Civilian Control or Military Rule?

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Civilian Control or Military Rule?

• The Future of Civil-Military Relations

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I. Evolution of Civil-Military Relations

• Newburgh Conspiracy (1783) Washingtons non-coup
• Origins fiscal crisis under Articles of
  Confederation
• Public resents pension obligations
• Officer clique protests to Congress, warns of
  fatal effects if demands not met
• Disenchanted veterans manipulated by Federalists
  (Hamilton, advocates of federal taxation) threat
  of coup used to justify federal expansion

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5. The Conspiracy

• Gates mobilizes support for mutiny (refusal to
  disband, threat of coup)
• Gates Plan Co-opt or eliminate Washington, take
  control of government
• Federalists warn Washington of plot (Federalist
  Plan Unsuccessful uprising to emphasize threat)

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6. Washingtons Choice

• March 1783 Gates circulates letter urging
  officers to meet (contrary to orders) If you
  have sense enough to discover and spirit to
  oppose tyranny, whatever garb it may assume,
  awake to your situation. If the present moment be
  lost, your threats hereafter will be as empty as
  your entreaties now. Appeal from the justice to
  the fears of government, and suspect the man who
  would advise to longer forbearance
• Washington takes control, re-schedules meeting
  (instead of forbidding it)

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Washington Stops the Coup

• Gentlemen, you will permit me to put on my
  spectacles, for I have not only grown gray but
  almost blind in the service of my country.
• Washington uses own prestige to shame pro-coup
  officers, gains expressions of loyalty
• Federalist plot works Fearful Congress passes
  taxation measures

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7. Key Points to Remember

1. Civilians used military against civilian enemies
   (very common path to coups)
2. Absence of junior-senior officer split allowed
   Washington to assume control
3. Washington had other opportunities for leadership
   (see textbook on Constitutional Convention)

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B. The Civil War

• The onset of rebellion
• The political logic of secession an outnumbered
  South depends on expansion of slavery to preserve
  parity in the Senate
• Lincoln elected ? secession

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c. Buchanan doesnothing

• Cabinet members shift weapons from Northern to
  Southern arsenals so that they might be more
  easily seized by secessionists
• Buchanan doesnt negotiate, mobilize, or even try
  to persuade
• Buchanans Secretary of War becomes Confederate
  general (John B. Floyd)

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2. Treason by American officers?

• Treason against the United States, shall consist
  only in levying war against them, or in adhering
  to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.
• 313 of 1108 (32) US Army officers join the
  Confederate Army
• Major Twiggs (pro-South) surrenders 20 of the US
  Army to Texas before secession!
• Civilian control maintained Confederate
  Constitution similar to US Constitution
• Confederate armies surrender against civilian
  orders (Jefferson Davis insists on continued war)

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3. The North Militarized Politics

1. Lincoln vs. McClellan open campaigning for
   soldiers loyalties (compare to Zachary Taylors
   insistence on non-voting)
2. Hookers proposed dictatorship Lincoln
   replies I have heard, in such way as to believe
   it, of your recently saying that both the Army
   and the Government needed a Dictator. Of course
   it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I
   have given you the command. Only those generals
   who gain success can set up dictators. What I now
   ask of you is military success, and I will risk
   the dictatorship.
3. Military failures undermine prestige of
   anti-civilian generals Grant refuses to run
   against Lincoln or replace him as Republican
   nominee

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4. Reconstruction and Posse Comitatus

• Military rule during Reconstruction
• End of Reconstruction Posse Comitatus Act. Goal
  prevent Army from supervising Southern
  elections
• Whoever, except in cases and under
  circumstances expressly authorized by the
  Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses
  any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse
  comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall
  be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
  than two years, or both

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C. Truman and MacArthur

• US suffers defeats when China intervenes in
  Korean War
• MacArthur demands war with China
• Truman tells him to shut up
• MacArthur demands war with China and then
  issues his own ultimatum to China!
• Truman fires MacArthur
• Unpopular decision Congressional hearings,
  threat of impeachment
• MacArthur loses support during hearings,
  Eisenhower becomes Republican nominee in 1952

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D. Cold War Realities

• Strong military is institutionalized becomes
  interest group vying for government funds
• Predelegation
• Begins in 1957, continues through end of Cold War
  (and beyond?)
• US Commanders given authority to order
  retaliatory nuclear attacks if President
  unreachable (also given the unlock codes)

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3. Military resistance to nuclear warfighting
LNOs

1. Problem US nuclear war plan (SIOP) had no
   contingency calling for less than a few hundred
   nuclear weapons
2. Eisenhower demands revisions to allow use of
   single weapons for political purposes (limited
   retaliation, response to conventional war)
3. So does Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter,
   Reagan.yet SIOP never updated to include LNOs

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4. Circumvention of civilian control The Air
Force and the unlock codes

• Air Force forced to install locks (PALs) on
  nuclear weapons during 1960s.
• PALs require secret code to physically enable
  weapon. Even if missile launched, warhead wont
  detonate without code. Prevents unauthorized use
  of nuclear weapons.
• Air Force quietly sets code to 00000000 and
  tells just about everyone involved in the launch
  process!
• 1977 Congressional hearings lead Air Force to
  finally pick a new code

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E. 1986 Goldwater-Nichols

• Origins
• Failed/difficult joint operations of 1970s-1980s
  Congressional pressure for interservice unity
• Joint Chiefs of Staff (commanders of the
  services) oppose reorganization
• Nearly five years of lobbying and horse-trading
  follow
• Key provision for our purposes Chairman of Joint
  Chiefs of Staff established as central military
  advisor to President
• Effects
• Notable reduction in inter-service rivalry
• Military now speaks with one voice more
  difficult for civilians to oppose

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F. Conclusions

• Coup risk has usually been low
• Few military officers ever had opportunity to
  launch coup
• Those that had opportunity refused -- and later
  became President
• Pressure for coup generally emanates from
  civilians seeking to counter political enemies
• Bureaucratic resistance has increased much more
  difficult for President and Secretary of Defense
  to ensure implementation

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II. The Military Learns to Play Politics A.
Military Opposition to Clinton

• Origins
• Characteristics of the President avoided Vietnam
  service, did drugs, expressed loathing for
  military service in 1969 letter, protested
  Vietnam War
• Increasing partisanship in military (probably due
  to end of conscription) military has shifted
  Republican since 1970s (about 21 in general, up
  to 91 among elite officers)

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c. Changing of the guard the post-Vietnam
generation
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d. The Gays in the Military Controversy

• Clinton promises to allow openly gay people to
  serve in the US Armed forces
• Widespread military opposition prevents policy
  implementation
• Colin Powell (Chairman of JCS) denounces policy
  in Congressional hearings
• Two Marine officers publish editorial in
  Washington Post warning that unless JCS keeps
  ban, it risks losing the loyalty of junior
  officers. Notes that a soldier swears
  allegiance to the Constitution, not to the
  Commander-in-Chief
• Congress responds to military lobbying by
  codifying ban as law, preventing future
  Presidents from overturning it

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2. Symptoms Repeated insubordination

• Clintons first visit to aircraft carrier marked
  by open mockery to reporters by both enlisted
  personnel and officers
• Air Force Major Gen. Harold Campbell forced to
  resign after he called President Clinton a
  "gay-loving, draft-dodging, pot-smoking,
  womanizing Commander-in-Chief
• JCS openly opposes policies of Defense Secretary
  Les Aspin in 1993 ? repeated leaks to press by
  military officers ? Clinton forces Aspin to
  resign
• Air Force chief of staff retires early
  (unprecedented), criticizes Clinton

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B. Military Criticism of Rumsfeld

• Rumsfeld tries to implement Revolution in
  Military Affairs services oppose cuts in
  weapons systems
• Rumsfeld attacks generals who insist occupation
  of Iraq will require more than 100,000 troops
• Retired generals begin to criticize Rumsfeld
• Democrats find many to sign anti-Rumsfeld
  statements
• Republicans respond with pro-Rumsfeld generals of
  their own
• Note Civilian parties are competing for the
  endorsement of the military!

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C. Procurement The Iron Triangle

• Congress, the Pentagon, and Defense Contractors

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1. Campaign Cash Defense Sector
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2. Contracts and Congress

1. Pentagon and defense contractors spread
   sub-contract work to key districts/states
2. Programs often use many more contractors/locations
   than required, inflating costs (but maximizing
   political survivability)

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3. The Follow-On Imperative

• New weapons systems create more new weapons
  systems need to replace obsolete/aging weapons
• Mission specialization increases number of
  weapons systems each specialized version
  requires different follow-on system

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4. Example The F-22 Raptor

• a. Overview
• Planned during Cold War to defeat future Soviet
  fighters
• Estimated cost 68 billion for 750 fighters
  (initial estimate) ? now down to 339 fighters
  at the same price
• 1999 House tries to kill F-22
• All six members of JCS publicly condemn decision
• Congress discovers F-22 has 1000 subcontractors
  in 42 states!

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b. Campaign Cash Lockheed-Martin
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c. Follow-On Imperative The F-22

• Air Force releases study showing F-15 is
  ineffective (F-22 is follow-on system)
• Air Force rejects Joint Strike Fighter as
  alternative. Rationale JSF is to replace F-16,
  not F-15 (different follow-on system)

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d. Outcome F-22 Preserved

• Clinton threatens to veto cuts to F-22
• House-Senate conference removes provision
• Follow-up
• F-22 still in FY2007 budget, despite repeated
  criticism by Rumsfeld
• 65 billion now buys only 183 planes
• 2006 GAO recommends against further spending

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5. More examples FY2006 Budget

• Secretary of Navy proposes building new destroyer
  in one shipyard instead of two in MS and ME
  (saves 300 million)
• MS, ME Senators place hold on Secretarys
  promotion to deputy defense secretary
• ME Senator attaches rider to defense bill in
  Armed Services Committee prohibiting
  consolidation of production
• Rumsfeld suggests cutting major conventional
  systems for 5th year in a row -- effort is
  unsuccessful. Services propose cutting personnel
  to pay for new systems (the Washington Monument
  ploy)

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6. Does the Iron Triangle threaten civilian
control?

1. Executive control decreased Evidence includes
   Carters naval strategy and resistance to
   Clinton/Rumsfeld
2. Congressional control increased Unhappy
   commanders lobby Congress to undo DoD decisions
3. Is divided control over military decisions good
   or bad for civilian control?

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D. Conclusions

• Military has become politicized
• Permanent standing army is large enough to be
  economically important
• Rank-and-file have recently become much more
  partisan (shift away from conscription?)
• Military has learned to protect interests within
  political system (organized lobbying)
• Civilians attempt to manipulate military for
  partisan advantage
• Tradition of deference has changed imagine
  generals publicly criticizing Lend-Lease or
  Trumans integration of the Army

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III. The Risk of a Coup

• Risk factors
• Political institutions Dominant chief executive
• Political conditions
• Parochialism Parties represent closed groups
• Polarization Politics is all-or-nothing
  struggle, losers are punished
• Mobilization Parties mobilize followers for
  extra-legal collective action
• History Recent coups
• Economics Low GDP, negative growth, rents as
  large of economy

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5. Military characteristics

1. Partisanship Military prefers one party to
   others
2. Civil-military values gap Civilians seen as
   corrupt and immoral
3. Perceived effectiveness of military vs. civilian
   institutions

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B. Evaluating the Risk to the US

1. Political institutions strong executive
   increases coup risk
2. Political conditions none of the risk factors
   apply
3. History No
4. Economics No

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5. Military characteristics

• Partisanship High and growing
• Civil-military values gap?
• Gap is smallest on foreign/defense policy
  except budget decisions
• Gap is largest on budget decisions and social
  policy

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Military influence through later office-holding?
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5. Military characteristics

• Partisanship High and growing
• Civil-military values gap?
• Gap is smallest on foreign/defense policy
  except budget decisions
• Gap is largest on budget decisions and social
  policy
• Military perceived as more effective than
  civilians?

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May 2006
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C. Status Respect for civilian control high
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D. Conclusions

1. Civil-military relations have deteriorated
2. Strong executive increases vulnerability
3. Nearly every other factor suggests very low coup
   risk
4. Coup unlikely without change in
   political-economic conditions (economic collapse,
   open persecution of political opponents by ruling
   party, etc)
5. Lesson American political culture and economic
   strength make our institutions stronger than they
   should be (on paper).