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Title: Oral Comps Slides


1
Oral Comps Slides
  • Major Ben Zweibelson
  • Seminar 4, SAMS
  • Lesson D316

2
Question 1 theory of warEach student likely
needs their own stuff here.
3
However, pleasure and pain are only root motives
for decision to act. They would not fully explain
much of human behavior in and out of war.
Schopenhauer German Philosopher (1788-1860)
Nietzsche German Philosopher (1844-1900)
PL
S
P
E
G
R
The Will to Survive (Live)
The Will to Power
WTP
All human action relates to a core desire to
survive, reproduce, and prosper.
All human action relates to a core desire to
increase ones power. This overrides survival in
terms of risk.
PA
4
Special Theory on Actors and Organized Conflict
The ODARR Cycle and Origin of Decisions to Act.
Includes enemy and friendly COG analysis.
Adjust forces, values, and contextual factors
Actions are also taken to protect friendly COG
vulnerabilities in the most recent observed
friendly COG.
All actions are directed against critical
vulnerabilities in the most recent observed enemy
COG.
Our COGs are linked to our pain/loss of
prosperity concepts as well as our WTS/WTP
gravitational pulls. The enemy is linked the same.
Enemy COGs
Friendly COGs
CC, CR, CV. COGs are open systems
CC, CR, CV. COGs are open systems
5
(No Transcript)
6
Question 2 Gaddis and continuity/contingency
with history
7
Gaddis Why and How should Historians Think?
(metacognition)
Continuity historians (unlike scientists)
represent what they can never duplicate. History
requires a level of consistency that is closer to
objective truth than subjective interpretation
(histiography explains how this often occurs, and
why).
Contingency historians must think critically
about how they represent history- flawed
processes produce faulty expectations of what the
future is. If historians follow too abstract a
path (or too detailed/pedantic), or if they give
into social biases and faulty logic, they will
misinterpret history.
unknown (exteriority)
Continuity
History
FUTURE
Change in Historical Perspectives (Hatchs Wheel)
Gaddis no time-traveling for history- no
changing it.
Gaddis weighing concepts- Hitlers love of dogs
and children is irrelevant.
Linear Time Space
Theories in science are reproducible history
does not repeat (but themes occur)
Contingency
More Accurate/ Relevant History
objectivity
Debatable/quasi- Relevant History
Counter-Factual Arguments (what if Barbarossa)
Gaddis distillation- not every detail is
critical historians decide what gets relayed in
narratives.
Known (interiority)
Inaccurate/ irrelevant History
PRESENT
information
Gaddis path dependency- Hitler kicked out of
art school caused WWII
Histiography
Human Limitations in Cognition
Gaddis constructed memories Churchills
youthful portrait
subjectivity
PAST
language
event
Hayden White The Content and the Form Peter
Novack That Noble Dream Mary Jo Hatch
Operational Theory Deluze/Guitari A Thousand
Plataeus
Values Tenets Culture Identity
Gaddis historians hide their methods
8
Question 3 theories of Herbst, Kalyvas, Brinton,
and Parsa
9
  • Herbst States and Power in Africa
  • Follows Jared Diamonds Guns, Germs, and Steel
    thesis that biological and geographic determinism
    shaped Africa- not the traditional Euro-centric
    theory of technological/genetic determinism.
  • Low densities of people over massive tracts of
    land- this generated a different set of values in
    African leaders (use Mary Jo Hatch wheel).
  • 3x African costs for state expansion
  • Cost of expanding domestic power infrastructure.
    To rule a distant location, you needed to control
    military out there and transmit info over roads.
  • The nature of national boundaries. capitals build
    container/distribution points out from central
    power colonial new capitals were coastal
    pre-colonial ones were not.
  • The design of state systems. winning wars
    brought slaves there was little organizational
    infrastructure to gain. Thus, post-conflict
    Africa differed from European conflicts over
    land.
  • Africans had different agriculture and
    industrial/economic structures trading for guns,
    mining minerals, limited farming (migrant).
  • Colonial imposed boundaries remain- Africa
    struggles with post-imperialism.

Brinton The Anatomy of Revolution Brinton
covers American, French, English, and Russian
revolutions and acknowledges that his thesis on
revolutionary cycles does not synch with all of
them. Brinton argues that revolutions end the
worst abuses and inefficiencies of the old regime
while bringing greater uniformity and equality to
the state system. While man changes his mind on
many issues (hereditary monarchy, aristocracy,
classes, civil rights, land and property
ownership, slavery) man does not change his
habits. Originally radical ideas transition in
the revolutionary cycle into state propaganda and
national self-identity for posterity within the
post-revolution society. Finally, successful
revolts create a tradition of revolution within
that society.
Parsas States, Ideologies, and Social
Revolutions Parsa uses states as his unit of
analysis (realism perspective). He studies Iran,
Nicaragua, and the Philippines revolutions by
exploring social versus political
factors. Variables used Popular opposition to
regime Type of political regime Class coalition-
present or absent Level of state
intervention Iran centralized state power with
extreme repression of moderate opposition class
structure transformation was moderate, and
radical theocrats were in the power structure.
Outcome social revolution. Nicaragua Same as
Iran in power and repression popular opposition
was high, and class coalition was present.
Revolutionary challengers were initially weak-
class structure transformation was high.
Socialists in power structure outcome social
revolution. Philippines centralized power with
moderate repression of opposition. Class
coalition was absent, and revolutionary
challengers were initially strong no
transformation in class structure, reformist
bourgeois were in the power structure- outcome
political revolution.
Kalyvas The Logic of Violence in Civil
War Kalyvas asks the question why are civil
wars so violent- or perceived as such? He
defines civil war as armed combat within the
boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity
between parties subject to a common authority at
the onset of the hostilities. Five factors of
Civil War bias 1. Partisan bias (taking sides)
2. Political bias (equating war with peace) 3.
Urban bias (overlooking bottom-up processes
emphasis on top-down hierarchy) 4. Selection
bias (disregarding nonviolence) 5.
Over-aggregation bias (working at too high a
level of abstraction- the will of the people).
10
Crane Brintons The Anatomy of Revolution A
Theory of Revolt
11
Question 4 JP 3.0, 5.0- does current doctrine
reflect systems thinking?
12
Positivism refers to a set of epistemological
perspectives and philosophies of science which
hold that the scientific method is the best
approach to uncovering the processes by which
both physical and human events occur.
Systems Thinking a Logic of Positivism,
Reductionism, Mechanistic and Linear Procedures
  • JP 3-0 Foundation Joint operations doctrine is
    built upon the bedrock principles of war and
    associated fundamentals of joint warfare.
  • Objective
  • Offensive
  • Mass
  • Economy of Force
  • Maneuver
  • Unity of Command
  • Security
  • Surprise
  • Simplicity
  • Restraint
  • Perseverance
  • Legitimacy

JP 3-0
FM 3-0
  • Traditional war and irregular war defined within
    Clausewitzian concept.
  • Operational and Mission Variables FM 3-0 warns
    of precise binning but the positivist and
    reductionist procedures are lost.
  • PMESII-PT centric.
  • Echoes JP 3-0s definition of Unified Action.
  • Quotes Clausewitz on uncertainty, chance, and
    friction. (when your logic creates abnormalities,
    you can categorize them under these catch-alls).

Reverse engineer termination criteria to
objectives, COGs, and DPs along a LOO.
  • 12 principles of war use Jominian systems
    thinking that use mechanistic, reductionist, and
    positivist constructs
  • Joint Operation Planning Process
  • Centers of Gravity

Identifying desired and undesired effects with a
systems perspective IV-8(3) JP 3-0.
Effects describe system behavior
JOPP Step 1 Initiation Step 2 Mission
Analysis Step 3 COA Dev Step 4 COA Analysis and
wargaming Step 5 COA Comparison Step 6 COA
Approval Step 7 Plan/Order Development
JP 3-0 Unified Action the synchronization,
coordination, and/or integration of the
activities of the governmental and
nongovernmental entities with military operations
to achieve unity of effort.
JP 3-0 LOGIC the nature of warfare is
characterized as a confrontation between
nation-states or coalitions/alliances of
nation-statesIW is a violent struggle between
state and non-state actors.
13
Centers of Gravity Using Systems Thinking in a
Positivist, Reductionist, and Mechanistic Logic
JP 3-0
FM 3-0
  • Clausewitz A COG comprises the source of power
    that provides freedom of action, physical
    strength, and the will to fight.
  • Dr. Kem the COG is the thing you fear most it
    is the actual power. Also uses the Strange
    CC/CR/CV modeling.
  • Dr. Strange CC/CR/CV modeling.
  • Critical capabilities crucial enablers for COG
    to function.
  • Critical requirements essential resources for
    CCs to work.
  • Critical vulnerabilities CRs that are vulnerable
    to attack or exploitation.
  • JP 3-0 the essence of operational art lies in
    being able to produce the right combination of
    effects in time, space, and purpose relative to a
    COG to neutralize, weaken, destroy, or otherwise
    exploit itto achieve military objectives.
  • Dr. Reilly Cognitive Map that reverse
    engineers end-states, COGs, and lines of effort
    backwards in time.

Quotes Clausewitz A COG is the source of moral
or physical strength, power, and resistance. A
COG is singular in nature- JP 3-0 wants one at
each level of war. In conventional fights, JP
3-0 prefers strategic COG to be government or
leader and operational COG as the fielded
forces. No tactical COGs. LOOs, PLOs- no LOEs.
Linear causality. Baseball makes the runner go to
1st, then 2nd base war might require us to run
to 3rd, then 1st, then 2nd Garandagangi makes
the distinction between non-minded, uni-minded,
and multi-minded systems COGs work for
uni-minded (EBO systems based) logic.
Quotes Clausewitz also. The loss of a COG
ultimately results in defeat. this is linear
causality and reverse engineering on a positivist
logic base. FM 3-0 goes beyond JP 3-0 and states
COGs are not limited to military forces and can
be either physical or moral eliminating them
requires holistic integrated efforts of all
national IOPs. 6-8. Supports JP 3-0 and sees a
single COG at each level of war. The Army does
not have a COG at the tactical level either (just
USMC). As Kem says, it is semantics- a tactical
COG equals a decisive point.
14
Elements of Operational Design JP 3-0
JP 3-0
FM 3-0
  • Termination military operations terminate when
    they achieve and preserve military objectives
    linked to the national strategic end-state. 3x
    approaches imposed (threatened or actual
    occupation of enemy territory) or negotiated
    settlement (coordinated political, diplomatic,
    military, and economic actions), and the indirect
    approach (when gaining legitimacy and influence
    over the relevant population this employs IW to
    erode an enemys power, influence and will over
    the population.
  • End State and Objectives developed after the
    termination criteria are established (Reilly
    reverse engineering). The military end-state is
    the point after which the President does not
    require the military IOP in the lead.
  • Effects Combined with a systems perspective,
    the identification of desired and undesired
    effects can help commanders and their staffs gain
    a common picture. An effect is the physical or
    behavioral state of a system that results from an
    action, set of actions, or another effect.
  • Objectives prescribe friendly goals.
  • Effects describe system behavior.
  • Tasks direct friendly action.
  • 4. COGs see previous slide.
  • 5. Decisive Points a geographic place, specific
    key event, critical factor, or function that,
    when acted upon, allows a commander to gain a
    marked advantage over an adversary or contributes
    materially to achieving success.-IV-12, JP 3-0.

Positivist logic Clausewitzian. Termination
criteria lend to linear causality and
reverse-engineering within a neo-realism logic.
FM 3-0 does not use termination in doctrine. It
does use strategic end state in 6-8. The POTUS
translates national interests and policy into a
national strategic end-state. FM 3-0 ties
end-state to JP 3-0 same term. Operational
objectives are linked to COGs, and tactical OBJs
are linked to decisive points (which follow LOEs
to target COG CVs. Very systematic process. FM
3-0 does not use effects in JP format D-2
states that Army forces DO NOT use joint systems
analysisor effects assessment. Army forces
conduct operations according to Army doctrine.
Linear causality effect occurs when AB equals
C. Implies reverse engineering and positivism.
Positivist logic Describing instead of
explaining. This deals with interiority instead
of exteriority!
This holistic understanding helps commanders and
their staffs identify COGs, critical factors, and
decisive points to formulate LOOs and visualize
the CONOPs. IV-12 JP 3-0.
Positivism refers to a set of epistemological
perspectives and philosophies of science which
hold that the scientific method is the best
approach to uncovering the processes by which
both physical and human events occur.
15
Elements of Operational Design JP 3-0
JP 3-0
FM 3-0
Positivism refers to a set of epistemological
perspectives and philosophies of science which
hold that the scientific method is the best
approach to uncovering the processes by which
both physical and human events occur.
Positivist logic Clausewitzian. Termination
criteria lend to linear causality and
reverse-engineering within a neo-realism logic.
FM 3-0 shares LOO with JP 3-0, but introduces
Lines of Effort the LOE helps planners link
multiple tasks with goals, objectives, and
end-state conditions LOE follows LOO systems
approach in linear causality and uni-minded
systems (COGs). FM 3-0 uses JP 3-0s operational
reach the limit of a units operational reach is
its culminating point (6-74). FM 3-0 uses
similar terms as JP 3-0 with simultaneity and
depth and introduces phases as a
planning/execution tool to synchronize an
operation. FM 3-0 does not use JP 3-0s phrasing
of moral failure it does paint a more holistic
approach- within a systemic framework.
  • 6. Direct versus Indirect In theory, direct
    attacks against enemy COGs resulting in their
    neutralization or destruction is the most direct
    path to victory. IV-12, JP 3-0.
  • Indirect the indirect paths are used when a JTF
    cannot conduct a direct attack they still
    indirectly target COG CVs in order to set the
    conditions for successful direct attacks. Once
    again, this uses positivist logic and linear
    causality.
  • Lines of Operations a LOO describes the linkage
    of various actions on nodes and or decisive
    points with an operational or strategic
    objective.
  • Operational Reach the distance and duration over
    which a joint force can successfully employ
    military capabilities. Reach is fundamentally
    linked to culmination geography may limit it-
    but technology offers methods for bypassing
    barriers and limitations.
  • Simultaneity and Depth
  • Simultaneity the application of military and
    non-military power against enemy key capabilities
    and sources of strength (JP 3-0 implies
    operational shock in a Naveh-style here even
    talks about moral and or physical failure in
    cohesion. Simultaneity also refers to concurrent
    conduct of operations at the tactical,
    operational, and strategic levels.
  • Depth overwhelming the enemy in multiple
    domains- depth applies to time as well as space
    this goes into Boyds OODA Loop.

Linear causality effect occurs when AB equals
C. Implies reverse engineering and positivism.
Direct paths imply linear causality again not
adaptive complex systems. Very EBO centric
thoughts here that simultaneity in action
against appropriate enemy forces results in a
moral failure echoes some of the British and
USAAFs flawed morale bombing in WWII.
16
Elements of Operational Design JP 3-0
JP 3-0
Positivism refers to a set of epistemological
perspectives and philosophies of science which
hold that the scientific method is the best
approach to uncovering the processes by which
both physical and human events occur.
FM 3-0
Positivist logic Clausewitzian. Termination
criteria lend to linear causality and
reverse-engineering within a neo-realism logic.
Positivist logic in FM 3-0 as well here. Tempo
used in 6-80 FM 3-0 ties tempo to enemy
specifically. FM 3-0 uses culmination where
there is a point in time when a force no longer
possesses the capability to continue its current
form of operations. This is a land-centric logic
that differs with JP 3-0 (Air, Sea Power). FM
3-0 includes RISK as well. This is Clausewitzian
logic that addresses the fog, friction, and
luck risk relates to time and space it is a
potential catalyst that fuels opportunity.
  • 11. Timing and Tempo With proper timing, JFCs
    can dominate the action, remain unpredictable,
    and operate beyond the enemys ability to react.
    IV-16 JP 3-0.
  • Tempo the rate of military action. Tempo has
    military significance only in relative terms.
    information superiority facilitated by a
    net-centric environment enables the JFC to
    dictate tempo.
  • Forces and Functions JFCs focus on defeating
    either enemy forces or functions, or a
    combination of both.
  • Attacking Functions destroys/disrupts enemys
    ability to employ its forces
  • Attacking Forces self-evident.
  • Leverage gaining, maintaining, and exploiting
    advantages in combat power across all domains and
    the information environment. Can be achieved
    through asymmetrical actions and concentration
    and integration of joint force capabilities
    (IV-17).
  • Balance the maintenance of the force, its
    capabilities, and its operations in such a manner
    as to contribute to freedom of action and
    responsiveness.
  • Anticipation JP 3-0 emphasizes description and
    volume of information as the means to
    understanding and anticipating what Taleeb calls
    Black Swan events- unknown-unknowns. This does
    not work with Designs logic of interiority and
    exteriority with complex adaptive systems.
  • Synergy combining military forces and
    capabilities so that their sum is greater than
    individual totals. Or, 1115.
  • Culmination has both an offensive and defensive
    application essentially when your chess opponent
    and you have the same number of pieces

Description over explanation represents the
systems thinking approach of Positivists. We had
tons of information in Iraq, yet we did not
dictate tempo in 2004-2005 at all. There is a
difference between tons of description and the
right explanation. How can you anticipate this
with a complex adaptive system if your planning
logic requires you to reverse engineer within
linear causality and uni-minded system logic such
as EBO?
19. Arranging Operations sounds like synergy,
tempo, forces and functions, and balance. Not
sure why JP 3-0 even uses this one
17
Question 5 Jomini versus Clausewitz, Steel Cage
Match
18
Mechanistic Logic
Positivist Logic
Jomini
Clausewitz
Follow these rules exactly regardless of future
conflict, and you will win. If not- you are an
idiot. The enemy is predictable and does not
adapt. Seek the Napoleonic victory- tactical
wins that accomplish strategic goals. This
ignores the operational level of war. Jomini was
widely read prior to the American Civil War
probably carried by most officers- geometric
considerations continued with artillery,
engineering, and naval applications in the 19th
century.
Similarities in Warfare Theories
War is an extension of Politics. -KVC In total
war, politics become an extension of war- D/G, A
Thousand Plateaus (they flip the maxim). Warfare
is complex- applying reductionist mathematics and
procedures does not work well in complex war.
Clausewitz was not read outside of Prussia
until the late 1880s- it arrived to West Point
only then and Jomini still had a huge hold upon
the US military.
  • Both Clausewitz and Jomini see military conflict
    as a perpetual behavior by societies (nation
    states)- they do not subscribe to what Anatol
    Rapoport (On War intro, 1968 edition) terms
    eschatalogical war theories.
  • Clausewitz goes mechanistic in some parts of On
    War by arguing procedures and formulas for field
    artillery and relative troop strengths.
  • Jomini follows Machiavelli's The Prince by
    crafting a process, a checklist of war principles
    and formulas for a military general to follow.
    Doing this in ANY conflict will deliver them
    victory- this is pure mechanistic linear logic.
  • Clausewitz does not follow principles of war, but
    he does take a positivist leap in logic by
    designating the enemys fielded forces as the
    primary thing (COG) that must be destroyed to
    win.

Differences in Warfare Theories
  • Jomini remains tactical. He does not go
    operational level as Clausewitz does. Jomini
    wants the politicians to get out of the way of
    the military in war- Clausewitz sees the
    trinity between government, military, and
    violent passions of the masses.
  • Jomini applies geometry, lines, and linear
    causality in a highly mechanistic fashion-
    Clausewitz goes further conceptually and avoids
    many of the pitfalls of prescriptive
    procedurizing that Jomini craves.

19
Anatol Rapoports non-Clausewitzian War
Philosophies (editor and wrote the intro to the
1968 Penguin Classic On War
There is a final war.
Eschatological (final war) Philosophies of War
Cataclysmic (world destruction) Philosophies of
War
Prevent all war.
Divine Eschatological (religious final battle)
Global Cataclysmic War Theory
Natural Eschatological (planet extinction human
extinction)
Ethno-centric Cataclysmic War Theory
Human (messianic) Eschatological (people here now)
  • Rapoport claims the Soviets switched to this
    during the Cold War- the chief difference is
  • War is NOT a tool.
  • The outside world wants to destroy the unique
    ethnic identity of the select people.
  • Protective measures such as the Berlin Wall are
    not for keeping people in, but keeping outsiders
    out.
  • The world will end in a final show-down.
  • Example MAD in the Cold War fueled this logic
    Soviets sought to preserve their state versus
    Capitalist westerners.
  • Rapoport calls this a system-theoretical
    approach. The principles are
  • War is NOT a tool.
  • ALL war is bad.
  • Global government is the answer to ending
    conflict.
  • International systems will aid in preventing
    global cataclysmic war.
  • The nuclear age advanced this logic.
  • Example The United Nations pursues international
    systems and a form of weak global governance with
    the general position that all war is badNATO is
    not an example of this NATO is an alliance under
    Clausewitzian logic.

Religious movements that feature an Armageddon
plot or the return of a savior with the
destruction of all non-believers follow this
logic. A final war will, God Willing, end human
conflict this is pre-determined (linear
causality), and the chosen people will reign
supreme. Example Iran launching WMD at Israel
to trigger emergence of 12th Imam.
A group of people already on the planet that will
bring about the final battle- the Nazis, early
Soviet Party, and other extreme non-religious
groups followed this logic. The Proletarian
Revolution where workers of the world
unit. American Manifest Destiny during the Great
Plains Indian Wars has components of this logic
also. Example Soviet Party of the early 20th
century followed this logic, according to
Rapoport.
Extreme environmentalism movements anti-human
movements (by humans, oddly). Non-human events
such as planet destruction, asteroid event, or
disease epidemic that ends human (or all) life.
Example the dinosaurs did not wage war but
their existence was terminated this way. Humans
waging limited war while an asteroid hurtles
towards us makes a similar example.
20
Question 6 Explain relationship between
conceptual and detailed planning
21
FM 5-0 Design Doctrine (Teaching Artistry via.
Paint By Numbers)
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Deliverables
Problem statement
Create Environmental Frame
Initial guidance end state time
Create Problem Frame
Operational Approach (design frame)
  1. Problem Statement
  2. Initial CDRs Intent
  3. CDRs Initial Planning Guidance
  4. Mission Narrative
  5. Other Products

Narrative and graphical description
Refinement of environmental frame
Broad actions to achieve end state
tensions
Relevant actors interrelations- PMESII-PT
Resources and Risks
Areas for action to achieve end state
Decisive Points
LOOs, LOEs
Starting with an End State and working
backwards does not work with ill-structured
problems.
Environment bounds. Ecology conceptually
allows distant yet relevant inclusion into the
system.
There is a problem with the word problem.
Transformation requirements exceed military
capabilities cultural change requires extensive
time and resources.
Phenomenon persist through feedback loops and
retention. Transformation requires emergence
and anticipation (not prediction).
Avoid description- seek explanation.
PMESII-PT bounds the known and goes descriptive
and deconstructive.
Doctrine is static. Theory is flexible.
Detailed Planning Methodology Linear Causality
and Short Term Targets
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Frame your environment with knowns (facts), known
unknowns (assumptions and PIR/CCIR), and force
influence the future of your world as a goal
(end-state) to aim against.
Build COAs and war-game scenarios to decide
upon the preferred action to undertake. Build
detailed integrated instructions (OPORDs,
graphics) to direct forces.
Execute action. Collect information and reflect
upon action. Make adjustments and continue
towards end-state.
22
Linking understanding to action
Conceptual Planning
Detailed Planning
Holistic Approaches (Design Theory)
Positivist/Mechanistic Approaches (Systems Logic)
Clausewitzian (On War)
Naveh (In Pursuit of, other works also) Kuhns
Paradigm Shifts Betanaflys General Systems
Theory Organizational Theory (insert
authors) Michael Foucote Problematization
Lectures
Jominian (principles of war)
Historic Vignette Metaphor Preference
Scientific Deduction (Kuhn, Capra, Taleeb,
Laszlo, Bosquette)
This is like that Historical Precedence Fighting
the Last Conflict (Linn) Weigleys American Way
of War
Rivals are phenomenon within a complex system.
The enemy is a state, group, actor, or super
powered individual.
Design Deliverables
Adaptive Metaphors (creation and destruction)
Detailed Planning Deliverables
FM 5-0 operational approach with graphic and
CDRs intent. Narratives in theory convey
EXPLANATION not description.
MDMP, JOPP, MCPP all follow procedures that
create precise and detailed OPORDs, FRAGOs, and
other actionable products. Military doctrine
comes out of this logic, as does AAR and
historical products.
Learning to Learn Naveh, Garandagangi,
Foucote Reflective Practitioner-
Shoen Interiority and Exteriority- Deluze and
Gutari Unknown Unknowns- Black Swans (Taleeb)
Each logic uses different vocabulary, theoretical
concepts, narratives, and metaphor construction
to make sense of the world (holistic in tension
with positivist reductionism)
23
Question 7 The relationship between Design and
Battle (Mission) Command
24
Holistic Approach
Mechanistic Logic
Mission (Battle) Command
Metacognition/problematization
Design
Positivist Logic
Naveh Persistent Creativity
Linear Causality
Battle Command is the art and science
of Understanding - Visualizing Describing Dir
ecting Leading Assessing Forces In order to
impose a CDRs will on a hostile, thinking, and
adaptive enemy.
Similarities between both
Design Theory differs from Army Design Doctrine.
Do not confuse the two. Design Theory seeks
explanation, not description. Mary Jo Hatchs
Cycle of Cultural Change is a good foil for
illustrating why Design doctrine and Battle
Command as procedures do not really ever
challenge any core structures or logics of the
military institution. Battle Command borrows
from Boyds OODA Loop- a cycle of leading and
assessing the process while continuing to try to
out-think and out-act the enemy. Design theory is
not so proceduralized- complex systems are not
susceptible to such linear causality. Design
operates on a different logic than MDMP and
detailed planning. Battle Command acts as an
overarching conceptual framework for detailed
planning- but it uses the same Clausewitzian and
Positivist logic unlike Design.
  • Both Design and Battle Command consider the enemy
    (or rival) an adaptive and critical thinking
    (learning) actor instead of a static (mechanistic
    Jominian) opponent.
  • Design doctrine and Battle Command place the
    Commander at the center (the architect) of both
    processes.
  • Design doctrine (not theory) does suggest
    PEMESII-PT and METT-TC to support environmental
    framing and LOEs
  • Both Design doctrine (not theory) and Battle Cmd
    combine analytic and intuitive thinkingbut
    Design theory does not limit thinking to within
    interiority of system and within
    positivist/reductionist logic with institutional
    biases.

Differences in logics
Analytic Decision making approach the problem
systemically
  • Design Theory seeks EXPLANATION over description.
    Battle Command wants description- this reinforces
    the positivist, reductionist, and linear
    causality logic.
  • Battle Command recommends PMESII-PT to
    understand, and METT-TC to visualizeDesign
    Theory avoids proceduralization.
  • BC relies on pattern recognition for
    anticipation this potentially follows Taleebs
    Black Swan fallacy of only considering the
    known knowns Deluze/Guatari and the
    interiority/exteriority.

Intuitive Decision making the act of reaching a
conclusion emphasizing pattern recognition,
experience, knowledge
Battle Command returns to the reverse engineering
logic of positivism the CDR visualizes a
desired end-stateand then a broad concept of how
to reach it.
25
Question 8 FM 6-22 Army Leadership Informal
Leadership
26
Informal Leadership Getting someone that is
higher in rank than you (or position of
authority) to see things your way (IF you are
right) without getting a beat-down.
Problematize towards Cognitive Synergy
My Big Fat Greek Wedding Transfer of Creative
Ownership
See Design.
Turning your idea into what the boss was saying
all along and having him take ownership of the
creation of his idea.
Sua-Sponte
Sliding Scale of Informal Leadership Approaches
Passive Aggressive
General Benedict Arnold at Saratoga he took off
without explaining to his boss what he was doing,
and directed the battle to an upset victory over
Gentleman Johnny.
Contrast in Logic
COL xxxx and his position on COIN versus guerilla
warfare in OEF 2010-2011. XXX was investigated
(and cleared) of any insubordination.
IDF and their problems with SOD and the Hezbollah
2006 War. Subordinate leaders like Naveh used
logic arguments on why SOD was superior to
detailed planning- they all got sacked by senior
leadership.
General MacArthurs actions during the Korean War
over which he got fired by the POTUS McCrystals
actions during OEF 2011.
Confrontational
27
Question 9 complicated versus complex
28
  • Simple problem Completing my six year-olds math
    homework.
  • Intricate problem Completing a tough crossword
    puzzle. There is only 1x right solution.
  • Complicated problem Normandy Amphibious Assault
    on D-day.
  • Complex Problem Accomplishing vague strategic
    goals that change under limited conditions (no
    troops on ground) with NATO and the Arab League
    in Libya while waging 2x other wars.
  • Complex
  • open systems
  • unknown unknowns
  • exteriority
  • adaptive actors
  • innovation
  • holistic approaches
  • dynamic
  • explanation over description
  • reduction does not explain
  • mechanistic resistant
  • Intricate
  • one solution
  • many steps
  • time consuming
  • precise
  • reverse engineerable
  • mechanistic
  • 100 predictable
  • Simple
  • Closed systems
  • Known knowns
  • clear actors
  • linear causality
  • reduction friendly
  • mechanistic friendly
  • principles/procedures
  • reverse engineerable
  • predictable
  • Complicated
  • Closed systems
  • Known unknowns
  • many actors
  • often linear
  • description rich
  • reduction friendly
  • interiority
  • mechanistic prone (COGs)

29
Question 10 function and utility of narrative in
Design relation to discourse.
30
emerging
current
extinct
known
unknown
Narrative
Discourse
Information
language
Problematize!
Narrative is defined by doctrine (FM 5-0) as
mission narrative- the expression of the
operational approach for a specified mission. It
describes the intended effects for the mission,
including the conditions that define the desired
end-state. It represents the articulation of the
CDRs visualization of the mission (echoes battle
command). Narrative in Design Theory Naveh
discusses codification of doctrine and
planners are shackled while designers
create. Hayden White The Content and the Form
history versus histiography Peter Novak That
Noble Dream narratives are incomplete-
historians are biased in writing them. Humans
(feminist movement, civil rights movement) try to
take ownership of some narratives- the military
may do the same (We do amphibious assaults, not
youWe do FID- you do SFA)
Design Theory post-modern philosophy such as
Deluze and Guataris A Thousand Plateaus devote a
chapter to the tension between information
(exteriority and interiority) and language
(flawed, human- associated with thoughts, but not
information). This is a tough concept- needs five
more slides to really explain. Discourse is
mentioned in FM 5-0 Design Chapter 3 where the
CDR fosters an environment where
problematization occurs- this is the critical
thinking portion of seeking explanation (WHY
questions and BECAUSE answers) instead of just
description (WHAT questions with HOW, WHERE, WHEN
answers). FM 5-0 Design does imply some
critical thinking benefits of Design Design
enables commanders to view a situation from
multiple perspectives- this supports the logic
that complexity requires organizational
intelligence- not a lone Napoleon.
metacognition
New vocabulary
Discourse occurs here metaphoric processes to
fuse new understanding and convey to others.
Narrative is a product of the system logic
empirical material explained with metaphor and
language (flawed) and organized in theoretical
concepts which publish into narratives.
31
Question 11 Define Adaptive Work and describe
how one leads to this effort.
32
Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare
(Beijing Peoples Liberation Army Literature and
Arts Publishing House, February 1999) 140-141.
Liang and Ziangsui argue that over the last 20
years, the world has grown more complex, yet the
military ignore the increased complexity of war
and instead focus on the level of weapons,
deployment methods and the battlefield, and the
drawn-up war prospects are also mostly only
limited to the military domain and revel in it.
Ervin Laszlo, The Systems View of the World a
Holistic Vision for Our Time. George Lakoff and
Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By. Fritjof
Capra, The Web of Life Jeff Conklin, Wicked
Problems and Social Complexity (CogNexus
Institute, 2008. http//cognexus.org/wpf/wickedpro
blems.pdf Last accessed 05 January 2011) 4-5.
This is the pattern of thinking that everyone
attempts to follow when they are faced with a
problemthis linear pattern as being enshrined in
policy manuals, textbooks, internal standards for
project management, and even the most advanced
tools and methods being used and taught in the
organization.
Solution Unclear
Flexible Problematizing Metacognition Creation/des
truction Process Persistent Adaptation
Emergence
Gerald M. Weinberg, Rethinking Systems Analysis
and Design (Boston Little, Brown and Company,
1982) 12. If our previous experience with
systems analysis proves anything, it proves that
anyone who tries to use all the information- even
about the simple systems existing today- will be
drowned in paper and never accomplish
anythingThe synthesist is someone who makes very
specific plans for action, and more often than
not stays around during the execution of those
plans to adjust them to ongoing reality.
Innovation
Learning
Problem Unclear
Positivism Reductionism Mechanistic Linear Procedu
res
Linear Causality
Making Sense
Pre-determined END STATE
Reframe
Positivist, mechanistic Approaches
Linear Causality
Pre-determined END STATE
Positivist, mechanistic Approaches
Alex Ryan, The Foundation For An Adaptive
Approach Australian Army Journal For the
Profession of Arms, Volume VI, Number 3
(Duntroon Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2009) 70.
With the industrial revolution, the planning and
decision-making process gradually built up a
well-oiled machine to reduce reliance on
individual genius.
33
Question 12 How do you build organizational
learning to facilitate integrated planning?
34
  • Examples of learning while in conflict
  • US Army in Philippines 1899-1901 (Linns The
    Philippines War
  • British in Malaya in 1956 versus US Army in
    Vietnam (Nagls Learning to Eat Soup with a
    Knife)
  • Israeli military in 1973 war with Egypt-
    adaptation becomes necessity.
  • Washington at Battle of Trenton (raid tactic
    achieved operational and strategic requirements)

Adaptive and Critical Thinking Organization
Flexible Problematizing Metacognition Creation/des
truction Process Persistent Adaptation
Rigid and Non-Learning Organization (Traditional,
Proceduralized)
  • Examples of resistance to changing an
    organization while in conflict
  • US Army in Cold War (Carl Builders Masks of War)
  • Linns Echo of Battle- peacetime strategists
    reinvent themselves with emergent technology to
    reinforce worldviews.
  • Egyptian military in 1973 war with Israel-
    planning phase 1 works, but what about phase 2?

Positivism Reductionism Mechanistic Linear Procedu
res
35
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37
Question 13 ANP- relationship between strategy
and operational art
38
Clausewitzian Theory
Neo-Realism
Mechanistic Logic
Liberalism
Operational Art
Strategy
Positivist Logic
Humanism
Operational Art links tactical action to the
pursuit of strategic objectives. Clausewitzian
logic guides operational art towards destroying
the enemy to compel a nation to obey our will.
Strachan in The Lost Meaning of Strategy says
that now, non-state actors initiate conflict,
they are fought by civilians, and principle
victims are not soldiers but non-combatants. FM
3-0 chapter 3, FSO Army forces combine
offensive, defensive, and stability or civil
support operations simultaneously as part of an
interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and
exploit the initiative the goal of FSO is to
apply landpower as part of unified action to
defeat the enemy on land. FM 3-0 uses
operational variables to describe the
operational environment in terms that describe
military aspects of the system, but the
populations influence on it. This means that FM
3-0 doctrinal logic uses reductionism for
PMESII-PT- they do consider strategic (DIME)
factors.
Gaddis Surprise, Security, and the American
Experience Gaddis sees post 9-11 where Powell
and Weinberger doctrines (nation-state centric)
are irrelevant. McDougalls Promised Land,
Crusader State explains US foreign policy as our
assumption (Hatchs model) that we can, should,
and must reach out to help other nations share in
the American Dream. American values and tenets
of democracy, freedom from government and
military intrusions (see Leachs Roots of
Conflicts) do not equal the military hierarchical
process and institutionalism logic. Carnes
Lords Crisis Management, A Primer. Lord presents
Pearl Harbor as a political, not a military
failure- the US enacted the 1941 oil embargo and
Roosevelt sent mixed diplomatic messages- this
drove Japan to make their move (just as they did
against Russia in 1908).
Cohesive Elements
  • As Gaddis notes, western strategic form follows
    the hierarchy that operational art uses. The
    White House is a necessary hierarchy because no
    one is the Presidents equal.
  • Gaddis explains how Eisenhower built a large
    military industrial complex with more hierarchy
    and procedures.
  • McDougall implies that Americans apply western
    values of democracy and the American Dream to all
    other societies- this is similar to how western
    militaries apply Clausewitzian logic to other
    rivals and enemies universally.
  • Hew Strachans The Lost Meaning of Strategy
    modern war is no longer the golden era of
    Clausewitzian state-on-state total war. It is
    with non-state actors, failed states or rogues.
    European states now view war as a peacekeeping
    requirement (Rapoports global cataclysmic war
    theory, not Clausewitzian).

Tensions
  • Operational art (western logic) relies upon
    hierarchy of control and procedures for
    uniformity and repetition- although Eisenhower
    increased this on the political side (strategy)
    after WWII, some components of American Strategic
    culture (Weigley) are in tension with this.
    Peacetime small military
  • NSC-68 represents a tension between traditional
    American strategic culture (we pick our fights)
    and Cold War containment that follows a
    military systems-process of they pick were we
    fight.
  • B. Liddell Hart, Strategy. Hart sees indirect
    strategy as superior in the nuclear age- this is
    in tension with Clausewitzian logic (destroy the
    enemy directly).

39
Question 14 ANP- What is deterrence? What is the
militarys role?
40
Figure 1a Zweibelson Political Science Theory on
21st Century Irregular Warfare Trends Regarding
Nuclear-armed Nations
victory undetermined failure
Super-power nations Large complex militaries
Cuban Missile Crisis 1962
Japan 1945
Conflict in the Q1 is not direct Nuclear nations
use proxy conflicts in Q4 for indirect action
Germany 1945
Berlin Air Lift 1947
Conflict in the Q2 is the golden era for most
western military cultures-
Q1
Q2
Korean War
Total war High Intensity Conflict
Limited War Low Intensity Conflict
Vietnam War (RNA)
Afghanistan 1988 (USSR)
Panama 1989
Vietnam War (Viet Cong)
Iraq 1990
Afghanistan 2001-present
Q3
Q4
Iraq 2003
Iran-Iraq War 1988 (Iraq)
Conflict in the Q4 is where weaker nations and
actors seek to exploit super-power nations on
terms that are better than in Q3.
Bosnia 1999
Libya 1985
Iraqi Civil War 2004-present
Conflict in the Q3 is between non-nuclear nations
or with one nuclear (usually superior) power.
Lebanon 2006 (Israel)
Failing nations Rogue state
41
Cuban Missile Crisis 1962
 
42
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43
Question 15 ANP- American Foreign Policy
Traditions
44
American Foreign Policy U.S. Strategic Culture
over 300 years (1711-2011)
Conventional War against China
Uni-polar 21st Century
Gulf War I
Panama
Final Soviet Battle in Western Europe
Korea
Berlin Airlift
Military Industrial Complex Air Power, Nuclear
Age Total War (global threat) End of
Imperialism Clash of Ideologies America defender
of democracy World Policeman
Cold War
Kennans Long Telegram NCS-68 UN
resolutions Brinksmanship Proxy
Wars Détente Glasnost
WWII
Entering the World Stage
Peacetime small army Fear of European
invasion Coastal forts and navy Monroe Doctrine
foreign policy Avoid European wars JIB/JAB for
democracy American Civil War
WWI
Golden Era
Span-Amer. War
Builders Masks of War Weigleys American Way of
War
Civil War
Somalia
Mex-Amer. War
Libya?
Philippines 1899
Isolationist Early America
Discarded Conflicts
Vietnam
Jominis Principles of War Teddy Roosevelt and
the navy Linns Guardians and Heroes (Echo of
Battle) Mahan and Naval strength equals economic
strength Monroe Doctrine, Manifest Destiny
(messianic eschatological) PME establishment
(West Point)
Impressment Colonial sub-status Troop
quartering Taxes, economics
War 1812
Cuba
Contras
Amer. Revolution
Afghanistan?
Iraq?
French Indian War
Triggering Powell Doctrine we need an exit
strategy. Blackhawk Down send enough combat
power with right mission. Avoid COIN. Training
tomorrows enemies to help us Today
Colonial Period
Leachs Roots of Conflict Paines Common
Sense Locke, Hume, Age of Enlightenment
45
Question 16 Historical Example of Military Force
and Diplomacy- the American Civil War
46
Interwar Theorists (pre-Civil War)
Clausewitz
Winfield Scott
Napoleon (Legacy)
Jomini
Mahan
Prussian Staff
Mass Armies
Mexican War
Defensive superiority
Frontal Assault
Army requires resources
West Point
Smaller population
Doctrine
History
Crimean War
Slave based agricultural economy
Confederate Army
Logistics
Geography in Mississippi
Southern fixation on States Rights
Union Naval Blockade
Tactics
Rifled muskets Steam engines Trains Telegraph Armo
r Screw propellers Balloons Artillery
State-centric gentlemen caste
Union Army
New Technology
Siege mentality
Confederacy divided
Politics
Political nepotism and corruption
Vicksburg
Confederate prosperity
Resources
Tobacco and Cotton Trade
President Davis in Richmond
Mississippi- key waterway
South lacked infrastructure
South unable to industrialize faster than North
South lacked international trade
Linn (Echo of Battle)
Wiegley (American Way of War)
Kuhn (Paradigm Shifts)
Hagerman (The American Civil War)
Historian Interpretation (post-Civil War
reflective)
47
Divergent Cognitive Diagram for Confederate
Commander Problems 1861-1863
Interwar Theorists (pre-Civil War)
Clausewitz
Winfield Scott
Jomini
Napoleon (Legacy)
Mahan
Prussian Staff
Centers of Gravity
Napoleonic Wars
Mexican War
Offensive frontal assaults
Defensive advantage
Union organized some staff specialization
Napoleonic tactics must adapt with paradigm shift
in technology
Artillery dominates
Screw propellers
Telegraph
Doctrine
Naval Armor
History
Tactics
Rifled Muskets
Industrialization
Theory
Steam Engine
Militarys Role
Speed and Mass increased
Constitution
Forces
Terrain
Infrastructure in North and South
Manifest Destiny
Small Officer Corps
Outdated Army (active)
Increased casualties
Inability to C2
Western Territories
JIB/JAB
Post Mexican War stand-down
Pre-industrial Warfare (tactical) Post-Industrial
Warfare (multiple campaigns)
Defensive advantages
3/5 slave votes
State Rights
US distrusts large standing army
New technology
Inter-war period discourse on tactics
Inter-war theorists unable to discourse new
technology vs old tactics
Wiegley (American Way of War)
Kuhn (Paradigm Shifts)
Linn (Echo of Battle)
Hagerman (The American Civil War)
Historian Interpretation (post-Civil War
reflective)
48
Figure C Fishbone Diagram for Confederate
Commander Problems 1861-1863
Various caliber firearms require munitions
Confederate supply dispersed across states
President Davis lacked influence and leadership
Confederate supply lines lack rail
Problem failure to supply forces
1
Logistics
Confederacy organized around states
Dependent on water transit
South lacked international trade partners
Confederates interior lines critical
State-centric mindset hamstrung strategy
Spies littered message couriers
Davis was removed from local environment
Telegraph vulnerable
Problem failure to coordinate tactics and
strategy
2
C2 ISR
Calvary sent north
Armies too large to maneuver quickly without
signal conditions optimal
Vicksburg isolated by river a strength was also
a weakness
Siege mentality lacked recon
Mexican War given too much credit Clausewitz and
Crimean War not enough.
Mahan led West Pointers but Jomini and Mexican
War veterans steered tactics
American value on life militia factor
Rifled muskets Steam engines Trains Telegraph Arm
or Screw propellers Balloons Artillery
Problem failure to apply violence effectively to
accomplish ENDS.
3
Failed Discourse (tactics vs. emerging technology)
Jomini and Napoleon favored frontal assaults
Artillery of 1820s outranged by muskets of 1860s
South lacked industrial base of North
49
Question 17 How Economic Theory can Influence
Military Operations
50
Figure 1a Musings on Political Science Theories
Nation-state primary actors
Humans are anarchistic naturally individual
liberty is trumped by state survival
Anarchy is not the cause of conflict. Free trade
and interdependent democracies will reduce
conflict. Legitimacy in tension with cost to act.
Zero-sum game for power balance of
power Statism, Survivalism, Self-Help
Realism
Q1
Q2
Liberalism
Compatible in some aspects
Compatible in some aspects
Implicitly Chaotic World
Implicitly Peaceful World
Compatible in some aspects
Ideology not compatible with others.
Q3
Q4
Marxists Communists Socialists
Social Constructivists
Compatible in some aspects
Ideological counter-capitalist individual
worker is the power- the state serves the worker
final battle vs. capitalism Non-marxist nations
will always threaten Marxist ones.
Changing values and perceptions will change
government and society meta-cognition and game
theory works here.
Individuals comprise actors
51
Economy Capitalist (realism Smith) or liberal
(global trade)
Anatol Rapoports non-Clausewitzian War
Philosophies (editor and wrote the intro to the
1968 Penguin Classic On War
There is a final war.
Eschatological (final war) Philosophies of War
Cataclysmic (world destruction) Philosophies of
War
Prevent all war.
Divine Eschatological (religious final battle)
Global Cataclysmic War Theory
Natural Eschatological (planet extinction human
extinction)
Ethno-centric Cataclysmic War Theory
Human (messianic) Eschatological (people here now)
Economy Capitalist Liberal
Economy Islamic (ideological)
Economy Marxist Socialist
Economy Marxist Socialist
  • Rapoport claims the Soviets switched to this
    during the Cold War- the chief difference is
  • War is NOT a tool.
  • The outside world wants to destroy the unique
    ethnic identity of the select people.
  • Protective measures such as the Berlin Wall are
    not for keeping people in, but keeping outsiders
    out.
  • The world will end in a final show-down.
  • Example MAD in the Cold War fueled this logic
    Soviets sought to preserve their state versus
    Capitalist westerners.
  • Rapoport calls this a system-theoretical
    approach. The principles are
  • War is NOT a tool.
  • ALL war is bad.
  • Global government is the answer to ending
    conflict.
  • International systems will aid in preventing
    global cataclysmic war.
  • The nuclear age advanced this logic.
  • Example The United Nations pursues international
    systems and a form of weak global governance with
    the general position that all war is badNATO is
    not an example of this NATO is an alliance under
    Clausewitzian logic.

Religious movements that feature an Armageddon
plot or the return of a savior with the
destruction of all non-believers follow this
logic. A final war will, God Willing, end human
conflict this is pre-determined (linear
causality), and the chosen people will reign
supreme. Example Iran launching WMD at Israel
to trigger emergence of 12th Imam.
Extreme environmentalism movements anti-human
movements (by humans, oddly). Non-human events
such as planet destruction, asteroid event, or
disease epidemic that ends human (or all) life.
Example the dinosaurs did not wage war but
their existence was terminated this way. Humans
waging limited war while an asteroid hurtles
towards us makes a similar example.
A group of people already on the planet that will
bring about the final battle- the Nazis, early
Soviet Party, and other extreme non-religious
groups followed this logic. The Proletarian
Revolution where workers of the world
unit. American Manifest Destiny during the Great
Plains Indian Wars has components of this logic
also. Example Soviet Party of the early 20th
century followed this logic, according to
Rapoport.
52
Fuzzy Cognitive Map on Kirkpatrick Victory Plan
Problem 1941
national prosperity vs. entropy
Resources available to nation vs. global resources
Training a military requires time/resources/techno
logy
USSR population and resources mobilized slowly.
Environment
Economic Factors
UK was losing resources and troops at a rapid
rate.
U.S. National resources
U.S. possesses massive resources and industry.
Ttime
Global trade empowered US economy
Limited Time (NLT 1943)
U.S. has a large military age population pool.
Soviet Union as a German buffer.
Technology advancements empowered military action
Threat to world (WW2)
X (means) y (ways) z (ends) How to get x t
(time) / r (resources)/ enemy R s (society) e
/ p (political structure)
UK as a German buffer.
Current (1941) US military inadequate to achieve
goals
Z goals
U.S. national goals in WW2.
U.S. democracy will function with 10 population
draft
America located across oceans from WW2.
inter-war military for U.S. downsized
Military decisions require political and public
discourse
Fascism diametrically opposes Democracy
American Isolationism
Pro-German lobby.
Failure of League of Nations
Pro-Allies lobby
German fascism resulted from WWI and LoN failures.
American independence
Ethnic/Social
Political Structure
American Democracy
Political threat (internal and external)
Ethnic and social national identity seeks
prosperity and power
53
Question 18 American Foreign Policy Traditions
and Small Wars
54
Figure 1a Zweibelson Political Science Theory on
21st Century Irregular Warfare Trends Regarding
Nuclear-armed Nations
victory undetermined failure
Super-power nations Large complex militaries
Cuban Missile Crisis 1962
Japan 1945
Conflict in the Q1 is not direct Nuclear nations
use proxy conflicts in Q4 for indirect action
Germany 1945
Berlin Air Lift 1947
Conflict in the Q2 is the golden era for most
western military cultures-
Q1
Q2
Korean War
Total war High Intensity Conflict
Limited War Low Intensity Conflict
Vietnam War (RNA)
Afghanistan 1988 (USSR)
Panama 1989
Vietnam War (Viet Cong)
Iraq 1990
Afghanistan 2001-present
Q3
Q4
Iraq 2003
Iran-Iraq War 1988 (Iraq)
Conflict in the Q4 is where weaker nations and
actors seek to exploit super-power nations on
terms that are better than in Q3.
Bosnia 1999
Libya 1985
Iraqi Civil War 2004-present
Conflict in the Q3 is between non-nuclear nations
or with one nuclear (usually superior) power.
Lebanon 2006 (Israel)
Failing nations Rogue state
55
Question 19 Operational Art Development from
18th to 21st Centuries- theories, doctrine, tech,
politics, culture.
56
Interwar Theorists (pre-Civil War)
Clausewitz
Winfield Scott
Napoleon (Legacy)
Jomini
Mahan
Prussian Staff
Mass Armies
Mexican War
Defensive superiority
Frontal Assault
Army requires resources
West Point
Smaller population
Doctrine
History
Crimean War
Slave based agricultural economy
Confederate Army
Logistics
Geography in Mississippi
Southern fixation on States Rights
Union Naval Blockade
Tactics
Rifled muskets Steam engines Trains Telegraph Armo
r Screw propellers Balloons Artillery
State-centric gentlemen caste
Union Army
New Technology
Siege mentality
Confederacy divided
Politics
Political nepotism and corruption
Vicksburg
Confederate prosperity
Resources
Tobacco and Cotton Trade
President Davis in Richmond
Mississippi- key waterway
South lacked infrastructure
South unable to industrialize faster than North
South lacked international trade
Linn (Echo of Battle)
Wiegley (American Way of War)
Kuhn (Paradigm Shifts)
Hagerman (The American Civil War)
Historian Interpretation (post-Civil War
reflective)
57
JIB/JAB refinement
Politics
Global Middle Class
International Law/Governance
GRIN tech
21th Century
Complexity
Resource Competition
Post Cold-War
Theory
Urban Populations
Gay Rights
Design
Deterrence
Naveh
biometrics
Unrestricted Conflict
20th Century
Civil Rights II
Pentamic Army
UAVs
Kennan
worms
Limited Conflict
Post-Imperialism
Sayid Qtub
Cyberspace
TH Lawrence
Space
American Exceptionalis
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