The Implications of the Atomic Bomb for International Relations

1
The Implications of the Atomic Bomb for
International Relations

• Jacob Viner, 1951

2
Observations

• Atomic weapons have obvious destructive
  capability
• Keeping atomic weapons secret is already
  impossible, preventing their manufacture through
  secrecy is similarly futile
• Atomic weapons the type that are not effective
  against their own kind

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Observations (contd.)

• Vulnerability is dependent on
• The proportion of its population which lives in
  large cities
• The average size and density of these cities
• The concentration of major industries of military
  significance
• There is a universal agreement that it is
  advantageous to strike first, but Viner contends
  that countries will not concentrate their atomic
  capability
• This is the rational assumption that states will
  maintain a survivable second strike capability, a
  minimum requirement for deterrence

4
Observations (contd)

• Defense against atomic bombs seems to be
  impossible
• Viner acknowledges that decentralization of
  industry and deurbanization of population can
  reduce the military effectiveness of atomic
  weapons
• This is an unwieldy procedure and carries
  tremendous economic costs
• Because the article was written in 1951, it does
  not account for the new countermissile
  technologies. The development of advanced
  radars, anti-missile missiles, and kill vehicles
  is obviously not taken into account
• Nonetheless, many defense analysts assess the
  effectiveness of a missile defense system as
  extremely suspect, so Viners presumption that
  defense is impossible is still relevant

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Observations

• Hypotheses
• Atomic bombs would be used early in war, each
  country would be laid to waste
• Both sides would make an agreement not to use
  atomic weapons at the start of a conflict
• Countries would try as hard as possible to
  prevent war for assurance that atomic weapons
  will not be used

6
Arguments

• Atomic weapons reshape the international system
  by making small states more powerful
• Small states will not be conquered without cost
• According to Viner, the small country will again
  be more than a cipher or a mere pawn in
  power-politics, provided it is big enough to
  produce atomic bombs.
• Viner seems to assume that atomic bombs will
  proliferate quickly
• However, in the present day most atomic states
  are acknowledged powers that states would likely
  not go to war with anyway
• The actions of rogue states illustrates what
  Viner is trying to argue

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Arguments (contd)

• Prospects of world government
• Unlikely in the near future
• The system (in 1951) is dominated by two states,
  neither of which will give up its vital interests
  for the sake of world government
• For world government to arise power needs to be
  evenly distributed
• What is left is a Concert of Powers and the
  United Nations
• The United Nations is effective, giving weight to
  the five world powers (the Security Council veto)
• Two other advantages near universal membership
  and an ambitious program of beneficent economic
  and social activities which may succeed in
  fostering a feeling of communitystrong enough to
  withstand the strains of the clashes of interest.

8
Arguments (contd)

• Mutually conciliatory diplomacy
• Atomic weapons make war too horrible to
  contemplate, which makes peace a mutually
  beneficial goal
• Trust and cooperation through diplomacy reduce
  the threat that atomic weapons pose