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Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings

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Title: Lecture 16: Suicide Bombings


1
Lecture 16 Suicide Bombings
  • Have to consider individual and organizational
    dimensions
  • Definition Intentionally killing oneself for the
    purpose of killing others, in the service of a
    political or ideological goal
  • To be distinguished from
  • High-risk missions
  • Fooled couriers
  • Suicide without homicide for a political
    cause

2
Trends Most deadly form of terrorism (so far)
  • Starts with Hezbollah in Lebanon
  • 1981 -- attack on Iraqi Embassy -- Beirut
  • 1983 -- killed 384 in six attacks
  • US Embassy -- Feb
  • 241 Marines at Beirut Airport -- Oct
  • Simultaneous attack on French
  • Cars, grenades and explosive belts
  • Sri Lanka, Tamil Tigers (pioneers innovators)
  • Israel 0.5 of attacks, 56 of fatalities.
  • U.S. 9/11 10 times more deadly than any
    previous terrorist attack in history.

3
Trends 1980s-2012
Exponential growth over the last two decades -
more global, more frequent, more lethal Suicide
attacks account for lt 5 percent of terrorist
events, but ? 50 percent of casualties due to
suicide attacks. Gaining in strategic importance
with disruptive effects that cascade upon the
political, economic and social routines of
national life and international relations Also
gets more media coverage than most other forms of
attack
4
How
  • Suicide bombs can be delivered by multiple means,
    complicating security measures
  • Vehicle bombs USMC barracks in Beirut, 1983
    Embassy attacks in Africa, 1998 Bali and Jakarta
    bombs Attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.
  • Boat bombs Sri Lanka, 1990s USS Cole, 2000 the
    MV Limburg, 2002
  • Airborne 9/11, Marseille plot, 1994
  • Individual-borne bombs the primary method of
    attack in Israel since 2000 Attacks in London,
    2005

5
Targets
  • Mostly civilian targets (shopping malls, buses,
    restaurants).
  • Approx. 85 civilian fatalities, 15 security
    forces
  • Military bases are on the A-List for targeting
    by terrorists, but difficult to penetrate

6
Who
  • Al Aqsa Martyr Brigades
  • Palestinian Islamic Jihad
  • Hamas
  • Al Qaida
  • PKK/Kongra Gel
  • Ansar al Islam
  • Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
  • Lashkar-e-Taiba
  • . . . and a few others . . .

7
Why Group Rationales
  • Personal attributes are not the key. The critical
    factor is the group. Suicide terrorism is a group
    phenomenon.
  • All suicide attacks have been carried out by
    groups. None by individuals on their own whim.
  • Main goal is to inflict as many casualties as
    possible
  • Objectives include
  • Causing widespread fear and panic
  • Demonstrating the targeted governments weakness

8
Why Suicide Terror?
  • Perception -- seemingly irrational act
  • From the perspective of a terrorist organization
    its a strategy that is
  • Well planned
  • Logical
  • Designed to achieve specific political objectives
  • Suicide attacks have increased over the past two
    decades Why?

9
Strategic Advantages
  • Traditional concepts of security are based on
    deterring terrorist attacks
  • Assumes the terrorist fears death or capture
  • But, suicide attacks depend on the death of the
    terrorist
  • The suicide bomber doesnt care about his/her
    death, imprisonment or torture at the time of the
    attack
  • No need for an escape plan, traditionally the
    most difficult part of a terrorist operation
  • The terrorist group wants to succeed
  • The suicide bomber does not want to die for
    nothing
  • If a target is too tough, they will choose
    another Ultimate smart bomb

10
Suicide Terrorism as an Organizational Strategy
  • Suicide terrorism is always part of a larger
    terrorist campaign
  • Sacrificing its best and the brightest signals
    the organizations costly commitment to the
    community, whether transnational (Al-Qaeda,
    Jemaah Islamiyah) or national (Hamas, Hizbollah).
  • This underpins trust in the organization, thus
    increasing the organizations political market
    share in the community. (M. Bloom, Dying to
    Kill, 2005)
  • Influence on terrorist groups decisions
  • Influence on the number of volunteers for
    terrorist activity in general and suicide attacks
    in particular
  • Often, competing claims for particular suicide
    attacks

11
Are Suicide Attacks Effective?
  • PAPE In 6 of the 11 campaigns that ended
    terrorists achieved at least partial political
    gains
  • Represents 55 success rate
  • Target states
  • Fully or partially withdrew from territory
  • Began negotiations
  • Released a terrorist leader
  • Suicide campaigns have been successful against a
    variety of democratic governments -- even hawkish
    ones
  • Reagan Administration
  • Netanyahu

12
Why Are Suicide Attacks Considered Effective?
  • With standard military coercion stronger states
    pressure weaker states
  • Suicide attacks work because they have a
    different structure
  • With suicide terrorism model the weaker acts as
    coercer and the stronger actor is the target
  • Target of suicide campaign cannot easily adjust
    to minimize future damage

13
However Suicide Terrorists Gains Are Limited
  • Suicide attacks do not achieve goals central to
    security or wealth
  • Even with a complete gain US withdrawal from
    Lebanon US had only humanitarian interest at
    stake
  • Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985, but
    troops remained in security buffer
  • 1994 1995 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and West
    Bank
  • Settlements increased
  • IDF have no trouble going back when they believe
    necessary

14
Summary
  • Unique phenomenon in the world of political
    violence
  • Driven by group strategies, decisions, and relies
    on public support
  • Traditional concepts of deterrence and security
    are ineffective
  • Requires combination of intelligence,
    counterideology and diminished public support to
    defeat

15
Individual Suicide Bombers Common Explanations
  • Religious fanaticism
  • Poverty
  • Ignorance
  • Revenge for personal suffering
  • Brainwashing
  • Psychopathology

None of these explanations are supported by
significant data
16
Sources of Empirical Data
  • Media accounts
  • Interviews with captured would-be suicide bombers
  • Interviews with trainers/launchers
  • Psychological autopsy of dozens of Palestinian,
    Tamil and other suicide bombers (interviews with
    families)
  • Jerrold Post
  • Ehud Sprinzak
  • Mia Bloom
  • Scott Atran
  • et al.

17
Demographic Details
  • Age
  • Marital status
  • Gender
  • Socio-economic level
  • Education

Sri Lankan suicide bomber Dhanu, moments
before killing former Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi,
herself, and 17 others
  • No real profile
  • Most are male and single. BUT
  • Can be any race, color, sex
  • Can be older, married people
  • Bombers often alter their appearance to blend
    in - Terrorist groups will employ bombers and
    disguises most likely to defeat security
    measuresor profiling

Wafa Idris
18
Religious fanaticism
  • Religious fanaticism is neither a necessary nor a
    sufficient factor
  • Most of the suicide attacks in Lebanon were
    carried out by secular groups.
  • The LTTE and Fatah are not religious groups.
  • The PKK and the PFLP are pseudo-Marxist groups.
  • Most Hamas PIJ members do not mention religion
    as main cause.

19
Psychological Profiling?
  • The most common result of research indicates a
    pattern of normalcy the absence of any unique
    attribute or identifier that would distinguish
    one individual from another
  • . . .rarely mad, and very few suffer from
    personality disorders (Andrew Silke)
  • Many of the personal traits or characteristics .
    . . are neither specific to the terrorist nor
    serve to distinguish one type of terrorist from
    another. (John Horgan)
  • 30 years of research has found little evidence
    that terrorists are suffering from
    psychopathology (Clark McCauley)

20
Conclusion
  • Media accounts of suicide terrorists should be
    read/viewed with caution too often they rely on
    assumptions than on empirical data and scholarly
    research
  • The majority of suicide terrorist are no more
    abnormal than you or me
  • Combating suicide terrorism requires strategic
    communications and counterideology narratives
    that discredit and deligitimize this tactic
  • Until families are embarrassed, not honored, to
    have a martyr, the problem will not go away
  • Messenger matters the effort to eradicate this
    tactic must involve community, religious leaders
    (more than government officials)

21
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