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Title: Terrorist Takeovers


1
Terrorist Takeovers
  • A growing threat

2
What we are dealing with???

3
Mumbai
4
Mumbai

5
History
  • There have been a couple of well-known similar
    incidents in Russia this decade
  • Moscow Movie Theater
  • Beslan

6
Overview
  • The recent terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India
    have reinforced that a small determined terrorist
    team can cause widespread killings/panic in a
    short amount of time.
  • Typical law enforcement tactics such as Active
    Shooter may be attempted instead of staying back
    and securing a perimeter

7
Will to Win
  • What is important is mindset. Without it, you
    cannot do much good.
  • Officers have training pertaining to skills
    (accuracy, movement, entries, etc..) but a will
    to win has to be developed.

8
Moscow Theater Takeover
  • October 2002
  • Up to 50 Chechen rebels took about 600 people
    hostage in a movie theater
  • 3 day standoff
  • Soft Target
  • Took over and planted bombs in strategic
    locations

9
Moscow
  • Negotiations began early
  • Some hostages released Friday Morning (Total of
    58 were released). Would not release children
    older than 12 years old as teenagers are not
    considered children.
  • Allowed food and medicine to be brought in
  • Friday night made promise to start shooting
    hostages

10
Moscow
  • Terrorist started by killing two males
  • Explosions and gunfire heard afterwards
  • Elite officers stormed the building
  • An unknown type of gas was used, killing
    hostages.

11

MOSCOW THEATRE SIEGE
On Wednesday, October 23, 2002, 40 Chechen
terrorists seized a crowded Moscow theatre,
taking over 700 hostages and demanding the
withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechenya.
After a siege of two and a half days, the Russian
government raided the building with the
assistance of knockout gas. All of the terrorists
were killed, along with about 120 of the hostages.
12
Beslan
  • September 1, 2004
  • Beginning of school year
  • 1100 hostages
  • 3 day period
  • 334 hostages killed, 186 children

13
Why Beslan?
  • An as yet unresolved question is why the
    hostage-takers targeted North Ossetia and Beslan
    in particular.
  • A number of theories have been advanced
  • Practicality It may have simply been that the
    attackers were only able to get as far as Beslan
    and were unable to get into Russia proper.
  • Opportunism The school in Beslan undertook
    major building work during the summer break. It
    has been reported that a Chechen company was
    involved, which may have given the attackers the
    chance to stockpile weapons (if this did happen)
    in the school well in advance of the siege.
  • Politics The Ossetians are a mainly Christian
    people who have a history of conflict with their
    Muslim neighbours. The attackers may have hoped
    to inflame inter-communal tension and goad the
    Ossetians into taking revenge on innocent Ingush
    and Chechens, thereby kick-starting a cycle of
    revenge and blood feuds. This would potentially
    plunge the North Caucasus into an all-out
    inter-ethnic war.

Demands of the hostage-takers
  • The hostage-takers in Beslan are reported to have
    at first made the following demands
  • Immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from
    Chechnya.
  • Presence of the following people in the school
  • Aleksander Dzasokhov, president of North Ossetia,
  • Murat Ziazikov, president of nearby Ingushetia,
  • Alu Alkhanov, president of nearby Chechnya,
  • Leonid Roshal, director of the emergency surgery
    department of the Pediatrics Institute.

14
Analysis In Review New facts come to light
(One year later)
  • Many new and additional facts have come to light
    since this incident was originally
  • reported upon in September 2004. The Center for
    Tactical Counterterrorism in New York
  • has conducted a through critique of this incident
    and made note of the following
  • additional observations
  • Careful Planning Allowed Terrorists To Control
    1,000 Hostages and Fight Security Forces for 10
  • Hours resulting in 335 People Killed 156
    Children, 727 Wounded, 260 Remain Missing.
  • 32 heavily armed and masked Chechen terrorists
    belonging to Shamil Basayevs Second Group of
  • Salakhin Riyadus Shakhidi seized the
    school on the first day of the Russian school
    year
  • Attack also bankrolled by Abu Omar al-Saif, top
    al Qaeda financier in Chechnya
  • 1,191 students, teachers and parents held in the
    school gymnasium. 50 children escaped by hiding
  • in a boiler room in the initial confusion
  • The school siege was well planned. Terrorists
    cached explosives, weapons, and food (canned
    goods
  • and chocolate) in July when school was
    going through renovations.
  • Terrorists released 26 during day 2 of the siege.
    Many of those were infants born in 2002 or after
  • Terrorists used Arab code names and remained in
    contact with outside support via cell phones
  • Hostages said that the terrorists wore NATO type
    camouflage, had modern assault rifles,
  • communications equipment and medical kits
  • Terrorists threatened to kill 50 children for
    each gunmen killed and 20 for each gunmen
    wounded.
  • Terrorists demanded Russian withdrawal from
    Chechnya and the release of 30 associates
    arrested
  • during attempted uprising in Ingushetia in
    June 2004 that killed 90 people

15
Analysis In Review New facts come to light
(Continued)
Tactics
  • Several of the terrorists' bodies have now been
    identified as the "construction workers" who
    remodeled the school. The same tactic was used in
    the killing of Chechen President Ahmad Kadyrov in
    May 2004. (Note that on 9 September, police in
    the Russian city of St Petersburg have found
    explosives, detonators and a gun in a cinema
    closed for repairspossibly a related incident)
  • According to hostages, within the first minutes
    of the siege, the terrorists made male hostages
    rip up the floor, from which they extracted their
    contraband.
  • They quickly wired explosives in the gym and
    established an explosive ring around the school
  • Windows in the gym were smashed and children were
    forced to stand in front of open windows as
    human shields to prevent police from firing into
    the building.
  • Terrorists brought dogs with them as early
    warning for CS (Security forces used CS in 2002
    theater siege) as well as gas masks, and
    positioned a sniper on the upper floors of the
    building.
  • Characteristics of the Terror Cell
  • Authorities have reported that the terror cell
    consists of Chechens, and Ingush (who are Muslim)
    Russians, Georgians (who are Christian) and 9
    Arabs. Russian security officials have since
    identified 10 of the Beslan school
    hostage-takers, confirming that six of them came
    from Chechnya.
  • 4 women were seen wearing suicide bomb belts.
  • Some of the terrorists were arrested prior and
    were supposed to be doing time in jail.
    Authorities are investigating why they were
    released. One terrorist was caught alive, 24 old,
    Nur-Pashi Kulaev. Kulaev and his brother,
    31-year old Han-Pashi Kulaev (killed september
    3rd), were Basayev's personal bodyguards.
  • There are reports stating that the terrorists
    quarreled - many were unhappy with the fact that
    the hostages were children. According to
    Kulaev, Polkovnik personally shot one of the
    terrorists and even blew up the two female
    suicide bombers (via a remote) to show that he
    meant business.

16
Analysis In Review New facts come to light
(Continued)
  • Local Law Enforcement Response Assault On
    School
  • According to the Federal Security Service (FSB),
    the plan was to negotiate, not to storm the
    buildings.
  • A gun battle erupted at 1 p.m. local time when
    authorities attempted to retrieve the bodies of
    those killed during the initial seizure.
  • The terrorists opened fire with RPGs and small
    arms fire.
  • FSB then started its assault. Some 30 women and
    children broke out of the building under
    terrorist fire.
  • There are reports that it was around this time
    that the terrorists broke off into 3 groups one
    to stay and fight, another to escape, and the
    third to mix in with the hostages.
  • The group that stayed set off the explosives in
    the gymnasium, reportedly killing hundreds of
    hostages and partially collapsing the roof
  • Terrorists were successful in killing many of the
    fleeing hostages, many of the children were shot
    in the back as they ran out of the building.
  • 13 terrorists escaped outside the school
    perimeter and found refuge in a nearby house.
    Authorities later reported that this group had
    been dealt with.
  • Authorities are looking at possible aid given by
    some North Ossetia police officers.
  • According to Russian intelligence, this terrorist
    act was planned from abroad - Basayev received 2
    million dollars and equipment to carry out the
    attack from al Saif.

17
Analysis In Review New facts come to light
(Continued)
  • Implications for our Schools in the United
    States
  • This attack reinforces the vulnerability of soft
    targets, especially schools.
  • Schools have improved security in the wake of
    high school shootings.
  • Most school districts have mandated all schools
    implement emergency response plans, to address
    terrorist threats. Many of these plans advise
    schools to take specific actions depending on the
    level of DHS warning then in effect.
  • Most plans require schools to interact with local
    law enforcement and emergency service providers.
  • Once again the involvement of Chechen women in
    the attacks, this time in the presence of
    children Illustrates a growing trend that
    terrorists no longer negotiate on specific
    demands but now kill hostages as the objective.
    In this case, the terrorists adjusted their
    tactics after the Moscow Theater siege, the
    authorities did not.
  • Construction projects are key for several
    reasons (1) they are a source of equipment, (2)
    in built up
  • areas they often provide access to
    underground systems, (3) some sites have
    explosives handy,
  • (4) unattended vehicles, or groups of
    people are not suspicious at odd hours.
  • Authorities must consider that a jihadists
    best-case scenario is their own death.

18
Analysis Russia's Caucasus Quagmire
By Dr Jonathan Eyal Military analyst
Nothing whatsoever can explain or justify
the unspeakable cruelty of the terrorists, who
remain solely responsible for the wholesale
massacre of children in the school in Beslan.
Nevertheless, some responsibility for the
calamitous outcome also belongs to Russia's
special military units which, yet again, bungled
a rescue operation and exacerbated the tragedy.
The Russian Spetsnaz, or special forces, have had
a glorious reputation for decades. Indeed, as the
Soviet Union collapsed, they were the only troops
of an otherwise despised and ridiculed Russian
military still considered fashionable. Every
street market in Russia sells some items of their
uniform or insignia, and most young Russian men -
even those who will do everything to escape
military service - still wear them eagerly.
The Alpha hostage rescue unit, directly
subordinated to Russia's FSB security service, is
considered an elite within the elite - the
ultimate in military ruthlessness and precision.
Yet, as the horror of the Beslan school
indicates, much of this reputation has been put
into question. The Russian military's first
failure during this school hostage crisis was in
the overall strategy. As any anti-terrorism
expert knows, not all such hostage crises are the
same. If the number of hostages is relatively
small, the situation can be fairly stable, and a
government has some time to negotiate with the
terrorists, while preparing its response. But if
the number of hostages is large - and it was huge
in the Beslan school - the situation is
inherently unstable from the start, and violence
can erupt at any moment. The reason for this is
that the terrorists themselves are unsure of
their situation, and the chances are high that
some of the hostages would rebel, thereby
starting the shoot-out everyone is seeking to
avoid. Either way, it should have been
clear from the start that, even if the Russian
government ruled out a military assault on the
school - as President Vladimir Putin now claims -
preparations to storm the building at a moment's
notice should have been ready. Yet nothing of the
kind appears to have been planned when the
explosions and shooting started, it caught the
Russian military commanders completely by
surprise. The result was no less than 10 hours of
shooting - just about the surest way of
guaranteeing heavy casualties. Ultimately, the
Russian troops did what they know best shoot in
all directions with massive firepower, rather
than execute the surgical strike required in such
circumstances.

19
Beslan
  • Terrorist wore military camouflage and black
    balaclavas
  • Some had explosive belts
  • Witnesses claim there were two groups
  • Initial shootout killed 8 people
  • Herded group into gymnasium
  • Cell Phones confiscated

20
Explosives

21
Beslan
  • Hostages were commanded to speak in Russian when
    spoken to
  • One male started talking in native language to
    calm hostages and was shot dead immediately.
  • Another refused to kneel and was shot dead also.

22
Gymnasium

23
Bombs
  • Terrorist standing on Dead Man Switch

24

25
What you are up against

26
Intel Gathering

27
Beslan
  • Exerted dominance from the beginning
  • No hesitation to kill
  • Group of adults(15-20) identified as possible
    problems taken to separate room, when a large
    blast was heard
  • Witness claims that a female terrorist had a belt
    bomb that went off, killing her and a second
    female and a male.

28
  • Remains of Suicide Bomber.

29
Beslan
  • Witness claims that the leader remotely set the
    bomb off to kill those who disagreed about child
    hostages
  • Surviving hostages were told to kneel and were
    subsequently shot, only one lived.
  • Mined the gym with explosives
  • Broke out window to prevent gassing

30
More Remains

31
Beslan
  • Negotiations started, but not successful
  • Eventually 26 hostages released
  • No food or water was allowed
  • 3rd day a small explosion was heard followed by
    another.
  • Some believe that RPGs were used by the military
    first. Blast and fire killed a majority of the
    hostages

32
Signs of Battle

33
Beslan
  • Attack was led by Russian Military forces
  • Hostages used as shields, who were shot by the
    military.
  • Ongoing gun battles throughout night
  • 385 people were killed
  • 334 hostages, 10 Special Forces, 10Other, 31
    hostage takers
  • 200 people missing or unidentified

34
Survivors

35
Day Three September 3rd
These two accounts may be reconcilable.
Ruslan Aushev, a key negotiator during the siege,
told the Russian Newspaper Novaya Gazeta that
an initial explosion was set off by an
hostage-taker accidentally tripping over a trip
wire as a result, armed civilians, some of them
apparently fathers of the hostages, started
shooting. Reportedly, no security forces or
hostage-takers were shooting at this point, but
the gunfire led the hostage-takers to believe
that the school was being stormed in response,
they set off their bombs.
Apparently, it was at this point that Russian
special forces activated their action plan to
storm the school to rescue any possible
survivors. A chaotic battle broke out as the
special forces sought to enter the school and
cover the escape of the hostages. A massive level
of force was used as well as the special forces,
the regular army and Interior Ministry troops
were also engaged, as were helicopter gunships
and at least one tank. Many local civilians also
joined in the battle, having brought along their
own weapons.
36
Day Two September 2nd
During the siege, the terrorists video taped
themselves and the hostage situation inside the
gymnasium. After the siege, the video tape was
recovered. It shows adults and children packed
into the school gymnasium as heavily-armed,
masked men walk around the room. Explosives,
apparently wired and ready for use, lie on the
floor while others are looped around basketball
hoops at either end of the gym. Russia's NTV
network aired the footage several days after the
siege had ended. The network did not explain how
it obtained the video. Shown below are several
still images taken from the video.
37
Day Three September 3rd
During the battle, a group of hostage-takers,
said by the government to number thirteen, broke
through the military cordon and took refuge
nearby. Two of those thirteen were reportedly
women who allegedly attempted to blend into the
crowd and escape disguised as health personnel.
The military cordon had been compromised by
permitting the passage of hostages' relatives,
dressed in civilian clothing and, in some cases,
bearing firearms. A few of the escapees were
said to be cornered in a residential two story
house within 40 metres from the gym. Whether or
not they had hostages is unknown. The house was
destroyed using tanks and flame throwers by 2300
September 3.
38
Day Four September 4th
Deputy Prosecutor General Alexander Fridinsky
states that 31 of 32 attackers had been confirmed
dead and one had been seized. One suspected
hostage-taker was beaten to death by the fathers
of hostages when he was injured and driven to the
hospital. According to official data 331
civilians and 11 soldiers died. At least one
surviving female hostage committed suicide after
returning home. Many other survivors remained in
severe shock. Some injured died in hospitals.
39
Day Three September 3rd
The hostage-takers set off more large explosions,
totally destroying the gym and setting much of
the building on fire, while the special forces
commandos blew holes in walls to allow hostages
to escape. By 1500, two hours after the assault
began, Russian troops claimed control of most of
the school. However, fighting was still
continuing in the grounds as evening fell, and
three gunmen were located in the basement along
with a number of hostages. They were eventually
killed, along with the hostages they were holding.
40
Survivor
  • Expect Horrific Scenes

41

42
Victims

43
Victims

44
The Aftermath
Dead Terrorist

45
Eyewitness accounts
"We heard a powerful explosion, and the snipers
who had been posted to keep an eye on things said
the gym had blown up. Shooting began straight
away... The hostages started running in our
direction... We could hear the characteristic
crack of bullets over our heads - they were
firing from the direction of the school...I saw
children with gunshot wounds being dragged. There
were about 12 children who started running out.
About four of our lads immediately, without
waiting for orders, formed a human shield, and
kept the windows of the school in their
sights... All the entrances were barricaded from
inside with desks, chairs and all sorts of
rubbish they could gather... So we had to go in
through the canteen window. When we went in, we
had nowhere to tread on the floor - there were
too many hostages, women and children... A gunman
sprang out from a small utility room - it was a
dead end, so he tried to break out. He shot one
of our men at point-blank range and immediately
threw a powerful grenade among the hostages. He
was immediately killed by another of our men, who
was injured by the fragments of that same
grenade. It also killed several hostages. There
was a dark corridor in front of us, and they were
firing from there all the time. We stood a bit to
the side, so as not to be hit. I shouted 'Throw a
grenade in there!' but the lads said 'How can we?
There are children in there!'... There were so
many grenades being thrown at us, so much firing
- what could we do, with all the children there?
We could not throw grenades there or do anything.
So that's how it was."
Unnamed officer in special unit of Federal
Security Service (FSB) in Russia TV interview
"Throughout the three days that we were
held hostage we were virtually on top of each
other. There were about 1,100 of us crammed in
there. Periodically gunmen came in and for a joke
ordered all of us to stand up or sit down. It
went on like that all day long. They put a huge
explosive device in the middle - about 50cm by
50cm - controlled by a trigger mechanism. One of
the terrorists kept squeezing it with his foot.
When they got tired they put a pile of books on
the button. The children behaved very calmly -
much more so than the adults. The adults were
talking to each other and because of that the
gunmen shot many of them. They were all prepared
for death, especially on the second and third
days, because the gunmen were saying nobody would
be able to enter the school and also that people
outside didn't give a damn about them. They
don't even want to give you water or food,' they
said. They said nobody had contacted them and
nobody had requested anything from them.
Sometimes they took the boys' clothes, soaked
them in a bucket used for the floor mop, then
threw the clothes at us, saying 'drink that!'"
Marina Kozyreva, mother of schoolgirl Diana,
spent the whole time in the school gym and was
later interviewed by the Russian newspaper
Kommersant.
46
Eyewitness accounts
"Initially we were escorted to the toilet
together, then they stopped doing that, and only
took the little kids. All the time the explosives
were hanging above us - they used adhesive tape
to fix it there. Before the assault the bandits
started arguing with each other about something.
I've spent a long time in Chechnya, I know the
Chechen language, and they weren't speaking
Chechen - they were just speaking a strange
language like Arabic, and also Ingush. One of the
gunmen was reading the Koran constantly, and I
counted exactly 23 gunmen altogether. The leader
was on the roof the whole time with a sniper's
rifle. We realized that, because the others went
to him for advice. The older pupils were forced
to carry desks to barricade the windows. When the
assault started one of the bandits shouted 'I'll
save you'. Everybody ran towards him and then he
blew himself up, killing many people. The whole
time they never let anybody sleep - if somebody
dozed off they would shake him awake again,
saying 'no sleeping!' The explosion took place
under the roof - there was no external explosion.
When the assault came I pulled two girls out with
me.
Marat Khamayev, 15, also spoke to the Russian
newspaper Kommersant
"It took us all by surprise. We were told
there would be talks and we were ordered to lie
face down in the gym... Then there was an
explosion in the yard. Then there was shooting...
My sister and I stayed where we were, lying on
the floor. But suddenly there was another
explosion above us and part of the ceiling fell
in. People were screaming, there was panic. I
looked up and saw some children lying on the
floor covered in blood and not moving. There was
a dead lady lying beside me. Torn-off arms and
legs were lying everywhere. There were bombs
hanging on the rope they'd strung up between the
basketball hoops, across the gym. And now these
bombs began going off, one after the other,
coming closer and closer to us. Anyone who could
get up ran screaming to the windows and the back
entrance corridor. Alina and I were near a window
both sisters managed to escape unscathed."
Diana Gadzhinova, 14-year-old girl hostage,
speaking to Izvestiya newspaper
"I woke up under the debris and all was covered
in sand - my ears, nose and eyes - and I could
not see anything. Then we were taken to the
dining room. There we were given water, then
explosions started. And then we jumped out of the
window and we were taken to the hospital."
Irina, girl hostage
47
Eyewitness accounts
"There was this thin tall man of about 35,
a typical Chechen, his right hand bandaged. He
was the angriest of our captors, he was
threatening us all the time and firing into the
ceiling. It was so stuffy I was unwell, I fainted
several times, so my mum asked him to take me to
the corridor for a while to take a breath of air.
To my surprise he agreed. In the corridor I was
nearly sick, my legs gave way, and sat on a
rucksack lying by the wall. But he said 'Don't
sit on this one, there are mines in it, sit on
that one instead'... I asked him 'Will you at
least let the children go?' He said 'No - why?
Your Russian troops in Chechnya catch children
just like you and cut their heads off. I had a
daughter, about your age, and they killed her,'
he said."
Survivor Santa Zangiyeva, 15, spoke to the
Russian newspaper Izvestiya
"I saw a wounded gunman fall out of the
school window during the fighting. Solidiers
were evacuating children nearby. When they saw
the gunman, they tore him to bits within seconds.
I did not even have time to realize what was
happening. I'll be honest not even for a second
did I think - I am witnessing the killing of a
human being. It felt like a venomous snake was
being trampled... They were scum. Professional,
well-trained scum. Their actions were highly
skilful, their shooting was first-class - you
could not raise your head... The only thing they
did badly was booby-trapping the building. It was
not a good idea to let the hostages assemble
explosive devices."
Moskovskaya Gazeta interviewed Oleg Tideyev,
whose son escaped from the besieged school
"We broke in, and saw piles of men and
women, and children too. The children were naked
from the waist up. There was nowhere for us to
tread, but we had to go in, so we did. I pulled
four people out. Many people were thrown to the
corners by the blast, or maybe they crawled there
themselves. Few were alive. We had to find those
who were still alive, but how? I made two
mistakes myself. When I pulled one young girl
out, there was another explosion. Just before
that, two girls shouted and waved to us from a
window, one was about seven, the other a bit
older. I waved back to show I'd come for them
right now, and they laughed they were so happy!
Then there was an explosion, and I never saw
these girls again. I'll keep looking for them in
the school..."
Kommersant interviewed Anzor, a rescuer who
helped in the smaller of the school's gyms
48
New report tries to lay blame on local police
(Washington Post 29 Dec 2005)
  • "The counterterrorist operation was plagued by
    shortcomings. . . . Many law enforcement officers
    did not know how to act in an emergency
    situation."
  • By Peter Finn, Washington Post Foreign
    Service
  • MOSCOW, Dec. 28 -- In the month before
    the Beslan school siege in which 331 hostages
    were killed last year, Russian security services
    received intelligence that terrorists might try
    to seize a school in the region on the first day
    of classes, but instructions for tightened
    security were ignored, according to preliminary
    findings of a parliamentary investigation
    released Wednesday.
  • Although the Russian Interior Ministry
    sent warning telegrams to regional authorities,
    the investigation found, only a single unarmed
    policewoman was stationed outside Beslan's School
    No. 1 when at least 32 terrorists stormed it on
    Sept. 1, 2004. She was taken hostage, too. Citing
    numerous failings by local and regional officials
    before the attack, the report found "negligence
    and carelessness in facing a real terrorist
    threat." The assault by local police, armed
    civilians and federal troops that ultimately
    ended the siege was marked by "a whole number of
    blunders and shortcomings," the commission's
    chairman, Alexander Torshin, said in presenting
    the report to parliament Wednesday. Torshin, who
    is deputy speaker of the upper house of
    parliament, also lambasted officials at the scene
    for initially lying about the number of hostages
    taken, which infuriated both the terrorists
    inside the school and hostages' relatives
    outside. Overall, the report faulted local
    officials, leading to some criticism that it
    whitewashed mistakes by high-level members of the
    government of President Vladimir Putin. During
    the crisis, command centers at the scene were in
    constant contact with Moscow.
  • The report "is an attempt to put the blame
    on regional and local law enforcers and not on
    the leaders of federal ministries, who in my view
    bear responsibility for what happened," Vladimir
    Ryzhkov, an independent member of parliament,
    told the Associated Press. "They didn't take
    preventive measures. They didn't check how their
    orders were being carried out." The attacks "can
    only be compared with Nazi atrocities," Torshin
    said. "The hostages who were held in the besieged
    school were deprived of food, medicines and
    water. They had to drink their own urine. They
    were forced to mine the building, and when they
    tried to escape, they got bullets in their
    backs." The three-day siege ended in a storm of
    fire and bullets. Of the 331 hostages killed, 186
    were children. In addition, 31 out of 32 fighters
    died the survivor is on trial. There have been
    three separate official inquiries, with sometimes
    conflicting findings. One conducted by the
    regional parliament found numerous failings by
    law enforcement authorities. An initial report by
    federal prosecutors, released Tuesday, said
    security services were not to blame for the
    outcome. That report angered relatives of the
    victims, but they generally welcomed the tone and
    thrust of Wednesday's report, which was based on
    interviews with more than 1,000 people. "The very
    fact that this commission exists is a precedent
    for Russia, and we think that Torshin understands
    that he can't use the usual doublespeak," said
    Anyeta Gadieva, a spokeswoman for the Beslan
    Mothers' Committee. She noted that Putin had
    initially resisted the establishment of an
    investigative commission. (Continued)

49
Mumbai
  • Most recent hostage takeover
  • At least 164 dead
  • Planned some time in advance
  • Involved detailed planned assault from water
  • 2,3,4 man teams

50
Locations Affected
51
Mumbai
  • Why from water?
  • Traffic sucks in Mumbai during rush hour
  • Train stations heavily monitored
  • Direct from abroad (Pakistan)

52
Mumbai
  • Two Tactics used
  • Hit and Run and Seize and Hold

53
Hit and Run
  • Attacked quickly with AK-47s and grenades
  • Looked for large groups
  • Withdrew from security areas when confronted by
    police
  • Tactics used at a hospital and cafe , CST
    Terminal.
  • Hit hospital as a drive-by

54
CST Terminal
55
CST Terminal
56
CST Terminal
57
CST Terminal
58
Seize and Hold
  • Gained entry and immediately began to fire
    anywhere
  • Hostages possibly taken
  • Had prior knowledge of building to make it easier
    to navigate through
  • Made strong points for defense
  • Used at Taj Mahal Hotel, Nariman House

59
  • Planned to have a rooftop stand-off but
    couldnt find the access to the roof
  • Allegedly was to contact handler and then make
    demands once hostages were secured

60

61

62

Terrorist
63

Terrorist
64
Brazen
Terrorist
65

66

67
Seize and hold
  • Rounded up hostages and took to a good location
    to defend.
  • Some walked through halls looking for people to
    shoot.
  • Room to room battles with police

68
New Terrorist Tactics??
  • These tactics are not new.
  • Munich 1973
  • Looked for soft targets, had innovative
    infiltration, and local knowledge

69
Target Analysis
  • Western Targets
  • -Five-Star hotels that cater to international
    businesses
  • -Popular restaurants for backpackers and Western
    Travelers
  • -Jewish Compound
  • -Crowded Transportation Terminals

70
Terrorists
  • Hyderabad Deccan Muhjahideen claimed attack
  • Claimed to defend Indian Muslims
  • Lashkar-e-Tayyiba denied it, although they have
    used similar tactics.
  • Lone survivor claims to have been trained by
    Laskar-e-Tayyiba(terrorist group outlawed by
    Pakistan)

71
Terrorist
  • Reports of Mauritius IDs captured
  • 20-30s in age
  • Indian Press claims they were Pakistanis
  • Terrorist received lectures of India Security and
    intelligence agencies and how to evade security
    forces.

72
Terrorist
  • Possible Home-Grown terrorist with extensive
    training, planning, and support from somewhere
    else.
  • Targets Westerners, Jews, and economic sites that
    suggest links to worldwide-Islamic groups.

73
Police response
  • Police blocked roads, set up barricades
  • Some police engaged terrorist, which the
    terrorist then evaded and went after new targets.
  • Army units cleared buildings
  • Cautious approach to limit injuring hostages

74
Police
  • Police allegedly had outdated firearms with
    little or no ammo.
  • -WWII Enfields (bolt-actions, limited ammo
    capacity).
  • Witnesses claim police did not attack, but were
    overwhelmed.
  • Plenty of opportunities to fight back, but
    nothing happened.
  • Photographer could have shot terrorist

75
Intelligence
  • U.S. had told India that a possible attack was
    imminent from the water, but not much security
    enhancements were done.

76
Response
  • Typical past response patterns are to set up
    perimeters in such incidents.
  • Active Shooter type-training can be utilized, but
    firepower may be limited.
  • - Not everyone may have a rifle
  • -Going up against well-armed people with
    explosives (grenades, RPGs).

77
Active Shooter
  • Traditional Active Shooters will kill until
    cornered.
  • Once cornered, they realize it is over and
    usually kill themselves
  • Want to make an individual statement

78
Terrorist
  • Will not stop
  • Will fight until death
  • Likely be better armed and trained
  • The more horrific the killings, the better
  • Idealogically and Religiously driven
  • Will place materials in location prior to event
    happening

79
From Al Queda Manual
  • Issue 10 of Al Batter

80
Kidnapping Guide
  • Capability to endure psychological pressure
  • Capability to take control of adversary
  • Capable physical fighting skills
  • Good physical fitness
  • Good awareness
  • Ability to use different types of weapons

81
  • Taught to be aware of stalling, execute hostages
    if stalling is suspected so adversary will know
    the seriousness and resolve of the kidnappers
  • Stalling indicates an attack is coming
  • Be careful who is released
  • Verify any food brought in is good
  • Avoid looking at women

82
Kidnapping Instructions
  • Kill all male hostages capable of resistance
  • Separate hostages into groups of children, women,
    elderly.
  • Immediately wire a perimeter with explosives
  • Prohibit any stalling by killing hostages at
    first sign.
  • Beware of diversion attacks

83
Kidnapping Instructions
  • When children cry, kill an adult and place the
    body in front of the child
  • Clothing exchange with hostages

84
Terrorist Group Breakdown
  • Protection Group to protect abductors
  • Guarding/Control Group to seize control of
    hostages and get rid of them if needed
  • Negotiator-relays Mujahideens message

85
Response
  • If terrorist are allowed to barricade, they will
    be able to re-enforce their position, kill more
    hostages, and kill more police responders as they
    are defending instead of attacking.
  • Recent history shows that if allowed to
    barricade, there will be many deaths, from the
    beginning to the end.

86
Response
  • Typical amount of terrorist range anywhere from
    10-30, depending on the location they choose to
    defend.
  • Hostages can be expected to be killed as time
    goes by.

87
Delays
  • In Beslan, Moscow Movie Theater, and Mumbai, each
    took 3 days to resolve.
  • On the third day, police/military attacked the
    stronghold
  • Coincidence or not?

88
Initial Responders
  • Can arrive and form 4-5 man Teams using Active
    Shooter tactics they have learned
  • Communicate with supervisors their location and
    manpower.
  • Can expect Teams to act individually at first
    without coordination. Wont have time to set up
    Command Post and wait for instructions.

89
Initial Response
  • Can expect police casualties
  • May have to perform rescues for trapped officers
    or staff. Decision will have to be made by
    responders as they see fit.
  • Must ignore injured civilians

90
Initial Response
  • Be aware of women terrorist who have bombs on
    them. Usually have two switches, one for them and
    a remote for the handler.
  • DONT STAND BY A DEAD TERRORIST WEARING AN
    EXPLOSIVE BELT!!!!

91
Attack or Hold?
  • If allowed to continue, the terrorist will keep
    killing more and more people, and will likely
    barricade in a stronghold, where an assault will
    be difficult, if not deadly.
  • Do officers have the authority to press the
    attack themselves?

92
Attack or Hold
  • Is it wise to attack given the circumstances?
  • Will you become more casualties or do you have a
    good chance to succeed?
  • Can you withdraw if needed?
  • Can you kill a few at a time at a distance?
  • Look for booby-traps
  • HOW MUCH AMMO DO YOU HAVE?

93
Preparedness

94
Firepower
  • Think about capturing terrorist weapons when you
    come across them.
  • Take ammo/magazines from dead terrorist to
    supplement your own firepower.
  • Take injured officers firearms as well.
  • Can you operate the terrorists weapons(AK-47s,
    SKS, RPGs???)

95
Firepower
  • Sidearms (most officers carry 3 magazines
  • Shotguns (buckshot and Slugs)-Department shotguns
    hold 4 in the tube, 1 in the chamber, and 6 on
    the side saddle
  • Rifles-Minimum requirements are three magazines.
  • Ammo management will be crucial to your survival.
  • Will it be enough??

96
Attack or Hold?
  • If attacked quickly, the terrorist will have less
    time to develop their stronghold and set
    booby-traps.
  • No matter what, people are going to die. It boils
    down to casualty mitigation How many more people
    will die if we hold position?

97
Attack or Hold
  • How many can be saved if the attack is pressed?

98
Military Response
  • Military response will be hours away.
  • Nellis AFB will be limited. Likely cant bomb
    locations or strafe with 20-30mm cannon.
  • Federal Response hours away as well (FBI)

99
Response
  • Local police agencies will have to take initial
    action.
  • Coordination will be non-existent at first.
  • Time will be wasted as ICS/NIMS command structure
    is established.

100
Response Tactics
  • Cross and Rolls
  • Dynamic or Deliberate searching?
  • Long gun coverage?
  • Communicate with someone as to where your team
    is. Try to find out where others are.

101
Response Tactics
  • Night Vision Capability?
  • Use of Stun Grenades to flush out Terrorists or
    cover your movement
  • CS/OC Irritants?
  • Multi-Blast devices to keep terrorists head down
    while moving.
  • Level IV Plates available??
  • Protective Helmets?

102
Terrorist Mindsets
  • They are willing to die
  • They will have no mercy
  • They may be on drugs for courage
  • They believe that they will be rewarded
  • They want to kill as many people as possible
  • They want press coverage

103
Terrorist Mindsets
  • They will be ruthless
  • They will look for the stronger hostages first
    and kill them.
  • They have no respect for children
  • They will torture hostages
  • They may rig themselves with explosives

104
Officer Mindset
  • Must have will to win
  • Must be able to think clearly
  • Must be able to develop tactics on the fly
  • Must be able to go by injured civilians
  • Must focus on what needs to be done
  • Must know the terrorists have to be stopped.

105
Will this be you?

106
Or will this be you?
107


108
In Harms Way
  • Officers MUST be able to put themselves in harms
    way.
  • Supervisors MUST be able to put their officers in
    harms way.
  • Supervisors should know who they can put into the
    fight and who they cannot.

109
  • People will die.
  • Officers will likely die

110
Questions
  • The questions are
  • How many dont have to die?
  • How many can we save?
  • The storm is growing Are we prepared?

111
Lest we forget

112

113
The only thing necessary for the triumph of
evil is for good men to do nothing."


114

115
  • People sleep peaceably in their beds at night
    only because rough men stand ready to do violence
    on their behalf.
  • -George Orwell-

116
  • The Community will ask for a few officers to
    protect it. Those few officers will bring the
    courage of the whole Department to defend it.

117
Biblio
  • Numerous Associated Press Articles
  • Wikipedia
  • Pratt, Larry Lesson Learned from Beslan School
    Massacre September 10, 2004
  • Badkhen, Anna Russia Ends Theater Siege, San
    Francisco Chronicle October 26th, 2002
  • National Tactical Officers Association

118
Bibliography
  • Al Queda Training Manual
  • LA County Sheriffs Dept September 2004

119
  • Radical muslims enjoy blowing themselves up, and
    we enjoy blowing them up. You'd think we'd get
    along better...
  • -Unknown-
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