gulf NS Fishermen Coalition (NS)
• Inverness South Fishermens Ass. (NS)
• Maritime Fishermens Union Local 4 (NS)
• Gulf N.S. Bonafide Fishermen ass. (NS)
• Area 18 Crab Fishermen Ass. (NS)
• North of Smokey Fishermen Ass (NS)
• PEI Fishermen Ass. (PEI)
• Mobile ground fish-dependant ass. (PEI)

58
Non-crabbers representation (21 new groups)

• Ass. des pêche. de la MRC-Pabok (QC)
• Ass. morutiers trad. de la Gaspésie (QC)
• Ass. pêcheurs de lAnse à Brillant (QC)
• Alliance pêch. Prof. Du Québec (QC)
• Féd. pêch. semi-haut. du Québec (QC)
• Regroupement pêch. prof. des I de la M (QC)

59
Non-crabbers representation (21 new groups)

• Ass. pêch. de p. de f. acadiens (NB)
• Northumberland Fishermen Ass. (NB)
• UPM Shédiac (NB)
• UPM Shédiac (NB)
• UPM Tracadie-Sheila (NB)

60
Consequences of the 2003 plan

• Conditions and alliances that had been essential
  to the construct of this sustainable fishery were
  shattered
• The 1990 restrictions to the fleets capacity
  were eliminated
• The co-management process with DFO was broken
• The cohesion between fishers organizations was
  also broken

61
The 1990 restrictions to the fleets capacity
were eliminated

• The credibility of the individual quota system
  was undermined by the expansionof the fleet
• and by the reduction of each crabbers historical
  share of the fishery

62
DFOs message to the crabbers in 1990

• Agree to the restrictions offixed individual
  quotas
• You will help the resource and you will reap
  the economic benefitsdown the road!

63
DFOs message to the crabbers in 2003

• Thank you for your help, Buddy!
• It is time for us to give your fishery to
  others!
• Divide and conquer

64

• Lets have a second look atFisher A and Fisher
  B

65

• The 1990 sharing agreement gave fisher A a higher
  portion of the stock than the value, in
  percentage, of his historical catches in order to
  foster the long term viability of his fishing
  enterprise
• His quota was raised by 224 climbing from66
  000 lbs to 148 000 lbs
• In 1990 numbers, his quota had dropped to108 000
  lbs in 2003
• His enterprise was once again made unviable in
  the long term

66

• On the other side of the ledger, the Fisher B
  quota went from 380 000 lbs to 210 000 lbs to 154
  350 lbs in 2003
• This enterprise suffered a cumulative lost of
  225 650 lbs or 59 of his historical share since
  1990 along with a significant portion of its
  profitability

67
The co-management process is broken

• Since 2003, the fishers perception is that they
  have generally been ignored, excluded or
  threatenby DFO officials

68
Following the 1989 collapse

• The crabbers rebuilt the crab stock and fishery
• DFO has now reinstated over-capacity
• The crabbers achieved financial self-reliance
• DFO has now reinstated over-capitalization
• The crabbers achieved this through successful
  public/private partnerships
• DFO has now confiscated their fishery and the
  crab stock itself for its own benefit and at its
  own discretion