Risk, Reasonableness, and Rationality

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• Risk, Reasonableness, and Rationality
• Robin Gregory
• Decision Research, University of Victoria and UBC
• Office address Galiano Island, B.C. Canada
• Tel [phone]
• E-mail rgregory_at_interchange.ubc.ca
• Presentation to Risk Rationality Conference
• Queens College, Cambridge
• March 29-31, 2007

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Risk, Reasonableness, and Rationality

• Introduction Rationality vs. reasonableness
• Public engagement Structured decision making
• Example 1 Treating interface fires
• Example 2 Facing taboo trade-offs
• Example 3 Recognizing invisible values
• Discussion What should be done?

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Risk, Reasonableness, and Rationality
Introduction

• Management of risks is a central concern of
  society
• Highly skilled people risk managers,
  scientists, elected officials view their job as
  helping citizens to make / support more rational
  choices across competing risk-reduction
  mitigation possibilities.
• In 1970s, work of Paul Slovic, Sarah
  Lichtenstein, Baruch Fishchhoff my Decision
  Research colleagues -- instrumental in initiating
  a dialogue about the standard of rationality that
  guides peoples perceptions of risk.
• Expanded set of factors considered as
  contributors to risk voluntariness of exposure,
  familiarity, dread.

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Risk, Reasonableness, and Rationality
Introduction

• How might rational risk choices be defined?
• Ignoring philosophical debates, I suggest three
  criteria
• Concern for risk management is higher among those
  experiencing adverse consequences
• People think carefully about consequential risk
  topics and seek out information to become better
  informed
• The factual base for estimating risk impacts is
  repeatable and reflects observations based in
  good science
• In my experience, these minimum criteria are
  repeatedly violated. What does this mean?
• People are irrational - no
• There are other standards besides rationality -
  yes
• Risk managers and policies need to reflect more
  than just rational / cognitive responses to risk
  - yes

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Risk and rationality Introduction

• In this talk, I will focus on public engagement
  as input to risk managers and decision makers
• Context
• Risk problems involving multiple dimensions
  economic, social, environmental, cultural, health
  safety
• Participants
• Diverse stakeholders (public, government,
  industry, academics, interest groups, indigenous
  populations)
• Management dilemma
• Increases on one dimension (protection of
  biodiversity, fewer illnesses ) mean decreases on
  another (fewer jobs, higher costs)

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Risk and rationality Introduction to Structured
Decision Making

• One useful approach for public engagement in risk
  management Structured decision making
• Based in insights from decision analysis and
  behavioral decision theory
• Widely used in stakeholder deliberations when
  problems are complex and involve tough choices
  across multiple dimensions of value
• Goal is insight for decision makers show pros
  and cons of risk management alternatives

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Steps in a structured decision making approach
Define Problem
Define Issues, Objectives Measures
Develop Alternatives
Estimate Consequences
Make Trade-Offs and Select
Implement and Monitor
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Terminology

• Objectives
• The things that matter in the decision
• Performance Measures (or attributes)
• The specific information used to report the
  consequences of the alternatives on the
  objectives
• Alternatives (or options)
• The means of achieving the objectives
• Trade-offs (or balancing across objectives)
• Differences in performance among objectives the
  key to understanding tough choices that decision
  makers have to make
• Constructed preferences
• The recognition that for many policy options, we
  dont really know what the components are or how
  we feel. So we construct our situation-dependent
  preferences in relation to cues.

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Example Use of SDM to help address management of
Cultus Lake sockeye (with G. Long, Compass
Resource Mgt)

• Worked with multi-stakeholder committee (approx.
  20 people) over 1 month period (April, 2006)
  but issues contentious for over a decade!
• Key risk tradeoff
• Environmental protection (of endangered stocks)
  vs. Economic (commercial fishing revenues)
• Multiple interests
• High visibility species, High importance to
  Conservation (COSEWIC listed) Commercial fishers,
  and First Nations
• Data quality variable (and controversial)
• Multiple management options (exploitation rate,
  captive breeding, predator removal) but
  uncertainty about consequences of actions

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SDM Cultus Sub-committeeObjectives Performance
Measures

• Sockeye conservation
• Probability of meeting Recovery Plan objectives 1
  and 2
• Returns in years 2010 and average of 2016-19
• Probability of extirpation by 2036
• Enhanced in 2010 and average of 2016-19
• Costs
• Total costs over 12 years, levelized
• No cost allocation attempted
• Catch
• Traditional commercial catch
• Commercial TAC available upstream of Vedder
• Total First Nations FSC
• Jobs
• Employment opportunities directly related to
  enhancement and freshwater projects

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SDM Cultus Sub-committeeAlternatives

• Alternatives created by assembling blocks of
  options
• Cultus Exploitation Rate
• Lates (Upstream) Exploitation Rate
• Enhancement options
• Freshwater projects options
• (Note these included those factors considered
  to be most important fine tuning to occur at a
  later time)
• Make use of strategy tables to encourage creative
  thinking. Two examples

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Building Alternatives A Strategy Table
Alternative 1 Status Quo 2005
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Building Alternatives A Strategy Table
Alternative 6 Spread the Pain 2
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SDM Cultus Sub-committeeAlternatives

• Exploration of alternatives through iterative SDM
  process creation, analysis, elimination
• Step 1
• created 6 alternatives
• Step 2
• Reviewed these 6 and created 3 more
• Step 3
• reviewed all 9, eliminated 6 because they were
  dominated (others the same or better on objs)
• agreed on several key components for all altsf
• Focused on one, favoured alternative and created
  6 new simpler variations
• Use of VISTA (G. Long) Displays objectives
  alternatives in consequence matrices,
  highlighting tradeoffs (pros and cons)

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SDM Cultus Sub-committeeTrade-Off Analysis
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Cultus Lake SDM trade-off analysis

• Participants examined how well different
  alternatives satisfied the objectives
• Recognition that some objectives are easily
  cheaply met common sense to retain these
  low-hanging fruit in all alternatives
• Recognition of need to simplify the decision
  problem through elimination of relevant
  objectives and alternatives. Do this via
  exploration of
• Redundancy where performance measures do not
  vary across alternatives
• Dominance where one alternative is better than
  or equal to all (or, by collective agreement,
  nearly all) aspects of another

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SDM Cultus Sub-committeeTrade-Off Analysis

• Three alternatives remained at the end of this
  process

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Establish/communicate areas of agreement and
disagreement

• One alternative favoured by group (8)
• Agreement on common features
• Full predator-removal program
• Full habitat-improvement program
• Employ habitat stewardship coordinator
• Bound deliberate on remaining issues
• Degree of enhancement (100-150k)
• Exploitation rate (20 - 40)
• Provide information on areas of agreement and
  disagreement to decision makers, also provide
  process recommendations
• Current status discussions continuing !!!

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Risk and rationality SDM and insights

• SDM / risk engagement assumes there is a problem
  to be addressed, that it can be characterized in
  terms of values and measurable attributes, and
  that peoples preferences for management options
  will reflect their values.
• New research in behavioral decision making
  suggests otherwise
• The role of emotions (pre-cognitive) (Damasio
  Loewenstein Hsee)
• The importance of affect (judgements of good and
  bad) (Slovic Peters)
• The role of judgemental heuristics (Kahenman
  Tversky, Thaler Knetsch)

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Risk v. reasonableness Role of affect

• Four roles of affect (Peters, 2006)
• As Information feelings act as information to
  guide the judgment or decision process
• As a spotlight focusing us on different
  information (e.g., numerical cues)
• As motivator we can take action or devote more
  attention to aspects of tasks
• As common currency facilitates the comparison of
  unlike options
• Affect is thus an active component in the
  construction of preferences
• conditions more delayed cognitive responses
• works in parallel with cognition

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Rationality v. reasonableness Examples

• This tension between affect and cognition is a
  challenge for decision aiding approaches that
  seek to assist in the development of risk
  policies through public engagement (prescriptive)
• Three examples
• Interface fires (public engagement) - Canada
• Facing taboo choices (experimental) US
• Recognizing invisible values (NSF, science and
  local / aboriginal knowledge) Canada, US,
  Thailand, New Zealand

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Example 1 Interface forest fires -- the role of
emotions (with Joe Arvai)

• Context
• public groups and surveys in aftermath of severe
  forest fires in western Canada
• Goal
• aid risk managers in making fire management
  decisions (fuels, speed bumps, evacuation
  plans, replanting, harvest timing, equipment)
• Analysis
• starting point was structured dialogue with
  stakeholders, asking What do you think are key
  sources of risk? What might be done to reduce
  risks?

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Risk and rationality Interface fires

• Factual result
• Most high risk areas remain so, even after
  burning. In some cases, risks increase.
• Expected finding Wake-up call
• people in high-risk fire areas, having already
  experienced losses, will seek added protection
  risk reduction (e.g., US after 9/11)
• Actual result Letdown
• people in high-risk areas feel safer the
  low-probability event already has happened, and
  lightning doesnt strike twice in the same
  place.
• Source Arvai, Gregory et al. 2006. Letdowns,
  wake-up calls, and constructed preferences
  Peoples responses to wildfire risks. Journal of
  Forestry 104 173-181.

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Risk and rationality Interface fires

• Post exposure wake-up call vs. post-exposure
  letdown

SURVEY ITEM Kelowna Kelowna Vernon Vernon P
SURVEY ITEM X SE X SE P
1. Calm vs. Upset (1very upset, 7very calm) 2.80 0.16 2.62 0.26 ns
2. Safe vs. At Risk (1very much at risk, 7very safe) 3.58 0.25 2.62 0.30 0.05
3. Confident vs., Unconfident (1not at all confident, 7very confident) 3.51 0.22 2.86 0.27 0.05
4. Optimistic vs. Pessimistic (1very pessimistic, 7very optimistic) 5.67 0.21 4.08 0.32 lt0.0001
5. At Ease vs. Worried (1very worried, 7very at ease) 3.80 0.24 2.68 0.22 0.001
6. Level of Concern about Future Fires (1low, 7extreme) 5.51 0.19 6.16 0.19 0.05
7. Level of Motivation (1low, 7high) 4.89 0.21 6.11 0.20 lt0.0001
Homeowners self-ratings of affect (items 1-5
midpoint neutral in all cases), and levels of
concern and motivation in an exposed (Kelowna)
and unexposed community (Vernon). Responses were
provided on seven-point Likert scales. Comparisons
between the two samples were made using a
2-sample t-test.
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Risk and Rationality Interface Fires

• Practical implications of affective response
• Little demand for risk mitigation in many
  high-risk communities people feel more safe
  than they really are
• Homeowners in high-risk areas not willing to
  undertake risk mitigation not at threshold of
  risk identification
• High level of trust (unfounded) in protection
  efforts
• Emphasis on context history-specific
  construction of preferences for management
  actions what? and who?

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Example 2 Facing taboo choices (with J. Irwin
and S. Lichtenstein)

• Context
• some decision situations are so difficult or
  repugnant that people dislike or refuse to make a
  choice.
• Literature refers to these as taboo choices
  (Tetlock), protected values (Baron), or
  protest votes (CVM)
• From standpoint of SDM / DA, its important to
  distinguish choices that are difficult or
  confusing provide help? -- from those that
  truly are taboo respect (and leave alone?).
• Source S. Lichtenstein, R. Gregory, J. Irwin.
  Whats Bad is Easy Taboo Values, Affect, and
  Cognition. Ms. under editorial review.

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Risk and rationality facing taboo choices as
part of public engagement

• Examples
• Do not eat foods containing modified genes
• Do not make choices that will increase risks to
  ones own children
• Do not jail citizens on basis of DNA profiling
• Characteristics of such values
• Quantity insensitivity 10 deaths 20
• Agent relativity it matters who makes the TO
• Moral obligation a social, as well as personal,
  reference (effects beyond the individual)

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Risk and rationality Taboo choices

• Study goals
• distinguish mere disapproval from protest and
  from taboo values
• understand reasons for disapproval
• develop rules for public engagement when to
  probe or educate vs. when to leave alone
• Study design
• 22 brief scenarios, covering range of issues. Ex
• Cut old-growth trees to assist in development of
  new drugs
• Transplant organs from patients in deep coma to
  help otherwise terminal patients.
• 16 reasons, both affective (this plan disgusts
  me) and cognitive (this plan is complex)

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Risk and rationality Taboo choices

• Note U-shape of figure scenarios judged most
  difficult to think about are intermediate in
  affect, whereas scenarios judged lowest and
  highest in affect are judged easy to think about.
  

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Risk and rationality Taboo choices

• The worst and the best
• scenarios are the
• easiest to think about.
• Thus it may be difficult
• to get people to accept
• assistance in thinking
• through tough decisions
• Whats bad is easy!
• Leads to polarization as part of engagement.

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Example 3 Recognizing invisible values (with L.
Failing, M. Harstone, N Turner, T. Satterfield)

• Risk management choices should reflect the best
  available knowledge few would disagree
• But in the context of public deliberations about
  risks, What does this mean?
• Typically, three sources of knowledge
• Science (technical)
• Community (local)
• Aboriginal (indigenous First Nations / First
  Peoples)
• Source L. Failing, R. Gregory, M. Harstone.
  Integrating Science and Local Knowledge in
  Environmental Risk Management A Decision-Focused
  Approach. Ecological Economics. (In press)

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Recognizing invisible values the limitations
of science

• Typical link is from knowledge to facts a
  rational approach to identifying risk
  consequences leads to the examination of factual
  evidence.
• But this assumption may be too limiting
• Knowledge of local communities includes concerns
  such as pride, integrity, lifestyle
• Knowledge of Aboriginal communities includes
  spiritual and ceremonial concerns, also impacts
  on ancestors
• Access to knowledge and values remains closed
  until basic level of trust is established

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Recognizing invisible values-- the limitations
of science

• Effective risk management thus must also look to
  values as a source of knowledge. In some cases,
  key impacts may be unobservable by neutral
  participants. Examples
• In Alaska impacts of oil/gas exploration on
  visible walrus populations vs. Great walrus
• In British Columbia, impacts of development on
  grizzly bear populations vs. Spirit bears
• In New Zealand, impacts of GMO foods on Maori
  culture (T. Satterfield)
• In Thailand, impacts of development on spirits
  of forest and on ghosts of historical
  inhabitants

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Invisible values the limitations of science

• Practical implications for risk engagement
• Requires expansion of measures of value in
  assessing risks. Food contamination (GMOs)
  health impacts, also spiritual, ceremonial,
  social relations impacts
• Brings focus to affective and emotional
  considerations worry, shame, fear, reverence
• Brings focus to constructed preferences / TOs
• Leads to questions about tradeoffs cultural
  survival, transmission of knowledge across
  generations
• Leads to questions about elicitation how to
  conduct public engagement with Elders

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Rationality v. Reasonableness in Risk Management
What should be done?

• Issues of fact are typically resolvable
• new studies, more deliberation, better models
• Issues of value are usually not resolvable
• no reason to expect that values will align
• Usual tools rational, decompositional,
  analytical may not work well in contexts where
  emotions and culture underlie risk exposure and
  risk management choices
• This leaves those of us working on public
  engagement in risk management with several
  (wonderful perplexing) challenges

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Challenge 1 Developing useful performance
measures / attributes

• Best measures of risk are natural, easily
  understood e.g. lives, dollars, kilometers. But
  often need to use case-specific constructed
  measures
• ecological health
• Inter-generational knowledge transmission
• degree of cultural or lifestyle change
• worry or shame or fear
• How can different measures best be used to
  capture dimensions of value without overstepping
  limitations of analysis (compartmentalization)?
• What are criteria for distinguishing successful
  from inappropriate measures / attributes?

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Challenge 2 Public engagement in highly
affective situations

• Rational risk management may make sense to
  experts but not to stakeholders
• dont want too little risk reduction initiatives
  overturned by post-exposure letdown
• dont want too much risk reduction initiatives
  inflated by affective worry or fear
• Reasonable suggestions
• Employ affect in risk communication (markers)
• Use non-traditional measures of risk
• Use risk language of local participants
• Address affective issues as prelude to risk
  reduction
• Recognize influence of affect on other judgements
  (e.g., assessment of probabilities
  consequences)

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Challenge 3 Applying RA or SDM techniques in
other cultures

• Engagement need to reflect culturally
  reasonable tools of analysis stories,
  qualitative analyses, narrative
• Engagement needs to be flexible
• Where cultural worldviews are more holistic
• Where spiritual values are more important
• Where trust in outside experts is missing
• Where key tradeoffs include invisible beings
• Where stakeholder expression of values is unusual
  (taboo to speak to outsiders)
• Where key populations are marginalized or
  unapproachable (thus speaking out is unsafe)

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Risk, Rationality and Reasonableness Conclusions

• Reasonable risk tradeoffs are informed by both
  rationality and emotion / affect
• Preferences for risk management options will be
  informed by culture and values as well as by
  factual knowledge science plus community/local
  knowledge
• Structured engagement methods need to work with
  expanded set of concerns and make use of
  constructed attributes / measures to incorporate
  diverse values
• Successful public engagement needs to recognize
  constructed nature of preferences
• Successful facilitators need to adapt tools
  (probability assessments with Elders?) and learn
  new ways to probe or question (stories?
  narrative? walks?)
• Establishment of trust may be precursor to
  actions